Entrepreneurs and morals by Özcan, Gül Berna
Islam, Law and Identity
The essays brought together in Islam, Law and Identity are the product of a 
series of interdisciplinary workshops that brought together scholars from a 
plethora of countries. Funded by the British Academy the workshops convened 
over a period of two years in London, Cairo and Izmir. The workshops and 
the ensuing papers focus on recent debates about the nature of sacred and 
secular law and most engage case studies from specific countries including 
Egypt, Israel, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Pakistan and the UK. Islam, Law and 
Identity also addresses broader and over-arching concerns about relationships 
between religion, human rights, law and modernity. Drawing on a variety 
of theoretical and empirical approaches, the collection presents law as central 
to the complex ways in which different Muslim communities and institutions 
create and re-create their identities around inherently ambiguous symbols 
of faith. From their different perspectives, the essays argue that there is no 
essential conflict between secular law and Shari’a, but various different 
articulations of the sacred and the secular. Islam, Law and Identity explores a 
more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the tensions that animate 
such terms as Shari’a law, modernity and secularization.
Marinos Diamantides is Reader in Law at Birkbeck College, University of 
London where he teaches constitutional law and theory. He has published 
extensively on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
Adam Gearey is a Reader in Law at Birkbeck College. His publications 
include Critical Jurisprudence, authored with Costas Douzinas. He is presently 
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Introduction
Politics, theology sovereignty
Marinos Diamantides and Adam Gearey
I. Secularism, religious faith and state law
This collection invites the reader to turn from the current obsession with 
the role of Islam in the modern world, and rethink the relationship between 
law, faith and power; one of the most pressing questions that we presently 
face. We cannot hope to come to any sensible conclusions if we address this 
problem from the exclusive standpoint of a European notion of history where 
secularism is at once defined too narrowly and too broadly. Thus, this col-
lection must be seen as intentionally failing to reach general conclusions about 
‘Islam, identity and law’. It is a contribution to a much broader debate about 
monotheism, state law and identity formation; and one that is committed 
to examining the agon between the old and the new, between secularising 
and religious forces. There are no given or necessary outcomes – only the 
possibilities of transformation, mutation.
The general conclusions that can be drawn would appear to be self-evident 
to most educated readers; this agon has not stopped with the emergence of 
European secular states; nor is there any such thing as a monolithic Islam 
with a singular substantive ‘Islamic law’ that regulates Muslim social life 
from Dakar to Luton and from Mecca to Utrecht. Rather, there are different 
versions of ‘Islamic laws’ built around a small Qura’nic normative core; a 
core that is given different interpretations in those diverse cultural and 
historical contexts where people look to texts for guidance. There are diverse 
ways in which the Muslim-majority political communities negotiate and 
articulate their belonging to different communities. Hence it is misleading to 
suggest that there is something essentially incompatible between modernity, 
human rights and Islamic religion. Accordingly this collection has no reason to 
be fixated on fundamentalist Islamism and its opponents. Instead, it addresses 
those areas of hybridity and overlap, where new forms emerge, such as the 
construction of ‘minority fiqh’ or, indeed, where social forces assert old 
patterns against the pressures of historical change. Underlying this theme is 
a concern with the different possible patterns of identity and recognition in 
which these conflicts and compromises can be theorised.
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2 Islam, law and identity
It is worth thinking about why the above are not self-evident in the wider 
debate about Islam and the modern world. We are trapped by certain as-
sumptions, and cannot appreciate the development of new patterns of being 
and thinking. For instance, the history taught to schoolchildren across Europe 
records the gradual emergence of the secular nation-state as part of the pre-
vailing of peace backed by practical reason in the aftermath of murderous 
‘wars of religion’. In this last phrase lie concealed two problematic and un-
explored ideas that weigh heavily on debates around identity and religion. 
The preposition ‘of’ points to irrational, murderous fanaticism as a necessary 
feature of religious faith per se, independently from theological, political and 
juridical context. This should not be left unchallenged. One must consider 
the historically more plausible counter-thesis that the international and inter-
necine conflicts of early European modernity
ought to be remembered as the first wars of the modern nation-state 
whose principal purpose was to establish the supremacy of secular author-
ity over every rival power, most especially the power of the church  .  .  .  Far 
from the secular nation-state rescuing Western humanity from the chaos 
and butchery of sectarian strife, those wars were the birth pangs of the 
modern state and its limitless license to murder. And religious alliances, 
and hatreds were used by regional princes for conflicts whose causes, 
effects, and alliances had very little to do with faith or confessional loy-
alties.  .  .  .  Early modernity was the age  .  .  .  of the great political struggle 
of the independent nation-state to emancipate itself from all the religious, 
legal, moral, and, sacramental bonds that had ever in any way confined 
or constrained its total sovereignty over its subjects.  .  .  .  The first of the 
early modern “religious” wars in Europe were waged by the Habsburg 
Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to shore up his power in his various 
demesnes: wars that ended in 1555 with the Peace of Augsburg, which 
established in imperial law the principle that the faith of a people would 
be determined by its prince.
 (Bentley-Hart, 2009: 88 –90)
The phrase ‘wars of religion’ refers to ‘religion’ in general as if the history 
of Western European Christianity synecdochically covers all religions and as 
if the term ‘religion’ sufficiently encompasses practices as diverse as voodoo, 
meditation and participation in the Eucharist. Although evidently wrong 
this rhetoric operates as a licence to participate in debates over the proper role 
of ‘any religion’ in organised social life within contemporary modern nation-
states. What is thus lost is the particularity of the history of interaction of 
specifically Abrahamic religions that have, since their inception, challenged 
the power of rulers. Their dogmas alone centred on covenants, which, in pre-
modern Christian Europe, gave rise to the ecclesia of ecclesiastical states. Later, in 
the early modern period, these ideas were transformed to become the notion 
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Introduction 3
of a ‘sacred bond’ between people of a specific region and their prince/king. 
Late modernity saw a further re-working of the sacred bond. It became the 
self-consciously ‘secular’ idea of the social contract.
It is, therefore, important to remember that it was in Europe and the Near 
East – not in pre-colonial Papua New Guinea, Sub-Saharan Africa or Central 
America – that the issue of ‘religious faith’ became so central to politics. 
Moreover, as the essay by Diamantides in this collection highlights, even 
within the three main monotheistic religions the evolution of the initially 
similar relation between state and religious authorities has been distinctly 
different in each case. In pre-Ottoman and pre-colonial Islamic modernity, for 
example, the state never quite managed to marshal the secular ideologies 
of ‘absolute monarchy’ and ‘divine right’ in order to fashion the notion of 
absolute state sovereignty as was the case in Western Europe. There are 
further changes that we should take into account. The post-colonial creation 
of European-style nation-states everywhere and the reactive emergence of 
Islamist and Jewish ultra-nationalist politics suggest that the rhetorical 
collapse of ‘religion’ into the European history of Christian states has become 
so pervasive that it is all too easy to forget that the manner in which we 
discuss the relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘secular’ power is framed by 
Abrahamic and specifically Christian–European ideas and history. It is in the 
context of such oblivion that, when confronted with calls and violent actions 
aimed at establishing ‘Islamic states’ or a purely ‘Jewish state’, Europeans 
tend to relive their history as if it were a universal necessity. The violent, 
modern Islamist ideological take on ‘Islamic jihad’ substitutes for the wars 
of ‘Christianity’ in the collective imagination. Jews and Muslims, it then 
follows, must reform their religions as Europeans did. And yet, it is perhaps 
true that it is not their religions but their states that must be reformed.
As with every other traumatic reliving this represents both a danger and 
an opportunity. The danger is that, in a desperate attempt to preserve what 
security one has found, one ends up confirming one’s preconceptions where 
the ‘other’ features only as a figment of one’s own imagination. For example, 
we often come across the condescending and a-historical ‘lesson’ that Muslims 
‘need their own reformation’. It is as if Islam (and Judaism, too, but here we 
concentrate on the former) needs to be ‘corrected’ by the secularising forces 
that have expressed themselves in European history. Not only is this a partial 
reading of the ongoing dynamics of the Reformation, as Gearey’s essay suggests, 
but it would be historically more accurate to understand that post-colonial 
Muslims are forced to choose between the absolutist and democratic versions 
of divinised European statehood as the best imported version of political 
association or try to come up with something in line with their own tradition 
in which the state never usurped God’s authority.
To elaborate our arguments, we have divided the essays that compose 
this book into two broad, thematic groups. The first group raise a number 
of general points about the relationship between monotheistic faith and 
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4 Islam, law and identity
Christian theology (for there is no such thing as a coherent Jewish or Islamic 
theology) on the one hand, and politics and law on the other hand. This is 
followed by a section that contains essays with a more specific focus on con-
temporary issues. Whilst we did not want to impose any single methodo-
logical frame we feel that there are several points of reference that are 
common to these essays. All of them can be read as pointing to the limits 
of the conventional multiculturalist paradigm that has been used for think-
ing these issues through.1 It is as if the energies of multiculturalism have 
resulted in a more or less workable compromise. If we are to continue exploring 
the challenges of religion and faith, we need a much more complex and 
subtle appreciation of the networks of overlap, agreement and contestation 
between traditions, concepts and ways of thinking.
II. European theologies and the modern reduction 
of the rule of law to mere process
Barshack’s elegant and complex essay appears at the beginning of the collec-
tion to prepare the reader for the task of rethinking the idea of the rule of law 
beyond the grounds of state sovereignty and its location in ‘secular’ liberal 
political thought. Its main anthropological premise is strikingly simple: no 
political community can exist by virtue merely of common interests without 
the constant labour of reference and counter-reference to what is past, dead 
and seemingly inoperative. This is a political task which is performed by 
those who are often seen as a-political; apart from village elders and modern 
historians, it is a task that usually falls to men and women of religion and 
law. We can appreciate that in both pre-modern and modern traditions law, in 
particular, vests in the narrative community of the living and their ancestors. 
Myths of origin suggest that the source of law is ‘projected’ outside of society 
onto the immemorial of custom, history and tradition. This means that 
modern ‘secular’ sovereignty, too, has to be given a constitutional interpret-
ation that continues to communicate with stranger, more antique and more 
obviously ‘mythical’ currents of thought even if these are conventionally 
thought of as ‘superseded’ and debunked.
The continuing purchase of old myths, however, should not be seen as 
licence to let one historical paradigm obscure others. It is of course true that 
the European fabrication of ‘absolute’ state sovereignty (sovereignty without 
reference to anything other than itself ) has now been globalised. But the 
modernity it heralded depended on a peculiar turn not shared by other 
monotheistic cultures and certainly not by non-monotheistic ones. In Europe 
the formal rule of law – law as process rather than content; controlled and 
guaranteed by centralised state apparatuses – replaced the absent sovereign 
1 We discuss multiculturalism in more detail at the end of this introduction.
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Introduction 5
in democratic states, that is, states in which the pretension of the absolute 
monarch to rule ‘with the grace of God’ had become unsustainable. In turn, 
the advent of the state opened the possibility of imagining a political 
community of ‘autonomous individuals’, namely human beings of certain 
characteristics (age, ethnicity, property, education, etc.) who have since been 
required to play, collectively, the role of gods/monarchs unto themselves. 
This new myth of autonomy was a break with the claustrophobia of generally 
cohesive pre-modern European communities in which individuals could 
scarcely be conceived apart from the community.
But one should not deceive oneself that this was a radical and ‘progressive’ 
break with the past. Hobbes’ Leviathan – a seminal early work on secular 
governance – can be read as a mere variation on the ancient Greek ur-myth told 
in the Oresteia: when the sovereign violence that preserves the community is 
not projected onto a ‘transcendental’ deity, but associated with a human 
figure – the sovereign – the immanent power of the latter is one of permanent 
violence. This is the failure of transcendental reference. Because sovereignty 
has not been placed ‘elsewhere’ its violence tends to remain even within the 
generality of law. The violence of the immanent community – aiming to 
eliminate all obstacles to the realisation of human will on nature and other 
humans – could only cease if communities renounce their absolute power 
over themselves, and invoke a source of law ‘outside of ’ factionalism and the 
perpetual war that their contract has failed to bring to a decisive end. The 
sense of this argument is that law can only mediate between social factions 
if its source is entirely removed from the human arena of conflict. Hence the 
notion of ancestral law or, indeed, a divinity located outside of nature and 
time whose will is expressed in a law given to the ancestors.
To what extent, though, does the conventional thinking of law grasp that 
behind any formal account of right there has to be some notion of transcendent 
(i.e. ancestral) authority? Barshack engages in a study that runs from Hobbes, 
through Austin to Hart. Do these authors provide the resources to think the 
absent sovereign? If this thinking remains blind to the problem, it is blind-
ness shared by other forms of contemporary jurisprudence – in particular law 
and economics. Economic reasoning and rational-choice theory simply cannot 
grasp the ‘excess’ on which the law depends, namely its ultimate reliance on 
reference to something ‘transcendent’. Nor can this excess be contained within a 
theory of adjudication and a community of principle. This, then, is a problem 
shared by liberal accounts of formal equality. In a final re-working of the rule 
of law Barshack reinvents the Dworkinian account of the point of political 
philosophy in order to account for and justify the coercive power of the state 
other than by reference to the social contract.
Since transcendent reference has – in European history – been theologically 
framed it would appear that ‘secular’ liberals need to start reading theology 
to understand the rule of law. In the history of Christian thought there has been 
a clear, albeit not discussed, schism regarding the fundamental monotheistic 
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6 Islam, law and identity
principle of faith in a withdrawn God of creation. On the one side Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart (amongst others) remained faithful to 
the ‘realist’ theological idea that ‘every  .  .  .  created thing, no matter how real 
it might be, is utterly contingent, relying upon Him for any substance that 
it might possess’ (Blond 1998: 7). Opposing theological realism is a position 
that derives from the ‘natural theology’ of Duns Scotus (1266 –1308) which 
explains the persistent attempts ever since to derive transcendent reference 
from a community of principles. Scotus posited a third term – ‘being’ – that 
he elevated above both the idea of God (now understood as ‘infinite being’) 
and His creations (‘finite beings’). The consequence of this argument was 
that ‘theology itself became idolatrous’ (Blond 1998: 6) whereby the mind is 
self-divinised and understands itself as essentially constructive. This eliminates 
‘any mind-independent account of ontology and ironically, helps to give 
“secular” modernity its characteristic immanence)’ (Blond 1998: 9).
To return to this collection’s immediate concerns, this triumph of ‘natural 
theology’ has been accompanied by the emergence of a specific form of 
political ‘secularism’ that considers itself either agnostic (in the case of 
liberalism) or atheistic (in the case of applied state communism), oblivious 
to the fact that it is nothing but a form of idolatrous worship of the mind. 
However, securalism (whatever its versions) is in reality theistic and com-
mitted to presence through the ‘deification’ of an immanent will expressed 
by either the social contract or the Communist Party. In consequence, it 
seems that the so-called securalist has decided that the only possible options 
for subjectivity are either to affirm itself through acting out desire and 
dominating nature, or to deny itself ‘by positing his consciousness as a con-
sequence of other less human structures  .  .  .  which it is suggested only the 
strong can bear to endure’ (Blond 1998: 4). Hence, for example, the two 
most prominent versions of the ‘rule of law’ either as a mere ‘tool’ for the 
realisation of whatever human objectives or as encapsulating ‘substantive’ 
principles (i.e. natural law, biological impulses, linguistic or biopolitical 
structures).
This crypto-theism of European secularism is problematic not only from 
the point of view of post-secular philosophy and realist theology but the very 
intelligibility of the political as such. In the words of Anglican Archbishop 
Rowan Williams, a politics worthy of the name cannot be based on the as-
sumption that action is nothing but the successful assertion of will, something 
which subverts the very idea of intelligible action as ‘contributing to a system of 
communication, to symbolic exchange’ by virtue of being a ‘representation of 
something prior, in such a way as to introduce that prior and shaping reality 
into a continuing narrative of uncovering through response and question’ 
(Milbank 2005: 1–3, italics added). As Williams wisely emphasises, this view 
of intelligible action is common to faithful Augustine, Hegel and atheist 
Marx. But it seems to have vanished from our discourse. In the case of those 
liberal polities, which emerged ‘triumphant’ following the collapse of state 
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communism, this has meant that ‘.  .  .  the lowest has become the highest, 
and equality names itself as the only value that cannot be devalued’ (Blond 
1998: 2). In these circumstances ‘critique’ becomes at best synonymous with 
scepticism. Before the disasters that both liberal polities and their erstwhile 
‘communist’ enemies have brought about, scepticism re-emerges as a welcome 
‘alternative’ (for example in the case of deconstruction) only to be exposed 
as ‘too weak a force to confront the present with its ownmost possibilities’ 
because it lacks what Merleau-Ponty called perceptual faith (la foi perceptive), 
namely the faith necessary to
understand that there is a world, and in all its paradoxical certainty it 
calls forth for description. To lack faith in the external world, or even 
to doubt that there is any knowable external to the synthetic activities 
of the human mind, is to be complicit with the modern oscillation 
between subjectivity and its indifferent denial.
 (Blond 1998: 4, italics added)
Whether or not this is an accurate assessment of the political potential of 
deconstruction, Diamantides relies on it when he insists on reminding us 
that Islamic history has followed a different path from that sketched out 
above. Faithful medieval Muslims never invested in the creation of a theology 
proper and certainly not the ‘natural theology’ that flourished in England. 
The theological category of ‘being’, which comprises both God and His 
creations, never took off in Muslim-majority societies nor in Jewish com-
munities. Consequently, and in distinction to the situation in medieval 
and modern Europe as well as post-colonial ‘Islamic’ republics and Israel, 
medieval Muslim (and Jewish) jurists did not respond or engage in the 
various attempts of state authorities to usurp theological authority and 
occupy the position of the ‘sovereign being’ that defines political community. 
Consequently, even if the political institutions of Muslim-majority (and 
Jewish-majority) societies have by now been shaped by force according to 
European models, they should not feel obliged to complete their colonisation 
by adopting Europe’s idolatrous immanentism. Muslim thought, in particular, 
need not commit itself to the idea of absolute sovereignty, a tendency that 
Diamantides attributes to both Islamists and Muslim liberals. Instead he seeks 
to summon critical energies that run through Christian, Islamic and Judaic 
notions of faith in an unknowable creator God and to turn these notions of 
faith against traditions of sovereignty, constitutionalism and positivist juris-
prudence that have presented themselves as the only resources for thinking 
the rule of law in modernity.
There are a number of elements to this argument. Elaborating a thesis of 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Diamantides asserts that there is an intriguing process of 
‘auto-deconstruction’ that runs through all monotheistic thinking: crudely, 
monotheism replaces pagan belief in the presence of a powerful God with faith 
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8 Islam, law and identity
in a withdrawn God; a faith which can survive even contemporary atheism. 
This makes any crude distinction between faith and secularism, religion and 
politics, theism and atheism, strictly impossible. It also gives rise to the 
necessary and difficult way in which one might try to reclaim or re-work a 
critical thinking of faith. Diamantides retraces the theological origins of the 
Western positivist belief in the power of the formal (procedural) rule of law, 
supposedly purged of morality, to provide the basic social structure in which 
a plural society can hold itself together. He stresses an original point where 
procedural law assumed, in different ‘secular’ terms, the theological prerogative 
of stating the social being. Positive law, it is widely assumed, turns the social 
bond into the expression of individual wills, bringing to an end, arguments 
about morality and antagonisms about faith, and allowing a coherent and 
pluralistic political community to found itself. Those theories of constitu-
tionalism and sovereign power that took root in modern North-Western 
Europe, however, reflect the particular history of North-Western European 
modernity and a Christian version of monotheistic auto-deconstruction that is 
no better or worse than what has happened in pre-colonial Islamic modernity. 
No better but victorious. Through imperialism, colonialism and now so called 
‘globalisation’ and the ‘creation’ of market economy, the way Christianity 
secularised itself in North-Western Europe has had a strong influence on 
societies around the world including Muslim-majority states. The centralised 
sovereign state has been imposed everywhere. Diamantides is concerned 
with historical and contemporary elaborations of this pattern, focusing on 
the work of liberal Muslim Abdullahi an-Na’im whose work is read partly 
as a tactical reaction to Islamist fundamentalists and partly as an attempt 
to mend the ruptures between constitutionalism and Shari’a that perhaps 
downplays the more radical (but not fundamentalist) challenges posed by 
faith to the state.
In contradistinction to the history of European faith and law, Islamic 
jurisprudence shows that religious, legal and state authority need to be neither 
coordinated nor antagonistic; and that sophisticated bodies of law can develop 
without reference to sovereign power and singular authority. Diamantides 
refers to ‘faithful jurists’ in both Islamic and Judaic traditions who developed 
subtle and nuanced jurisprudences on the basis of the ‘withdrawn God’ – one 
who would not guarantee the ‘truth’ or the correctness of their interpretations 
of ‘His’ word. In distinction to the Weberian notion of officials and the 
Hartian notion of legal personnel as a sine qua non of the modern rule of law, 
this jurisprudence points at a peculiar idea: that complex law can exist despite 
or, even on the basis of, a certain disinvestment from the idea that state action 
is the ultimate guarantor of meaning. Within contemporary Islam, and in 
spite of both Islamist and liberal ideologies, one can still find the refusal to 
merge faith and state power, a fact that accounts for the ‘still born’ nature 
of sovereignty within Islamic political history but also the possibility of a 
different way of thinking universally about law and the state. The latter part 
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of the essay reads this thesis into contemporary arguments about legal theory 
and reflexive politics and seeks a genealogy for itself in Christian political 
theology.
Gearey’s essay also takes the position of the long durée. Although focused 
on a reading of the British case law concerning the Islamic scarf, it seeks to 
put this case in a much broader historical and intellectual context. The Begum 
case is read as a modern manifestation of the old dispute over the faith that 
attaches itself to instruments. In modern terms this is an argument over 
human rights, but human rights must themselves be seen as the way in 
which a certain logic of the reformation plays itself out. This argument 
returns us to our thesis that supposedly ‘secular’ terms contain within them-
selves theological residues. The essay concludes with an examination of Rowan 
Williams’ position on Shari’a. His proposal for the formal recognition of 
Shari’a within the UK correctly identifies the need to bring Islamic law 
within a human rights framework. This is not the ‘triumph’ of supposedly 
secular human rights against benighted faith; nor is it an argument that the 
state can define the terms of political community. The following passage, 
from Dr Rowan Williams’ consideration of faith and plurality, gives some 
sense of the consequences of the argument:
Societies that are in fact ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse are 
societies in which identity is formed  .  .  .  by different modes and contexts 
of belonging, ‘multiple affiliations’. The danger is in acting as if the 
authority that managed the abstract level of equal citizenship represented 
a sovereign order which then allowed other levels to exist. But if the 
reality of society is plural – as many political theorists have pointed out 
– this is a damagingly inadequate account of common life, in which 
certain kinds of affiliation are marginalised or privatised to the extent 
that what is produced is a ghettoised pattern of social life, in which 
particular sorts of interest and of reasoning are tolerated as private 
matters but never granted legitimacy in public as part of a continuing 
debate about shared goods and priorities.
 (Williams 2008)
Whilst, in the light of Barshack and Diamantides’ arguments, this position 
might not be entirely acceptable, the shared point of reference is that the 
state is a latecomer. Whilst it must in the last instance arrange the terms of 
common being, it has absolutely no claim to its definition, either through 
rights or constitutionalism, which remain ‘derived’ forms and entirely sec-
ondary. This rests on an argument about the nature of ‘common life’ that 
cannot be defined by the state, determining by fiat, as it were, what groups 
could participate in the life of the community. Such versions of the state 
have proved weak. The distinction between private matters of faith and 
public expressions of secular belonging do not allow strong communities to 
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be created, where the legitimacy of political institutions is provided by the 
fact that they give form to an inclusive common culture.
Thinking these issues through requires a redefinition of one of the key 
terms that has justified the sovereignty of the state: the rule of law. The 
dominant version of this political philosophy would hold that it is necessary 
for the state to guarantee the equality of its citizens and the fundamental 
way in which this is achieved through access to the courts, and the discourse 
of equal rights. In recent years, the rule of law (as we have seen) has become 
linked to the idea of human rights. This perhaps strengthens the rights of 
the citizen against executive authority, but the argument still works with 
fundamentally the same terms of the doctrine of the rule of law. Dr Williams 
offers a partial critique of this idea. The rise of human rights has brought 
with it a privileging of the idea that all citizens are essentially individuals, with 
rights claims that can be pressed against other citizens and the state. It 
becomes difficult to think of political community as something that is shared 
between people and requires a public culture. Values such as ‘civility’ and 
conventional communally orientated ethical codes are replaced by ‘individual 
rights’. However, this is not to condemn the state. It is to seek a new balance 
between state and community:
The role of ‘secular’ law is  .  .  .  the monitoring of [social] affiliations to 
prevent the creation of mutually isolated communities in which human 
liberties are seen in incompatible ways and individual persons are sub-
jected to restraints or injustices for which there is no public redress.
 (Williams 2008)
III. The essays: friction, resistance, hybridity
In order to step outside of Western Europe, but to retain our concern with 
the malleability of concepts like secular state and identity, we turn to El 
Menyawi’s attempt to read the aporias of Egyptian family law. These have 
developed around conflicts between the secularists and the conservative cham-
pions over the precise form that both law – and the state – should take. The 
terms of the conflict were laid down in the last century. Modernising secularists 
were forced to compromise on their drive to re-make Egyptian law on a 
European model. Religious elites and their supporters were placated by 
maintaining family law as an Islamic core – around which the programme 
of modernisation could then be completed. The cost of this compromise was 
the sacrifice of women’s’ rights, such as the provision of no fault divorces; a 
pattern that has repeated itself in more recent years. How can this peculiar 
tension be described? At one level, it is a successful political strategy that 
allows a secularising project to continue. From a different perspective, though, 
it is a strategy that is only possible because Egyptian women are kept in a 
perpetual limbo or an indeterminate zone, where secular reforms and, hence, 
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more complete and better protection of rights are always promised and 
forever delayed. It would appear that the preservation of an Islamic legal core 
has become the very condition of secularising reform; secular norms are only 
possible if, at the heart of the Egyptian legal system, there are deep-seated 
principles that contradict them, but, at the same time, allow them to exist. 
Further reforms continue to be threatened by this peculiar situation and its 
affects. Recent feminist attempts to work in Islamic terms, and to improve 
women’s rights by presenting their arguments as essentially Islamic, have not 
been productive and, furthermore, run the risk of strengthening resistance 
to future reforms. It may be that this system can be perpetually ‘managed’ 
as a constituent tension of the Egyptian state or can its inherent ambiguities 
be exploited in a progressive direction? Is there another way of exploiting 
the aporetic tensions of reform?
This appears to be a variation on a theme that we can also find in Barshack’s 
essay, which draws attention to the inherent violence of secular legal systems 
that lack transcendental reference. El Menyawi, too, is concerned with the 
violence ‘walled up’ within law. For him, however, Egyptian law can be 
neither properly secular nor religious for there can be no ‘transcendental 
reference’ as there is no general agreement over the symbols that can be 
shared. Therefore, there is ongoing conflict over the terms of the law and 
irresolvable violence, which in the Egyptian case plays itself out over the 
perennial question of the status of women’s rights. This is why El Menyawi 
is so concerned to find the appropriate theoretical path that navigates between 
the Derridean logic of sacrifice and Agamben’s concern with abandonment.
El Menyawi draws on Baudrillard’s account of the simulacra to push the 
logic of Egyptian law to its limit. Crudely, the simulacra presents a copy of 
reality as if it was real or, more precisely, creates a zone of ambiguity where 
what is real, inauthentic and copied is impossible to distinguish from the 
real and authentic: the ‘gift’ of ambiguity. The focus for this strategy is on 
the reforms contained in Article 20 of Law No 1 of 2000, which draws on 
the Islamic concept of the khul’. The khul’ allows a wife to divorce on the 
condition that she surrenders any financial rights against her husband. When 
the khul’ was enacted as law, the condition that a wife receives her husband’s 
permission was absent. Could this be seen as a ‘hyper real khul’, a law which 
appears to be consistent with the norms of Islam whilst containing within 
it a radical secularist ‘virus’? The khul’ law split the conservative religious 
elite. Whilst the Sheikh of Al-Azhar University – an influential religious 
scholar – supported Article 20, others argued that there were no textual 
sources to justify divorce initiated by the female spouse. Despite these dif-
ferences, there seemed to be a popular understanding that the law was indeed 
coherent with Islam. Liberal modernisers and feminists appeared to have 
created a zone of indeterminacy, a site where it might be possible to develop 
further secular principles as if they were religious (or indeed, to seize the 
secularising potential of religious principles).
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Dupret’s essay seeks to demolish the idea that Islamic family law represents 
the last stand of something ‘authentically religious’ within the jurisdiction 
of the ‘secular’ Egyptian state. Read more broadly, however, his argument 
also suggests that those states that label themselves ‘Islamic’ actually do not 
make consistent use of ‘religious law’. The hard and fast distinction between 
secular and religious state is thus rendered yet more oblique. Dupret’s 
approach is based on praxiology, an attempt to get closer to the ways in 
which law is practised and interpreted, and to leave on one side over-arching, 
general concepts that appear to have little to do with daily life. Thus, claims 
to the ‘intrinsic authority’ of Islamic family law have to be assessed against 
the background of how lawyers, judges and litigants actually compose and 
contest their understandings of particular claims. Rules appear to have no 
authority beyond the way in which claims are made within any given context. 
It would be easy to get this argument wrong. It does not seek to replace ‘law in 
books’ or classifications, secular or otherwise, with law ‘in action’. Nor does 
Dupret’s argument reject analyses of rules in terms of power relationships 
or the implicit or explicit cultural assumptions that animate and underlie 
religious or secular rules. Praxiology requires that the analytical focus is 
firmly on those instances where (to repeat a jurisprudential catchphrase) 
people do things with rules.
So what does Dupret’s study of a series of Egyptian decisions about personal 
status tell us? If we suspend the assumption that these cases are a privileged 
site for the application of the norms of religious law, we can begin to see the 
actual practices which articulate the norms themselves. At this level we have 
to observe that in the place of learned deliberations on fine jurisprudential 
points there is in fact very little ‘religious law’ in judicial practices. Rather, 
these cases suggest much more narrow concerns with procedure, the construction 
of fact and court routine. We are a long way from some ‘orientalist’ fantasy 
of learned religious disputation and, instead, are in the routine, bureaucratised 
world of a working court.
With Larson’s essay we move from Egypt to the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania. The concept of KafA’a in Sunni jurisprudence determines the 
legal idea of a ‘suitable marriage’ and thus constructs the sense in which the 
parties can be seen as equivalent in terms of their genealogy, social standing, 
piety and wealth. Focusing on the development of the concept in the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania, Larson argues that KafA’a relates to a complex of 
interpretations and practices that show tensions between notions of equality 
before the law as a Mauritanian citizen, and ethnic/cultural articulations 
of legal identity. Larson traces the development of the term in Maliki 
jurisprudence and the way in which understandings of equalities between 
partners have been transformed. Her history of the term is then linked to two 
contemporary cases on personal status discussed by the Mauritanian scholar, 
Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, in which rival ideas of clan and ethnicity play 
themselves out. Lying behind these conflicts are different ideas of belonging. 
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It is significant that the cases were heard in the 1990s, after the promulgation 
of the democratic 1991 Constitution but prior to the publication of the 2001 
Code of Personal Status. This time-frame raises the question of how the state 
deals with notions of personal status in Islamic law, and its rival interpret-
ations. Is there an interpretation of KafA’a that stresses the equality of Muslim 
citizens? These issues are analysed in the third section of the essay.
The Mauritanian cases can be read as pointing to some general themes 
about the problems of post-colonial law. In conventional theory the law of a 
nation coordinates with the customs of a people who are themselves coord-
inated with a territory that will be a nation-state. At the same time, though, 
these principles must be rooted in specific local ‘conditions’, and the law of 
the nation-state must be able to mediate these foundational conditions. The 
jurisprudence of KafA’a suggests the possible resolution of a fundamental 
problem of foundation. Nationality and religious or ethnic belonging can be 
combined. Recognising KafA’a jurisprudence allows the state to present itself 
as ‘multi-ethnic’ – respecting different interpretations of the term; at the 
same time the potential ambiguities inherent in KafA’a can be resolved by a 
court speaking for the coherence of Mauritanian citizenship. But is such 
a use of these terms possible, particularly after the traumatic ethnic cleansing 
of 1989? The fundamental problem is a tension between two ‘measures’ of 
equality: that of the citizens of a democratic European-style nation-state who 
are formally equal before the law, and that of notions of status defined by 
ethnic and religious norms which, in this case, ultimately further the power 
of elite groups. If these concepts can be brought together by the court speak-
ing for the nation, it needs to deal with the problem of foundations. After 
independence, pre-national forms of life must express themselves in the terms 
of an Islamic nation-state defined by sovereign law. The problem is that these 
forms carry forward into the democratic nation-state inequalities that charac-
terised its multi-ethnic history. The past casts a long shadow.
What do we make of these arguments? Larson’s argument points away 
from conventional liberal thinking. Take, for example, Kymlicka’s notion 
that societal culture defines social being and allows people to achieve their 
identity through a complex of meanings; the network of shared significations 
that make life in its totality understandable. This definition is meant to stress 
the importance of ‘common institutions and practices’ (Kymlicka 1991: 165), 
and ultimately to underlie Kymlicka’s account of minority rights and the 
multicultural state that defends the diverse ‘cultural heritage[s]’, a culture 
that is somehow recognisably ‘ours’ (Kymlicka 1991: 165). Although Kymlicka 
has worked to refine this model to make it applicable to other cultures, Larson’s 
work suggests that the construction of common ‘narratives’ is far more complex 
than liberal thinking might suggest. Moreover, it points towards the notion 
that minority rights may not be as stable a concept as Kymlicka allows; 
indeed, minority rights may be subject to the tensions of definition of the 
concept of KafA’a and equally as unstable.
9780415566810_C00.indd   13 5/16/11   3:25:40 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
14 Islam, law and identity
Özcan’s essay examines the moral world of Muslim entrepreneurs in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Born and educated in the atheist 
Soviet Union these individuals discovered as adults two previously unavail-
able ‘gods’: the free market and Islam. Özcan is concerned with this peculiar 
conjunction; how are Islamic norms used to delineate and justify business 
practices? Her thesis is that the sudden withdrawal of Soviet power opened up 
a complex conjuncture where different moral codes, including still influential 
communist ideas, were pragmatically combined. In particular, there was a 
growing public appreciation that markets required public morality. What 
norms could be invoked? The picture that emerges is another exercise in 
understanding hybridity and complexity; the way in which different indi-
viduals bring together the different norms and ideologies that have influenced 
them, and attempt to use them to make sense of their worlds. The implicit 
suggestion is that ideologies operate not because they are somehow doctrinally 
pure but precisely because their ideas and beliefs are malleable. This research 
warns us against positing a ‘pure’ idea of Islam that forms a substratum of 
core principles articulating a post-communist moral world. Kazakh and 
Kyrgyz interpretations of Islam had already been nuanced by their own 
pragmatism and animistic folk cultures; and are further combined with 
secular influences acquired through Soviet education.
Working out and acting on hybrid moralities is a difficult process. The 
paper focuses on elaborating three ‘ideal types’ of business morality: a type 
that draws on communist ideology, a second that is articulated through Sufi 
ethics and a third that is animated by utopian Islam. These moral codes are 
exemplified through a close study of the moral worlds of three businessmen 
based on field research and interviews. These studies show how the combination 
of different ideas, lead to the privileging or downplaying of certain concerns 
relating to the structure and objectives of business activities. In general, the 
tensions between different norms can lead to a sense of moral dissonance but 
equally those who attempt to think of business in moral terms derive com-
fort from their beliefs in times of frustration and failure. Whether or not 
individual commitment to codes of behaviour in itself is sufficient for a 
functioning market, however, remains an open question. Özcan’s conclusion, 
echoing Durkheim, suggests that unless there is some consistent effort to 
provide over-arching moral norms, a crippling sense of anomie will paralyse 
public life.
Kausar’s study is of the role that religion played – and continues to play 
– in the foundation and coherence of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Her 
essay draws attention to the difficulties that arise when modern law and 
constitutionalism speak for the divine in a modern Muslim majority setting. 
As Kausar notes, Pakistan, like Israel, is a modern European-style nation-state 
explicitly founded on a notion of religious faith. The problem is that the 
intense moment of identification of people, faith and nation in 1947 has not 
been sustained in the decades of the country’s history and the various problems 
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that the new territorial nation-state both brought about and had to contain 
or solve. Dividing the history of Pakistan into four representative periods, 
Kausar argues that the notion of ‘Islamic unity’ has failed to mediate the 
ethnic, territorial and ideological tensions that characterise the nation-state. 
The foundational moment requires the creation of a unique Islamic identity, 
distinct from and incompatible with the dominant Hinduism of India. In 
this sense, the coordination of faith and nation remains ‘reactive’ and, once 
the forces that oppose its objectives are overpowered or removed, the notion 
of a nation synonymous with a religion collapses under its own weight. 
Indeed, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan evidences the failure 
of a common Muslim identity. These themes are traced into the politics 
of constitution-making, and the attempts to give the foundational idea of 
religion a viable legal form. This results in an uneasy tension between 
ethnicity and nationalism. These themes communicate with other pieces in 
the collection, notably those of El Menyawi and Larson.
Kausar suggests that the dynamic of Pakistani politics might have produced 
different ways of articulating common belonging, had it not been for various 
factors that revivified religious forms of expressing national cohesion. External 
support for the Islamist pretensions of President Zia’s military dictatorship 
– a product of cold war alliances – enabled an unprecedented ‘Islamisation’ 
of national life. In Zia’s wake, though, it became increasingly clear that this 
process had not furthered national coherence, as struggles broke out between 
Shi’a and Sunni factions over the form that an Islamic state should take; 
problems exacerbated by the Iranian revolution. Democracy proved unstable, 
and General Musharraf ’s coup returned the country to military dictatorship 
in 1999. Musharraf had a more moderate approach to Islam and in his desire 
to modernise Pakistan sought to distance himself from Zia. The events of 
9/11, and Musharraf ’s decision to ally himself with the US, have opened a 
new phase in the history of Pakistan. If Jinnah’s vision remains a lodestar for 
this essay, it is only right that he is left the final word: what is the form of 
the relationship between state and religion?
For the final two essays we move back to the West. Caeiro’s essay examines 
the life of Muslims who live in Christian-majority secular states. He focuses 
on the attempts by Muslim scholars and public intellectuals to create a 
‘European’ or ‘Western Islam’ through a Muslim jurisprudence for minorities 
( fiqh al-aqalliyyat or minority fiqh). This kind of thinking comes out of fiqh 
councils such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research and the Fiqh 
Council of North America. Indeed, it is precisely the mobility of minority 
fiqh, the fact that it is constituted by so many different writers, working in 
different tradition and raising diverse concerns, that makes it such a vital 
phenomenon. Although it appears to be innovative in terms of its practitioners 
and modes of dissemination – in particular through the internet – it also has 
a presence within traditional Islamic thought and scholarship, and receives 
notices and support from powerful establishment figures. Minority fiqh is 
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thus a mixture of tradition and innovation. It seeks to reconfigure Islamic 
scholarship and define how the faith is to be lived within a globalised world 
characterised by migration.
‘Minority fiqh’ raises issues around the creation of a discourse specific to 
the realities of Muslim communities living in Christian/secular states and, 
although it covers a variety of issues from critical engagement with human 
rights to the status of Islam in public discourse, it seems to be focused upon 
the peculiar difficulties faced by Muslim minorities. How is this status to 
be understood? How are the challenges to a life lived in faith to be navigated 
within secular democracies? In particular, how can faith be practised publicly, in 
those nations where it is seen as primarily a private matter? Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
one of the most influential scholars of minority fiqh, has argued, for instance, 
that Muslim minorities are necessary for the spread of the religion and that 
there is no compulsion to move to an Islamic state. This thesis requires a 
particular articulation of the relationship between the community and the 
state. Al-Qaradawi roots authority in the community and its authorised 
scholars but also asserts that Muslims must politically engage in order to 
achieve legal recognition and equal rights. This development of minority fiqh 
often echoes critical approaches to liberal equality – and suggests the need to 
develop those resources of social capital that work outside formal arguments 
about equality.
However, the problems experienced in France by the Imam of Bordeaux, 
Tareq Oubrou, suggest the limitations of this way of thinking. Oubrou sought 
unsuccessfully to reposition Islam culturally and re-negotiate the relationship 
between religious and republican norms. In the hands of men like Tariq 
Ramadan, minority fiqh has taken on a different and more radical form that 
moves away from the notion of an Islamic minority, and shows how it is 
possible to conceive more broadly of Islamic citizenship. Ajil al-Nashmi has 
also been critical of how the very notion of minority rights has limited the 
spaces in which Islamic ‘agency’ can be understood and practised; others have 
been concerned as to how international law and minority rights can be 
brought together. Indeed, they might point towards a much more expansive 
concept of a ‘public Islam’, as suggested by Salah Sultan’s argument. Sultan 
has asserted that American Muslims have a duty to ensure the general spread 
of literacy, as a public good, and also as a chance to encourage the reading 
of the Qur’an and engagement with the Islamic community.
However, as Caeiro stresses, it would be wrong to impose a false consensus 
on minority fiqh. He thus focuses on a debate between Taha Jabir al-Alwani and 
‘Ajil al-Nashmi to suggest how even those committed to the promulgation 
of the discourse radically disagree about its terms and content; the two 
scholars have very different ideas about the status of the Sunna and inter-
pretation of key passages from the Qur’an. It is not Caeiro’s intention to 
mediate in this debate but to see the positions that the two scholars take as 
representative of the wider tensions that characterise the field.
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Brown’s essay takes us to the complex structuring of Muslim identity in 
the United Kingdom. The fundamental question she poses is: how can a 
hybrid British Muslim identity be created? This must be based on a notion 
of citizenship and thus the exercise of the rights and duties that define the 
citizen. However, a British Muslim identity as a citizen must take into 
account those religious and ethnic differences that are as important to self-
definition as belonging to a national community. Her essay takes entrance 
to higher education as its focus. This is a particularly interesting site for 
studying the emergence of new identities. For instance, civil society and 
campus-based groups are active in encouraging young Muslim women to 
take up university places. This has created tensions with traditional ideas 
that are resistant or hostile to women’s education. Those promoting education 
for women have stressed that education does not necessarily mean turning 
away from faith. The tensions between these positions inform debates around 
appropriate clothing and facilities. Rather than reading such tensions as the 
assertion of ‘fundamentalist’ doctrines, it is necessary to be sensitive to the 
fact that they are about the terms in which a notion of Muslim citizenship 
could be composed.2
The ‘politics of fear’ that have resulted from the ‘war on terror’ make it 
more difficult to navigate the intricacies of such problems. Despite the 
best efforts of the British government to separate notions of moderate and 
fundamentalist or radical Islam, adoption of or requests for Islamic forms of 
dress are now seen as the mark of ‘suspect populations’ – ready to assert a 
radical identity against the tolerance of their host community. Brown warns 
that ‘security policy’ threatens to homogenise a complex set of positions, and 
to limit the very tendencies that would be helpful in the fabrication of a 
cultural position that could negotiate the old and the new, the secular and 
the sacred.
Brown’s essay fits into the broader pattern of concern over fundamentalism 
and the perceived failure of multiculturalism. Primitivist or fundamentalist 
assertions of Islamic identity are seen to be linked to a rejection of modern-
isation, secularism and liberalism. The problem that Brown stresses is that 
2 Kathleen Moore’s The Unfamiliar Abode (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) offers a 
striking analysis of how Muslim communities in the United States and Great Britain 
articulate their identities around strategies of ‘diasporic legality’ (6) which combine both 
Islamic and secular legal resources to negotiate the diverse tensions that are attendant on 
assuming a public position as a Muslim. The resonant concept of the ‘unfamiliar abode’ 
describes the difficulties of stating an identity when the terms that the law offers are 
characterised by both indeterminacy, and a ‘universal’ that only pretends to be ‘open, 
rational and pluralistic’ (10). Is it possible for Muslims to make a claim to a public ‘faith’ 
identity without being considered either as a fundamentalist threat to national values, or 
un-Islamic? The unfamiliar abode is a product of contradictory tensions playing themselves 
out in the migrations caused in part by globalisation: the need to assert an identity, when 
‘solid’ reference points appear not to be available.
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fundamentalism cannot be read as the failure of multiculturalism. To do 
so would be to throw out doctrines that have proved themselves resilient 
and adaptable. Multiculturalism remains a useful paradigm. However, we 
need to stress the way in which identity can be fabricated. This fabrication 
goes beyond the old sense in which ethnicity or religious identity is somehow 
taken for granted and opposed to other cultural terms which are equally 
as rigid. One broad conclusion from the essays above is that conventional 
multicultural analysis has not developed the necessary analytic tools to 
perform this kind of analysis.
IV. Conclusions
In their different ways these essays suggest that it is necessary to move beyond 
conventional multiculturalist positions which mirror the individualist versus 
communitarian divide.3 Liberals like John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin aspire 
to an ethically neutral legal order where every individual is assured the 
opportunity to pursue his or her conception of the good. Implicit in these 
views is the standard Lockean understanding of the primacy of the indi-
vidual as the fundamental component of political association. In this approach, 
we also come across the idea of a separation between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
spheres where, predictably, religion is allocated in the latter. For many this 
way of thinking is deeply embedded in specifically modern European cultural 
and intellectual contexts. By contrast, communitarians, such as Charles 
Taylor, disputing the ethical neutrality of the law, expect the liberal state to 
open up to diverse specific conceptions of the good life, including, if need 
be, those that prize collective over individual rights. However, in recent 
years, the debate has become less polarised; a softening of positions due, in 
3 The fundamental claim of multiculturalism is that ‘minority cultures or ways of life are 
not sufficiently protected by ensuring the individual rights of their members and as a 
consequence should also be protected with special group rights or privileges’ (Moller Okin 
1997). We need to distinguish our understanding of multiculturalism from that of the 
‘secularists’ or champions of ‘enlightenment values’. To give an example: Cohen argues 
that the state must ‘commit itself to secularism; to offer full religious freedom, while 
striving to keep religion out of the public sphere. Leaving all considerations of principle 
aside, secularism is the only ideology that can make a multi-faith society work. The 
alternative is a future of competitive grievance and unremitting vexatious litigation’ (Cohen 
2008). These secularist arguments are similar to those put forward by critics like Barry 
(2002) who asserts that multiculturalism leads to the fragmentation of the nation-state and 
the collapse of national cultures. Whilst such arguments are difficult to disprove, it would 
seem that the state has proved itself able to accommodate a wide range of multiculturalist 
demands ( Joppke and Lukes 1999). Indeed, multiculturalism can itself become part of 
official legitimising discourses. Grillo draws attention to a tendency in recent American 
political and social thinking that has articulated versions of ‘strong pluralism’. He cites 
K.H. Claghorn’s arguments that judges should be able to speak minority languages (Grillo 
1998: 189).
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part, to a re-examination of the precise terms of law’s ethical neutrality.4 For 
us, the specific challenges for the law that are raised by Muslim cultural and 
religious identities – both in the form of minorities within non-Muslim 
majority states but also within Muslim-majority European-style nation-states 
– represent an opportunity to go even further.
We need to redefine the debate by reflecting on the mutual transformations 
that come from the encounter between monotheistic faith and state sover-
eignty. Multiculturalism has been successful in re-articulating the terms in 
which one belongs to a nation-state only up to a point.5 From this perspec-
tive, multiculturalism is less of a threat to the norms of liberal democracies 
than was perhaps first imagined.6 But can we really stretch its premises so 
as to defend liberal democracies from more radical implications of the cultural 
traditions of minorities?
If we consider the United Kingdom, the accommodation of cultural and 
religious difference has been achieved incrementally. As Parekh7 (2006: 243) 
stresses, the law took into account the importance of certain cultural practices 
that are discriminated against by an insensitive enforcement of common rules. 
For instance, the amendment of the law in 1976 that required Sikhs to wear 
crash helmets whilst riding motor cycles went some way to realising this 
principle. Similar reforms were made in the construction industry where health 
and safety legislation made wearing hard hats obligatory. Another example 
would be the resolution of the dispute over appropriate uniforms brokered 
by the General Nursing Council. The Council was able to compromise over 
the demands of Asian women who sought to wear shalwar kameez whilst 
4 See, for example, Brian Barry (1995) and Will Kymlicka (2001).
5 This idea of the centrality of the state to any realisation of community runs through the 
different understandings of how potentially threatening and disruptive differences can be 
legitimately managed. Following Parekh’s (2006: 199 –206) instructive typology, these can 
be broadly defined as: proceduralist, civic assimilationist and the Ottoman millet model. 
Proceduralism tends to stress the intractable nature of cultural difference and accepts it as 
an inconvenient fact of political community. The task of the state is to remain largely 
‘formal and neutral’: as it would be illegitimate to impose its own understanding of the 
good life it must instead articulate minimum rules that relate to behaviour and keep social 
conflict to the minimum. Civic assimilationists favour the creation of a strong public 
culture that allows different communities to agree upon common institutions and goals. 
The state, as the pre-eminent part of public culture, articulates what is held in common. 
Civil society and the family are accorded a greater expression of diversity. The legitimacy 
of the state rests on its ability to police the boundary between the public and the private. 
The millet system acknowledges more than the other two models the primary importance 
of culture, and sees the state as merely providing the over-arching administrative and legal 
framework in which different minorities can be left to their own devices.
6 See Gutmann (1994).
7 Given limitations of space, we are using Parekh as a representative figure. There is clearly more 
to theorising multiculturalism but Parekh’s work has the virtue of providing a well-articulated 
general account of how liberal democracies can accommodate multicultural demands.
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performing official duties. However, it is not the case that the courts have 
always made decisions protecting cultural differences. The so-called ‘objective 
necessity’ test was successfully used to prevent Muslim men with beards from 
working in food preparation. This ‘instrumental’ approach to the law appears 
insensitive and inflexible (Parekh 2006: 246).
So, we are not trying to suggest that there is always a possibility of com-
promise. Tensions, even profound tensions, can and do emerge.8 Parekh (1996) 
recognises that the ‘British’ model has hit boundaries. Perhaps one of the 
most contentious matters in recent years has been the insistence of Muslim 
women on their right to wear the hijab. To an extent the problem is one of 
perception. To return to Brown’s point, the right is not exclusively claimed 
by fundamentalist Islamists. The ongoing ‘affaire du foulard ’ in France in the 
late 1980s is symptomatic. It was prompted by the assertion of three French 
girls of North African descent that they should be allowed to wear the hijab 
in the lycée. The French establishment was not sympathetic and argued that any 
visible display of a religious symbol threatened the laicité of the French state. 
This was particularly worth upholding in schools to encourage the formation 
of universal secular cultural values. Counter-arguments stressed that Christians 
or Jews were not prohibited from wearing religious symbols and that the 
French state should be open to plurality. The attempts of the Ministry of 
Education to distinguish between the ‘discrete’ wearing of religious symbols, 
and those that tended to ‘proselytise’ or were inherently discriminatory, did 
not resolve matters. One of the features of the whole episode was the sense 
in which the state and the media, on the whole, sided with the principle of 
laicité. However, the ‘affaire du foulard ’ shows just how high levels of anxiety 
and misunderstanding about Islamic cultural ‘otherness’ have become.
This volume aspires to contribute to the undoing of this ‘othering’. From 
the first group of essays, we can extract the following theme: rather than 
reading history as a singular process of secularisation with the emergence of 
positive law as a necessary part of it, we want to see it as a study of the 
malleability of concepts that can be used to fabricate a notion of the social 
bond. This allows us to see the Western liberal order as based on specifically 
8 The recent decision of the the French Senate (September 2010) to prohibit the wearing of 
face-covering veils in public would be a good example of a profound tension between the 
state (speaking for a national community) and a religious minority. The ban should become 
law in spring 2011. The Justice Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, was quoted as saying ‘The 
full veil dissolves a person’s identity in that of a community. It calls into question the 
French model of integration, founded on the acceptance of our society’s values. Living with 
one’s face uncovered.  .  .  .  was a question of dignity and equality’. It is interesting that the 
face, and the figure of the veiled face, becomes an image of equality and individuality. The 
obscuring of the face is the sign that the individual has not transcended the ‘community’ 
– whilst the visible face is the symbol of the citizen who belongs to the public space of 
the nation. See www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/14/france-senate-muslim-veil-ban. On 
the veil and ‘Islam in Europe’, see Motha (2007).
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Western European theological concepts that have been adapted to political 
exigencies and secularising arguments. These have been used to suggest that 
the terminal point of a tradition is an absolutely sovereign state – even a 
human rights state – that grants and sustains the terms of social being. We 
want to elaborate a counter-argument to this assertion of the European nation-
state as a source of singular codified state law. Religious faith (and critical 
thinking) can harbour infinitely more complex understandings of social being 
when disjointed from the demands of sovereignty. These articulations of being 
together are to be found in those nodes where people share the truths that 
circulate amongst them; or even, in Diamantides’ terms, in the productive 
yet unresolved anxiety and the non-paralysing ‘moral trembling’ of the type 
shown by medieval Jewish and Muslim jurists.
These jurists were concerned with the rule of law and its logical coherence 
but were equally able to reach a number of varying, and equally valid, solu-
tions to the problems they posited. They were not concerned with the state’s 
need to turn law into a means for the efficient implementation of centrally 
made decisions throughout huge territories. Such faith-induced indifference 
to general legislation certainly is antithetical to today’s states – including 
many of the post-colonial, ‘Islamic republics’, which emulate the medieval 
European reduction of faith into state idolatry in all but name. But it is 
worth bearing in mind at the same time that religious humility before an 
unknowable God (or a thinking that works with doubt and irresolution) also 
prevents the abuses that contemporary human rights ideology struggles to 
contain. To refuse to legislate for others for reasons of religious humility or 
from doubts as to the possibility of generalising one’s own position is as 
far away from the situation of ‘dictatorship of majorities’ that embarrasses 
modern democracies as we can ever wish to arrive. Faith-based humility 
prevents what human ‘rights’ defend against.
This conclusion, however, does not mean that Islam, Judaism or other 
forms of faith offer ready-made alternatives to liberal democracy. This is 
because organised religion is now largely in the service of statist ideals 
throughout the world. It would, therefore, be grossly misleading to suggest 
that faithful Muslims (or Jews or Christians) would necessarily be disloyal 
to nation-states. What conclusions can we draw? We can take Larson and 
Dupret’s work as pointing in the following general direction. Despite the 
arguments of some, there is authority to maintain that Islamic thought has 
never held that the simultaneous belonging to the community of believers, 
the umma, and a state is impossible. Likewise, it would be unrealistic to think 
that Islamic faith can operate in isolation from its political and legal context. 
Dupret, El Menyawi and Larson offer examples of this hybridity at a micro 
level in Egypt and Mauritania, while Kausar takes a macro perspective in 
the context of Pakistan. So, we would not disagree with Dr Rowan Williams’ 
conclusion that ‘even in a predominantly Muslim state’, a Muslim has ‘some-
thing of a dual identity’ as s/he is both a ‘citizen and a believer’ (Williams 
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2008). However, a caveat may be necessary: the historical process which 
accounted for hybrid identities in pre-colonial Muslim contexts differed 
significantly from that in Europe, as well as from post-colonial Muslim-
majority states. Specifically, government in the Christian West has operated 
as part of a particular economy of coordinated division between secular and 
religious institutions from very early on.9 In this regard the relevant thesis 
recently articulated by Giorgio Agamben (2007) is likely to lead to further 
research in this direction. How can the agonistic duality between the secular 
and the sacred be understood in the Muslim context, rather than from that 
articulated by liberal constitutional arrangements?
References
Agamben, G. (2007) Il Regno e la Gloria: per una genealogia teologica dell’economia e del 
governo, Vicenza: Neri Pozza.
Barry, B. (2002) Culture and Equality, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Barry, B. (1995) Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bentley-Hart, D. (2009) Atheist Delusions: the Christian revolution and its fashionable 
enemies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Blond, P. (ed.) (1998) Post-Secular Philosophy – between philosophy and theology, London: 
Routledge.
Cohen, N. (2008) ‘A cast iron case for a secular society’, The Guardian, Sunday, 
3 August 2008, available at www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/03/ 
race.equality
Grillo, R.D. (1998) Pluralism and the Politics of Difference, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Gutmann, A. (ed.) (1994) Multiculturalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Joppke, C. and S. Lukes. (1999) Multicultural Questions, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1991) Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2001) An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Milbank, J., Creston Davies and Slavoj Zizek (eds) (2005) Theology and the Political 
– the new debate, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Moller Okin, S. (1997) ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women’, Boston Review available 
at www.bostonreview.net/BR22.5/okin.html
Moore, K. (2010) The Unfamiliar Abode, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Motha, S. ‘Veiled Women and the Affect of Religion in Democracy’, Journal of Law 
and Society, 34 (1), 139 – 62.
Parekh, B. (2006) Rethinking Multiculturalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Williams, R. (2008) ‘Address to Royal Courts of Justice’, at www.archbishopof 
canterbury.org/1575
9 This could be dated to the theological consensus on the triadic nature of God.
9780415566810_C00.indd   22 5/16/11   3:25:42 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
Chapter 1
Transcendence and 
interpretation
Introductory notes on the theology of 
the rule of law
Lior Barshack1
While the core idea underlying the rule of law is debated among lawyers, 
there is general agreement on the operative implications of that contested 
idea. The rule of law is taken to constrain law-making and law-enforcing 
branches of government. The main imperatives addressed to the legislator 
are those of drafting general, prospective, consistent and clear laws. The law-
enforcing branches are expected to act in conformity with pre-established 
law and to be able to adduce before the public evidence for their conformity 
with the law. The rule of law has been generally associated with liberal 
values such as negative liberty and fair notice. In his seminal treatise on the 
rule of law, written in the mid-thirties, Franz Neumann described the rule 
of law as historically anchored in the liberal ideas and economic interests of 
the bourgeoisie. While many of Neumann’s observations remain definitive, 
the rule of law cannot be situated exclusively within the history of liberal 
ideas and reforms and seen as a response to distinctly liberal concerns. Rather, 
the various injunctions that are cited in the name of the rule of law are based 
on the proposition that the law originates outside the society in which it is 
in force. The rule of law is premised on the notion that ultimate law-making 
power does not vest among the living. This idea is neither distinctly liberal 
nor alien to the liberal tradition. Indeed, it is a fairly widespread if not 
universal idea. I will argue that the relegation of ultimate law-making power 
outside society and the observance of the prescriptions that make up the 
formal aspect of the rule of law are inseparable institutional achievements. 
The absence of sovereignty depends on society’s deference to the formal 
principles of the rule of law, which in turn depend on the projection of 
sovereignty outside society.
1 The Radzyner School of Law, The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. Earlier versions of this 
essay were presented at the British Academy conference in Izmir, the faculty seminar of 
the Radzyner School of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and a workshop on 
interdisciplinary approaches to the law organised by Michael Anderheiden and Stephan 
Kirste at the ZIF in Bielefeld. I am grateful to participants in the different discussions for 
their comments.
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I. Ancestral authority and the reconciliation of 
unity and plurality
The obvious objection to the assertion I just made would be that the rule of 
law does not depend on the transcendence of sovereignty because immanent 
sovereignty can constrain itself and abide by self-imposed rules and principles. 
Another response would be to deny that the fiction of a sovereign subject, 
immanent or transcendent, has a role to play in an account of the rule of 
law. The ‘abolition of sovereignty within the body politic of the republic’ was 
praised by Arendt as ‘perhaps the greatest American innovation in politics’ 
(Arendt 1963: 153). In the following paragraphs, I will outline one view of 
the contribution of theological notions of sovereignty to our understanding 
of the rule of law. According to the proposed view, the relegation of ultimate 
law-making power to an external realm conditions the transformation of 
lawless founding violence into principled violence.
I will suggest that the problem of violence to which the projection of 
sovereignty is the response does not consist in the war of all against all 
described by Hobbes but rather in total social cohesion. It consists in excess 
of unity rather than diversity. In the apolitical state to which philosophers 
refer as the state of nature, individuals are not set against each other but 
disappear into a single collective body, which devours its individual organs 
and in which sovereignty is vested. The passage from state of nature to rule 
of law proceeds through the dispersion of social unity. The rule of law pre-
sumes the reconciliation of unity and diversity among individuals. Employ-
ing the metaphor of projection, it can be said that founding violence is 
overcome through the expulsion of the sovereign collective body outside the 
social. The idea that the sovereign unity of society lies outside society is one 
that can be intuitively grasped. The projection of unity makes room for 
individuality and diversity within the social. It also implies that the contours 
of the social body are superimposed upon society by a transcendent principle. 
In other words, it is not up to society itself to draw its own boundaries in 
the normal course of affairs. Thus, the absence of sovereignty prevents society 
from excluding parts of itself from the protection of the law.
The dependence of the rule of law on the projection of sovereignty is illus-
trated in Aeschylus’ play Eumenides, one of the most illuminating literary 
investigations of the rule of law. The play charts the passage from archaic 
justice to legal disputation. Haunted by the furies (the Erinyes) for having 
murdered his mother Clytemnestra in order to avenge the blood of his father 
Agamemnon, the fate of Orestes is to be finally decided in court. Orestes is 
spared the torments inflicted by the Erinyes, the earthbound furies in charge 
of vengeance and retaliation. The passage from retaliation to legal resolution 
of disputes is accompanied by the transformation of the furies into benevolent 
beings (Eumenides) that guard the order laid down by the Olympian gods. The 
metamorphosis of the furies into benevolent beings can be read as an allegory 
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for the process of projection of sovereignty and the sacred (in particular, of 
the sovereign power over life and death) from the terrestrial sphere onto a 
superior realm with the foundation of a legal order.
In Greek mythology and in Aeschylus’ play, pre-political deities such as 
the Erinyes pervade the realm inhabited by humanity and perpetuate a cycle 
of violence. These deities were contrasted by the Greeks with the Olympian 
gods and goddesses of the polis.2 The terrestrial presence of the pre-Olympian 
deities leaves no space for rational human self-government and does not allow 
for legal regulation of social conflicts. The emergence of an independent 
temporal realm is signalled in the play by the transformation of the furies 
into protectors of the Olympian order and, before that happens, by Athena’s 
refusal to settle the conflict between Orestes and the Erinyes, by her decision 
to found instead a human court for homicide, and by the status that she and 
Apollo receive in court. Athena and Apollo behave in court like ordinary 
mortals. Their sanctity is not allowed to interfere with the logic of the legal 
proceeding. In the conclusion of the trial Athena insists that her vote for 
the acquittal of Orestes should count like any mortal vote. Apollo plays an 
unspectacular role in court as a witness and advocate of Orestes. The story 
of the furies, the savage, relentless agents of archaic justice, records the pro-
jection of sovereignty outside the space inhabited by humanity. The furies 
cease to wander freely across the earth; they are renamed benevolent beings 
and integrated into the polis as guardians of the order presided over by the 
Olympian gods. The setting apart of the human realm from the superior 
realm of the gods, notwithstanding the gods’ frequent intervention in human 
affairs, conditions the establishment of the rule of law.
Hobbes offers a different account of the process of projection through 
which peace and order are established. According to Hobbes, the pacification 
of the war of all against all is accomplished through the monopolisation 
of violence by an immanent sovereign, that is, by a living human being. 
Hobbes cared very little for the rule of law in the modern sense of the term. 
2 While classical scholars have often warned against simplifications and overstatements of 
the opposition between the two families of gods, the distinction between gods of the polis 
and pre-political gods has parallels in many religious systems. For example, in his account 
of Tallensi religion Fortes records a distinction between ancestors and the wild ‘bush sprites’. 
The latter, in contrast to the ancestors, ‘are not mystical agencies ritually incorporated in 
the total system of human social life and therefore having mystical rights to intervene in 
human affairs. There are no shrines or altars at which they can be approached. In short, they 
do not complement or even contrast with humanity; they simply negate all that is human, 
being totally lawless and without any moral capacity, such as is vested in the socially in-
corporated mystical agencies’ (Fortes 1987: 260). On the primordial and implacable nature 
of the Erinyes in comparison to the Olympian gods, see Sewell-Rutter (2007) at 88. Sewell-
Rutter lists a number of interpretations of the pacification of the Erinyes in Aeschylus’ play 
which differ from the proposed interpretation associating pacification with the projection 
of sovereignty.
9780415566810_C01.indd   25 5/16/11   3:25:53 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
26 Islam, law and identity
The Hobbesian sovereign exercises founding violence permanently. While 
the Hobbesian sovereign is not supposed to show respect for the rule of 
law in the first place, the reasons for which Hobbes’ social design fails to 
tame the violence of the state of nature entail that immanent conceptions 
of sovereignty will fail to secure the rule of law even when they purport 
to do so.
Contrary to Hobbes’ prediction, the war of all against all and the uncer-
tainty of the state of nature are bound to persist as long as ultimate law-
making power remains immanent and self-grounded. As long as power lacks 
an extra-social sanction it remains factional and retaliatory, even where man-
made law wears the guise of generality and neutrality. Without a superimposed 
normative framework that dictates the scope of jurisdiction, and in which 
any claim to power must be grounded, officials and ordinary citizens alike 
will have no certainty as to who enjoys the protection of the law. Citizens 
will be as uncertain as they were in the state of nature, and civil war will be 
perpetuated. Only once a superimposed principle delineates jurisdiction and 
constrains the pleasure of the king can the law serve as a neutral mediator 
of disputes between factions.
Hobbes would concede the allegation that law and power remain in his 
account factional. His response to the intransigent partiality of power consists in 
urging citizens to erase any trace of individuality and difference and to form 
a single faction headed by the sovereign. By sacrificing their individuality 
citizens are likely to evade the wrath of the sovereign and somewhat improve 
their condition in comparison to the state of nature. Hobbes does not in fact 
ask citizens to renounce their innermost beliefs, only to pretend in public 
that they endorse the sovereign’s.
Contrary to the Hobbesian scenario, the display of absolute unanimity would 
only heighten distrust among citizens and between subject and sovereign. 
It will fail to produce civic peace. This is illustrated in Hegel’s reflections 
on Terror in his account of the French Revolution. Once the Revolution 
dissolved the objective social differences that made up the old regime, order 
could only be conceived in terms of absolute oneness. The demand of 
universal and absolute loyalty to a common cause, Hegel’s account shows, 
escalates violence since every individual seems to constitute a separate faction. 
Every individual, as an individual, is suspected of conspiracy and deviance: 
‘.  .  .  subjective virtue, whose sway is based on disposition only, brings  .  .  .  the 
most fearful tyranny’ (Hegel 1944: at 450).3 While Hobbes, unlike the 
Jacobins, does not expect the sovereign truth to penetrate the minds and 
hearts of individual citizens, the imperative of complete outward accord 
would trigger suspicion and terror even without an expectation of ‘subjective 
3 On Terror as the realization of abstract reason’s tendency to eradicate any instance of par-
ticularity, see Hegel (1977) at 359 – 60.
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virtue’. When the protection of the law depends on loyalty, overt or covert, 
and not on status bestowed by a superimposed principle, it is bound to be 
uncertain and to inspire both conspiracy and suspicions of conspiracy. Indeed, 
totalitarian regimes which followed several of Hobbes’ recipes offered a spectre 
of uncertainty that approximated the Hobbesian state of nature more closely 
than any other regime.
It is thus questionable whether rational considerations of self-preservation 
will lead individuals to resign their natural freedom to an immanent sovereign 
as Hobbes asks them to do. In exchange for a complete waiver of autonomy, 
the members of Leviathan are subjected to a constant threat of denunciation 
and persecution. Immanent sovereignty entails terror. Furthermore, the dangers 
of immanent sovereignty are greater than what can be gathered on the basis 
of the Hobbesian assumption of man’s self-preserving rationality. Historical 
evidence of senseless bloodshed in episodes such as civil wars, revolutions, 
interregna and carnivals suggests that the presence of sovereignty sets self-
preserving rationality in abeyance.4 Once sovereign, arbitrary power over life 
pervades society, ruthless violence is unleashed. The affirmation of life, on 
which the Hobbesian social contract is premised, can no longer be taken for 
granted. Violence is asserted for its own sake by a society which, as medieval 
and early modern society perceived itself during carnival, sheds its humanity 
and is temporarily given over to sinister powers.
Monopolisation of violence by an immanent sovereign can pacify the war 
of all against all only as a transitional measure. Violence will have to undergo 
two further, interdependent transformations which were rejected by Hobbes: it 
will have to become principled and impersonal, and to be grounded in a 
principle that is superimposed upon the living. The renunciation of sover-
eignty on the part of the living creates the social conditions which give rise 
to self-preserving rationality. It endows the subject’s status as a subject of 
the law with determinacy, relieving the uncertainty of the Hobbesian state 
of nature. It allows for the accommodation, and legal regulation, of social 
divides within a single political body whose boundaries are superimposed 
upon the polity.
The Hobbesian account of the war of all against all in the state of nature 
is one among several possible points of departure for an account of the origins 
of sovereignty. According to an alternative line of thought, the political 
institution of sovereignty is meant to alleviate a condition of interpersonal 
communion rather than interpersonal strife. The state of nature can be con-
ceived in terms of excessive unity rather than excessive division. Contrary to 
Hobbes’ position, the role of the political is to overcome, not to generate, 
conformity. In the state of nature, with the absolute conformity which 
4 See, for example, Paravicini-Bagliani’s account of ritual plundering in Rome prior to the 
election of a new pope; Paravicini-Bagliani (2000), pp. 99 –107, 150 –155.
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characterises it, the group enacts its collective body. Since sovereignty vests 
in the collective body, the state of nature is one of immanent sovereignty. 
The presence of the collective body collapses boundaries between individuals 
as well as between the living and the dead, since the collective body is 
the common body of all generations.5 I use the terms communal body and 
corporate body to designate the collective body in two different positions 
that it can occupy in relation to the social: the ‘communal body’ designates 
the collective body of all generations when it is enacted by the group while 
the ‘corporate body’ refers to the collective body once projected outside the 
social. When the group contains its sovereign unity, no room is left for the 
law as a mediator between alienated and antagonistic groups and individuals 
and between generations. Individuation and the rule of law depend on the 
projection of the sovereign collective body outside the social.
The two accounts of the social predicament to which the projection of 
sovereignty can be the response – oneness and fragmentation – are not as 
inconsistent as they appear. Excessive unity and excessive fragmentation are 
two sides of the same coin. Hobbes’ depiction of atomisation and dispersal 
in the state of nature turns into a spectre of total social conformity. As 
Hegel’s discussion of Terror shows, atomisation and uprootedness lead to 
absolute social uniformity which leads back to fragmentation and civil war. 
Arendt’s comments on the loneliness of the individual in the midst of the 
totalitarian crowd expand upon Hegel’s observations (Arendt 1973: 476). 
‘Groundless’ individuals, namely, individuals whose identity is not solidly 
grounded in objective social and legal categories that are in turn anchored 
in transcendent authority, disappear into a collective body which then dis-
bands and sets them against each other. The enactment of the collective body 
in transitional ‘constitutional moments’ makes society appear at the same 
time totally fragmented and totally unified. The presence of the sovereign 
collective body unleashes destructiveness and self-destructiveness which 
compel its projection. The projection of the collective body outside the social 
anchors the social order in an external foundation, a mythical reference which 
endows society with unity while allowing it to accommodate and adjudicate 
factional divides.
When projected outside the social, the collective body of all generations 
is personified by ancestral authority since ancestors are taken to extend through 
the bodies of their descendants across the generations.6 The projection of the 
oneness of the group onto the realm of the ancestors means that communal 
bonds are loosened in favour of an overarching legal unity. Ancestral law comes 
to embody the unity of society in a way that allows for the reconciliation of 
5 On sovereignty, intergenerational communion and the body corporate, see Barshack (2006b), 
p. 185 and Barshack (2009).
6 On ancestors and the social body, see Fortes (1969) at 304.
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unity and division within the social. By dispelling communal unity and 
ordaining interpersonal separation and a separation of powers, ancestral law 
establishes itself as the repository of any unity that can still be attributed to 
society.7
Traditional representations of the law in different media – learned, figura-
tive, ritual, or oral-popular – point to law’s origin in ancestral authority. 
Moreover, cultural representations of ancestors rarely omit references to their 
juridical capacities. Ancestors are depicted as sovereign in the lands inhabited 
by their descendants and as members of an ultimate tribunal whose infallible 
decisions are appropriately never fully predictable.8 Mythical law-givers, 
founders of dynasties, and the founding fathers and mothers of modern nation 
states count among the more familiar instances of law-giving ancestral authority. 
While many of these figures are historical, their authority is embedded in 
narratives which display repetitive mythical patterns.9
The origin of the law in ancestral authority entails that behind the chang-
ing positive articulations of the law lies an ancestral law which binds all 
generations. I will refer to ancestral law interchangeably as eternal law, higher 
law or fundamental law, notwithstanding historical variations between these 
terms and possible analytical distinctions between categories of norms that 
claim an ancestral origin.10 The eternity in question derives from the idea of 
corporate perpetuity, the potentially or fictively perpetual succession of 
generations, not from the metaphysical notions of eternity that informed 
Aquinas’s philosophy of law. Eternal law is explicitly or implicitly recognised 
by legal systems in the official narratives of their origins. Such accounts legal 
systems have of their historical and normative foundations blend ancestral law 
and ancestral myth. Legal systems come into being through the postulation 
of an ancestral authority which vindicates the claims of a political centre for 
universal jurisdiction. The unity of law in a legal system is produced through 
 7 On law as a national symbol, see Beaune (1991) at 245 – 65.
 8 In an essay on ancestral authority, Meyer Fortes gathered observations on the jural aspects of 
ancestral authority scattered throughout his extensive work. Fortes writes: ‘The ancestors 
are the ultimate source of life both for the individual and, much more obviously of course, 
for the descent group which would not exist if there had been no ancestors. But this 
implies the converse: that ancestors have the sole right and power to terminate the life 
of an individual or of a corporate group, phrased often in terms of summoning the deceased 
as if before a judicial tribunal’. [.  .  .] ‘Ancestors are projected as figures of authority to 
whom powers of life and death are attributed – judicial figures – rather than bountiful 
deities’ (Fortes 1976: 1, at 12, 14). While the model of descent groups that is associated 
with the British school of structural anthropology does not apply to all societies, the 
general category of ancestral authority is much more broadly applicable. For an argument 
to that effect see, for example, Scheffler (1966), pp. 541–51.
 9 On analogies between legends that relate the achievements of different lawgivers, see 
Szegedy-Maszak (1978), pp. 199 –209.
10 On the history of the term ‘fundamental law’ and of other terms denoting types of higher 
law, see Thompson (1986) at 1103.
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the imposition of a standard ancestral reference, the establishment of an 
official pantheon. Jurisdiction is a relationship between the subject and 
ancestral authority, a relationship in which the humanity of the subject is 
anchored since it is ancestral law which disperses the communal body and 
clears the temporal realm for habitation by the living.
Finley has observed that the idea of ancestral law recurs across civilisations 
and historical periods because it is rooted in the temporal structure of human 
existence. In an essay entitled ‘The ancestral constitution’ Finley remarked 
that the grounds of the ancestral constitution lie ‘in the very nature of man, 
who alone possesses both memory and the prescience of inevitable death, 
leading unconsciously to a desire, a need, for something that will create a 
feeling of continuity and permanence’ (Finley 1975: 34, at 47). While Finley’s 
view of the ancestral constitution as a response to the temporal predicament 
of humanity is illuminating, it seems to me that he misconceived the nature 
of that predicament. According to Finley, the authority of the ancestral 
constitution stems from the continuity it forges between the generations 
and which alleviates the sense of transience and futility that besets human 
existence. Contrary to Finley’s suggestion, I have argued that the primary 
role of ancestral law is to separate rather than connect the generations: 
ancestral law disbands the communion of the generations that takes place when 
society enacts its sovereign collective body (Barshack 2009). The temporal 
predicament of humanity consists in the arrest of time that results from the 
simultaneous presence of all generations in the ‘state of nature’ and in con-
stitutional moments. Once the collective body is projected outside the social, 
the generations succeed each other in time instead of being simultaneously 
present. By transforming the communal into a corporate body ancestral law 
launches the flow of time.
A general point which can be raised in relation to the subject’s fidelity to 
ancestral authority is that social aversion toward the law is as crucial to the 
rule of law as the love of law. The externality of law to the social can be 
preserved only if a tension between the law and social practices, modes of 
enjoyment and aspirations, is maintained. The rule of law is consistent with 
large-scale deviance and is conditioned by a fair amount thereof. One of the 
most reliable indications for the vigour of the rule of law in a society is the 
cultivation of certain forms of transgression accompanied by a measure of 
laxity in law enforcement. The rule of law is animated and sustained by 
regular instances of transgression on the part of citizens and, as we shall see, 
even branches of government. The following sections sketch an understanding 
of the rule of law that is centred on the idea of ancestral law, through a cursory 
overview of central questions in the theories of legislative, judicial and 
executive powers. I cannot even begin to do justice to the complexity of these 
questions in the present discussion. My aim is only to suggest how they can 
be approached from a perspective in political theology which, unlike Schmitt’s, 
takes the rule of law seriously.
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II. Lawmaking
A. Myths of immanent sovereignty (divine kingship and 
parliamentary sovereignty)
One of the guises in which ancestral law appears in different cultures is that 
of immemorial custom. The prominence of custom accounts for the arduous 
crystallisation of the modern concept of legislation. While modern notions 
of the rule of law regard custom with distrust and champion legislation as 
a source of law which can provide individuals with accurate information 
about their rights and duties in changing social conditions, the idea of cus-
tom captures the core of the rule of law, the view of the past as a legitimate 
source of constraints upon the living.
Historians of the common law debated the approximate point in history 
in which legislation had been distinguished from the articulation and ap-
plication of existing custom. McIlwain famously argued that the concept of 
legislation was not clearly distinguished from application before the seven-
teenth century, and that until then parliament was regarded primarily as a 
court of justice (see, in particular, McIlwain 1910). Acts of parliament were 
perceived as articulations and restatements of existing custom devised for the 
instruction of lower courts. The debates to which McIlwain’s claims gave rise 
reveal an underlying agreement over the prominence of ancestral, immemor-
ial law. Some of his critics have argued that a concept of legislation as strictly 
distinct from mere application of custom emerged earlier than he thought. 
This critique does not challenge the idea of ancestral law because it is not 
contested that statutes, however sharply distinguished from judicial decisions, 
were still conceived as bound by higher law (see, for example, Plucknett 1962). 
Furthermore, the difficulties that beset the crystallisation of the modern idea of 
legislation attest to the tenacity of the idea of ancestral custom irrespectively 
of the precise or approximate date in which this conceptual crystallisation 
took place.
Another response to McIlwain’s argument consisted in challenging the 
very notion of permanent custom which his account allegedly presupposed. 
Various critics have claimed that custom itself was ever-changing rather than 
stagnant, and that legislation, before being clearly distinguished as a separate 
source of law, formed part of the ongoing and varied activities through which 
custom recast itself.11 This line of thought, too, only demonstrates the persistence 
11 Plucknett writes: ‘.  .  .  our common law is custom, and  .  .  .  the various modes of legal 
change in the reign of Edward I were conceived (if this interpretation can be sustained) 
as being changes within that mass of fluctuating customary law  .  .  .’ (Plucknett 1962: 
10 –20). See also Cheyette (1963), p. 362. For Plucknett’s initial critique of McIlwain, see 
Plucknett (1922) at 26 –30. As McIlwain explained, he had never contested the fact that 
parliament made and changed law, only that it conceived of its role in terms of law-making. 
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of the idea of ancestral law. The all-inclusiveness and liberality of custom 
reveal the robust sense of continuity which was attributed to the law, and 
which was undisturbed by constant innovations and adaptations. In fact, the 
idea of ancestral law as a mediator between the generations implies legal 
continuity through change, a formula which captures each generation’s simul-
taneous identity with and difference from all other generations.
In The Concept of Law Hart famously argued against theories of immanent 
sovereignty, such as Hobbes’ and Austin’s, that ‘The statement that a new 
legislator has a right to legislate presupposes the existence, in the social 
group, of the rule under which he has this right’ (Hart 1961: 58). The fallacy 
of Hobbes’ theory consists in its attempt to perpetuate a state of divine 
kingship. A political authority that emanates entirely from personal charisma 
or naked power can only be short lived. It can exist in periods of foundation, 
transition or abrupt decline (De Heusch 1962: 215 – 63). While the divine 
king embodies the charisma of the founding moment, his successors derive 
their authority from an established principle. Authority comes to be vested in 
kingship as an office and loses its personal, private character.12 Prototypically, 
the office of pater familias subjects its changing occupants to a law personified 
by the lineage founder and renders them mere guardians of the family’s 
property and long-term interests. Similarly, the king is obliged to exercise 
his power as guardian of the interests of the realm as a cross-generational 
entity.13 He is constrained by fundamental laws that safeguard the interests 
of future generations in the name of an ancestral authority that decreed the 
perpetuity of descent and of the realm.
See McIlwain’s brief review of Gough’s Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History 
in McIlwain (1955), pp. 109 –110.
12 Historians have often traced the emergence of a system of offices – and, by implication, 
of the rule of law – to the Gregorian Reform. The separation between the temporal and 
spiritual realms in the Gregorian Reform secularised the royal body and turned kingship 
into an office. On the impersonalisation of authority, see Strayer (1970), p. 6, Wolter 
(1997), pp. 17–36, and Hollister and Baldwin (1978), pp. 867–905. According to 
Cheyette, the distinctions between office/person, rule of law/rule of man, public/private 
crystallised in the second half of the eleventh century; see Cheyette (1978), pp. 143–78. 
For a wealth of illustrations of the secularisation and professionalisation of kingship in 
the course of the twelfth century, see Leyser (1982), pp. 241– 67. See also Mayali (1992), 
pp. 129 – 49.
13 It has often been remarked that the theory that the divine right of kings exempted the 
monarch, in his various capacities, from subjection to higher law is not in tune with 
dominant views in the history of Western constitutional thought. The very idea of divine 
right implies that royal power is circumscribed by higher law. On medieval constitution-
alism generally, see McIlwain (1947), chapters 4, 5. On the history of fundamental law 
in England, see Gough (1961), p. 45, especially the claim that the medieval belief in the 
supremacy of natural law was shared by early modern lawyers. On inalienability, see 
Kantorowicz (1954), pp. 488 –502. On fundamental law in France, see Lemaire (1907) 
and Giesey (1961). For a recent discussion, see Taylor (2001), p. 358.
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Hart’s critique of Austin demonstrates that the rule that confers law-
making powers upon a king establishes an intergenerational continuity that 
is characteristic of legal systems. Hart did not make the further step of 
recognising that in order to establish intergenerational continuity social rules 
have to be perceived as issuing from an ancestral, fictive authority which 
endows successive generations with a common identity. Hart also did not 
recognise that the rules that confer law-making power impose enforceable 
substantial constraints on that power. He admitted, however, that ‘.  .  .  it 
is difficult to give general criteria which satisfactorily distinguish mere pro-
visions as to “manner and form” of legislation or definitions of the legislative 
body from “substantial limitations”’ (Hart 1961: 70, 75).
This is a statement which Hart makes in relation to parliaments and which 
equally undermines the theories of absolute monarchy and parliamentary 
sovereignty. Hart seems to concede here the familiar argument that any answer 
to questions such as ‘What is the parliament?’ and ‘Who are its members?’ will 
imply substantial limitations on legislative power in addition to limitations of 
manner and form. These substantial limitations stem from the cross-generational 
nature of the common good. Parliaments, like kings, derive their law-making 
power from rules and principles that establish intergenerational continuity 
and impose substantial constraints on the law-making powers of the living 
in the interest of other generations and of corporate perpetuity. The parlia-
ment, like other instances of temporal power, makes decisions about the 
common good for the foreseeable future and these must comply with ancestral 
law since the foreseeable future partakes of eternity.
Advocates of parliamentary sovereignty would respond that even if the 
existence of substantial constraints on law-making power is granted, the 
courts are not necessarily the best guardians of the ancestral constitution. 
The parliament’s take on the demands of ancestral law and the interests 
of other generations, they would argue, should be final. Contrary to such a 
position, I believe that the well-nigh universal idea of an ancestral constitution 
is inseparable from that of enforceable substantial constraints upon the law-
making power of the living. In the first place, the very idea of ancestral 
law depends on, and in turn decrees, the waiver of institutional omnipotence, 
that is, a genuine division of powers between branches of government that 
secures the projection of sovereignty outside the social. The second reason is 
that a doctrine of parliamentary (or royal) sovereignty is interwoven into an 
entire network of principles, doctrines and conventions that makes up the 
core of a legal tradition, of custom, or of an ancestral constitution. As such, 
it is interpreted and qualified in the light of other doctrines and principles. 
As I have briefly hinted above, due to the dynamic nature of intergenerational 
relations the ancestral constitution is not a stagnant law; its implementation 
involves an ever-innovative negotiation between legal principles, doctrines 
and conventions. Once a concrete doctrine of immanent sovereignty such as 
parliamentary sovereignty is subjected to continuous re-interpretation, it is 
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likely to become qualified due to the gradual crystallisation of its own under-
lying reasons and of competing principles, the incessant transformation of 
institutional configurations and the recurrence of hard cases. This argument was 
mounted in the debate on parliamentary sovereignty in Britain by Paul Craig 
and other public lawyers identified in recent years as the school of common law 
constitutionalism (CLC). T.R.S. Allan, Paul Craig and others have convinc-
ingly insisted on the seemingly innocuous proposition that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is itself a doctrine of common law. Whether or 
not the rule of recognition differs from other legal rules in the ways indicated 
by Hart, it is interwoven into the fabric of the common law body of doctrine. 
As such, it might be challenged in certain circumstances, it can be asked to 
justify itself and it is exposed to limitations and qualifications.14
B. Generality
According to Neumann, the generality of laws is the kernel of the rule of 
law and the source of the other dictates associated with it. Neumann regarded 
the prohibition on retroactivity and the separation between law-making and 
law-applying powers as institutional guarantees of the generality of law. He 
traced the advent of generality to the rise of competitive bourgeois society. 
Generality, he argued, expressed the bourgeoisie’s interest and belief in open 
economic competition and enabled the spread of capitalism (Neumann 1986: 
213). The roots of generality and of the maxims that derive from it can be seen 
as theological rather than economic. If constituent power dwells outside society, 
higher law and the ordinary laws that are deduced from higher law have to 
be general. A transcendent lawgiver is blind to the personal circumstances 
of individual subjects and has no partisan stake in the feuds and rivalries 
that divide the group of his or her descendants. Higher law was fictively laid 
down by the ancestors at the beginning of time in order to govern the lives 
of their descendants ever after. It must be abstract and impersonal. Insofar 
as ordinary legislation is a concretisation of higher law, it should by and large 
partake of its generality and impersonality.15
14 Craig called for a renewed ‘awareness of the need for principled justifications for the existence 
of sovereign power’, an awareness revealed by the ‘constitutional discourse of previous 
generations’ (Craig 2000: 224). For an attempt to ground parliamentary omnipotence in 
the theory of the rule of recognition, see Goldsworthy (1999).
15 In tribal societies, ancestral law often comprises non-general norms which prescribe an 
allocation of territories or constitutional powers among particular, named clans. In such 
cases, the law records a founding treaty between the different clans which fixed certain 
allocations for perpetuity. Fortes describes how Tallensi law allocates offices among different 
groups of clans in a way that made sense of the founding myth of Tallensi. See Fortes (1968), 
pp. 53– 88, 65, 78. The system of statuses and privileges that made up pre-modern European 
law can be largely understood in terms of the legal and political device of constituent 
distribution of resources among descent groups that are united under a single jurisdiction.
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Once we shift the focus from the law-givers to the subjects of the law, the 
externality of sovereignty seems to entail generality because it entails equality 
among the subjects of the law. While criteria for the attribution of humane-
ness are historically and culturally variable, they typically establish a relation 
to ancestral law which places humans in a an equal position vis-à-vis the law. 
Individual bodies are humanised, that is, disentangled from the collective 
body, through the protection of ancestral law which endows each individual 
with a package of rights and entitlements that safeguard individuation. To 
have legal status means to enjoy equal rights by virtue of shared descent and 
the equal standing vis-à-vis ancestral law which descent implies.16 The notion 
that all citizens should be treated with equal concern and respect is rooted 
in the position of the living before a law of which they are not the principal 
authors. It is beyond my present capacity to assess how thick this notion of 
equality is, but contrary to the view of legal philosophers of analytical bent 
generality is not only a logical feature of the language of the law.17 It is 
inseparable from some notion of substantial equality. The Nuremberg laws, 
for example, while general in their formal structure – they did not refer to 
individual Jews by proper names – violated the thinnest conceivable notion of 
equality and hence the externality of sovereignty to the legal system. Leaving 
aside the question of their legal validity, the Nuremberg laws amounted to a 
manifestation of immanent sovereignty and were contrary to the rule of law.
According to Neumann, the prohibition on retroactive legislation derives 
from the idea of generality. Retroactive legislation can be more easily tailored 
to handle particular persons and events, implicating the law in retaliatory 
violence. Neumann writes: ‘If law provides for an indefinite number of future 
individual cases, a retroactive law cannot possibly be law; because those facts 
already realized are computable, and therefore the law is confronted with a 
definite number of particular cases’ (see Neumann 1986: 222). Cicero linked 
retroactivity to lack of generality in his implacable orations against Verres, 
a Roman provincial governor who was brought to justice in Rome for grave 
abuses of power. Cicero accused Verres of applying new rules of inheritance 
to past testaments in order to divert the course of one particular bequest.18 
Throughout history, retroactive legislation has been deemed abominable 
because it re-enacts retaliatory violence by collapsing the correlative imper-
sonality of the makers and the subjects of the law. It has been considered 
tolerable only in certain dramatic constitutional moments, such as revolutions, 
in which the polity’s break with its own past and the redefinition of the body 
16 Descent is of course a symbolic rather than biological category. On equality as a funda-
mental feature of corporate descent groups, see Fortes (1969), p. 304.
17 For an example of the analytical approach, see Marmor (2004), pp. 1, 11. For a critique 
of the thin, formalistic reading of the idea of equality contained in the rule of law, see 
Allan (2001). Allan bases his critique on political morality, not constitutional theology.
18 Cicero, Second Speech against Verres, Book I, sections 41– 4.
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politic allow the use of retroactive legislation. Even retroactive dispensations 
such as amnesties are typically limited to constitutional moments, such as 
interregna, declarations of independence, states of emergency, changes of regime, 
and inter- and intra-national reconciliations.19
III. The rule of law in court: a note on  
the anthropology of interpretation
When applied to adjudication, the rule of law requires that courts should 
derive their decisions from pre-existing law. The rule of law is often thought 
to entail the vague method known as judicial formalism. According to the 
formalist view of adjudication, crudely characterised, when courts decide cases 
they use a toolbox of distinctly legal reasons – for example, the obligatory 
force of precedent – whose operative consequences in each case tend to be 
straightforward and uncontroversial, and which are placed in relation to each 
other within the overall structure of a legal argument by a second-order legal 
rule, such as Hart’s rule of recognition. While such a view of adjudication 
has little to do with reality, it plays a role in the self-understanding of par-
ticipants in the judicial ritual and in certain justifications of judicial power. 
Formalism has been regarded as a component of the rule of law because it 
seems to draw the contrast between lawmaking and application with par-
ticular starkness and to guarantee in this way the generality and prospectivity 
of the law. It seems to provide a solid institutional anchor for the distinction 
between legislation and application which dispels sovereign presence. However, 
on closer examination the idea of absent sovereignty turns out to challenge 
rather than call for formalism. The absence of sovereignty renders every 
application of the law, in Dworkin’s words, thoroughly interpretive.
The association of the rule of law with formalism underlies a view of 
judicial controversy as a hindrance to the rule of law. Several authors have 
argued against this assumption that interpretive controversy forms one of 
the essential manifestations of the rule of law. Dworkin’s portrayal of the rule 
of law as a quest for the realisation of the political rights of parties to legal 
disputes implies the inevitability of interpretive controversies over the con-
tent and scope of rights.20 Neil MacCormick suggested that argumentation 
should be viewed as a component of the rule of law since it reduces the 
arbitrariness of state power. Argumentation, for MacCormick, extends beyond 
traditional legal arguments to encompass almost any appeal to reason. The 
rule of law requires that defendants in criminal and civil proceedings be 
19 On amnesties, see Gacon (2002).
20 As conceived by Dworkin, interpretation does not detract from the generality and 
prospectivity of the law because it does not involve judicial creativity of any sort; 
see Dworkin (1986) at 11–17.
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given the opportunity to challenge legal certainties by appeal to a wide range 
of reasons in a way that detracts from the predictability of judicial decisions 
(MacCormick 1999: 163).
Martti Koskenniemi has observed that the kernel of the rule of law lies 
not in adherence to rules but in argumentation over how law’s ‘functional 
objectives’ are to orient the application of rules: ‘.  .  .  the rule of law  .  .  .  relates 
to the way the law-applier (administrator, public official, lawyer) approaches 
the task of judging within the narrow space between fixed textual under-
standings (positivism) on the one hand, and predetermined functional objec-
tives (naturalism) on the other, without endorsing the proposition that the 
decisions emerge from a “legal nothing” (decisionism)’ (Koskenniemi 2007: 12). 
The rule of law is realised through the ‘constitutional mindset of interpretation’. 
Adopting a Kantian perspective on law and autonomy, Koskenniemi claims 
that the underlying values of the Kantian worldview should orient the 
application of laws because constitutionalism and respect for law are grounded 
in that worldview. In other words, these values are inherent in the enterprise 
of law. He writes:
The Pietist search for self-improvement, Bildung, and spiritual perfection 
prepares a constitutionalist mindset from which to judge the world in a 
manner that aims for universality, impartiality, and all the virtues of the 
inner morality of law: honesty, fairness, concern for others, the prohibition 
of deceit, injury, and coercion. Though this is a vocabulary of moral 
regeneration, it is also the vocabulary of constitutionalism.
 (Koskenniemi 2007: 33)
While I agree with Koskenniemi that certain values are inherent in legal 
interpretation, I shall argue that these inherent values do not derive from a 
Pietist understanding of moral regeneration, or from any other moral doctrine, 
but from the fiction of absent sovereignty on which interpretation in law 
(and elsewhere) is premised.
The persistence of interpretive controversy is a consequence of absent 
sovereignty. The externality of sovereignty compels a resort to interpretation 
and is in turn consolidated by practices of interpretation. Externality implies 
the existence of a layer of hidden meanings behind that of the legal materials 
haphazardly accumulated in the course of history. The fiction of a hidden law 
that infuses the entire legal system with life and meaning ties legal materials 
to their presumed absent origin, the source of their unity. Moreover, contrary 
to Hart’s account of the standard legal case in The Concept of Law, no viable 
conception of the judicial role can spare judges the obligation to uncover the 
law that lies behind the surface. Hidden meaning has to be constantly mined 
in order to regenerate the authenticity of the text and of its message, which 
cannot rest solely on the circumstances in which the text originated. Inter-
pretive controversy establishes the status of the text as a repository of higher 
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law and reason and makes possible the recovery of its ‘proclamation’, as 
Gadamer would describe the process. It endows the text with ever-renewed 
relevance and authority. In order to animate perpetual controversy, higher 
law must remain elusive and unfathomable. It can never be fully spelled out 
by the courts.
As ‘priests of the law’, judges are obliged to find answers to legal questions 
within established legal materials. Neumann argues compellingly that this 
conception of judicial authority is equally fundamental in continental and 
common law systems. The power of common law judges to set precedents, 
Neumann argues, is merely that of correctly applying existing precedents to 
novel situations. Continental and common law systems are equally premised on 
the fiction, championed by Blackstone and Montesquieu, that judges declare 
existing law.21 However, existing law must remain perennially uncodifiable and 
controversial if it is to retain a link to its absent source of reason, legitimacy 
and vitality. Every court decision, as Dworkin argues, rests on a complex and 
contested interpretation of an entire history of a legal system. Viewed in light 
of the idea of corporate perpetuity, the goal of such synoptic interpretations 
is the articulation of an ancestral law that binds all generations.
The claim that courts are obliged to engage in a pursuit of higher law 
lends support to the conception of judicial review known as common law 
constitutionalism (CLC). According to CLC, modern constitutional judicial 
review is just a subcategory of a general inherent judicial power to review 
laws made by the living. Leading exponents of CLC, such as T.R.S. Allan 
and Paul Craig, find in Coke’s judgements in Dr Bonham’s case and other 
cases a prime illustration of their approach. Among the theoretical influences 
on CLC, Dworkin’s has been particularly consistent. Allan and Craig ground 
CLC in the assertion that the common law is an embodiment of reason. 
Another possible ground for CLC – one which derives from the present 
understanding of the rule of law – is the assertion that the common law 
embodies ancestral law. The two arguments coincide if reason is understood 
in terms of a circumspect adherence to ancestral law and custom. Coke under-
stood in this way the common law’s claim to embody reason. Coke’s view of 
the role of ancestral law and immemorial custom in common law illuminates 
the workings and claims of interpretation in many other, if not all, legal 
traditions. Craig seems to endorse today Coke’s flexible association of reason 
21 Both systems assume ‘that the legal system is closed and that every decision is a mere 
application of a code, a statute, or of customary law’ (Neumann 1986: 246). But in nei-
ther system, Neumann adds, can decisions be straightforwardly deduced from the law. 
Neumann challenges the presumed contrast between common and civil law: ‘.  .  .  the 
belief that an appropriate clause in a statute or in a code can easily be found and as easily 
determined, is obviously a myth, as everyone knows who is even slightly conversant with 
Continental law’ (Neumann 1986: 242).
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and tradition.22 Allan advocates a more ambitious account of the common 
law’s intrinsic reason. He views disputation in court as a paradigm of rational 
public deliberation and implies that the principles that evolve in common law 
are the most philosophically defensible moral principles.23
As an ordinary feature of adjudication, interpretive controversy not only 
reflects the externality of sovereignty but reproduces and consolidates this 
externality. It dispels sovereign presence and underscores the boundary between 
the living and the dead. Interpretation can be viewed as a generative, liminal 
practice which postulates hidden meanings through the fabrication of con-
troversy. Scant familiarity with learned discourses in law, religion or criticism 
suffices to disclose that interpretation not only responds to problems of mean-
ing but amplifies and multiplies them. In literature and the other arts, as in 
theology and law, the purpose of interpretation is to set up a superior realm 
occupied by an absolute other who looms large behind the human author, and 
with whom readers communicate through the artwork.24 The more intense the 
controversies over the meaning of an artwork or of scripture, the more abstract 
and elusive its divine author. The protestant idea that each believer is an 
authoritative interpreter of scripture pushes the correlation between the tran-
scendence of the author and the plurality and individuality of interpretations 
to an extreme. Any centripetal move toward the sealing and reification of 
scripture, whether in literature, theology or law, leads to a centrifugal pressure 
toward dispersal of meanings. Any process of codification and canonisation is 
accompanied by a parallel elaboration and sophistication of interpretive tools.
By cultivating the differentiation between layers of meaning, practices of 
interpretation reproduce the corporate structure of society as a structure that 
is premised on the absence of the intergenerational, sovereign unity of the 
group. Without the critical construal of man-made law in the light of higher 
law, sovereignty would be re-appropriated by the living. The law would 
become incapable of safeguarding individual rights vis-à-vis a unified and 
unfettered community. The formal conditions of the rule of law, such as 
generality and prospectivity, can be secured for long only where man-made 
law is subject to interpretation in the light of ancestral law. At the same 
time, however, the liminality of interpretation implies that interpretation 
22 Coke famously stated in Dr Bonham’s case that ‘when an act of Parliament is against 
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law 
will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void’. Craig embraces a traditional common 
law model in which ‘[t]he common law was seen as being based on reason and principle, 
and could be fashioned to meet the challenges of a new age’ (Craig 2000: 211, at 234). 
On the CLC school, see Poole (2003), p. 435.
23 On the rationality of deliberation in common law courts, see Allan (2001), pp. 75 – 85, 
290.
24 On art as a medium through which individuals contemplate the corporate unity of the 
group, see Barshack (2010).
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occasions a moment of sovereign decision that violates the law’s generality and 
prospectivity. The sovereign character of judicial decisions is already implicit 
in the claim that interpretive practices regenerate order by fabricating inter-
pretive controversies. However solemn and sedentary, interpretation refounds 
the normative order through its suspension. The authority of the judiciary 
probably derives from the liminal, sovereign character of interpretation much 
as it does from the contradictory and more explicit fiction that judges apply 
existing law. The interpreter, like top executive power, occupies a liminal 
position between constituent and constituted powers, a point which has been 
elaborated in different ways in discussions of the place of paradox in the law.
The liminality of interpretation, like that of other activities, can be under-
stood by reference to the idea of the collective body of the group. Liminal 
practices and activities render the sovereign, intergenerational unity of the 
group immediately present and then re-establish the normative order through 
repetition of the founding projection of sovereignty outside the social.25 The 
enactment of the communal body implies the dissolution of the normative 
order as a network of boundaries among the living as well as between the 
living and the dead. The projection of the collective body re-establishes spatial 
boundaries among the living and temporal boundaries between the gener-
ations. Gadamer’s notion of fusion of horizons captures the liminal experience of 
intergenerational fusion that occurs in interpretation: the distance between 
the present moment and the founding revelation, between the living and the 
dead, is suspended.
Needless to say, in interpretation liminality is highly domesticated. The 
interpreter’s appropriation of sovereignty is tame because it takes place in 
the course of an engagement with a text that is accepted as authoritative.26 
25 For an account of liminality in terms of the enactment of the intergenerational unity of 
the group, see Barshack (2009), p. 553. On the liminal and hence paradoxical nature of 
the legal proceeding, see Barshack (2006a), p. 145.
26 An account of interpretation as a liminal activity is consistent with a non-interpretive 
account of the preliminary process of identification of the authoritative texts to be inter-
preted. Contrary to Dworkin’s claim that the rule of recognition itself is contested among 
judges, the demarcation of the site of interpretation has to be governed by formal criteria. 
The relation between the formal boundaries of legal scripture and the liminal, interpretive 
engagement with meaning can be explicated by analogy to the structure of rites of passage. 
In Van Gennep’s well-known formulation, rites of passage consist of a succession of rites 
of separation, rites of transition and rites of incorporation. Interpretive controversy stands 
to the formal delineation of the legal text as rites of transition do to rites of separation. 
In other words, interpretation is preceded by a phase of ‘separation’ in which the law-
applier enters the realm of law. A boundary is crossed between the secular and the sacred, 
between the realm of the living and the realm of the dead. Rites of separation in law and 
elsewhere are typically highly formalised. Legal form demarcates law from non-law, setting 
up a closed realm in which the interpretive quest for higher law can be launched. On the 
highly formal character of rites of separation in comparison to the subsequent stages of 
rites of passage, see, for example, Leach (1961), p. 132.
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Furthermore, the lawlessness of interpretation is domesticated through the 
introduction of guiding principles. Manuals of interpretation are devised to 
contain the interpretative encounter with the dead within a method, in terms 
of Gadamer’s opposition between truth and method. Alongside methodological 
guidelines, legal interpretation is oriented by values that are intrinsic to any 
interpretive practice. Since interpretation is premised on the absence of sover-
eignty it is intrinsically loyal to the rule of law and to other institutional 
manifestations of society’s renunciation of sovereignty. Competent interpreters 
produce interpretations that sustain the rule of law and concomitant principles, 
such as, the separation of powers, the separation between the sacred and the 
secular and the affirmation of temporal existence, and equality before the 
law. Interpretation is naturally oriented toward the introduction of novel 
distinctions and sub-distinctions and the delimitation of existing powers and 
ideas since differentiation and division consolidate the projection of the group’s 
sovereign unity.
IV. Aside: the courts under fascism
Neumann concluded his treatise with a brief account of the rule of law under 
fascism and Nazism. Writing during its inception, Neumann succeeded in 
capturing the essence of the Nazi legal regime (as well as the uniqueness of 
Carl Schmitt’s approach in 1934 –5, unperturbed by the legal innovations 
even in comparison to the most enthusiastic Nazi jurists). Neumann noted 
the violation of standards of generality and prospectivity and the complete 
dissolution of the separation of powers. Nazi law, he observed, found in the 
will of the leader an immanent foundation.27 Neumann pointed out a tension 
in the Nazi conception of the role of the judiciary: judges were expected to 
obey both the law and the tenets of National Socialism (Neumann 1986: 
294 –5). According to Neumann, the gap between the two expectations was 
largely bridged by a new conception of the law which transformed the judi-
ciary into a bureaucracy carrying out written executive decrees, including 
retroactive and individual ones, and which postulated an ultimate identity 
between the law and the will of the leader.
The postwar literature on Nazi courts did not pursue Neumann’s attempt 
to overcome the tension between formalism and teleology. Immediately after 
the war Radbruch famously drew a picture of Nazi courts as slavishly following 
formal methods of application of the law. In contrast to Radbruch’s account, 
historians in recent years have argued that Nazi courts were not formalist 
27 The authority of the law is immanent since ‘Law is nothing but the will of the Leader’ 
(Neumann 1986: 293), and since the Leader’s own authority is immanent (‘The identifi-
cation of the people with the movement, and of the movement with the Leader is a trick 
used by every dictator who intends to justify his rule immanently, and not by invoking 
transcendental justifications’ (Neumann 1986: 289).
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enough and that they frequently deviated from the letter of the law in order 
to advance Nazi policies. The courts, it has been argued, were eager to pro-
mote the interests and spirit of the people and the homeland, and engaged 
in full-blooded political, teleological reasoning (Radbruch 1946: 1–11. On 
teleological reasoning, see Müller 1991).
Contrary to these competing explanations, the distinctive characteristic of 
courts in totalitarian regimes is neither excess nor shortage of formalism, but 
the refusal to consider formal and substantive arguments in light of each 
other. The collapse of the rule of law under totalitarianism cannot be explained 
in terms of the relative predominance of formal or substantive reasoning. It 
results from the impoverishment of the interpretive, controversy-generating 
mediation between different categories of considerations. The will of the 
people or the leader as the ever-present fount of the law implies an obscenity 
of meaning which leaves no room for interpretation. In non-fascist legal systems, 
interpretation ascertains the externality of sovereignty and subordinates both 
formal and ideological guidelines to higher law by attuning them to each 
other in a way that induces controversy. Interpretation consolidates the cor-
porate structure of society and the independence of legal vis-à-vis political 
reasoning which cannot be secured by formalist procedures.
Formalism, no less than undisguised teleological reasoning, attests to 
the community’s appropriation of sovereignty. Formalism can temper the 
manipulation of the law by the regime only where it serves as a prelude to 
interpretation. When formal rules are not applied in the light of underlying 
principles, their political manipulation outside and inside the court becomes 
all too easy. While blind formalism seems to be grounded in the ideas of 
absent sovereignty and separation of powers, it severs legal norms from their 
transcendent source of reason and authority and turns the law into an incar-
nation of a violent communal body. Moreover, formalism eventually becomes 
in itself an instance of teleological reasoning: divorced from underlying 
principles of reason, reified and idolised, the arbitrary legal form becomes 
an ultimate political end, an embodiment of the fall of reason and of holy 
inevitability.28 Totalitarianism revels in form and often excels in adherence 
to formalities. Under fascism, form comes to epitomise the community’s 
immanent sovereignty by expressing the complete sway of arbitrary forces 
over individual fates.
The rejection of interpretation is a general characteristic of a society that holds 
fast to its sovereignty. Hitler expected his artists to produce an unambiguous 
and transparent art which does not call for interpretation and therefore does not 
28 Weber was wrong, in my view, to assert that ‘formal justice is repugnant to all authoritarian 
powers, theocratic as well as patriarchic, because it diminishes the dependency of the 
individual upon the grace and power of the authorities’ (Weber 1978: 812). On the worship 
of arbitrary fate in authoritarian religion, see Fromm (1950) at 35.
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presuppose transcendence.29 In an essay entitled ‘What National Socialism 
has done to the arts’, Adorno writes: ‘It is just this taboo of expressing the 
essence, the depth of things, this compulsion of keeping to the visible, that 
fact, the datum and accepting it unquestionably which has survived as one 
of the most sinister cultural heritages of the Fascist era  .  .  .’ (Adorno 2002: 
373, at 381). True art, like real law, invites the subject to contemplate an 
absent sovereign body through the interpretive engagement with hidden 
meanings. Nazi art, by contrast, draws no line between the overt and the 
covert, surface and essence, society and its body, and relieves the subject of 
the burden of interpretation. It seeks to render the sovereign body, the com-
mon body of all generations, immediately present and withhold any reference 
to an absent ideal or goal. It is perceived uniformly by all members of the 
political community finding their oneness immediately present in it. A longer 
discussion may be able to demonstrate the actual contribution of fascist 
aesthetics to the collapse of the rule of law.30 Insofar as the rule of law is 
premised on the absence of sovereignty, it is arguably consolidated by practices 
of artistic creation and interpretation.
V. Legality and founding violence
In recent years, legal scholars occupying different theoretical standpoints have 
claimed that also in liberal democracies founding violence is neither renounced 
nor transformed in the course of normal politics. For some, the blame for 
the persistence of executive lawlessness is laid at the door of the idea of 
emergency: once emergency powers are recognised they cannot be effectively 
demarcated in time and space, and inevitably spill over into everyday govern-
ment. For others, founding violence inheres in the ordinary operation of 
the state and cannot be eliminated through the curtailment or abolition of 
emergency powers. The latter view goes back to Benjamin’s ‘Critique of 
violence’ [1921] where Benjamin introduced the distinction between found-
ing and conserving violence in order to call it into question (Benjamin 
1996: 236). Benjamin’s distinction reminds us that the passage from the 
state of nature to political society is accomplished by means of utter violence. 
In order to preserve its authority over its citizens, Benjamin’s discussion 
suggests, the state continuously terrorises them by means of unlawful and 
murderous violence.
Benjamin’s ‘Critique of violence’ can be read as a socio-critical elaboration 
of the psychoanalytic and anthropological theme of the founding murder. 
Indeed, the persistence of founding violence is often expressed in terms of a 
29 On Hitler’s notion of clarity, see Miller Lane (1968) at 189.
30 On aesthetics and the rule of law, see Procaccia (2007) at 140.
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permanent sovereign power over life and death.31 Traditional examples of the 
power over life include capital punishment and the right to dispatch citizens 
to the battlefield. Judicial killing has been traced to ludic and sacrificial 
spectacles of manslaughter, such as the Roman arena games.32 While such 
rituals have been suppressed in the civilising process, they arguably reveal 
the archaic roots of political authority in an arbitrary power over life. The 
lawlessness of the power over life has also been detected in apparently lawful 
executions. Benjamin noted that capital punishment cannot be fully under-
stood in terms of conserving violence. Capital punishment allows the vio-
lence upon which the law is founded to resurface and re-establish the law 
(Benjamin 1996: 236, at 242). In the Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg Joseph de 
Maistre famously described the executioner as a spectre of divine wrath who 
grounds the social order in terror. Girard claims that the criminal sanction, 
even in its civilised and attenuated forms and irrespectively of its overt justifi-
cations, re-enacts founding sacrificial violence.33
Perhaps the most glaring instance of executive lawlessness is the fabulous 
imagery surrounding intelligence agencies and other secret branches of execu-
tive power. The mystique of the secret services, which has not received yet 
the scholarly attention that it deserves, plays a pivotal role in civil religion. 
Alongside its references to absent sovereignty and the rule of law, civil religion 
disseminates the idea of executive powers that lie beyond the reach and know-
ledge of the law. These powers are intimated in official communication and 
less subtly in espionage literature, a genre distinguished by its compounding 
of obscenities, both sexual and political. Like the pardoning power, the power 
to appoint and command intelligence forces retains a distinctly personal 
character. Bond’s license to kill is granted by the queen in person. In most 
types of regime, secret services are answerable directly to the head of the 
executive who occupies a liminal position between constituted and constituent 
power. The more power is personal and inscrutable, the more it approximates 
the sovereign, self-conferred and undivided power of the first, divine king, 
and the less constrained it is by the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
However legally regulated the secret services may have become in liberal 
democracies, they always maintain a direct link to a quasi-sovereign personal 
will which animates them. While the power to appoint and command special 
forces, like the pardoning power, may be recognised in the constitution, the 
personal nature of these powers places them in an intermediate position 
between constituent and constituted powers.
31 Influenced by Foucault’s work on the power over life and death, Agamben (1998) couches 
the permanence of the exception in terms of a constant and arbitrary power over life. For a 
recent survey of the historical origins of the power of life and death, see Gaughan (2010).
32 On the political functions of the Roman games see Veyne (1976), Hornum (1993), and 
Clavel-Lévêque (1986).
33 On punishment as a rationalized form of sacrifice, see Girard (1977).
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Advocates of the idea of absent sovereignty can hardly deny that founding 
violence infiltrates and punctuates ordinary state violence.34 Sovereignty always 
retains some of the original unbridled character which preceded its pacifica-
tion into a system of rules.35 However, the residue of executive lawlessness 
does not refute the externality of sovereignty to society and the distinction 
between founding and conserving violence. Unlike founding violence, the 
residue of executive lawlessness occupies the margins of an established legal 
order, the periphery of the rule of law. While the lawlessness of founding 
violence is often overt, once a constitutional order is established the residue 
of founding violence is relegated to the crepuscular zones of political repre-
sentation and civil religion. Under the rule of law only the arbitrariness of 
sovereign mercy is publicly conceded.
Moreover, the lawlessness of ordinary state violence consolidates in various 
ways the corporate, legal organisation of social life in the face of communal 
aspirations for the enactment of the communal body. The head of the executive, 
with its power of life and death, is placed between constituted and con-
stituent powers in order to anchor the constitutional order in its externality. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the imaginary power over life prevents the 
petrifaction and eventual disintegration of institutional structures by virtue 
of its lawless and unsettling nature.36 Finally, the exercise of founding violence 
allows the state to confirm beyond doubt its exclusive possession of the power 
over life. It demonstrates that the state’s authority originates in a prepolitical 
undomesticated violence, and that its hold over that violence is both ongoing 
34 An instructive analogy for the lingering of founding violence can be found in Nietzsche’s 
account in The Birth of Tragedy of the role of the chorus as a residue of ritual, ecstatic 
presence and of the real within representation. Nietzsche’s is one of many accounts of the 
disruptive but persistent presence of the negative in art; see Nietzsche (1967), section 8.
35 The limits of the judicial review of the executive sometimes reflect an implicit recognition of 
a sphere of executive lawlessness. Contrary to the position of certain authors, these limits cannot 
derive from a superior institutional aptness of the executive to make good decisions in certain 
areas. Even if such difference in competence is real, it cannot transform the executive into 
the final interpreter of higher law, a role which belongs to the judiciary. On institutional 
competence as the justification for judicial underenforcement of the constitution in certain 
areas, see Sager (2004). The difference between Sager’s position and mine stems from a 
deeper divergence over the nature of the judiciary. While Sager regards the judiciary as 
‘partners’ with other branches of government in the task of constitutional interpretation, 
many constitutional theorists view the judiciary as privileged ‘agents’ of higher law.
36 In a famous passage that would elicit perennial controversy Hegel remarked that war 
rejuvenates the state ‘just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from foulness’ 
(1821, section 324). Hegel also argued that the legal order continually grounds itself in 
the monarch’s personal power, in a pre-legal moment which persists within the established 
constitutional order but which is largely confined to symbolic gestures. The personal 
aspect of political power, however inconsistent with the rule of law, is not unique to 
monarchy. It can also be found in democracies, for example in the pardoning power which 
often retains a distinctly personal character. The pardoning power should be understood 
as an extension of constituent power into normal politics.
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and exclusive. It shows that the constitutional/corporate order is not challenged 
by persistent unintegrated and undomesticated forces.
These considerations suggest that the somewhat paradoxical idea of permanent 
special forces reinforces rather than undermines the projection of sovereignty 
outside society. As long as the lawlessness of these forces is confined to a largely 
imaginary realm of ‘mysteries of state’,37 it does not attest to the permanence of 
immanent sovereignty and founding violence. Contrary to appearances, the 
general literary fascination with lawless instances of power betrays the love for 
the rule of law, since the alternative to the mystique of the secret forces is the 
communal exercise of terror in full transparency. The rule of law is condi-
tioned much as it is threatened by the lack of complete transparency.
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Chapter 2
Shari’a, faith and critical legal 
theory
Marinos Diamantides*
I. Legal theory and the misleading obsession  
with Shari’a
Public discussion by Muslims and non-Muslims about ‘Islam’ has, for some 
time now, been dominated by polemics between Islamists – ‘crusaders’ with 
a crescent instead of a cross – and Islamophobes, the new antisemites. Two 
of the symptoms of this unholy alliance are the increased rhetorical iden-
tification of the ‘Shari’a’ with Islam; and the tendency to essentialise the 
‘civilisational’ differences between, on the one hand, a ‘European’ culture that 
is presented as Greek and Christian (downplaying its Jewish and Islamic 
influences) and an ‘Islamic’ one, which is presented as essentially ‘Eastern’ and 
which could never have absorbed the influences of Greece and Christianity. 
In this second regard much too much commentary has been made on 
S. Huntington’s approach to deserve further mentioning here. A more recent, 
and perhaps more disturbing, example, in France, was Sylvain Gougenheim’s 
deeply flawed but widely publicised Aristote au Mont-Saint-Michel – Les racines 
grecques de l‘Europe Chretien (Gougenheim 2008). Focusing on the figure of James 
of Venice, the twelfth-century Greek who translated Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics directly from the Greek (bypassing the Arabic translations), the 
book suggests that the much studied Arab/Muslim contribution to European 
enlightenment has been exaggerated and proposes, in its place, a mythical 
version of a Christianity that managed to become ‘purely European’ (spe-
cifically Greek and Norman with all Semitic elements excised), ecumenical 
and at peace with itself (forgetting the great schism in 1054 or the sacking 
of Constantinople). While this mythical Europe is presented as harmoniously 
incorporating its Greek and Christian heritage – the spirit of scientific 
curiosity and philosophical reflection embedded in a religious tradition that 
the Church sought to guarantee – the book presents a picture of the Arab/
Muslim world as only superficially Hellenized due to two essential features: a 
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Semitic language (Arabic, pejoratively qualified as idiom) that is structurally 
incapable of expressing scientific and philosophical ideas contrary to Indo-
European languages (Gougenheim 2008: 126, 136), and a religion (Islam) 
that is inherently contrary to reason (for example, Gougenheim 2008: 101). 
Of course such works do not go unanswered by serious scholarship and 
Gougenheim’s in particular has encountered devastating criticism by a dedi-
cated volume (Büttgen 2009). What is more harrowing is the realisation that 
this book is only the most recent in a long history of attempts by Europeans 
to ‘salvage’ the Greek heritage from its Arabo-Muslim pollutants; something 
which complements other more crudely formulated anti-Semitic/Islamophobic 
views. Centuries ago St Thomas Aquinas, while compiling his theology, also 
sought access to the original Greek texts in order to bypass the neo-platonic 
Arab translations: chronologically his writings coincide with his vociferous 
anti-semitism.
In this newly re-focused and re-energised anti-Semitic European environ-
ment formerly insular academic experts in Islamic religion, culture and law 
have increasingly engaged in interdisciplinary discussions concerning the 
modernisation of ‘Shari’a and Islam’. While initially welcomed, as a means to 
counterbalance the combined threat of Islamophobia and Islamist extremism, 
it is time that said contributions be critically re-evaluated in so far as they 
also display an essentialist approach. As Baudoin Dupret has put it, much of 
the literature on the norms and law in societies dubbed ‘Muslim’ follows a 
culturalist–interpretativist model and has, as a whole, displayed an essentialist 
attitude with the battle between traditionalists and modernisers raging around 
the interpretation of this or that source of Islamic law, all the while taking 
for granted that a coherent body of laws called shari’a exists and deserves to 
be referred to as the primary expression of the religion of Islam (Dupret 
2000, 2006, 2007). While I agree entirely with Dupret, I wish to argue that 
in order to combat the present dangers, one needs to do more than expand 
on his praxiological alternative. It is certainly indispensable, bearing in mind 
his faulting the literature that adopts an essentialist approach to cultures in 
Muslim-majority societies and that portrays ‘Islamic law’ as characterised by 
a distinctively ‘Islamic’ legal sensibility, ethics and politics. Such approaches 
subscribe to interpretive theory according to which law is a ‘cultural code of 
meanings’ for both understanding and creating meaning in Muslim societies and 
cultures. On the other hand, however, we have to remember that praxiology’s 
exclusive ethno-methodological focus (on micro-processes of construction of 
local and unfixed meaning on the basis of temporarily stabilised common pre-
ferences, choices and means-end schemes) undoes essentialism at the acknow-
ledged cost of all cultural specificity, whereas a distinction can be made 
between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ versions, namely between those that assume the 
existence of fixed-meaning characteristics and properties and other, more 
nuanced versions. My concern is that in fixing its view to ‘micro’ in order 
to avoid essentialism, praxiologists are unable to partake in the critique of 
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those who insist that the approach of positivist jurisprudence to constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, understood as neutral and universally valid procedural 
devices, represents the optimal rational framework for thinking rationally 
and ultimately containing the conflict between Muslim traditionalists and 
modernisers.
In what follows I will exemplify this position with reference to the work 
of Abdullahi an-Na’im, a popular representative of liberal faithful Muslims 
in North American academic circles, whose thesis is at once essentialist and 
universalist. It is essentialist in so far as it advances the view that ‘Islamic 
law’ and state law are entirely different types of normative systems. It is 
universalist in so far as it believes that Muslims and everyone else need the 
liberal secular constitutional state in order to practise their religion or not, 
out of conviction alone. It is to achieve this that Muslim-majority societies 
are also organised in such a way that people are only legally required to 
respect those norms that belong to morally neutral positive legal systems. 
What lies beneath this liberal position is a conviction that the way positivists 
– such as H.L. Hart – understood ‘law’ has universal purchase. This, of course, 
is not a controversial view – and that should worry us. Similarly, for example, 
the take of the psychoanalytically inclined (Hegelian/Lacanian) on positive 
law is that Hart’s point of view masterfully exemplified that:
every society needs a regime of positive law, which officials enforce 
regardless of whether they agree with its substantive content.
 (Schroeder 2008: 42)
The point is that in every culture the agent of what Lacanians call ‘master 
discourse’ occupies a position or function that must be obeyed unconditionally 
or just so that humans can cope with life’s uncertainties and their mortality 
(Schroeder 2008: 42). To put it extremely crudely, the idea is that belief in 
master signifiers mitigates mortals’ anxiety. The direct result of this argument 
is that it turns the positive function of legal form in western history into a 
synecdoche of humanity’s (supposedly) common psychological ‘crutch’. As 
such, I argue, it makes it impossible to think of law otherwise than in 
Hegelian terms – as property and contract. Hegel thought that the most 
primitive intersubjective relationship is private law – property and contract 
– and that state-enforced positive law is the optimal framework for its 
operations. Is this the ultimate truth? What if such unconditional reliance on 
contract is not really a universal ‘crutch’ but, merely, a secularised European 
crosier with the missing cross very much present if only by its absence? In 
this case we need to expose the theological underpinnings that belie the 
positivist’s claim to moral neutrality. Aware that we are operating under the 
spectre of our broken cross-turned-liberal contract (which tops [overrides?] 
our belief in the indispensable function of positive law), we realise the need to 
beware of further slippage into liberal millenarianism, namely the assumption 
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of an inevitable universal process toward Western-type pseudo-secularisation 
within the context of the constitutional nation state obscuring the theo-
logical underpinnings of the modern state (cf Diamantides 2010). If not, far 
from advancing universal principles of rational co-existence, we risk necessarily 
importing through the back door – unconsciously and without acknowledge-
ment – specifically European conceptions of law. In fact, when philosophical 
speculation is coupled with historical and anthropological narrative we are 
reminded that late-modern contract theories and legal positivism operate as 
master signifiers not just anywhere and not ‘just because’, but specifically in 
the context of the European state and only as always-already justified; that is, 
as the equivalent of what, in earlier times, was seen as justified with reference 
to now abandoned, albeit still operative, substantive theological structures 
and beliefs. We thus recognise that our focus on law’s contractual form is 
the latest expression of a specifically monotheistic dogma centred on covenants, 
which, in Christian Europe, gave rise to the ecclesia of ecclesiastical states 
and, in atheistic Europe, operate as a misnomer of Greek demos. In this regard, 
although all psychoanalytical jurisprudence accepts that the harsh laying 
down of a law is necessary if the human individual, with its myriad and 
conflicting desires, is to be able to enter the symbolic universe as a civilised 
(‘castrated’) subject, not everyone equates this function with legal positivism. 
Pierre Legendre has dedicated his life to arguing that it is precisely modern 
legal bureaucracy that is unable to perform this function. More recently, 
Alain Supiot’s legal anthropology relates this function to unconditional, 
constitutive human submission to substantive, collective visions of justice 
(Supiot 2007). The general idea of law or justice (la loi, as opposed to posited 
rules, le droit) refers to the anthropological function of substantial dogmatic 
beliefs, varying from culture to culture, to institute humans as rational beings 
by linking together the biological and symbolic dimensions that make up our 
being and connecting our infinite mental universe with our finite physical 
existence. While such substantive visions are constantly re-interpreted, the 
specificity of each normative culture is guaranteed by the techniques of legal 
interpretation that are particular to its legal system’s dogmatic resources. 
The dogmatic idea of law-as-contract is specific to monotheistic cultures, 
while the idea of the individual rights-holder (what he calls Homo Juridicus) 
is specifically Christian.
To ignore this is to offer a snapshot of the late-modern subject in liberal 
regimes as a synecdoche of humanity ‘without strangers’. It is also to speak 
from the ‘end of history’, free from the spectres of the dogmatic legal past 
in the context of Christian European states, adopting a ‘constitutive’ stance. 
However, tracing positive law to, say, the Theodosian and Justinian legislative 
acts, we see that these were undertaken in the guise of merely codifying Roman 
law, and followed preambles which stated that the ruler was concerned with 
nothing but the public good and guided by God. It was through such false 
modesty, and not unabashed power exhibitionism, that power started to 
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express itself primarily through legislation in Western Europe. Such initial 
false humility became gradually redundant thanks to legal and theological 
experts making possible first the idea of absolutist sovereignty in the name 
of God; then the useful fiction of the social contract in the place of God; 
and, finally, the idea of individual autonomy as the rightful self-legislation of 
the propertied classes, which now, following the linguistic turn, is reinterpreted 
as the right to legislate as a means of self-realisation of the possessing but no 
longer self-possessed split subject. Currently, complex processes are responsible 
for violently transposing this idea out of its historical and territorial context 
and onto a world that is imagined as ‘globalised’, ‘de-territorialised’, etc. To 
consider that contract, property and positive law are elementary forms of law 
that cut across cultures is, I think, to fall for the myths of Western political 
theology/theory that turned the historically contingent trajectory of sover-
eignty in Christian Europe into a necessity.
If social contract theories and their positivistic inception are specific 
products of European history we can additionally examine them as variations 
on a common theme aptly called, by Jean Luc Nancy, the ‘monotheistic model 
of social organisation’. Nancy includes in the composition of this model the 
Greco-Roman legacy, that is to say the philosophical and statist-juridical 
legacy of Greece and Rome and Semitic faith in a withdrawn creator God. 
In the case of Judeo-Christianity Nancy speaks of a tight symbiosis between 
Greco-Roman consciousness and the monotheistic frame of mind developed 
during the Hellenistic era (Nancy 2003: 39). By symbiosis he means the 
awareness of a logico-techno-juridical universality and its splitting from the 
realm of salvation, which was gradually hereafter conceived as an entirely 
interior or private care. Nancy’s clear thesis needs no further elaboration from 
me apart from adding that, as with any symbiosis, the one that developed 
between Greek reflexivity and Semitic faith has been anything but a neutral 
experience. The enquiry over plural final causes of all things can neither 
integrate nor displace the persisting Semitic faith in one creator but with-
drawn God as a singular efficient but useless cause. This difficult Greek-Semitic 
symbiosis – Aristotle meets Woody Allen – has been managed in a specific way 
in the context, and for the benefit, of the European state of law as institutional 
inheritor of the Roman statist-juridical legacy.
My qualification – that the symbiosis has always been traumatic – comple-
ments Nancy’s further thesis, namely the existence of what he calls endemic 
‘auto-deconstructionist’ characteristics common to all three monotheistic 
cultures. Of these, two are of particular importance for my discussion. The 
first and most evocative characteristic is that, paradoxically, ‘monotheism is 
in truth atheism’ since it invokes Abraham’s faith to a uniquely withdrawn, 
absent God in contrast to religion proper understood as theism, which invests 
in belief in the presence of power that assembles the world and guarantees 
its meaning (Nancy 2003: 41– 42). Therefore, the Christian West’s ‘secular’ 
modernity, the meaning of which is but a work in progress (or promised), 
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continues the tradition of monotheistic covenants based on a promise that is 
paradoxically already realised and yet to come, and of meaning that is both 
taken for granted and absented in its very presence. Nietzsche, in this sense, 
is not only the last prophet of Christianity but of all monotheism since, in 
announcing the death of God, he only made explicit the principle of a world 
without God that monotheism has accommodated within itself since its 
inception. The second, auto-deconstructionist characteristic of monotheism flows 
from the first: it is ‘demythologisation’, or monotheism’s auto-interpretative 
history, in which it understands itself in a less and less ‘religious’ manner to 
the extent that a religion implies mythology, and more and more through 
narratives that relate directly to the human condition among which narratives 
of and about the law must take a prominent place. In the West, Rousseau’s 
term ‘civic religion’ captures the web of such interconnected narratives and 
rightly places, at the very heart of this web, the crypto-theological idea of 
the social contract.
Elsewhere I worked on this basis to explain the excessive anxiety, or terror, 
that prevails when Islamic and Christian/secular signifiers are in close prox-
imity with reference to the fact that, up to a point, in both cultures law, rather 
than God, functions as master signifier (Diamantides 2006). In the West we 
went from Jesus ‘rendering unto Ceasar  .  .  .’, to Popes and Emperors, in the 
person of whom the temporal and the spiritual merged as expressed by the 
notion of sovereignty, the juridical and theological basis of which has been 
explained in the seminal work of Ernst Kantorowicz (1997). In Islam, by 
contrast, the similar early endemic attempts to invest exclusive interpretative 
authority in the image of a ruler, as both just and sovereign, was undermined 
by the same jurists that created the sophisticated body of Islamic laws because 
that image was reserved exclusively for Mohammed, the prophet and first 
ruler of the Islamic state. Since then, the function of producing Islamic 
justice has been performed at local community level by numerous popular 
Islamic jurists belonging to several Islamic schools of interpretation. Hence, 
in Muslim states, the legal fiction of ‘sovereignty’ was stillborn. This situation 
was only partially and temporarily reversed by the Ottoman state which, 
much closer to European sovereign states than any other Muslim-majority 
state, rendered the Hannafi as the state’s official madhab, controlled the admin-
istration of Islamic justice through a system of centralised appointments of 
qadis and, in the nineteenth century, invested in the process of codification 
of law. After the collapse of the Ottoman state the problem of the missing 
Islamic sovereignty has only been superficially neutralised by the imposition 
of European-style sovereignty in the colonial and post-colonial Muslim-
majority states and by the attempts to appropriate it by Islamists.
But if Europe and its Muslim emulators could not endure the paradoxical 
symbiosis of Semitic faith and Greek reflexivity within the new ‘sovereignty’ 
framework of the old Roman statist legacy (in which the state’s power to 
enforce positive law was both juridically and theologically justified), that was 
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not the case for the faithful jurist. For centuries, Muslim and Jewish jurists 
have developed a highly rational jurisprudence while rejecting the (Hartian) 
maxim ‘every society needs a regime of positive law, which, in rational legal 
systems, officials enforce regardless of whether they agree with its substantive 
content’. (I should add that I reject categorically the Weberian view of 
‘qadi justice’ as primitive.) The jurists did that thanks to their faith in one 
absolutely withdrawn God – faith, which, as J.L. Nancy has written ‘undoes 
theism’ as much as contemporary atheism does. This meant that the jurists 
exercised practical freedom (interpreting holy texts; devising solutions for 
moral dilemmas and legal disputes, etc.) while ‘trembling’, namely without 
any hope for certainty that they were either ‘good’ or ‘right’ and, consequently, 
failing to become officials. Consequently, Muslim ulema and Jewish rabbis 
have played a more radical role politically than the one Hart attributes to 
legal officials ensuring, on the one hand, that the subject obeys the law simply 
because it is the law and not due to the merits of its contents (as with 
positivists and psychoanalytic approaches) but, on the other hand, that the 
subject also disinvests from the institutionalization/étatisation of law’s function. 
In short, the message was to obey the law as dictated by your local wise man, not 
the one appointed by the state. This could be why sovereignty was stillborn 
in Muslim empires and, also, why the highly complex and elaborate systems 
of Islamic laws incorporate in legal practice diverse understandings of key 
concepts to the point that a litigant can rely on different madhahib (‘schools 
of interpretation’) in relation to different aspects of the same legal case. 
Similarly it explains why, until the emergence of Zionism, Jews had nothing 
else to go by when looking for ‘authoritative’ guidance, but the aporetic and truly 
liberating double maxim: make a rabbi for yourself (Aseh lecha rav) (Pirkei Avos 
1:6) and acquire for yourself a friend (Kneh lecha chaver) which, as Maimonides 
explained, involves the freedom to choose unqualified, unprofessional masters 
lacking authority and pedigree, and treat them as your ‘friend’, meaning 
with fierce loyalty, commitment and love as is the case with one’s spouse.1
II. The secular legal politics of Abdullah Ahmed 
An-Na’im
If the Muslim world never truly successfully developed its own version of 
sovereignty by refusing to merge the theological and the legal as Europe did; 
and if European ‘secularism’ is a travesty in so far as it qualifies states which, 
by virtue of their self-understanding as ‘sovereign’, are necessarily theistic; 
then one can speculate about the potential Muslim lessons for a truly radical 
European politics that aims to salvage the ‘political’ (the use of constitutive 
power) from the business-as-usual of a small ‘p’ politics in the context of 
1 The Hebrew verb kneh/acquire has the same route as marriage.
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liberal constitutional states, where all and any political initiative must first 
and foremost bow to the crypto-theocracy of positive law (with the state as 
God). But before we get there it is first important to salvage the Muslim 
difference (the lack of sovereignty) from those who, like the Ottoman High 
Porte, wish to annul it. Confusingly, today these are seeming enemies: liberal 
Muslim (as well as Zionist) modernisers and their supposed nemesis Islamists 
(and ultra-orthodox Jews). My example will be Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im 
(2008).
The strength and value of An-Na’im’s thesis is his point that Islamic 
religious, political and juridical cultures (note the plural) suffer when Shari’a 
law is promulgated via positive law by governments. I can think of nothing 
that will negate his historically demonstrated argument that:
whatever the state enforces in the name of shari’a will necessarily be 
secular and the product of coercive political power and not superior 
Islamic authority.
 (An-Na’im 2008: 7)
He is also descriptively right that:
[T]he notion of an Islamic state is in fact a postcolonial innovation based 
on a European model of the state and a totalitarian view of law and 
public policy as instruments of social engineering by the ruling elites.
 (ibid.)
And:
[A]ll Muslims today live under what is commonly referred to as the 
nation-state, which is based on European models that have been estab-
lished around the world through colonialism, even in regions that were 
not formally colonized.
 (An-Na’im 2008: 86)
And:
.  .  .  European colonialism and its aftermath have drastically transformed 
the basis and the nature of political and social organisation within the 
territorial states where all Muslims live today  .  .  .  [so that]  .  .  .  a return to 
pre-colonial political philosophies and systems is practically impossible.
 (An-Na’im 2008: 125)
Less useful are his ‘conclusions’. First, he concludes that faithful Muslims 
need the secular liberal constitutional state because it alone can facilitate the 
possibility of religious piety out of honest conviction; they can, at most, 
9780415566810_C02.indd   56 5/16/11   3:26:10 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
Shari’a, faith and critical legal theory 57
externalise their beliefs by working to ‘influence the development and inter-
pretation of state law and contribute to its legitimacy’ through substantive 
‘influences on the formulation of public policy and legislation’ (An-Na’im 
2008: 89). Second, he concludes that ‘Islamic law’ and state law are ‘different 
types’ of normative systems, each based on its own sources of authority and 
legitimacy and that the two can be ‘complementary’ with Islamic law, as a 
system of jurisprudence that is not state-enforced (An-Na’im 2010).2
In response, it seems one has to reiterate the rather well-known argument 
that the notion of religion as ‘private’ matter within a ‘morally neutral’ 
constitutional modern state functions ideologically in obscuring the theo-
logical structure of the sovereign authority of the state as persona ficta and 
the related (Hobbesian) juristic theory of representation. Moreover, it needs 
to be pointed out that this structure, whether explicit or concealed, has been 
indispensable in containing the ‘paradoxical distinction’ between the state/state 
law and politics which An-Na’im evokes and which, when uncontained could 
have radical, constitutive, political implications. This distinction – otherwise 
known as the ‘constitutional paradox’ regarding the distinction between 
constituted and constituent power – is a very fragile one and the ability to 
act on it should not be taken for granted, as An-Na’im does. Historically, 
the acknowledgment of the paradox emerges with modern constitutionalism 
after centuries of forced conflation at the hands of non-democratic states. 
Nowadays, we can all agree that within the confines of liberal constitutional 
states it is regularly swept aside whenever a state of emergency is declared 
as well as under so-called acts of state. From a more sceptical/critical point 
of view, liberal constitutionalism fails to maintain the distinction even in 
times of normality between what in French is called the political (le politique) 
and politics (la politique). In sum, its critics point out that ‘constitutionalism 
must face the fact that constituent power is not free-floating, but appears to 
come always already implicated with constitutional form, the instituting 
already coupled with the instituted’ (Christodoulidis 2007: 191).
Moreover, they argue, not only does the constitutional state not overlap with 
the political domain, but its primary feature is to contain potentially trans-
formative political conflict within the established framework of politics, in 
a manner that is ultimately depoliticising.
2 His view is premised on a ‘difficult distinction between state and politics’ (Pirkei Avos, 
p. 4). ‘Since complete autonomy is not possible  .  .  .  it is sometimes important to recall the 
state’s political nature. Paradoxically, this reality of connectedness [between the state and 
politics] makes it necessary to strive to separate the state from politics, so that those 
excluded by the political processes of the day can still resort to state organs and institutions 
for protection against excessive use or abuse by state officials’ (Pirkei Avos, p. 5). ‘This 
necessary though difficult distinction can be mediated through the principles and institu-
tions of constitutionalism and the protection of the equal human rights of all citizens’ 
(Pirkei Avos, p. 6).
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Second, even though Islamic law developed in relative distance from the 
demands of sovereign rulers (for the reasons mentioned earlier), it is an 
essentialist fantasy to say that this is because of the specificity of its ‘normative 
nature’ as An-Na’im believes. The notion of Islamic law ‘naturally’ being 
free from the political exigencies of the various states in which it developed 
is not helpful as it only begs a hypothetical question that it raises: what 
would ‘Islamic law’ mean without these states? It seems clear to me that 
starting from the creation of a Quranic vulgate under the commission of 
‘Uthman, the third Caliph (23/644-35/655), which gave the ‘legally minded 
a textus receptus on which to draw’ (Hallaq 2007: 34), ‘Islamic law’ has always 
been actively desired by the various Muslim states in which it was formulated, 
and its history reflects this even though it never quite became the province 
of a ‘sovereign’ ruler as in the West. The story of the creation of the Sunnah 
as the second most important normative source after the Qur’an also attests to 
the important state-ulamma dialectic as a source of law. While the Prophet’s 
authority during his lifetime was anchored in the Quranic event and, there-
fore, he was and according to Islamic theology still is nothing more than a 
human being, this is not the whole story. As Hallaq notes, by the time of 
the prophet’s death his mission had already met with great success and he 
was the most important living figure the Arabs knew together with the 
charismatic men who surrounded him. As a result, very soon after his death, 
history records an intense preoccupation with Prophetic material (reflected in 
a considerable body of writings found in papyri, inscriptions and numismatics). 
In order to shore up their authority the successor Caliphs – until at least the 
middle of the second/eighth century – tended to see themselves as God’s direct 
agents (baring titles such as ‘God’s Deputy on Earth’ and ‘The Commander 
of the Faithful’) with the mission to implement His statutes, commands and 
laws. In fact they ‘held their own courts and personally acted as qadis’ (Hallaq 
2007: 44). To be sure, the authority of those early Caliphs did not yet derive 
from the office itself and they were not ‘independent agents of legislation’ 
(Hallaq 2007: 45). However, in accordance with pre-Islamic Arabic tradition, 
all laws were meant to reflect generally accepted custom and the sunan (note 
the plural), that is, various commendable practices of earlier Caliphs, the 
Prophet and his companions but also ‘.  .  .  in fact any good model’ (ibid.). 
The development by the ulama of stringent techniques for ‘authenticating’ 
the sources of the ‘true’ Prophetic sunna (dispensing with apocryphal elements) 
was precisely a means to control the process of legitimation of state power 
by association with (invented) good practice. Later the ‘Abbasid Caliphs’ 
attempt to create a single coherent and extensive body of Islamic law, with 
the Caliph as supreme interpreter, expressed more directly their desire to go 
a step further and sanctify their office and, recalling Nancy, to complete the 
process of demystification/secularisation of Islam. To what extent this succeeded 
or failed and why it did not lead to a European-style political theology of 
sovereignty of the type Kantorowitz described with the expression ‘the King’s 
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two bodies’ is a most interesting and complex question that is not answered 
by saying that inherently ‘Islamic law’ is normatively alien to state law.
One partly speculative, partly historical, explanation for this contingent 
(not structural) difference ascribes a crucial role to the faith-induced rebellious 
actions of those eminent Muslim jurists who resisted the invitation to serve 
power directly. I call these jurists ‘faith-induced’, drawing on Nancy’s double 
insight that Abrahamic faith – as opposed to pagan belief – is fundamentally 
not a power discourse (since it is directed towards not an intervening Master 
but a withdrawing God). But for them, the auto-deconstructionist path of 
Islamic faith could have been the same as in the West where it was collapsed 
into belief in the value of first, absolutist sovereign rulers and later into 
sovereign state-backed contract law. In this regard the narratives around 
jurists such as Imam Malik Ibn An-Naas are inspirational. A faithful man as 
well as brilliant jurist, Imam Malik Ibn An-Naas rejected offers and extreme 
pressure by the Caliphs of his time to have his jurisprudence ‘canonised’, on 
the grounds that he respected other madh’Ahib (schools of Islamic law). He 
was punished for it. This stance has been emulated by most historically 
prominent Muslim jurists and it should not be underestimated. It effectively 
signals a different (and earlier than the European) modernity in which the 
classical Muslim-majority societies underwent (what systems theorists call) 
functional differentiation instead of stratification and centralisation. By contrast, 
European societies transitioned from stratification to functional differentiation 
much later on. As a result, one has always been able to stand in a court of 
Islamic law and simultaneously use aspects of different madh’Ahib in the same 
case and, indeed, do so independently of whether the madh’Ahib in question 
are prevalent or even have any followers in the country where s/he lives or 
not. ‘Disarmed’ by the sunna of the Prophet who apparently said that ‘my 
[Islamic] community will not err’, An-Naas and the other great jurists were 
simply not able/interested in discrediting opposing interpretations, but were 
willing to ‘let a thousand flowers blossom’. This was all at the expense of 
the desire of powerful statesmen intent on increasing the overlap between 
Islamic jurisprudence and the specific raisons d’etat they were advocating, and 
who were spending considerable amounts of money at the time in order to 
develop coherent legal and political ideologies for all their imperial subjects 
(Muslim and non-Muslim), including the use of Aristotelian logic, helped 
by their sponsoring of the great translation movement. It was indeed in their 
time that ‘Islamic law’ came to mean not only Qur’an and Sunnah but also the 
highly rational and huge body of fiqh. Alas, for them, this body of jurispru-
dence was never streamlined into one state-sanctioned Islamic canon law but 
remains divided into mutually respecting schools for the reasons mentioned.
An ‘evil’ consequence of this failure to streamline theology and law was 
the stifling of the development of an integrated Islamic political tradition 
wherein the religio-legal and the philosophical strands of Muslim political 
philosophy could have merged (cf. Brown 2000: 51, 57) and, perhaps, given 
9780415566810_C02.indd   59 5/16/11   3:26:11 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
60 Islam, law and identity
rise to the fiction of the sovereign state as a sine-qua-non of politics, as it 
happened in the West. With such and such Imam Malik Ibn an-Naas and 
others like him, have rendered successive Muslim polities relatively defence-
less before the expansionist energies gathered by the sovereign Western states. 
This, I think, is what both today’s Islamists and liberals like An-Na’im are 
– naively – attempting to ‘correct’ respectively by striving to establish Islamic 
sovereign states and putting Islamic theology in the legitimating service of 
western secular constitutional states (minority fiqh would be a good example). 
Liberal An-Na’im, invites Muslims to substitute their aporetic faith for a 
pagan belief in the Unity of the Representing Hobbesian State and its power 
to turn the people from a multitude into a commonwealth. In so doing, 
Ironically, he is not structurally dissimilar to proponents of so-called ‘Islamic states’ 
where justice follows the implementation of supposedly divine Islamic law 
albeit in a territorial, nation-state context (e.g. Islamic Republic of Iran). I say 
‘naively’ because this happens at a time when governmentality/securitisation 
pose an existential threat to state sovereignty and legal positivism, and where, 
consequently, constitutional theory turns away from both Hobbes’s juristic 
theory of representative sovereignty of the state and Kelsen’s hypostatisation 
of the constitutional legal order into a self-grounding and self-sustaining 
system of rules, towards the likes of Karl Schmitt.
In this connection what is thought-provoking in the narratives around 
medieval Muslim jurists is that even as, for reasons of state, the doors of 
interpretation of Islamic law were declared to be ‘closed’ and, therefore, the 
officially recognised madh’Ahib today can be counted by the fingers of one hand 
and are ostensibly the same as hundreds of years ago, their founding jurists’ 
faith-driven rebellion constitutes an exemplary act of powerless resistance as 
well as an assertion that the umma (the Islamic community) may retain its 
integrity despite – perhaps because of – lacking in representable doctrinal 
and political unity be it of the Kelsenian (normative) or the Schmitian (sub-
stantive) sort. This, I must stress, is not a communitarian embrace of pluralism; 
it is an indifference to the problematic of unity/pluralism. Nor does it require 
war; it is disinterestedness in power and territory. And it requires patience 
and endurance two qualities that are very short in the faithless human. It is 
the sort of subjective stance that both psychoanalysis and deconstruction 
expect of us.
III. Reflexive jurisprudence and a-theistic  
faith today
This takes me to the paper’s last part. If monotheistic faith can defy power 
and if, per Nancy, contemporary a-theism paradoxically realises such faith, 
I speculate on the possibility that monotheistic and humanist faith may have 
potentially equal implications for a truly radical politics, one that disinvests 
from the power or powerlessness of the contemporary centralising state, to 
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the extent that they remain disinterested in and un-co-opted by its power 
or lack thereof. Setting our states’ pseudo-secular credentials aside, seeing 
how they are nothing other but successors to, rather than replacements of, 
their politico-theological predecessors we could seek inspiration in how to 
gain critical distance from them also from the faithful Muslims, Jews and 
Christians who defied them.
Critical social-theoretical debates identify ours as the ‘late modern age’ in 
the context of the reflexive modernisation thesis (Beck 1992, 1994, 1999; 
Giddens 1990, 1991). In these, dystopic, visions of modernity, the term 
‘reflexivity’ takes the semantic content of continuous self-confrontation. As 
Beck argues, reflexive modernisation occurs as a stage of the modernisation 
process and not via its repudiation. Applying modern principles to modernity 
itself we find it lacking. In this sense, the reflexive quality of contemporary 
late modern societies is a deeply political quality. It paves the road for a 
creative self-destruction of an entire epoch: that of industrial society. It is 
not a big leap on my part to add that this disenchantment may also become 
directed towards the constitutional state’s legal system. The depoliticising 
management or containment of this self-confrontation is the other side to 
our late modern age, however. Our societies are ‘risk societies’ in the sense 
that we are constantly forced to deal with the unintended consequences of 
their developmental trajectories; but also in that our biggest problem is not 
with the production and distribution of ‘goods’ (hence old-fashioned ‘experts’ 
are obsolete) but the prevention and minimisation of ‘bads’ through expert 
systems. Consequently, in our times, positive law’s function to justify power 
is performed by lawyers and judges who have adapted to the circumstances. 
Thus, for example, a judge may or may not declare ‘water boarding’ to be 
torture depending on the severity of the perceived threat by terrorism. A 
lawyer may help her client realise that settling her claim against a powerful 
corporation is preferable, if money is what she desires, although the claim 
could succeed, because of the costs/delays involved. The ‘legal risk expert’ 
no longer aims to justify centralised power positively (i.e. with reference 
to some utilitarian, or more traditional, transcendental good); rather, s/he 
justifies the dispersed, national and transnational, networks of power only 
indirectly and negatively, by encouraging the calculation of risks that come 
with dis/obedience among plural, potential masters and letting the individual 
decide, from the point of view of her desire. In this context the continuing 
liberal emphasis on individual choice and desire expresses the form in which the 
subject is addressed by power in late-industrial societies as the ‘post-modern 
individual’ who is no longer seen as self-possessed (in the sense of the self-
coincidence of the individual autonomous subject; but also in the sense of 
the self-coincidence of the national body) but which possesses means for self-
actualisation (individual or sovereign capital and property). Indeed, the care 
of the self is seen as one arena within which the colonisation of the life-world 
by ‘expert systems’ unfolds. The sceptic may question whether legal practice 
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which in reality falls somewhere between litigation and negotiation and 
judicial review, which in reality falls between constitutional interpretation 
and accommodation of immediate pragmatic considerations, may not be part 
of these mechanisms.
Setting aside those members of contemporary monotheistic societies who, 
despite these significantly new circumstances, still believe and invest in the 
power of state legal systems to ‘contain’ the energy released by modernity’s 
self-confrontation, be they ‘secular liberals’ of ‘religious fundamentalists’, I 
want to turn to immanentist, materialist, critics of the modern European legal 
system who wish to unlock the politically constitutive potential of modernity’s 
crisis from the ‘shackles’ of a jurisprudence still worshiping state-sovereignty 
and constitutional ‘entrenchments’, and turn towards ‘purely reflexive’ accounts 
of law and politics as separate sub-systems (cf. Christodoulidis 2001, 2007). 
The ultimate aim is to enable the thinking of some new kind of political entity 
as a genuine heterogeneous alternative to the sovereign state, cosmopolis or 
community all of which presuppose a capitalist economy of representation. 
For example, Emilios A. Christodoulidis seeks to defend Carl Schmitt’s thesis 
that the origin of political action is already political (without the heteronomy 
of representation and law) against Kelsen’s objection that the members of a 
polity cannot identify any set of qualities which would univocally and un-
controversially define them as a political unity (thus the ‘unity’ of a people 
is possible only in a normative sense: constitution ‘of’ a people). This criticism 
is relative, Christodoulidis writes, even as he concedes that political unity 
requires recognition, because such recognition is itself contingent (Christo-
doulidis 2007: 192). Having affirmed this contingency Christodoulidis thinks 
– or hopes? – that pure constituent power can give rise to revolutionary changes 
if only we resist the collapse of the ‘constituent’ into the pathways of the 
instituted whereby any attempt to bring about something new is seen as a 
‘crisis’ in need of constitutional containment. This resistance is all the more 
difficult, he concedes, in the current conditions of globalisation where recog-
nition is available only from within the dialectic of global and communal 
with anything else rendered invisible and, consequently, political participation 
only finds outlet in the largely reactionary upsurge of community politics, 
of state (and sub-state) nationalism that presents itself as the only entry point 
into the public sphere. How do we resist? The challenge is to theorise the 
‘constitutional thinking of dissensus’, which turns out to mean, again, no 
more than to reflect on resistance as constituting the very framework of 
recognition for the kind of political entity that it wants to bring about.
Christodoulidis, for one, is adamant that opportunistic conflict alone is 
needed, not faith. Semitic traditions’ faith in particular is, once more, excised 
and ridiculed. He derides Lacanians for reducing the political to politics 
because they emphasise the human fear of the return of the, necessarily law-
less, political (Christodoulidis 2007: 193). Alongside he derides Derridians, 
too, who, in response to this fear, propose not revolutionary struggle, but 
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patient, endless, work of deconstruction and reconstruction (ibid.). For them, 
he decries, the visibility of ‘the political’ is verified only indirectly, as memory 
or trace. Instead, Christodoulidis wants to shed ample theoretical light on 
‘the political’ as a pure universal idea, which he seems confident that he thinks 
as human, not as European, Christian, Greek, etc. He also derides Lefort’s 
formulation of democracy’s institution of the locus of power as an ‘empty 
place’. Christodoulidis, I gather, wants to fill this empty place with the 
bio-political bodies of individuals and social groups, which may (indeed) 
have their own power of resistance against structures.3 In short he derides 
all positions that take seriously human weakness and its religious expression, but 
especially those which, following through monotheism’s auto-deconstruction, 
recall a specifically Jewish and Muslim anti-theological ethos of combining 
tolerance of juridical uncertainty with persistent faith. The materialist that 
he is Christodoulidis is explicitly mocking such a-theistic faith. Complaining 
against a ‘proliferation’ of theories that draw their inspiration from the 
impossibility of containment of constituent within the constituted within 
the institution, he concludes,
.  .  .  a new faith has emerged at the interstice of the mystical and the 
political thinking of resistance. Traces, specters, surpluses, and remainders 
dominate thinking here. I will not pursue this path because resistance 
to structures of oppression requires political opportunities rather than 
mystical faith.
 (Christodoulidis 2007: 193–194)
This is a perfect example of deriving from Kant not the much advertised 
freedom of ‘daring to know’, but to ‘know how to dare’ (Negri and Hardt 
2009: 17). But the question is: is this ambitious project of ‘reflective resistance’ 
– which can change the framework of our politics without appeals to heter-
onomy – a plan or an aspiration? Could it be that this reflexivity can never 
be ‘purified’ from Semitic faith and revert to the thinking of the new in the 
way that Aristotle could (who, after all, was confident that the heavens were 
solid and harmonious, unlike us)? In reverse, could the politics of resistance 
not be explained by an economy of rebellious a-theistic faith, specifically 
Abrahamic faith, even – especially – at this stage, when both atheists and 
truly spiritual faithful people must contend with formidable ‘believers’ and 
their apologists (be they believers in the market, science, the constitutional 
state law, global de-territorialised law or one or other caricatural version of 
3 Bio-political research agendas share three maxims: ‘bodies are constitutive components 
of the biopolitical fabric of being’, bodies ‘have to resist in order to exist’ and ‘corporeal 
resistance produces subjectivity, not in an isolated or independent way but in the complex 
dynamic with the resistances of other bodies’ (D’Ancona 2005: p. 31).
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the God of Abraham)? Admirable and crucial as their goals may be, I want 
to point out that the materialist critics’ failure to realise that their ‘atheism’ 
is nothing but the realisation of monotheistic faith (in the paradoxical sense 
of Nancy mentioned earlier) renders their confidence in the possibility of a 
‘purely reflexive’ politics faulty. Not realising that the spectres of the European 
past cannot be ‘reflected away’ but only confronted as part of the process of 
modernity’s self-confrontation, they end up driving (again) an artificial and 
unhelpful wedge between humanist faith and monotheistic faith. As I argued 
earlier the two kinds of faith are, in fact, equally products of monotheism (in 
other words, being an ‘atheist’ is not a universal category but specifically 
situated in late modern monotheistic settings). In this respect they are not 
reflecting but repeating – as if by ‘reflex action’ – biases and mistakes by a 
European humanism that has denied and disavowed its monotheistic provenance. 
In this regard a lot is to be gained by the study of Jewish and Muslim legal 
and political histories and in particular the role of aporetic faith in preventing 
the merging of law and politics and the emergence of an integrated political 
philosophy out of the encounter of philosophy (especially Muslim falsafa) 
with rational dialectical theology (in particular Islamic kalam). There was no 
lack of brilliant, erudite, minds to work for this integration; among the many 
medieval Muslim philosophers, stand out careful neo-platonists such as Avicenna 
(with his distinction between essence and existence) (cf. Wisnovsky 2005) and 
Averroes (whose influence extended beyond European scholasticism to Jewish 
medieval philosophical thought (Taylor 2005: 186) and who taught that the 
truth of religion and philosophy are one and the same and that the Scriptures 
contain three kinds of texts that, respectively, must be read literally, interpreted 
allegorically and contested). Moreover, Muslim rulers strongly supported the 
philosophers’ efforts towards an integrated political philosophy and spared no 
means to achieve it (e.g. al-Kindi was the tutor of Ahmad, the son of Caliph 
al-Mu’tasim; he was also the editor of the Theology of Aristotle which was 
nothing but a paraphrase of the Enneads with Neo-Platonic emanationist 
principles such as the existence of the soul prior to birth – which rendered 
compatible Aristotle’s immanent Metaphysics with Semitic creationism, most 
importantly that of God as an agent and efficient cause) (D’Ancona 2005: 24).
There is one last, and more unpleasant, historical reason to warn against 
the unrestrained turn towards ‘reflexivity without faith’. The history of cross-
fertilisation and mutual repulsion between Greek reflexivity over final causes 
and Semitic faith in one efficient but useless cause (i.e. the creator but sub-
sequently withdrawn God), is replete with instances of Europeans eagerly 
seeking to purify the former from the latter (read: to repress) and the intended 
and unintended consequences of their efforts must not go amiss. While neo-
Platonist philosophers such as Plotinus, and some of the neo-platonic Muslim 
philosophers, and even early Christian clergy such as St Augustine, had man-
aged to be neither anti-Aristotelian nor anti-Semitic, the same cannot be 
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said of their successors who specifically sought to bypass neo-platonism 
including by seeking out translations of Aristotle directly from the Greek. 
Like Aristotle Plotinus had identified the highest level of being – divine 
Intellect – with reflexive thinking; at the same time he sharply criticised 
Aristotle’s doctrine of substance and denied that such a principle can be the 
first uncaused cause of things (D’Ancona 2005: 11, 24). For him the One 
lies ‘beyond being’, like the Good of the Republic. Plotinus consequently 
identified the ‘fall of the soul’ with the inevitable tension between pure con-
templation and divisive action – a tension that for him constitutes the 
natural mode of existence of the soul (cf. Ennead IV.8.6 –7). He left it to each 
person to determine how to seek ‘authenticity’ within this tension. Berber 
St Augustine’s favourable view of Neo-Platonist thought contributed to the 
baptism of Greek thought and its entrance into the Christian and subsequently 
the European intellectual tradition, mostly through translations from the 
Arabic by scholars and philosophers who were as much Neo-Platonic as 
Augustine. Augustine had no time for individuated strategies of authenticity 
and taught that salvation was none other than the love of God pure and 
simple. The idea of a decisive self made its comeback with the shift from the 
Augustinian Neo-Platonic view of the Good as the ‘love of God’ to Aquinas’s 
‘purely Aristotelian’ rational teleological theology where man is responsible for 
pursuing his salvation; it underwent a further mutation with the protestant 
identification of the Good with performance of one’s worldly tasks under 
the doctrine of ‘pre-determination’; it got secularised in Machiavellian and 
consequentialist/utilitarian accounts whereby the ‘Good’ is disassociated from 
the divine and its pursuit is entrusted in the hands of a rational, calculating 
autonomous subject. Finally, in the post-enlightenment atmosphere the idea 
of self is returned to us, minus its association with the Good, in the various 
contemporary formulations of subjectivity that centre around the key herme-
neutical insight that man makes himself in hermeneutical reflexivity in a 
plethora of theories. In fact, however, the whole intellectual history of the 
West since Aquinas through to reformation and its secular philosophical after-
math is characterised by intensifying efforts to purify Aristotelian reflexivity 
with the combined effect of, first, rendering the Good fully rational and, 
secondly, replacing God with a subject of constant action – becoming – that 
synthesises the divide between potentiality and actuality. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that another characteristic of the European intellectual tradition 
is its insipient anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. While compiling his theology 
Aquinas had sought access to original Greek texts in order to bypass the 
neo-platonic Arab translations. There’s another Christian who wanted to think 
merely as a Greek then. It may incidentally be mentioned that chronologically 
Aquinas’s mature writings coincide with his vociferous anti-semitism. Luther 
too grew anti-Semitic just as he summed up the courage to rebel against the 
church’s mediation between text and individual.
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Chapter 3
One law against another?
Reading the veil cases: the foundational 
reference, Shari’a and human rights
Adam Gearey*
I
This paper is an analysis of what remains veiled; a covered face that is the 
figure of one law coming up against another. How are we to read this peculiar 
tension? What can the veiled woman tell us about the relationship between 
secular and divine authority? In broadest terms, the argument can be outlined 
as follows. This paper reads the case of Begum1 through Legendre’s theory 
of the foundational reference to reveal the dynamics of the strange encounter 
between Shari’a and common law.
Commentators have suggested that the ‘veil cases’ in the UK and other 
jurisdictions reveal a scene of opposition between two opposed legal orders. 
This approach obscures a deeper problem about the spaces where subjectivity 
is articulated – the agonistic that exists between the common law’s construction 
of human rights and Begum’s arguments about religious law. It would perhaps 
be more accurate to see Begum, and the veil cases in general, as a conflict 
over the precise relationship of the divine and the secular.
Perhaps we have been distracted, therefore, by the argument that the veiled 
woman is somehow alien to our secular order. The figure of the veil will take 
us to a function of the law that in psychoanalytic terms underlies the very 
possibility of culture. However, this is not to suggest that there are no tensions 
between common law and Shari’a. We have to plot a complex relationship 
between the content and form of the foundational reference that underlies 
both secular and divine law; a function that only shows itself only through 
‘misleading forms’ (Goodrich 1997: 137). Might it be that the very possibility 
of a common law articulation of human rights depends on the veiled woman 
and what she represents?
One of the key themes of this essay is the argument that both contemp­
orary liberal and multicultural theory has largely failed to create the analytic 
* Thanks to Valerie Kelley, Marinos Diamantides and Mary Gearey for their help in writing 
this paper.
1 R. (On the Application of SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL, 15.
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that can appreciate the terms in which these issues are enacted. This is not 
to delight in obscurity, nor to reject multiculturalism. Rather, it is to argue 
that certain forms of scholarship remain reluctant to engage with an under­
standing of symbols and legal communication that draws on psychoanalysis, 
and thus fail to appreciate the issues at stake.
The argument will develop as follows. It is necessary, first of all, to engage with 
the history of the common law, and to revise the idea that it is simply a secular 
body of law. This will provide the re­working of the misleading assertion that 
the veil cases show secular and divine law in opposition. Admittedly, this 
introduces a long­term historical perspective into our consideration of the law, 
but engaging with deep­seated structures will allow an appreciation of the 
foundational reference and its dogmatic communication through texts, symbols 
and rituals. We will argue that an account of the foundational reference takes us 
towards a theory of the contemporary law of human rights; the most recent 
manifestation of an ancient jurisdiction over the soul. The next sections will 
show why contemporary liberal and multiculturalist accounts of rights largely 
fail to understand the structure of the law. Having cleared away these problems, 
we will engage in a close reading of Begum before concluding with a recent 
speech on Shari’a and human rights by Dr Rowan Williams, the Archbishop 
of Canterbury. The Archbishop’s approach was condemned by many media 
pundits who, in so doing, displayed the wider cultural failure to locate the 
resources that would allow informed discussion of religion, rights and law.
II
The starting point is the Legendrian notion of the foundational reference. 
This takes us to the Reformation. The passage below shows how the triumph 
of secular power over the church courts was essentially an inclusion of their 
spiritual jurisdiction into that of the ascendant common law courts:
The expansion of the monarchical jurisdiction or regia potesetas was to 
transfer the ‘government of the soul’ to the civil magistrate  .  .  .  the civil 
subject was now properly reflected in the mirror of the constitution. The 
icon of the Crown and the spiritual unity of secular authority formed a 
model in which the subject could narcissistically see his own face  .  .  .  Its 
art, the art of the law, held the subject fascinated, magnestised or bound 
to an already established law  .  .  .  The establishment of an identity, the 
constitution of a community, and the capture of subjectivity are first a 
matter of establishing a collective or national identity whose virtue will 
be matched only by the evil of those who do not belong to it.
 (Goodrich 1995: 89)
There are a number of important themes. To stress the main point: the creation 
or production of the secular state is based on its assumption of the power of 
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the civil magistrates for the care of the believer’s soul. Spiritual matters are 
now to be decided in the name of the state; a state that speaks for a national 
church. Impacted in this comment are complex ideas of the relationship 
between the prince and the church that provide the foundation of the modern 
state. However, for the moment we need to leave such concerns to one side.
Why is the constitution described as a mirror? This is more than a meta­
phor. The civil subject discovers itself in the reflection of its status that it 
finds in the law of the state. The crown as icon adopts the essential function 
of the church: the fashioning of subjectivity. This is why law is an art; it 
brings into being a civil identity that provides the support for what would 
otherwise be an incoherent being or, perhaps, an entirely private life sunk 
into the dark world of the family. These ideas may be somewhat strange to 
us. We tend to think of the law in rather narrow terms. Once we allow that 
this is only possible on a forgetting of the history of the common law, we 
can start to recover the sense in which law creates the very possibility of 
an identity, a function that it effectively took over from the church. The 
identity offered to the civil subject by the law is over time increasingly 
coordinated with the nation state and becomes, ultimately, an understanding 
of a nation defined by the rights and liberties of the common law.
In order to understand the issues raised by Begum, we need to realise that this 
constitution of the subject is no longer necessarily that of the nation, but an inter­
national community whose identity is provided by human rights. Human rights 
thus repeat the process of reformation. Just as the nation state took over the 
jurisdiction of the church and granted itself the power to speak for the believer’s 
soul, to articulate the truth, so too, in more recent times, human rights deter­
mines the terms of social being. Rights are now the truth of the social bond.
In the same way that the state replaced the mysticism of the church with 
the transparency of rational organisation (which it could only do through the 
inclusion into itself of the spiritual jurisdiction), human rights now claims 
to be the most rational and humane articulation of political organisation (and 
must, thus, at some level, carry forward yet again the remains of the spiritual 
jurisdiction). In psychoanalytic terms, human rights are the new icon, replacing 
the crown as the imago or mirror in which the subject is meant to see him­
self or herself as a rational being whose inherent dignity is the mark of his 
or her equality with all other human beings. To return to our previous point, 
human rights become so by taking on the original religious function: the 
care for the believer’s soul. Human rights might change the terms in which 
religion operates but, in so doing it effectively claims for itself the power to 
determine the relationship of religion to the state.
III
At this point in our argument we will elaborate further what we mean by 
the foundational reference, for this will take us to the heart of dogmatic 
9780415566810_C03.indd   70 5/16/11   3:26:24 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
One law against another? 71
communication, and hence to the way in which human rights takes over 
the original power of the church to fashion the identity of the political 
subject. To clarify our terms further we will now refer to the believer not 
as the subject of a specifically Christian polity, but as the political subject. 
This signifies that we are dealing with western modernity and the political 
community created by the nation state.
What, then, is the foundational reference? Psychoanalysis argues that the 
human subject has to be brought into being through the imposition of a 
structure that will mark it off from the dumb chaos of nature. At the most 
primal level, this is the work of the incest taboo that creates a cultural order 
by prohibiting certain expressions of sexual desire. In more sophisticated 
terms, the structuring imposition must stand in for ‘something’ that is absent 
but, nevertheless, powerful and capable of providing and guaranteeing the 
coherence of being.
The great monotheistic religions developed conceptualisations of this guarantor 
of order in the sublime majesty of the one true God. Religion mediates between 
the deity and the world, providing the differentiation of two levels – heaven 
and earth. Religious symbols and rituals speak of the divine order present in 
its absence. In monotheistic religions, the mediation between the divinity and 
the world is also linked to the coming of a prophet; a representative of God, in 
whose name the church or the priesthood will found itself. Thus, the founda­
tional reference and its dogmatic communication through symbols, rituals 
and sacred practices guarantee a coherence of being, at both a personal and 
communal level. This organisation of being must always be ‘propped up’ 
through the correct interpretation of those rites and devotions that stand in 
for an impossible and infinite God in the world of time and finite being.
In the history of the west the inheritance of Christian monotheism is com­
municated through Roman law. This can be demonstrated in myriad ways 
but one example will have to suffice. Consider the Veronica. The Veronica 
is a representation of the face of Christ which the believer, in venerating, 
considers not only an image of divinity but also an image of her own true 
self. Although the believer recognises the imago dei as a reflection of the true 
self, it is also a representation of ‘something incommensurable’ (Goodrich 
1995: 228): complete alterity or divinity. The imago dei counters the threat 
of emptiness; the loneliness of the created in the absence of the creator.
In Roman law, in the period of the Empire, the Veronica can be linked to 
the imago. The imago was a wax image of the face and shoulders of the 
Emperor. Imagos were set up in law courts and in public places; indeed, 
wherever there were official acts the ‘imperial effigy’ had to be present. The 
imago allows law to speak; to declare its verdicts.
Given the European heritage of human rights, a link between rights, 
Roman law and the Christian tradition is not too farfetched. Let us return 
to the imago. The imago that now lies behind human rights is not that of 
the Emperor but a notion of the human being as a subject of rights. This 
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presupposes the logic of reformation; the movement from the sacred to the 
secular, and the enshrining of human being as self­founding and self­
justifying. From this position, and particularly given the international 
provenance of human rights, the foundational reference is now the positing of 
a universal figure of the human being as the subject of rights. Human rights 
are where we recognise ourselves. The universal maps onto the particular: 
‘I am’, to the extent that I am a subject of human rights. Through a process 
of identity formation, too complex to trace here, when we come before the 
image of what we should be, we see ourselves as we really are: subjects of 
rights in the international community of human rights.
IV
To advance our argument we need to make a distinction between the content 
and the form of the foundational reference. It has been implied in the argu­
ment so far that there is a difference between the form that the foundational 
reference takes, and the content of that function. The form of the foundational 
reference is structural, and underlies the very possibility of an organised 
society and shared cultural meanings. The content, however, is variable and 
historically determined. We have suggested that in the West a Christian 
religious content was taken over or adapted by Roman law. In more recent 
history the content of the foundational reference has again changed. The 
processes begun by the Reformation have led to the nation state and then 
human rights becoming the fundamental terms of the social bond. We will go 
on to suggest that the veil cases represent a struggle over the precise content 
that the foundational reference will take. The terms of the foundational 
reference are always open to dispute. Precisely because symbols and texts 
have no indisputable meanings, their correct interpretation must always be 
a matter of conflict. This truth relates to the meaning of the veil and the 
meaning of human rights. Given the indeterminacies of human rights law 
(itself related to religious struggles over the correct interpretation of doctrine), 
we cannot presume that there is no ‘room’ for a European Islamic identity, nor 
that Islam is ‘other’ or ‘alien’ to Christianity. Extending this principle, we 
could go on to suggest that the meaning of the veil, or indeed the right to 
wear or not to wear a veil, may still be to come.
V
How, then, do we understand the veiled woman? As many commentators 
have already pointed out, the veil is a complex symbol.2 Whereas in some 
2 Supra n. 1 at para.94. Baroness Hale presents a useful summary of this literature as it 
applied to the issues raised in Begum. She refers to Yasmin Alibhai­Brown (Who do we 
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cases it is undoubtedly imposed on women by patriarchal religion, in other 
instances it is adopted as a symbol of religious authenticity or personal 
autonomy. It is a common place that the veil has no single meaning. This 
points to the inevitable conflict over the interpretation of symbols. We need 
to focus our analysis of the foundational reference on the veil. The practice 
of veiling can be seen as a specific example of the way in which symbols 
meditate between two levels: the human and the divine. The veil can be 
understood alongside the Veronica, for example, as a way in which a coherent 
order of being is maintained. Our first point, then, is that the veil cannot 
be denounced as other to the order of symbols which we inhabit. It is as 
central to our inheritance as the crucifix or the civil code.
We can elaborate some of these points by briefly considering the evidence 
on veiling practices presented to the court in Begum:
The main sources of the Muslim religion are the Holy Quran, which 
Muslims believe to represent the word of Allah, and Hadiths, or sayings 
of the Prophet Muhammad, on different topics. A secondary source of 
authority is a canon of practices and sayings that are ascribed to Muhammad. 
These are known as the Sunnah, and a combination of the Holy Quran, 
the Hadiths and the Sunnah provide the basis for the Islamic laws known 
as the Shari’a. Scholars differ about the authority of the Sunnah, and 
some of these differences are apparent in the present dispute. In this field 
familiar problems arise when early traditions pass down the generations 
by word of mouth, and there is much scholarly dispute about the authority 
and authenticity of the earliest surviving written texts.3
All Muslims endeavour to follow the teachings in the Holy Quran, which 
include the following:
And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and guard their sexuality, 
and to display of their adornment only what is apparent, and to draw 
their head­coverings over their bosoms.  .  .  .  O Prophet, tell your wives 
think we Are? (2000), p. 246). Baroness Hale explains: ‘What critics of Islam fail to under­
stand is that when they see a young woman in a hijab she may have chosen the garment 
as a mark of her defiant political identity and also as a way of regaining control over her body.’ 
Baroness Hale goes on to refer to Parekh’s ‘A Varied Moral World, A Response to Susan 
Okin’s “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women”’ (Boston Review, October/November 1997): 
‘In France and the Netherlands several Muslim girls freely wore the hijab (headscarf ), partly 
to reassure their conservative parents that they would not be corrupted by the public 
culture of the school, and partly to reshape the latter by indicating to white boys how they 
wished to be treated. The hijab in their case was a highly complex autonomous act intended 
to use the resources of the tradition both to change and to preserve it’.
3 R. (On the Application of SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] EWCA 
Civ 199, at para.32.
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and daughters and the believing women to draw their outer garments 
around them when they go out or are among the men.
A Hadith of the Prophet states: ‘Whenever a woman begins to men­
struate, it is not right that anything should be seen except her face and 
hands’.4
This pithy summary of complex theology stresses a couple of central points 
about scripture and interpretation. Before we engage in more detail, however, 
it is necessary to anticipate objections to our argument. Switching from a 
discussion of the Reformation to Islamic theology is a risky move. A proper 
development of our argument would require more time and space than is 
available in this collection. However, this compression is justified as we are 
attempting to present the essential arc of a broad historical thesis, and the 
need to argue for the connection of themes takes priority at this stage to the 
presentation of detail. The second point is more problematic.
Our assumption is that if this elaboration of our central argument was 
attempted, it would have to be clearly shown how Legendre’s thesis, developed 
primarily with relation to Christian and Roman law sources, can be adapted 
in order to ‘read’ a different tradition. This could be seen as an example of 
the most simplistic reductivism. Whilst there is indeed an element of 
reductivism in our claims, it is worth pointing out that Legendre stresses 
that the structural function is the most ‘empty’ of categories. We suggested 
above that its content is always culturally and historically specific, and so 
our comments here attempt merely to outline the way in which, as far as 
the basic summary of Islamic theology above is concerned, the foundational 
reference is ‘apparent’.
After summarising the textual sources, the court stresses that ‘[a]ll Muslims 
endeavour to follow the teachings in the Holy Quran’.5 This is hardly sur­
prising. Islam is one of the great religions of the book. The sacred text records 
the divine message; the Quran is the word of the prophet, the mediator 
between God and man. The divine message is, however, destined for inter­
pretation, hence the scholarly disputes over its authority and meaning. The 
point is, moreover, that the teachings have to be followed. The truth of the 
text has to be discovered in order that the message of the text is translated 
into a coherent set of practices that define a culture and a way of being. 
Interpretation enacts the need to discover the truth of the authoritative speech 
that will call being into existence and sustain ways of living.
The passage quoted above thus represents a secular court reminding itself 
of the essential function of the foundational reference. One law coming up 
against another.
4 Ibid., para.33.
5 Ibid., para.33.
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The verses cited from the Quran take us directly to the notion that sub­
jectivity has to be created by the foundational reference. Just as Roman law 
creates legal categories that are distinct to the sexes, the verses from the 
Quran lay down rules that define gendered subjectivity. It is worth stressing, 
however, that the terms of the foundational reference can always be disputed. 
Indeed, these disputes are often a matter of life and death, because the foun­
dational reference is itself, in the most literal way, a fundamental question 
of the construction of life.
VI
As the focus of this essay is on Begum’s case, we now need to turn our 
attention to the tension between the understanding of the veil in Islamic 
law, and its construction in European human rights law. Our first point will 
be to stress that this is not a jurisprudential clash of civilisations. We need 
to show how human rights take over the foundational reference from religion 
and, secondly, how this determines the context of the veil cases.
The sequence of our argument will open with a brief consideration of the 
response of liberal scholars and multiculturalists.
VII
What resources does liberal theory or multiculturalism have for identifying 
the problems that we have outlined? Can it comprehend the problematic of 
the foundational reference? Liberal responses to ‘the veil cases’ have taken a 
variety of forms. A brief review of the field suggests that human rights are 
seen as central to any possible articulation of the problem. Human rights 
can achieve a ‘fair balance between competing interests’ as human rights 
provide the ‘language, discourses and, in some cases, institutional structures 
for mediating and resolving headscarf­hijab debates’ (McGoldrick 2006: 
308 –9). In this section of the chapter, these claims will be examined in more 
detail. Our argument will be that neither liberal theory nor multiculturalism 
understands the structural function of human rights.
In turning to Kymlicka’s work on minority rights, it is not suggested 
that this is directly drawn upon by all liberal writers on the headscarf 
debate. However, it does perhaps display, in one of the more articulate 
and consistent forms, an extended attempt to engage with the problem 
of what are framed as minority rights. Rights enable the very possibility 
of fair solutions. Our criticisms are, in part, a recuperation of Modood’s 
argument that liberal theories of rights cannot provide the ‘neutral’ grounds 
for the articulation of plural identities (Kymlicka 1989/91). However, it 
is also an attempt to find out why liberal theories of rights lack the 
analytical focus to articulate the symbolic spaces where law takes hold of 
the subject.
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It might be that Kymlicka appreciates the ‘inside’, the psychic space of 
the foundational reference, but his model of a market of equality and cultural 
equivalence deprives a theory of rights of the appreciation of the necessary 
agonistics that has to inform a sensible appreciation of the tensions inherent 
in the communication of rights.
So, Kymlicka’s theory of rights and freedom stresses that lives should be 
lived from ‘the inside’ (Kymlicka 1989/91: 12). People need to live from the 
values that they have ‘endorsed’ rather than being somehow benignly guided 
by some higher agencies’ understanding of what is good for them. Precisely 
because we live from our own beliefs and can revise our own understanding 
of the values to which we have committed ourselves, we need to be able to 
live as social beings with ‘the resources and liberties’ to enable this activity. 
People require ‘the cultural conditions’ that allow them to ‘acqu[ire] an 
awareness of different views about the good life’ and to examine critically 
the options available (Kymlicka 1989/91: 13).
How is this worked out? Kymlicka posits a market mechanism that 
effectively shares social resources out to those choices that are freely made. 
Minority rights protect those practices that are so embedded in cultures as 
to be markers of identity, and which thus require special treatment. Rights 
protect a kind of special status in the cultural market place. Precisely because 
they are not in the majority, certain cultural practices are fragile and, for this 
reason, these circumstances have to be taken into account in determining 
what is fair. The market is a mechanism that measures ‘what is in fact 
equitable’ (Kymlicka 1989/91). Culture takes on an exchange value; it enters 
a general structure of equivalence which is enabled by the protection of 
certain interests through minority rights.
This move from culture to the market is far too precipitous and obscures 
the fundamental logic that we have been arguing is central to the foundational 
reference. There is an implicit assumption in Kymlicka’s argument that the 
operation of markets, as understood in liberal theory, has the interpretative 
power to articulate the meaning and possibility of exchange or otherwise of 
cultural symbols. This is how Kymlicka can move from the ‘internal’ notion 
of a life lived from its own centre, to a suggestion of how an ‘external’ public 
culture can somehow agree on the terms of acceptable practices. However, 
a market cannot articulate the terms in which the foundational reference 
operates as this underlies the very possibility of a culture in the first place. 
The foundational reference simply cannot be traded. This is not to say, how­
ever, that the content of the foundational reference is not open to articulation. 
Whether or not this can be grasped in Kymlicka’s thought is unlikely. Our 
concern is with scholarly disputes over the meaning of being that are not 
exchanges or tradeoffs. They are forms of speech: dialogues over the meanings 
of texts. We cannot hope to engage in meaningful discussion about the 
meaning of symbols if they are thought of as merely problems about the 
public distribution of resources.
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VIII
Perhaps Parekh’s understanding of multiculturalism comes much closer to 
this sense of the lived meaning of symbols than Kymlicka’s liberalism. Indeed, 
Parekh’s thesis is based on a notion of dialogue that is explained by reference 
to Heidegger and the hermeneutical tradition. The grounding elements of 
human culture are the ‘inclination’ of human beings to interpret themselves. 
This interpretative faculty presupposes the embedding of human beings in 
cultural communities. However, these communities are not somehow sealed 
off from each other and self­defining. They may have a hold over individuals 
to the extent that they provide the means through which the world becomes 
intelligible, but they are not impregnable. Cultural values are the products 
of ‘dialectical’ (Parekh 2006: 127) tensions between the inherent internal 
and external relationships of different communities. Human values come out of 
‘cultural dialogue’ that realises the ‘comparative’ nature of ‘[m]oral discourse’ 
(Parekh 2006: 128).
Thus, culture is a dynamic process that both nurtures individuals in ‘local’ 
contexts and brings those contexts together. The human being is a cultural 
creation, a creation in and of discourses. Ultimately, this is underpinned by 
‘human worth’. If human beings are language­using, symbol­ and ritual­
creating creatures, then one has to assume that the practices that they create 
are inherently meaningful for them and deserve respect. Human beings must 
be accorded ‘dignity’ for the expression of ‘unique and worthwhile capacities’ 
(Parekh 2006: 139) that define their different cultural worlds.
Rights, as in Kymlicka’s account, mediate and balance out the tensions 
between communities. The constitution must, at its minimum, contain an 
‘enshrined system of fundamental rights’ (Parekh 2006: 208). Fundamental 
rights have a twofold role to play: they guarantee that minorities are not 
subject to populist political attack and thus allow minorities to interact on 
equal terms with the majority. The risk is that a divided society lacks agree­
ment over the terms of a catalogue of fundamental rights. In such a situation, 
a bare minimum should be agreed by negotiation and act as a way of achiev­
ing some kind of consensus.
Whilst this account of culture is certainly useful, it needs to be supple­
mented with a psychoanalytic approach if we are to understand in greater 
detail how the agonistics between the various interpretations of symbols by 
different groups interface with human rights. Without at least some notion 
of the foundational reference it becomes difficult to think how a community 
might perpetuate itself. We would, of course, have to make the important 
distinction between the form of the foundational reference and the inevitable 
tensions over its content. It is the latter issue that takes us to Parekh’s con­
cern with the way in which cultural change redefines a community’s mores. 
To be precise, we would have to see this as enabled by a structural function 
which is not susceptible to change or cultural negotiation. However, the key 
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point is that Parekh’s work neglects the peculiar logic of reformation. This 
is the horizon for any discussion of fundamental rights and common values. 
If any values emerge, they would do so out of an agonistics of interpretation 
that put in issue the very sense of their commonality. It may be that new 
values emerge that challenge an old consensus, creating a new community 
of interpreters. In turning to a specific dispute over headscarves, we need to 
plot how these warring interpretations can define a new informing social 
tension.
IX
How, then, does European human rights law take over the foundational 
reference and re­articulate its content? Answering this question means reading 
the cases that were central for the arguments in Begum. However, we need 
to read these texts in a double way: both to the law they reveal, and the 
arguments about the structural function that they obscure.
The first case is the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria.6 Our reading 
of the case will stress that the imago of human rights is not necessarily a 
secular idea. In the jurisprudence of the court human rights are always already 
an acknowledgement of a particular religious heritage. Otto-Preminger-Institut 
v Austria can be read as a clash between Article 10 and Article 9 but, more 
precisely, as an interpretation of the precise terms of Article 9. After all, 
Article 9 reduces the reformation to three paragraphs. It is founded on the 
assumption that a secular court can determine the boundaries of acceptable 
religion.
The Otto Preminger Institute undertook a screening of a film, Das 
Liebeskonzil, based on a satirical play by Oskar Panizza that was, in part, a 
reconstruction of the writer’s trial and conviction for blasphemy in 1895. 
The Innsbruck diocese of the Roman Catholic Church requested that criminal 
proceedings be instigated against the Institute for ‘disparaging religious 
doctrines’, an act prohibited by section 188 of the Penal Code. The case was 
referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) 
in April 1993. The ECHR accepted that the seizure of the film had been 
necessary to safeguard the rights of others; or, more precisely, the faith of 
others. This can be elaborated by examining the way in which the court 
relied on the judgement in the case of Kokkinakis v Greece of 1993.7
In Kokkinakis it was determined that:
Article 9  .  .  .  is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the 
meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the 
6 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (13470/87) [1994] ECHR 26 (20 September 1994).
7 Kokkinakis v Greece (Application No. 260­A) Ser. A.; 17 EHRR 397.
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most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
their conception of life.8
Thus, as far as the content of the film was concerned:
The respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 
9 can legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative 
portrayals of objects of religious veneration; and such portrayals can be 
regarded as malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which must 
also be a feature of democratic society.9
The civil magistrates protect the sensibilities of the believer. Within the European 
polity, and in the name of human rights, the court can affirm that a democratic 
society can attach protection to objects of religious veneration. The European 
Court of Human Rights, then, rather like the old ecclesiastical courts, is 
concerned with the faith that attaches itself to instruments. But how is this 
faith to be governed? Not by the church or the churches, but by the executive. 
If there is no consensus over what constitutes the correct balance between the 
values of freedom of religion and artistic expression, the European Court of 
Human Rights has to allow the executive of the state a ‘certain margin of 
appreciation’ in determining the precise nature of the relationship. The margin 
of appreciation is the echo of the power of the reformed secular state to deter­
mine the precise boundaries of state religion. But, as we are within the empire 
of human rights, the power of the executive is limited. The powers of the 
executive have to be interpreted within the context of the Convention. As a 
matter of fact, in this case, the European Court of Human Rights determined that 
the Austrian government were not in breach of Article 10: the correct balance 
between the right to artistic freedom and the right to respect for religious 
beliefs as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Basic Law had been struck.
So, Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria shows the extent to which the European 
Court of Human Rights adopts and elaborates its jurisdiction over the govern­
ance of souls. It is willing to see a limitation of Article 10 in protecting 
Christian religious sensibilities. The jurisprudence of human rights thus 
includes within itself a jurisdiction that once rested with church courts, was 
claimed by secular common law courts (at least in England) and now defines 
and demarcates human rights law.
In turning to Leyla 9ahin v Turkey10 we have a further definition of the 
jurisdiction of human rights over matters of belief. The case raises the question 
of the extent to which the court is willing to protect the religious sensibility 
 8 Ibid., para.31.
 9 Supra n. 6, at para.47.
10 Leyla 9ahin v Turkey, 29th June 2004 (Application no. 44774/98).
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of Moslems rather than Christians. We will see that the court can only assert 
the universal nature of human rights by deferring to the specific histories of 
member states.
X
The applicant in this case, Leyla 8ahin was a Turkish national who was a 
medical student at Istanbul University. In 1998, the University prohibited 
the wearing of Islamic headscarves. 8ahin considered it her religious duty to 
wear a headscarf and refused to comply with the ban.
The Court argued that there had been no breach of Article 9. As the inter­
ference in religious freedom was both justified in principle and proportionate 
to the aims pursued, it was therefore ‘necessary in a democratic society’.11 
The European Court of Human Rights relied on a ruling of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court which had held that freedom of dress was not absolute 
in higher educational institutions; furthermore, the court determined that 
authorising students to ‘cover the neck and hair with a veil or headscarf 
for reasons of religious conviction’12 in the universities was in breach of the 
Constitution. There were also rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court that 
had held wearing Islamic headscarves was incompatible with Constitutional 
principles. The ban on headscarves at the University had been in place long 
before 8ahin had enrolled as a student.
The interference with 8ahin’s religious freedom was justified from a slightly 
different perspective. It achieved the legitimate aim of protecting both the 
rights and freedoms of others, and preserving public order. The values that 
were protected were those of ‘secularism and equality’.13 The Constitutional 
court had repeatedly held that secularism underlay such democratic values 
as freedom and equality; it also prevented the state from promoting any 
particular set of religious values, thus maintaining its neutrality. A ban on 
outward manifestations of faith protected individuals from ‘pressure from 
extremist movements’14 and also helped to further gender equality.
8ahin presents a real insight into the law of human rights. Whilst Turkey 
as a non­Christian state cannot be thought of in terms of the European 
Reformation, the case shows how the secularising logic of Attaturk that 
founded the Turkish Republic over­determines any other meaning to be given 
to religious freedom. Most specifically, the case shows the court linking this 
logic to the contemporary value of sexual equality. Whilst this does update 
the content of the structural function, it does so in a very specific manner. 
11 Article 9, cited in Leyla 9ahin v Turkey, para.70.
12 Ibid., para.35.
13 Ibid., para.38.
14 Ibid., para.109.
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The structural function that founds Turkey and defines the modes of living, 
the symbols and rituals of secular power, is articulated in such a way as to deny 
any rival interpretation through Shari’a law. Claims as to justifiable interference 
in 8ahin’s right to wear a headscarf thus seem a rather flimsy excuse for a 
decision that is more properly understood as an uncompromising statement 
of both the form and content of the structural function.
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that human rights law will 
always simply acknowledge the power of the state to define the acceptable 
use of religious symbols. In Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria15 the European 
Court of Human Rights stated that:
[The court] recalls that, but for very exceptional cases, the right to 
freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any 
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs 
or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.16
This suggests that the state itself cannot interfere with the sensibilities of 
believers. It would seem to be a contradiction not only of 8ahin, but of our 
argument above that human rights law adopts the power of the magistrate 
to determine acceptable symbols of faith.17 This would be to misunderstand 
another equally important element of reformation: the understanding that 
it is necessary to accept deviations in Christian doctrine in the spirit of 
tolerance. As the Reformation plays itself out, the civil magistrate becomes 
willing to accept the legitimacy of religious expression. From our perspective, 
this represents the achievement of political stability of the secular order. 
Having redefined the terms of the social bond, religious expression is allowed 
a status within civic life provided that it is a private matter. At the level of 
structural function this produces two understandings of the state. In the case 
of France (a similar argument could be made in relation to Turkey) it leads 
to the uncompromising assertion of the secular appropriation of the dominant 
content of the structural function. In England it produces the compromise 
where a national church remains central to the symbology of the state, but 
is deprived of all forms of ‘real’ power.18
15 Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (October 26, 2000: Application No. 30985/96).
16 Ibid., para.78.
17 This is a claim about how the spirit of the reformation influences the thinking of the 
ECHR not about historical processes of reformation in Bulgaria.
18 As the court comments in Begum, supra n. 1, at para.61: ‘The United Kingdom is very 
different from Turkey. It is not a secular state, and although the Human Rights Act is now 
part of our law we have no written Constitution. In England and Wales express provision is 
made for religious education and worship in schools in Chapter VI of the 1998 Act. Schools 
are under a duty to secure that religious education in schools is given to pupils, and that 
each pupil should take part in an act of collective worship every day, unless withdrawn 
by their parent.’
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The comments above are not meant to suggest that the settlement between 
secular and religious power is unproblematic. The later history of the Refor­
mation (an epoch that we remain within) is still animated by the policing 
of the boundaries of symbols. However, as we have seen, the assumption of 
the dominant form and terms of the structural function by human rights 
means that in our times the negotiation of this particular legacy is in very 
particular terms. We will see below that this historical articulation of the 
content of the foundational reference can help us to understand the decision 
of the English courts in Begum.
XI
To what extent can Islam become a content of human rights law? Is the cost 
of this an acceptance of a certain idea of reformation, where human rights 
speaks for religion?
Could it be said that in Begum, the ‘state’ has missed the opportunity to 
sanction within human rights law a female, Muslim subjectivity? We must 
now turn our attention to the case.
XII
Shabina Begum, a devout Muslim, was a pupil at a state­maintained school 
that required pupils to abide by its uniform policy. This policy had been 
developed in consultation with a number of local religious groups. It allowed 
female pupils to wear a variety of forms of dress including the shalwar kameeze. 
The shalwar kameeze was a form of dress of Pakistani origin, which included 
a headscarf. The majority of pupils at the school were Muslim, and the issue 
of school uniform had not arisen before the litigation occasioned in this case. 
Indeed, it was noted that the claimant had herself been happy to comply 
with the uniform rules when she first attended school. However, Begum 
argued that the shalwar kameeze was not an acceptable form of dress and she 
began to attend school wearing the jilbab. The jilbab provided covering for 
the wearer’s arms and legs. Begum was suspended from school because she 
refused to stop wearing the jilbab. She applied for judicial review of the 
decision to exclude her, arguing that the school’s policy was in breach of 
Article 9 and Protocol 1 of the Convention. Her case was dismissed and an 
appeal to the Court of Appeal ensued.
The court held that Begum’s rights under Article 9 had been breached:
Although her belief that the shalwar kameeze was not a religiously 
acceptable form of dress was shared by only a minority of Muslims 
in her community, it was sincerely held. It was not for school 
authorities to pick and choose between religious beliefs; every shade 
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of religious belief, if genuinely held, was entitled to due consideration 
under Article 9.19
How does the court argue this particular articulation of the faith which may 
attach itself to objects and symbols? To return to Section II above, this reflects 
the particular articulation of the spirit of reformation. Refracted through the 
language of human rights, the court is asserting the possibility of coordinating 
public and private symbols. This is done by reference to Article 9: the right 
to ‘manifest’ one’s religion. Arguably, with this concern, we return to the 
scene of the manifestation of an inner sense of belief: how does one display 
the truth upon one’s heart?20
The court returned to Hasan and Chaush on this point: ‘[The court] 
recalls that, but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion 
as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of 
the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express 
such beliefs are legitimate.’21 It would thus follow from Hasan and Chaush 
that the school’s uniform rules were limiting Begum’s right to manifest her 
faith.
The rhetoric is interesting because it gives us an insight into the dogmatic 
communication of human rights. This involves a transmission of messages 
that are predicated upon reference back to the fundamental truth of the 
foundational reference. The transmission of the text is the dissemination of 
a discourse that for the society in question has the status of truth. To engage 
with the text is to accept its hold, to submit to a pre­existent embodiment of 
the truth. The text itself bestows on the interpreter the authority to interpret 
and thus carry forward the function of reference. In other words, the truth 
19 Supra n. 3, para.94.
20 How is this expressed in the language of human rights? The ‘correct starting point’ was, 
first of all, to accept that the claimant had a valid right to ‘manifest her belief ’. The onus 
was then on the school to show that there was a legitimate aim that justified restricting 
the claimant’s religious freedom. Indeed, it may have been possible to justify the refusal 
to allow the claimant to wear the jilbab with reference to a policy of inclusiveness which 
could not accommodate some forms of clothing. The Court of Appeal made reference to the 
European Court of Human Rights in Kokkinakis v Greece, which, as we have seen asserts 
that Article 9 is a foundation of ‘democratic society’. The broader idea of religious freedom 
implies the ‘freedom to manifest [one’s] religion’. Article 9 also refers to the ‘freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief’. However, to what extent was it true to assert that the 
shalwar kameeze was not a correct form of Islamic dress for a mature woman? The evidence 
given suggested two schools of thought: the first, representing mainstream opinion among 
South Asian Muslims, was that the shalwar kameeze, if worn with a headscarf, was sufficient. 
The other school of thought, and a minority position amongst British Muslims, was that the 
shalwar kameeze was insufficient, and that the jilbab must be worn. This would suggest that 
the jilbab is a manifestation of religious faith, albeit a minority position within a faith.
21 Supra n. 3, para.49.
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of the text is largely a notion of the conditions of its own remembrance, 
perpetuation and continued dissemination.
What truth has the civil magistrate pronounced? It has affirmed and restated 
its own foundational truth: the human right to manifest one’s religion. At 
the same time it asserts that it is the prince or the state that can limit human 
rights. Most precisely, the rights to faith can be limited in the name of 
human rights; in other words, the limits allowed by Article 9.22
XIII
The decision of the Court of Appeal was overturned by the House of Lords. 
This decision is interesting because it turns on a re­inscription of the values 
of the sacred and the secular. Lord Bingham’s argument rests, in part, on 
ECHR cases23 that show that Article 9 ‘does not protect every act motivated 
or inspired by a religion or belief ’.24 This reasoning re­asserts through the 
language of human rights, the power of the state to determine what is and 
is not an acceptable use of a religious symbol. Lord Bingham supports this 
argument with a reference to Ahmad v United Kingdom25:
.  .  .  the freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9, is not absolute, 
but subject to the limitations set out in Article 9(2). Moreover, it may, as 
regards the modality of a particular religious manifestation, be influenced 
by the situation of the person claiming that freedom.26
Lord Bingham points out that the ECHR has not looked favourably on breach 
of Article 9 arguments. The case law suggests that broad limitations on 
Article 9 are permissible; in particular in instances when an individual has 
voluntarily accepted contractual terms that might limit their freedom 
22 Begum won her appeal on an argument about the correct interpretation of Article 9, and 
the restrictions that can be placed on Article 9 rights. Can the restrictions be applied to 
Begum’s choice of the jilbab? Evidence given to the court suggested that if some students 
wore jilbab, others viewed them as extremists. This would have a negative effect on school 
discipline, leading to ‘divisiveness’. There were also fears expressed on health and safety 
grounds. However, in order to address these issues, a school would have to address the 
following questions: has the claimant a valid Article 9 right? Was interference with that 
right justified under Article 9? (In other words, did the interference have a legitimate 
aim?) The School did not ask these questions, nor approach the issue in this way: ‘Nobody 
who considered the issues on its behalf started from the premise that the claimant had a 
right which is recognised by English law, and that the onus lay on the School to justify 
its interference with that right. Instead, it started from the premise that its uniform 
policy was there to be obeyed: if the claimant did not like it, she could go to a different 
school’. Supra n. 6 at para.76.
23 Sahin v Turkey and Kalac v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 552.
24 Supra n. 1, at para.32.
25 Ahmad v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 126.
26 Supra n. 1, at para.32.
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to manifest their faith. Lord Bingham resolutely asserts the dominance of 
secular concerns over the public manifestation of one’s inner desires.
XIV
Baroness Hale took a somewhat different approach to the issues of the case. 
Although she agreed with the majority that the appeal should be overturned, 
her reasoning is interesting as it directs our attention to the very issue of the 
articulation of the content of the foundational reference:
If a woman freely chooses to adopt a way of life for herself, it is not for 
others, including other women who have chosen differently, to criticise 
or prevent her. Judge Tulkens, in Sahin v Turkey at 46, draws the ana­
logy with freedom of speech. The European Court of Human Rights has 
never accepted that interference with the right of freedom of expression 
is justified by the fact that the ideas expressed may offend someone.27
To approach the issue of the veil through the figure of the autonomous female 
choosing the way of life she will lead, invokes the central concern of human 
rights. The subject is not the obedient believer in thrall to sacred mysteries, or 
the unquestioning follower of the rules of traditional culture. Rather, it is the 
reasoning individual who willingly adopts a symbol as a form of self­expression. 
The analogy with freedom of speech is thus quite apposite. Speech, in this instance, 
is literally a saying of the self: a figure of the self­creating subject who chooses a 
mode of dress, a manifestation of faith that appropriates what would otherwise 
be patriarchal symbols; it is a new coordination of self and symbol.
Note that Baroness Hale approaches the issue from an explicitly feminist 
perspective. This is a peculiar moment. Might it be the point at which a 
certain idea of Islam might correspond with the imago of human rights? 
Might this be a moment that, if sustained, would represent a redefinition of 
the foundational reference’s content? It is hard to say. At the very least, we 
could suggest that Begum cannot be understood as one law coming up against 
another. Reading Baroness Hale’s argument brings us to a realisation that 
the case opened the possibility that a particular conjunction of sacred law 
and common law could be worked out.
What sense does this make?
XV
In February 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, gave 
the foundation lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice.28 In his address, Dr 
27 Ibid., at para.34.
28 At www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575.
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Williams engaged with the status of Shari’a law in the UK. We will read 
his speech as an attempt to apply the logic of reformation in a sensitive way 
to Shari’a law in the United Kingdom.
Shari’a has been subject to a certain degree of misrepresentation at the 
hands of self­appointed spokesmen for western ‘liberal’ values. Their proletysing 
has led to a simplistic idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’ where the enlightened 
values of human rights are opposed to a strict pre­medieval social code 
based on violent punishment and profound social conservatism. Even if our 
arguments about the structural equivalence of human rights law and Shari’a 
are ignored, this view of benighted Islamic law and enlightened common 
law is unsustainable. Whilst Shari’a law has been used by extremist move­
ments as exemplary of their ‘primitivist’ understanding of Islam, traditions 
of Islamic jurisprudence are far too complex and sophisticated to be reduced 
to such caricatures.
In arguing that Shari’a can be understood as a complex practice of 
interpretation, Dr Williams’ ideas come close to our understanding of the 
articulation of the foundational reference. Rather than a ‘monolithic’ set of 
enactments or a ‘single code’, the Shari’a is a way in which the Koran and 
other sacred texts have been read so as to ‘actualise’ the principles of Islam 
in ‘human history’.29 Indeed, the major traditions of Islam are identified with 
different ways in which the Shari’a can be interpreted. These traditions 
are now established, and have such historical authority that there can be no 
further attempts to open new ways of interpreting the sacred texts. However, 
there are also a ‘good many voices’ arguing that new interpretations can be 
forged by ‘reasoning from first principles’ rather than entirely remaining 
within the historical traditions.30 It is from this position that it might be 
possible to outline a ‘just and constructive relationship between Islamic law 
and the statutory law of the United Kingdom’.31 It is possible, in other 
words, to re­articulate the content of the foundational reference, even though 
conventional approaches to the sacred texts would hold that there is no need 
for further interpretation.
Where does this argument lead? Dr Williams refers to the need to think 
about whether or not there could be ‘something like a delegation of certain 
legal functions to the religious courts of a community’32 – a question not 
just of Shari’a, but of other bodies of religious law. The problem with such 
an enhanced presence for a religious court might be that it strengthens the 
hand of those who speak for the ‘retrograde’33 aspects of faith traditions. 
Women in particular tend to be disadvantaged by elements of family law 
29 Ibid., no page numbers.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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concerning divorce settlements and inheritance. The fundamental response 
to these concerns is simple:
[i]f any kind of plural jurisdiction is recognised, it would presumably 
have to be under the rubric that no supplementary’ jurisdiction could 
have the power to deny access to the rights granted to other citizens or 
to punish its members for claiming those rights.34
In building this argument, the Archbishop returns to the logic of reforma­
tion. The law of the secular state serves to licence the acceptable forms of 
social communication, and sees itself as the dominant way in which public 
discourse is constituted. However, once it is accepted that religious opinions 
have to be taken seriously, it raises the question of plural jurisdictions. Is Dr 
Williams suggesting that, in certain circumstances, the common law might 
have to give way to a court with jurisdiction over religious matters? This 
important concern takes us to one of the most interesting parts of the lecture: 
should we question the fundamental ideas of universal rights, and the principle 
that all come before the law on equal terms?
To the extent that European cultures can be traced back to the Enlightenment 
revolt against Church authorities that could not justify their claims to legitimacy 
through reasoned argument, any return to special privileges for faith is to go 
against the fundamental movement of western culture. This does not mean, 
however, that the logic of reformation is not incompatible with courts that 
remain bound by human rights having some form of jurisdiction over matters 
of faith. Picking up on Dr Williams’ point about the re­interpretations of the 
Shari’a, might this not lead to the creation of those institutional sites where 
the promulgation of a ‘reformed’ set of religious laws might take place?
XVI
This chapter has argued that the foundational reference brings together both 
secular human rights law and religious law. This argument requires an im­
mediate distinction between the structural function and the content of this 
fundamental anthropological operation. The structural function runs through 
diverse bodies of law. Thus, whether we are concerned with the law of the 
Christian Church, Shari’a law or human rights law, we have to recognise that 
these bodies of law serve to determine the symbols and practices that will 
define forms of being. This does not mean that the content of these bodies 
of law is the same or even similar. There are many different ways in which 
life can be given form. The pressing task is to determine the precise content 
of a Shari’a law that is somehow compatible with human rights. However, 
34 Ibid.
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this requires us to recognise that human rights are unthinkable outside of 
the logic of reformation. This suggests that notions of autonomy and personal 
authenticity will be the imagos that animate any fusion of rights and Shari’a. 
Far from a prohibition on the wearing of headscarves, such a hybrid body of 
law would seek to re­negotiate the tensions between the sacred and the 
secular.
The terms of this important task have not been understood properly by 
either the liberal or the multicultural commentators. The media response to 
Dr Williams’ speech also suggests that there has been a wider failure to 
mobilise the intellectual resources necessary for a proper consideration of the 
issues raised by re­assertions of religious identity. It is indeed necessary to 
tread a careful line between criticisms of human rights and a resistance to 
monolithic ideas of Islam. If the resources for such a thinking can be found, 
they come from within the depths of our own histories and the ambiguities 
of the symbols we use to speak of ourselves.
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Chapter 4
The gift of ambiguity
Strategising beyond the either/or of 
secularism and religion in Islamic 
divorce law
Hassan El Menyawi*
Truth is such a precious quantity, it should be used sparingly.
 Mark Twain
The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth – it is the truth 
which conceals that there is none.
The simulacrum is true.
 Ecclesiastes (Baudrillard 1994: 1)
I. Introduction and background
This article attempts to demonstrate that women’s rights have been sacrificed 
throughout the twentieth century in the context of Egyptian family law. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, secular liberal male elites 
envisioned a secular legal system with European legal transplants and a Civil 
Code modelled on the French system. Ultimately, to achieve this, the secu-
lar, liberal elites had to keep the Islamic character of family law intact in 
exchange for making the rest of the legal system largely secular. This has 
had significant costs for women’s rights, including women being unable to 
exercise no-fault divorce.1 After providing a brief background on Egyptian 
* New York University, hem251@nyu.edu. I would like to thank Craig Calhoun (NYU), 
Judith Stacey (NYU), Juan Amaya Castro, Shannon Gilreath and Ben Francisco for the many 
conversations, which deepened and enriched my thinking on this topic. Thanks to the 
editors Adam Geary and Marinos Diamantides for their comments and editorial suggestions 
on earlier drafts. A version of this paper was presented and discussed at Wake Forest Law 
School, November 2009 during the Distinguished Lecture Series. My thanks to the participants 
at Wake Forest Law School for their valuable comments and responses.
1 See El Alami and Hinchcliffe (1996: 3) describing how, in the Muslim world, marriages 
are most commonly dissolved by the husband exercising his right of talaq (divorce). Islamic 
law grants the husband the power to unilaterally terminate the marriage rendering it 
analogous to no-fault divorce in contemporary Western family law systems. However, in 
Islamic law, only the husband is eligible to take this course of action. The husband is not 
required to demonstrate cause and does not require any recourse before a court of law.
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family law, the article examines the idea of sacrifice as contemplated by 
Jacques Derrida in his Gift of Death (Derrida 1995), which explores the biblical 
story of Abraham’s sacrifice of his son, Isaac. Similar to Abraham’s sacrifice of 
Isaac, the liberal elite have sacrificed women’s rights as part of a project of 
largely – not totally – secularising the legal system. This sacrifice is reiterated 
again and again throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
legislative reforms and judicial decisions can be characterised as perpetually 
compromising – ‘splitting the difference’ – between the demands of feminists 
and those of the religious intelligentsia. By splitting the difference between 
feminist and Islamic arguments, the liberal elites have produced an either/or 
dichotomy that impels a choice between secularism and religion.2
Drawing on Giorgio Agamben (1998), the article contemplates women as 
abandoned by the liberal elites. Women have been in a state of ‘exceptional 
secularism’, a limbo in which they have opportunities to establish feminist 
legal reforms yet never achieve a fully fledged liberal family law. The question 
is what should be done? The strategy of relying on liberal male elites to 
liberalise family law has been less than effective, particularly when considering 
the past century of family law jurisprudence. Making reference to Jean 
Baudrillard’s idea of simulacra (Baudrillard 1994: 3), the article contemplates 
new strategic possibilities in which normatively powerful religious language 
is deployed to achieve substantive liberal effects. To demonstrate this, the 
example of khul’ reform in Law No. 1 of the year 2000 in Egypt is explored. 
This statutory reform by the Egyptian state allows a wife to elect to divorce 
without her husband’s permission (and without the mediation of the courts) 
if she surrenders her financial rights over family property.
The ultimate aim of this article is to determine possible strategies to 
advance feminist goals in Islamic family legal systems across the Middle East. 
While the paper takes up the example of Egyptian family law, many family 
legal systems in the Middle East are similar in that they have adopted a 
largely secular legal system, but have preserved the religious character of 
family law. In order to examine new strategies for the secularisation of 
family law, the article begins with an overview of the legal background. It 
then turns to explore Derrida’s notion of sacrifice and Agamben’s idea of 
abandonment. By means of a conclusion, the article draws on Baudrillard’s 
idea of hyperreal and simulacra to advance a strategic approach that furthers 
liberal, secular reforms in family law without having to compromise with 
the religious intelligentsia.
2 This either/or choice is analogical to the manner in which Soren Kierkegaard examines the 
choices individuals must make between living within an aesthetic sphere or the ethical 
sphere in his text, Either/Or. See Kierkegaard (1971, 1843). See Anderson (1968: 209, 
217–24).
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II. Background: the example of Egyptian family law
The history of Egypt is marked by a contestation between two emergent 
identity groups at the turn of the century: the religious intelligentsia and 
liberal, secular elites. The liberal intelligentsia includes enlightened liberal 
ulema (religious scholars) and liberal muftis (who are licensed to deliver fatwas), 
liberal judges and jurists, and the secular nationalist elites who govern through the 
legislature and judiciary. (While the ulema and muftis are, of course, religious, 
the more liberal among them have generally been supportive of the overall 
secularisation of the legal system, and thus are included in this category.) 
The religious intelligentsia includes conservative ulema (religious scholars) 
and muftis, as well as the religious right more generally, which includes the 
leadership of political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The secular 
elites seek to advance progressive reforms that are not necessarily loyal to a 
textual Islamic conception as approved by the religious intelligentsia, but 
that are instead liberated from the requirement for family law reforms to be 
articulated in religious terms (Holyoake 1896: 51).3
Egyptian secular liberals have been under attack for the past century by 
the religious intelligentsia. This antagonism can be traced through the recesses 
of Egyptian law; it is particularly evident in family law, but also visible in 
the recent implementation of criminal law. It is primarily in family law where 
feminists and secular elites battle conservative Islamic scholars – each with 
a particularised ‘imaginary’ of the Egyptian nation, each increasingly viewing 
the other as their polar opposite – the ultimate adversary of their would-be 
social utopia.4
Let us briefly recount the historical narrative of how family law became 
such a vital battleground. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century 
and continuing throughout the early twentieth century, Egypt’s Islamic legal 
rules were dissolved in favour of secular laws transplanted from Europe.5 
3 The current article defines secularism in a similar manner to the inventor of the term, George 
Holyoake. Holyoake considered secularism to be a realm of thought or practice separate 
from that of religion. In other words, secularism (or secularist thought) is not dependent 
on religious inspiration, thought or practice. While Holyoake seems to suggest that free 
thought requires the elimination of religious discourses and approaches, in the context of 
this article, secularism is defined – in slightly different terms – as not necessitating religious 
discourses and approaches (as opposed to entailing the elimination of religious discourses 
and approaches). The Egyptian secular elites in fact occasionally use religious legal discourses, 
but begin from the premise that reforms do not necessarily require a religious justification 
to be legitimate. The secular elites are open to considering legal approaches that are not 
grounded in shari’a (or Islamic law) or that have been adopted in non-Muslim countries. 
The secular elites’ legal approach is in stark contrast to the religious intelligentsia who 
seek to justify their actions and practices exclusively through Islamic (religious) texts.
4 See Anderson (1983: 6) describing the nation as ‘an imagined political community’.
5 See Anderson (1968: 209, 217–24) detailing the legal changes resulting from European 
legal transplants in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
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However, one legal area was kept intact, wholly in its Islamic form: family 
law.6 When the first Civil Code was adopted in post-colonial Egypt in 1949, 
its drafters deliberately excluded family law.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Egyptian elites sought 
to modernise the nation, with increased secularisation as one of their primary 
goals. This project of modernisation occurred over an expanded period of 
time but began to lose momentum (though never came to a complete halt) 
by the middle of the twentieth century. Determined to change most areas of 
law, Egyptian liberal elites replaced Islamic laws with imported European 
legal transplants. However, these same liberal elites kept the ‘religious’ or 
‘Islamic’ character of family law rules intact, hoping this would appease the 
religious intelligentsia. While it may have appeased them temporarily, it led 
to the eventual construction of family law as the last bastion of Islamic law 
surrounded by a sea of ‘impure godless legal secularity’. It served as a reminder 
that Islamic law was not used in the rest of the legal system, tantalising the 
religious intelligentsia with the possibility of full rule by Islamic law. This 
led them to a demand for further reforms to ‘Islamicise’ the law and, most 
of all, for feminists to ‘lay their reformist hands off’ family law.7 In fact, 
feminists have been viewed by the religious intelligentsia as traitors and have 
been constructed as allies of the ‘colonial West’ because of their calls for reform. 
But, rather than appeasing the religious intelligentsia as was the intendion 
of the secular elites, they have instead sustained a paroxysm of furious debate 
about the imagining of the status and role of women in Egypt and, cor-
respondingly, a debate about how the Egyptian state can be imagined. This 
sustained crescendo has brought feminists, secular elites, and the religious 
intelligentsia, into a single story – with the feminists seeking to wholly 
liberalise family law, the religious intelligentsia seeking to preserve the Islamic 
character of family law, and the liberal elites attempting to split the difference 
between the demands of feminists and those of the religious intelligentsia. 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, this game of splitting the difference 
between theories has made family legal reforms slow, difficult and limited.
The secular elites’ strategy of splitting the difference is reflected in both 
legislative reforms by legislators and in judicial decision-making by judges. 
In the case of legislative reforms, consider Law No. 100 in 1985. Law 
No. 100 reformed family law by including a bundle of new rights for 
women. Arguably, the most significant right was that of a woman to divorce 
6 See Crecelius (1974: 67) stating that ‘the scope of the shari’ah [Islamic law] was reduced 
to personal status law (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.  .  .  .  )’ (1974: 75, 79). During 
the process of secularisation, family law ‘involved the ulema in constant political conflict 
with their modernizing government’ (1974: 83– 4).
7 See Najjar (1988: 319, 323–25) providing a description of how religious, conservative 
opposition of family law reforms in the twentieth century viewed themselves as defending 
Islam from the onslaught of Western secularism and feminism.
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her husband on the grounds of harm. While significant, these new rights 
do not grant women access to no-fault divorce. Feminists had aggressively 
agitated for no-fault divorce, but harm-based divorces were seen by secular 
elites in the nation’s legislative body – the Egyptian National Assembly – as 
the best compromise to appease the religious intelligentsia. The legislators 
split the difference by allowing women access to harm-based divorces, but 
without permitting no-fault divorces. The strategy of splitting the difference 
has also been reflected in judicial decision-making. Consider the 1994 
Supreme Constitutional Court family law decision that found that a wife is 
entitled to divorce if her husband marries another woman. In this case, 
judges responded to feminists’ concerns by providing a woman the right to 
divorce in the event that her husband marries another. However, the decision 
fell short of fulfilling the liberal feminists’ desire for judges to expunge 
polygamy from family law. The judges split the difference. They allowed a 
wife to divorce her husband if he marries another woman, but they did not 
strike out what members of the religious intelligentsia consider a Muslim 
male’s God-given right to polygamy.
Splitting the difference has resulted in the emergence of a paradox: the 
secularisation of Egyptian family law preserves Islamic principles. These para-
doxes can be approached through Jacques Derrida’s aporias; it appears that 
the very possibility of secularism is the condition of its impossibility.8 To put 
this slightly differently, secularism is legitimated through the paradoxical 
violation of the very ideas and principles of liberty and equality (between 
spouses) that it allegedly seeks to advance. In other words, to secularise, one 
must not secularise. Feminist reformist demands and women’s rights (applicable 
within the context of family law) have been ‘trumped’ in favour of secularising 
the remainder of the Egyptian legal system (in a way that is historically 
parallel to many Middle Eastern states). We might want to argue that women 
have been made the ‘object’9 of sacrifice for secularism’s (virtual) adoption. 
At the same time, they have also become constructed as the site of national 
imagination – the site of discursive contestation about the state of the nation, its 
vision, goals and ideals. Both the male liberal, secular elites and the religious 
intelligentsia, have sought to speak on behalf of the ‘subaltern’ (Spivak 1994). 
We could say that women have been abandoned, expelled from secularism, 
while simultaneously held within it, never able to achieve complete ‘eman-
cipation’ in the ways contemplated by feminists.
By splitting the difference between feminist and Islamic arguments, the 
liberal elites have produced a strict either/or dichotomy between secularism 
8 See Derrida (1994: 12) saying that ‘the impossible that seems to give itself to be thought 
here: these conditions of possibility of the gift (that some “one” gives some “thing” to some 
“one other”) designates simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift’.
9 See De Beauvoir (1989: xxxv) stating that women ‘.  .  .  liv[e]  .  .  .  in a world where men com-
pel her to assume the status of the Other. They propose to stabilize her as object  .  .  .’.
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and religion, reinforcing the construction of two groups – the liberal feminists 
advancing women’s rights, and the religious intelligentsia advancing Islamic 
law. Once created, the dichotomy is difficult to escape: every advantage for 
one group is a loss for the other. The prospect of a so-called win-win scenario 
is impossible. Instead, an eternal oscillation between feminists and religious 
elites defines the legal system.10 For the liberal, secular elite this perpetual 
back-and-forth, this ongoing oscillation is a stabilising force in Egyptian law. 
By focusing the attention of the religious intelligentsia on one single area of 
law, their reformist gaze is not drawn to the rest of the legal system, in turn 
preserving the overall secularity of the legal system. There are many legal 
cases in family law that demonstrate how the oscillation between feminist 
and religious demands produce bounded spaces in which feminists cannot 
simply liberalise the entirety of family law in a single instance.
In 1980, the Egyptian legislature amended Article 2 of the Egyptian 
Constitution in response to a vocal call by the religious intelligentsia. The 
amendment altered the wording from the milder ‘the principles of Islamic 
shari’a are a principal source of legislation’ (of the 1971 constitution) to the 
more aggressive and all-encompassing ‘the principles of Islamic shari’a are 
the principal source of legislation’ (emphasis added).11 This has led to a flurry 
of legal cases in which the religious intelligentsia challenged what they 
saw as secular legislation that violated the shari’a. To demonstrate how the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) navigated their decisions by splitting 
the difference, three examples are explored.
In a 1997 legal decision, the SCC was asked to determine the constitu-
tionality of Article 11 of the 1929 law of the family that gives the judge 
the capacity to grant a woman a divorce in the event that it is impossible 
for the spouses to reconcile their differences. The court concurred with the 
plaintiff that the Quran gives a husband an absolute right to divorce his 
wife12 and argued that while the arbitrators should attempt to reconcile the 
spouses, the law did not specify what subsequent actions should be taken if 
10 See Vattimo (1992: 10) describing an oscillation between belonging and disorientation.
11 See Foblets and Dupret (1999: 63). The authors describe the decision of a 1985 constitutional 
case, explaining that the Supreme Constitutional Court interpreted the applicability of 
Article 2 to extend to legislation that follows the article’s date of coming into force, which 
is 22 May 1980. Legislation that pre-dates Article 2 is not subject to its requirement, 
but legislation enacted after the 22 May 1980 date must conform to the principles of 
Islamic law. See El-Morr (1997: 8); also see Balz (1999: 231, 234 –5).
12 Case No. 82, Judicial Year 17, 1997, at 5: ‘Divorce (talaq) has been permitted by God who 
gave the power to man because he is wiser and more rational  .  .  .’, translation by author. ‘When 
there is discord between husband and wife, arbitrate between them based on the commands 
of God’, ‘And when it is feared that discord will erupt between husband and wife, send an 
arbitrator from his family and also one from hers; if they seek reconciliation, God will ease 
tensions between them.  .  .  .’, citing verse 4:34 of the Qur’an, found in the chapter (sura) 
titled Women (Al-Nisa) Case No. 82, Judicial Year 17, 1997, at 6. translation by author.
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they fail to achieve a reconciliation.13 The court concluded that Article 11 
was not unconstitutional, since it merely grants the arbitrators the power to 
make a recommendation of divorce to the judge.14 By making this argument, 
the court forestalled the possibility for no-fault divorce in Egyptian family 
law. The court seems both to advance women’s rights and yet to block retro-
spectively significant liberal reforms by its interpretation of Islamic law.
In this case, as in most cases, there are two countervailing positions – a 
religious one and a feminist one. The court appears to take the middle ground 
between them. The religious position is that polygamy is the absolute right 
of any man, and the feminist position is that polygamy should be prohibited. 
The court splits the difference by allowing women a way to leave a marriage 
through a restricted ground of divorce, but also upholds the right of men to 
engage in polygamy.
In a 1996 case, the SCC was asked to determine whether the Minister of 
Education had the right to prohibit the wearing of the veil or headscarf (niqab 
or hijab) in primary and secondary schools.15 The Minister of Education 
issued an executive order that non-university female students were to remove 
their headscarves. This provoked such a fury of controversy from religious 
fundamentalists that liberal elites in government amended the language of 
its order, requiring instead that schoolgirls who personally elect to wear the 
headscarf must obtain permission from their parents. Even though the govern-
ment had compromised by requiring parental permission, the religious intel-
ligentsia were relentless and challenged the executive order in the highest 
court of the land.16 In deciding the case, the liberal justices of the SCC directly 
interpreted verses in the Qur’an that relate to the issue of the headscarf. They 
ruled that women are required to cover some parts of their bodies but that 
there was no conclusive evidence to suggest that women were required to 
cover their hair or face.17 After rigorous exploration of the verses and hadith 
13 See Case No. 82, Judicial Year 17, 1997, translation by author. Jurists have struggled to 
determine who has the power to enforce divorce in the event that the discord between 
spouses is irreconcilable. Some jurists have argued that in the event of irreconcilable 
tensions, the arbitrators have the power to divorce the wife from her husband. But other 
jurists have argued that the jurisdiction of arbitrators remain limited to negotiating and 
reconciling the interests of the spouses in the pursuit of the goal of terminating the 
discord between them.
14 The judge grants a divorce to the wife in the place of – on behalf of – the husband.
15 Case No. 8, Judicial Year 17, 1996. For a discussion of this case, see Abu Odeh (2004: 
1043, 1140).
16 See Benner Lombardi (1998: 81–108): ‘Under the new edict, schoolgirls could wear the 
hijab  .  .  .  Plaintiffs, however, continued to fight the decrees in court.  .  .  .’.
17 See Benner Lombardi (1998: 81–108): ‘The author reports that “the SCC first identified 
two passages of the Quran which require women to cover up those parts of their body 
that are sexually appealing to men, but it found none that specifically required women 
to cover their hair or their faces”.’
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(sayings and actions of the Prophet), the court explained that the binding 
principle determining what a woman should wear is ‘modesty’. The court 
ruled that a woman’s modesty can be preserved without having to wear a 
headscarf. The SCC upheld the Minister of Education’s executive order, 
requiring non-university female students wishing to wear the headscarf to 
obtain permission of their parents. Again, the court predictably split the 
difference, offering a compromise between religious and feminist positions. 
The court affirmed that women’s dress could be regulated and that it is 
limited by the principle of ‘modesty’, but it did not consider the headscarf 
as a requirement of modesty.
The third case, decided in 1994, concerns a law that entitled a wife to 
obtain a divorce in the event that her husband marries another woman.18 The 
plaintiff argued that allowing a woman the right to obtain a divorce without 
the consent of her husband violates the explicit language of the Qur’an that 
a man can marry up to four wives.19 The argument was that the law violated 
a man’s right to engage in polygamy. In its ruling, the court explained that 
the law did not violate the explicit dictates of the Qur’an. The Justices con-
curred with the plaintiff that men have an ‘absolute right’20 to marry up to 
four wives.21 However, while insisting that men had a right to marry up to 
four women, they explained that a woman who obtained a divorce when her 
husband married another woman is merely a ‘restriction of the right and not 
a cause of it’.22 Splitting the difference between feminists and the religious 
intelligentsia, the court crafts a middle-ground position between the argument 
that divorce is the sole right of the husband and not of the wife, and the 
feminist position that asserts an equal right to (no fault) divorce: the court 
allowed a judge to use his authority to end a bad marriage on behalf of the wife, 
while simultaneously upholding the right of a man to marry up to four wives.
To bring an end to these judicial compromises, feminists have been seeking 
novel strategies. A new strategy that is gaining ascendancy is premised on 
the idea that instead of sacrificing liberal feminism to save the preponderance 
18 Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994. See El Alami and Hinchcliffe (1996: 58) citing Article 11 of 
Law No. 25 of 1929, as amended by Law No. 100 of 1985: ‘[a] wife whose husband takes 
a second wife may petition for divorce from him if she is affected by some material or 
moral harm of a kind which would make it impossible for a couple such as them to 
continue living together, even if she has not stipulated in the contract that he should not 
take further wives’.
19 See Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994, at 3: ‘The plaintiff argues that the provision in contention 
violates the text of the Quran that authorizes polygamy.’ Translation by author.
20 Sometimes the Supreme Constitutional Court describes this ‘absolute right’ as a ‘license’.
21 Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994, at 3.
22 Case No. 35, Year 9, 1994, at 8: ‘Since polygamy is based in fairness – which is a restriction 
of the right and not a cause of it – no harm or injustice will inflict the wife when her 
husband marries another’ (translation by author).
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of secular law, women’s rights may be reconciled with Islamic law.23 The goal 
of this strategy is to Islamicise family law, but in a decidedly liberal fashion. 
This alliance, however, possesses significant potential costs. Fundamentally, 
the new alliance replaces one sacrifice for another. Before, liberal feminism 
was sacrificed to preserve legal secularism, and now – according to this new 
strategic line of thinking – secularism would be sacrificed for liberal feminism. 
Let us develop these points.
The new feminist strategy of reconciliation certainly has compelling 
elements. Since there is little Islamic law in contemporary Egyptian law, the 
Islamic character of family law is constantly being discursively guarded by 
religious groups. Any time feminists demand reforms, they are criticised and 
vociferously attacked by the religious intelligentsia in the Egyptian media 
and in the mosques. To stifle such criticisms, feminists have begun to deploy 
Islamic texts to demonstrate exegetically that their proposed reforms are 
reconcilable with Islamic legal tenets. The importance of this strategic shift 
is that it attempts to evade the limited dichotomous space that is marked by 
ideational scarcity and a lack of creativity. So, feminists are now attempting 
to ally themselves with the religious intelligentsia in the hope of persuading 
them that their liberal reforms are consistent with the tenets of Islamic law 
(shari’a). In other words, this new strategy advocates the establishment of a 
state based on the shari’a in the hope that it will effectively achieve the goals 
of secular, liberal feminists.
However, there are real dangers inherent in an alliance with the religious 
intelligentsia. While the normative power of Islamic law is undeniably power-
ful, it results in a new sacrifice into which liberal, secular discourses – which 
are increasingly influential among the Egyptian public – cannot be drawn 
to advance women’s rights. Furthermore, such Islamic laws can begin as 
liberal, and later be transformed into more conservative forms, depending on 
what is seen as ‘Islamic’. Liberal feminists may be promised liberal effects in 
return for an alliance to Islamicise Egyptian law, but there is no guarantee 
that the law will not gradually (or even suddenly) be interpreted in con-
servative ways. There is also the risk that conservative religious forces will 
become strong enough to go beyond the present compromises of the courts 
– with detrimental results for the limited gains made so far by feminists and 
secularising modernists.
III. The sacrifice of women’s rights
One way of exploring the sacrifice of women’s rights in the context of family 
law, is to make reference to the story of Abraham – as described by Derrida. 
23 See An Na’im (1990) building a liberal (as opposed to conservative) interpretive meth-
odology applicable to Islamic law.
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In the Gift of Death, Derrida analyses notions of sacrifice and responsibility. 
In the Genesis story, God demands that Abraham commit ‘that most cruel, 
impossible, and untenable gesture: to offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice’ (Derrida 
1995: 5 – 6). God tells Abraham: ‘Take your son, your only son Isaac, whom 
you love, and go the land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering’ 
(Genesis 22:2 Revised Standard Version).
This sacrifice that God demands is not explained. Instead, the sacrifice is 
made in silence, in solitude and in total absence of knowledge. Furthermore, 
this sacrifice is absolute because it entails the loss of someone who is ‘unique 
in terms of its being unique, irreplaceable, and most precious’ (Derrida 1995: 
58). In the case of Abraham, the sacrifice is of ‘what is one’s own or proper, 
of the private, of the love and affection of one’s kin’ (Derrida 1995: 95). 
Abraham must sacrifice the person that he is most intimate with – his son 
– and this is why the sacrifice can be called the ‘gift of death’. Ultimately, 
when Abraham puts the knife to his son’s throat, it is ‘the moment when 
Abraham gives the sign of absolute sacrifice, namely, by putting to death or 
giving death to his own, putting to death his absolute love for what is dearest, 
the only son’ (Derrida 1995: 95).
To carry out this sacrifice, Abraham informs neither his son, Isaac, nor his 
spouse, Sarah and in so doing, he violates the bond and commitment to them, 
establishing ‘a sort of rupture of marriage, an infidelity to Sarah, to whom 
Abraham says not a word at the moment of taking the life of his son, their 
son’ (Derrida 2003). Derrida identifies Abraham’s singularity and solitude 
in his decision-making to sacrifice his son as central in his conception of 
responsibility. Responsibility ‘consists in always being alone, entrenched in 
one’s own singularity at the moment of decision’ (Derrida 1995: 60).
Finally, the angel of God tells Abraham, ‘lay not thine hand upon the lad, 
neither do thou anything unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, 
seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me’ (Genesis 
22:12 Revised Standard Version). ‘I see that you have understood what absolute 
duty means, namely, how to respond to the absolute other, to his call, request, 
or command’ (Derrida 1995: 72). Ultimately, the story of Abraham enacts 
an aporia: to act responsibly one must be irresponsible:
Absolute duty means that one behaves in an irresponsible manner (by 
means of treachery and betrayal), while still recognizing, confirming, 
and reaffirming the very thing one sacrifices, namely, the order of human 
ethics and responsibility.
 (Derrida 1995: 67)
Abraham’s decision is absolutely responsible in the sense that it is a decision 
made ‘before the absolute other’ (Derrida 1995: 77). It is also simultaneously 
and paradoxically irresponsible as it is not guided by reason, by ethics, human 
rights or the rule of law. One cannot do both: be responsible before the 
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absolute other and be responsible ‘at the same time before the other and 
before others, before the others of the other’ (Derrida 1995: 77). This para-
doxical contradiction occurs in the moment of decision-making ‘for every 
man and every woman’ (Derrida 1995: 78).
What can this allegory of responsibility tell us about the problems we 
have been studying? The condition for the possibility of Abraham’s respon-
sibility is also the condition for its impossibility. He cannot be responsible 
without being irresponsible, and his irresponsibility is itself the basis of his 
absolute responsibility. This is also true of the male liberal, secular elite that 
determined that family law must remain Islamic in order to establish a largely 
secular legal system in Egypt: the condition of the possibility of secularism is 
also the condition of its impossibility. The liberal, secular elite cannot be true 
to the secular principles of autonomy, equality and mutual exchange in the 
context of family law in order to retain the continuity of a secular system.
Of particular relevance to the liberal, secular elites is the assumption that 
secular liberal principles ought to apply throughout the legal system writ 
large. However, instead of carrying this out, liberal scholars such as Sanhuri 
(see Hill 1988: 148 – 49), who drafted the first Egyptian Civil Code, are 
known to betray those principles as part of the response to the sacrificial 
demand of the ‘absolute other’ – in this case, the absolute other paradoxically 
being ‘Secularism’. Sacrificial responsibility involves a singular relationship 
with an unknown other. In the Christian tradition this other is named God 
but, in the case of Egyptian family law, we might name this other ‘the 
Secular’. This responsibility can be acted upon only in silence, in solitude 
and in the absence of knowledge. This responsibility was indeed acted on 
without the consent or advice of feminists or women. It was instead deter-
mined by male secular elites who felt it best to keep the character of family 
law Islamic. Their judgement was that it was necessary for the overall advance-
ment of the nation to sacrifice family law, and with it – women – who sought 
greater autonomy and equality in family law. Just as Abraham violated the 
bond of commitment and fidelity to Isaac and Sarah, the liberal elite has 
done the same with their feminist allies. It would not be stretching this 
point to suggest that – in the terms of our allegory of responsibility – this 
represents the sacrifice of a feminism that is part of the same political family 
as liberalism.
There are other ramifications worth pursuing. The secular elites appear 
‘sad and dangerous’ (Koskenniemi 999: 488, 510), ready to violate – to 
sacrifice – the very values they espouse publicly and collectively: autonomy, 
consent, gender equality, liberty and mutual exchange. It is as if they are 
bound up in an aporia – involving at once a public espousal of obligations to 
women’s rights, and a secret relationship to the singular other of ‘Secularism’, 
which legitimates the betrayal of those obligations and underpins the juris-
prudence of family law, as conceived and implemented by liberal, secular 
elites throughout the twentieth century and onwards. For the liberal elite to 
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be responsible, they must be irresponsible towards women and feminist allies, 
sacrificing women’s rights on the altar of secularism.
IV. The abandonment of women
While the Derridean allegory of responsibility might describe the secular 
elites’ strategy to secularise the legal system, it may be seen to pay too much 
regard to a paradigm where we have to think in terms of the absolute other. 
As suggested above, whilst we can make these moves, it might be more 
useful to look to an alternative way of thinking sacrifice. Consider Giorgio 
Agamben’s idea of homo sacer that combines formal law with biopolitics.24 
For Agamben, the interpretation of those destroyed or abandoned by the 
state within a sacrificial doctrine or through ‘the prestige of the mystical’ 
(Agamben 1999: 26 –33) originating from the Bible, is unwarranted. Agamben 
argues that the price individuals pay for inclusion in the state should be 
understood in a more secular manner – through the concept of abandonment 
rather than the more religious notion of sacrifice. Roman law contained a 
figure known as the homo sacer who is abandoned by the sovereign power. 
Homo sacer is the sacred man ‘who may be killed and yet not sacrificed ’ (Agamben 
1998: 8). Agamben describes the homo sacer as follows:
The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of 
a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him 
will not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, 
it is noted that ‘if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the 
plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide.’ This is why it is custom-
ary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.
 (Agamben 1998: 71)
If someone was a homo sacer, Roman law did not apply. Although law did not 
formally apply, the homo sacer was defined in a manner that included him in 
the juridical order solely through his exclusion. The homo sacer was both 
excluded from the law, while also included by the law that excluded him. 
We could apply this logic to the struggles over Egyptian family law. Women 
can be seen as homo sacers of secularism. By rendering family law external to 
secularism as a means to retain the largely secular character of the state’s 
laws, women are cast as within (or internal to) secularism to the extent that 
they are external to it. Their inclusion in secularism is defined by their 
exclusion.
24 For Agamben’s argument that the biopolitical paradigm of the Nazi concentration camp 
should not be interpreted within a biblical doctrine of sacrifice, see Agamben (1999: 
26 –33).
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The homo sacer echoes Franz Kafka’s short parable, ‘Before the Law’ (1992: 
165 – 6): this is the story of a man from the country who journeys to the doors 
of the law and stands before the law – mesmerised by its brilliance. There, he 
finds the doors open, but guarded by a gatekeeper who refuses to let him in. 
Although he refuses him entrance, the guard allows him to see through the door. 
The man from the country waits, waits and waits – wasting away his time – 
perpetually asking the gatekeeper when he might be able to enter. At the end 
of the story, when no other person has come to the door, the gatekeeper informs 
him that the door was meant only for him – and that now he is going to close 
it. The parable points to how the citizen-subject stands before the law – trans-
fixed by its brilliance – awaiting for the gatekeeper to allow him to enter the 
kingdom of the law. The citizen-subject ‘is delivered over to the potentiality of 
law because law demands nothing of him and commands nothing other than its 
own openness’ (Agamben 1998: 50). The law holds the man from the country 
in a holding position by ‘includ[ing] him in excluding him’ (Agamben 1998: 50).
The gatekeeper, represented in Kafka’s story as a guard, is analogous to the 
liberal elite that guard the law’s secularity. Women (and feminists) are patiently 
waiting at the door of the law, not knowing what an invitation into the law 
may bring. Feminists wait at the doors of the law hoping for reforms to expand 
autonomy and equality. But these hopes have been frustrated by the secular 
elites’ imposed compromises. The doors remain closed. But the compromises 
tantalise feminists into continuing their wait in the hopes that their ideological 
allies will one day implement the very ideals they purport to support.
By compromising, liberal secular elites have inadvertently reinforced the 
influence and importance of the religious intelligentsia in the politics of 
family law, thereby reinforcing their legitimacy and encouraging them to 
persist in advancing their religious agenda in family law (and other areas of 
Egyptian law as well). This oscillation between feminists and religious groups 
produces a legal system that is never fully secular and never fully religious. 
Both groups develop a sense that the law is on a journey towards completion, 
in turn waiting for an invitation to enter through the doors of the law.
Women have been abandoned from secularism and its values. This has 
produced a type of feminism that is never complete, always waiting for ex-
pression, for implementation. It is an incomplete feminism of the homo sacer 
– a homo sacer feminism in which women are both within secularism, but 
also external to it. Women’s excluded inclusion makes Egyptian secularism 
– to draw on Agamben’s language in his State of Exception – a type of ‘excep-
tional secularism’ in which the judiciary imposes an imagined compromise 
in which secularism is suspended only in the case of the exception – in this 
case, women in the context of family law. Agamben describes the importance 
of investigating the ‘exception in the following way’25:
25 See Schmitt (1985: 15) saying that ‘[t]he exception explains the general and itself ’.
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The exception is more interesting than the regular case. The latter proves 
nothing; the exception proves everything. The exception does not only 
confirm the rule; the rule as such lives off the exception alone  .  .  .  The 
exception explains the general and itself. And when one really wants to 
study the general, one need only look around for a real exception.
 (Agamben 1998: 16)
The exception is more interesting than the regular case because it illuminates 
how the system operates. In a sense, the ‘general’ of Egyptian law is that it is 
secular. However, this is not entirely accurate because its underlying structure 
is kept intact by keeping family law religious. Secularism justifies the exclusion 
of women who must endure the very opposite of secularism including unequal 
treatment in the event of divorce.
V. Strategic ambiguity: simulacra of the religious 
and the secular in Islamic divorce law
Earlier, we discussed new strategies that feminists are considering. The twentieth-
century feminist strategy of accepting imposed compromises of the secular, 
liberal male elites has not been successful in liberalising family law. The 
newly conceived strategy to ally feminists with the religious intelligentsia 
in the hope of creating a state system that is governed through Islamic law 
– but results in liberal, feminist substantive effects – is also problematic and 
riddled with risks. The goal is to examine an alternative possibility that 
explores deploying both religious and secular languages that contain norma-
tive power. To explore this further, an examination of khul’ will be undertaken. 
Khul’ is a ground of divorce that came into effect in the year 2000 in Article 
20 of Law No. 1 (2000) Egypt.
For years, feminists have sought to achieve no-fault divorce for women. 
Currently, the law of divorce (talaq) in Egypt entitles men to the right to 
obtain no-fault divorce. Throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (onwards), a woman was entitled to a unilateral right of divorce 
if her husband delegates his right of divorce to her at the inception of the 
marriage. A woman could also obtain a divorce if her husband willingly 
divorces her at her request. Men can divorce their wives with the expectation 
that their wife must forfeit her financial rights, primarily by requiring the 
wife to return some or all of her mahr (dowry) or the deferred part of the mahr 
back to the husband. This ground of divorce is known as khul. If the wife 
cannot obtain the permission of her husband for divorce, she can only obtain 
a divorce under restricted conditions such as the absence of her husband, 
the imprisonment of her husband, or if her husband engaged in anal sexual 
intercourse.
It was not until the reforms of 1985 (Egyptian Law No. 100) that a judge 
was capable of granting a wife the ability to divorce outside the previous 
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grounds, but only in the event of harm caused by the husband to the wife 
(and proven accordingly) or in the event that the husband continuously fails 
to provide his maintenance obligations. The previous grounds remain valid 
grounds for a woman to obtain divorce up to this day. In each of these cases, 
divorce stops short of no-fault divorce. A woman cannot autonomously 
determine that she needs to divorce her husband. She must either obtain the 
permission of her husband or obtain a judicial divorce through the courts.
But in the year 2000, statutory reforms (Law No. 1) were introduced that 
were later ratified. These enabled a woman to autonomously obtain a divorce 
without the permission of her husband or the mediation of the courts even, in 
exchange for the forfeiture of her financial rights to her husband. The reforms 
named this ground of divorce khul’ after the original version – although khul’ 
as originally practised required the permission of the husband.26
Law No. 1 of 2000 caused an uproar of opposition with discussions about 
khul’ taking place in the media and at Egypt’s Al Azhar University – the 
oldest Islamic university in the world and an influential institution in policy 
debates. The official position of Al Azhar was supportive. The position of 
the Grand Mufti of Al Azhar was that khul’ was in accordance with religious 
injunctions. But considering the fact that there was no textual evidence sup-
porting khul’ as being triggered based on the choice of the wife (rather than 
the husband), many other ulema (scholars) disagreed. Despite opposition, 
the final draft was approved by the National Assembly and became law. In 
this case, the approach of splitting the difference was less relevant as many 
religious scholars and conservative Muslims saw khul’ as a genuine ground 
of divorce in Islam. The reality is that the application of the term khul’ to 
this novel ground of divorce created debate within the religious intelligentsia 
about its legitimacy and, in fact, was seen by many believing Muslims (who 
themselves are not trained in the details of Islamic jurisprudence (usul ul 
fiqh)) as legitimately Islamic. Many Muslims did not realise that khul’ was 
historically not a ground of divorce that the female spouse was allowed to 
pursue autonomously.
26 See El Alami & Hinchcliffe (1996: 27– 8) providing a general explanation of khul’ divorce. 
See El Alami & Hinchcliffe (1996 at 174). In a khul’ divorce, a woman in general agrees 
to give up some or all of her financial rights in exchange for an exit from the marriage. 
The woman does not have to base her request on one of the grounds for divorce established 
by the law. As one author put it, ‘apart from the divorce effected by the husband, marriage 
may be dissolved by mutual consent by the wife giving the husband something for her 
freedom  .  .  .’ (Nasir 2002: 12–3, 115). The new legislation on khul’ divorce passed in 
Egypt allows the wife to buy her freedom from the marriage without getting her husband’s 
consent. Esposito (2001: 47, 60): ‘Under a new law that came into effect in March 2000, 
a woman can divorce her husband, with or without his agreement, in exchange for returning 
to him any money or property he paid to her upon their marriage. This is a variation on 
khul’ divorce’. The reason why this is a variation of khul’ is that in the case of khul’ divorce 
the consent of the husband is needed.
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To explore this approach further, consider Jean Baudrillard’s idea of simulation 
and simulacra. Using Baudrillard’s framework, one can advance a strategy that 
is not religious in intent or in effect, but is religious only at a superficial level. 
The newly conceived khul’ in the proposed statutory reforms of Law No. 1 is 
crafted as religious, but not merely in name; it also genuinely seems similar 
to the original institution (as interpreted textually) that was contemplated in 
the Qur’an and by the Prophet as attested in the hadith (sayings and actions 
of the Prophet Muhammad). In the case of khul’, it is an institution that has 
often been differentiated from other grounds of divorce as being based on the 
willingness of the female spouse to surrender her financial rights. However, 
Islamic textual laws on khul’ never contemplated that a female spouse would 
exercise autonomy in the way envisaged in the reforms of Law No. 1 (2000).
This newly conceived khul’ seems to be an example of – in Baudrillard’s words 
– a third-order simulation (also referred to as the fourth phase of the sign). 
In a third-order simulation, the system (e.g., model, machine) does not attempt 
to imitate the real, but rather to imitate the very difference between the system 
and the real that allows their equivalence (Baudrillard 1994: 3). For example, 
the clone, android or replicant is not equivalent to man, but the generation 
of the real by its model through genetic technologies, or digital, electronic 
technologies (Baudrillard 1983: 105). There is a collapse of difference between 
what is true and what is false (Baudrillard 1994: at 3). Somehow the real is 
replaced by the hyper-real, ‘something perfectly real, truer than true’ (Baudrillard 
1999: 275), or ‘more real than real’ (Baudrillard 1994: 3), in Baudrillard’s words. 
And in the example of the android, the hyperreal is represented as something 
more human than human. In Baudrillard’s words, the hyperreal is ‘.  .  .  the 
generation by models of a real without original or reality’ (Baudrillard 1983: 1).
The hyperreal is a realm where the distinction between the real and the 
imaginary is a tautology, in turn making the imaginary impossible, since 
reality is itself imaginary. In the hyperreal, difference is constantly generated, 
produced to sustain the illusion of reality. Baudrillard states the following:
Now the image can no longer imagine the real, because it is the real. It 
can no longer dream it, since it is its virtual reality. It is as though things had 
swallowed their own mirrors and had become transparent to themselves, 
entirely present to themselves in a ruthless transcription, full in light 
and in real time. Instead of being absent from themselves in illusion, 
they are forced to register on thousands of screens, off whose horizons 
not only the real has disappeared, but the image too. The reality has 
been driven out of reality.
 (Baudrillard 1999: 275)
Khul’ as envisaged by Law No. 1 can be described as a hyperreal instantiation 
of the original khul’ being transformed to something else, but so similar 
(simulacra) that it conflates the original khul’ into the new form of khul’ (as 
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represented in Law no. 1). The new version of khul’ redefines khul’, altering 
it in ways that make it seem as though it was always historically practised 
in the way envisaged in Law No. 1. This approach of collapsing a new khul’ 
with liberal effects into the old khul’ – practised for centuries and once seen 
as antithetical to feminists’ goals – is now bringing divorce law closer to 
no-fault divorce. In a sense, the new khul’ is a clone of the older version of 
khul’ – one that the public (and even Islamic scholars) cannot distinguish 
and, therefore, one that cannot be overturned by the lobbying efforts of 
right-wing factions of the religious intelligentsia.
In this case, women – cast as exceptions – speak the language of religion as 
a means of opening the doors of the law – not through splitting the difference 
with the religious intelligentsia – but rather, through the de-stabilisation of the 
boundaries between secularism and religion. This strategy is based on ambi-
guity. In other words, the state of exception that marked family law remains 
a state of exception at the perceptual level (of the judiciary, the secular elites 
and the religious intelligentsia), but is truly a ‘hyperreal state of exception’. 
This hyperreality of the state of exception that at once marks women as an 
exception yet simultaneously speaks on behalf of women’s rights, is produced 
through the ambiguous collapse of secularity and religion. In this contem-
plated strategy religion speaks the hidden goals of secularism while secularism 
hides itself in the language of religion. This is the Gift of Ambiguity.
VI. The différance of khul’
The ambiguous collapse of secularism and religion echoes Derrida’s ideas on 
ambiguity. In order to explore how the reformed version of khul’ harnesses 
ambiguity, we will make reference to Derrida’s notion of différence. How is 
khul’ made both the same and yet different? The ‘same yet different’ quality 
of khul’ produces ambiguity, again suggesting strategic opportunities in 
Islamic divorce law.
Derrida’s différance (see Derrida 1974: 141; Derrida 1978: 278) is developed 
as part of a critique of the epistemological conceptions of such philosophers 
as Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant and Jurgen Habermas. He describes how 
such philosophers prioritise what is above what is not; this becomes the 
privileging of the present over the absent that characterises a great deal of 
philosophical thought. For Derrida, however, signs are used as a way to bring 
presence to the absence. He explains this in the following way:
Signs represent the present in its absence; they take the place of the 
present. When we cannot take hold of or show the thing, let us say the 
present, the being-present, when the present does not present itself, then 
we signify, we go through the detour of signs. We take up or give signs; 
we make signs.
 (Derrida 1996: 441, 447)
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Drawing on De Saussure’s model (see de Saussure 1959: 1907–11) of how 
signs represent something that while not present, could be potentially present, 
Derrida’s conception of ‘arche-writing’ (Derrida 1996: 453) differs from De 
Saussure in that signs perpetually and persistently refer to more signs and 
these signs again refer to yet other signs ad infinitum. Derrida refers to this 
as différance. Différance can also be referred to as deferral – described by 
Derrida as a type of ‘interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and 
temporalizing that puts off until “later” what is presently denied, the 
possible that is presently impossible’ (Derrida 1996: 441). ‘“To differ” in this 
sense is to temporalize, to resort, consciously or unconsciously, to the 
temporal and temporalizing mediation of a detour  .  .  .’ (Derrida 1996: 447). 
But différance is more than the deferral produced by spacing and temporalising. 
It also includes the type of ‘differing’ that ‘signifies non-identity’. This 
notion of non-identity is inclusive of the idea of différance. It is ‘the other 
sense of “to differ” [différer]  .  .  .  [I]t is the most common and most identifi-
able, the sense of not being identical, of being other, of being discernible’ 
(Derrida 1996: 446). But through this deferral (brought on by its spacing 
and temporalising movement), différance also signifies sameness. Différance 
represents the two movements of differing: deferral brought on by spacing 
and temporalising, but also difference ‘as sameness which is not identical’ 
(Derrida 1996: 441).
The newly invented version of khul’ is marked by the deferral described 
by Derrida. A type of sameness that is not identical, the newly conceived 
khul’ (in Law No. 100) appropriates religious language and legitimacy, while 
also surreptitiously containing a different (distinctive) signified from the 
original khul’ as practised in the past millennium (in taqlid law). The fluid 
boundaries between the original and the newly invented khul’ led to vigorous 
debates between Islamic scholars. By debating the legitimacy of khul’, Islamic 
scholars extended the impression that it was potentially a legal ground of 
divorce. The debate was largely a contestation about whether the new khul’ 
was similar enough or too different from the original khul’. To scholars, 
it seemed that the two versions of khul’ were both similar and different, 
producing confusion and rampant undecidability. They were, as Derrida puts 
it, engaged with a sameness that was not identical.
The original khul’ included the right of a woman to divorce, but only 
conditional on a husband’s consent so long as she forfeits her financial rights. 
The newly conceived version of khul’ enabled a female spouse to obtain khul’ 
without consent, but still retained the requirement that she unilaterally 
forfeit her financial rights in exchange for her husband’s non-consensual 
divorce. Does this suggest that khul’ has three sub-parts: a wife’s demand to 
obtain a divorce, a husband’s consent that she can be divorced from him and 
a wife’s willingness to forfeit her financial rights in exchange for the divorce? 
Or does it merely contain two discrete sub-parts: a wife’s demand to obtain 
a divorce and the forfeiture of a wife’s financial rights in exchange for divorce? 
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Might it be that this version of khul’ abandons a husband’s consent in exchange 
for the wife’s forfeiture of her financial rights? Can forfeiture of a wife’s 
finances be seen as a tacit form of consent in that she is ‘paying’ for consent? 
Is this an accurate reading of Islamic law? What makes khul’ khul’? These 
issues not only confused the ulema and muftis at Al Azhar, but questions 
continued to multiply as they debated. The debate led to the collapse of the 
signified of khul’ and the signifier khul’, in turn enabling this newly invented 
ground of divorce to come into existence.
Of course, the term khul’ played a further role in disorienting those con-
sidering the question, and the public did not understand the differences, 
viewing it as Islamic by virtue of its name, and simultaneously viewing it as 
a purely academic debate. By producing the question, ‘is it Islamic?’, feminists 
won the debate. The question is framed in a manner that presupposes it is 
within the spectrum of religious legitimacy. By producing ambivalence about 
the authenticity of the legality of khul’, it suggested its own potential legal 
validity. In turn it also divided the scholarly community and provided an 
opportunity for feminists to be viewed as using Islamic conceptions to 
address their concerns rather than secular ones that are often identified with 
the colonial West.
khul’ became law because it was both the same as the Islamic concept, and 
different from it. This disorientation has been described by Derrida as the 
undecidability of words – whose meanings are in constant deferral. In this case, 
the attempt to uncover a reality in the term khul’ was separate from the 
Islamic idea of khul’ as practised throughout history. This follows Derrida’s 
discussion of the substitution of signs. On this topic, he states the following:
Following this classical semiology, the substitution of the sign for the 
thing itself is both secondary and provisional: it is second in order after 
an original and lost presence, a presence from which the sign would be 
derived. It is provisional with respect to this final and missing presence, 
in view of which the sign would serve as a movement of mediation.
 (Derrida 1996: 447)
The original way in which khul’ was historically practised is secondary and 
provisional. The original is lost at the moment that the term khul’ emerges. 
There is no inherent meaning to khul’. In a sense the sign is flexibly unmoored 
to a zero institution, in which meaning is imbibed from without, with the 
perpetual potential of transforming into something else. Instability.
To examine how religious discourses can provide a road toward secularism’s 
goals, consider Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological 
Reproducibility (Benjamin 1936), and the notion of aura. Benjamin’s work on 
aura sought to capture the groundbreaking cultural shift from authenticity 
to replication, from uniqueness to seriality, and from the original artwork to its 
‘soulless’ mechanical copy. Benjamin describes aura in the following way:
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One might subsume the eliminated element in the term ‘aura’ and go 
on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the 
aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance 
points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by saying: the 
technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain 
of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of 
copies for a unique existence.
 (Benjamin 1936)
Benjamin’s conception of aura as applied to works of art – particularly painting 
and photography – can be analogically extended to such religious institutions 
as khul’. Khul’ represents a type of traditional institution similar to that 
of Benjamin’s initial work of art (in the domain of tradition) prior to its 
mechanical reproduction (or copy). Drawing on such religiously coded and 
traditional institutions as khul’, the replication and reproduction of khul’ (and 
other religious institutions) leads to a loss of its religious aura. While it 
seems to be religious, its religious traditional conceptions that were once 
historically practised for the duration of a millennium are withering every 
time it is reproduced within a largely secular legal system. Its traditional 
content is detached from its original object – in this case a sign – as its 
original unique existence is unmoored from the new discourses that inevitably 
become attached to its reproduction. While not a ‘mechanical’ reproduction, 
it is a ‘linguistic’ reproduction of the sign itself, khul’, containing new 
signifieds. While Benjamin laments the reproduction of works of art, such 
reproductions of religious language bring forth the strategic possibility of a 
move toward secularism. Perhaps this could be more accurately described as 
a move away from conservative interpretations of religious law that draws 
on religious signs that contain secular signifieds. These signifieds themselves 
carry an underlying secular logic or purpose which also strangely shields 
them from being interpreted as overtly secular. The reproduction of khul’ 
enables the loss of its religious aura by detaching itself from its original 
religious significations.
VII. Conclusion: a single bloc of secular/religion 
instead of an either/or of secular/religion
The new form of khul’ does not in itself mean the achievement of no-fault 
divorce for women, but it does bring us ever closer to the possibility of no-fault 
divorce. It is the ambiguity – the hidden abstraction – the hyperreal version 
of khul’ – that enables it to become the law. That, in effect, assures that the 
door of law will not be closed on feminists and women’s rights advocates. It 
provides enormous mileage since it is seen by the public – and even by 
Islamic scholars (ulema) – as genuinely and inherently religious. Now, instead 
of sacrificing women’s rights, the sacrifice takes place in the realm of the 
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hyperreal – seemingly remaining religious as an act of appeasement, but 
never sacrificing. A hyperreal sacrifice.
A passage from Deleuze and Parnet’s book, Dialogues, originally written 
in reference to the idea of dialogue, is potentially applicable to the idea of 
achieving secular effects from religious language and institutions:
The question ‘What are you becoming?’ is particularly stupid. For as 
someone becomes, what he is becoming changes as much as he does 
himself  .  .  .  The wasp and the orchid provide the example. The orchid 
seems to form a wasp image, but in fact there is a wasp-becoming of the 
orchid, an orchid becoming of the wasp, a double capture since ‘what’ each 
becomes changes no less than ‘that which’ becomes. The wasp becomes 
part of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus at the same time as the orchid 
becomes the sexual organ of the wasp. One and the same becoming, a 
single bloc of becoming  .  .  .
 (Deleuze and Parnet 1977)
The dichotomy of secular and religious has led to a socially constructed legal 
landscape – one created at the hands of the liberal, secular allies of feminists 
– in which the only possible answers are either liberal/secular or conservative/
religious. To move away from this either/or of secular versus religious, we 
do not assume that it is necessarily possible (although sometimes it is) to 
achieve feminist goals through the liberal elites splitting the difference 
between feminists and the religious intelligentsia. We also do not accept that 
it is altogether easy or possible to accomplish the full-fledged creation of an 
Islamic legal system in Egypt that will necessarily be sympathetic to the 
goals of feminists. Instead, we advance a strategy to deploy religious language 
that advances a liberal, secular agenda while hiding this agenda from 
immediate view. By collapsing the hyperreal with the real – by seeing the 
religious wasp and the liberal, secular flower as one block – ambiguously 
inter-connected and interwoven with one another – and not separating or 
dichotomising secular and religious – it is possible to come closer to achieving 
the liberal goals for which feminists have been waiting for more than a 
century.
Secular elites contemplated a strategy that figures family law as the excep-
tion that must be sacrificed to advance secularism. In other words, secularism’s 
condition is also a condition of its impossibility – to bring it into existence. 
But while extant, it simultaneously undermines itself by advancing the 
overall secularity of the law by sacrificing a single person or group. But by 
drawing on the language of religion, the goals of secularism can be advanced. 
This contrasts sharply with the sincere, transparent and truthful advancement 
of secularism through the language of secularity. Such clarity and knowability 
can produce strategic losses. The goal should be to separate the religious sign 
from its religious signified, in turn introducing a strategy that results in the 
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loss of traditional, religious auras. This will move the Egyptian legal system 
away from ‘exceptional secularism’ to a hyperreal ‘exceptional secularism’ 
characterised by contingency and unknowability. Such a political tactic does 
not guarantee the entrance of feminists through the doors of the law, but 
rather introduces sufficient contingency, unknowability and uncertainty into 
the ontology of legal institutions in family law (and more broadly throughout 
Egyptian law) and, by doing so, in turn advancing possibilities for change in 
Egyptian family law and the family legal systems throughout the Middle East. 
As Slavoj Zizek says, ‘it changes the very parameters of what is considered 
“possible” in the existing constellation’ (Zizek 1999: 119).
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Chapter 5
What is Islamic law?
A praxiological answer and an Egyptian 
case study
Baudouin Dupret
I. The nature of Islamic law
Neither law nor religion is endowed with intrinsic, substantial and natural 
authority. There are only punctual situations where people orient to something 
that they identify as being religious law, the authority of which they publicly 
acknowledge. There is henceforth no way to examine the reference to Islamic 
law outside its circumstantial and situated uses, that is, outside practices of 
referring to an object explicitly characterised as Islamically legal in various 
contexts, each one having its own constraints.
A. Searching for law in Islam
Literature on norms and law in societies dubbed Muslim has, as a whole, an 
essentialist attitude. According to interpretive theory, law is a cultural code 
of meanings for interpreting the world. In this hermeneutic project, words 
are the keys to understanding societies and cultures, and to giving them a 
meaning. Geertz (1983: 185) gives the example of the Arabic word ‘haqq’, 
which is supposed to come from a specific moral world and to connect to a 
distinctive legal sensibility. This word would carry along with it all the 
specific meanings that are consubstantial with something that is called 
‘Islamic law’. In situations where many cultural systems are described as 
interacting, law would produce a ‘polyglot discourse’ (Geertz 1983: 226). 
Interpretive theory fundamentally conceives of law in holistic terms, that is, 
as one of the many reverberations of a larger explaining principle: culture 
(cf. also Rosen 1989). Accordingly, the laws that characterise societies carry 
along with them, throughout history, the same basic tenets.
However, cultural interpretivists fail to consider that law is not necessarily 
and integrally part of culture, and that culture is not a set of permanent pre-
existing assumptions but something that is permanently produced, repro-
duced, negotiated and oriented to by members of various social settings.
The same pattern of argument holds true when the culturalist attitude is 
combined with text analysis. Messick (1993), for instance, associates the shape 
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of Islamic cities with Yemeni Islamic lawyers’ calligraphic style to demonstrate 
that Muslim societies were embedded in a system of textual domination. The 
text, here, is the sharî‘a, something described as much more than Islamic 
law, a ‘textual polity’ including ‘a conception of an authoritative text’ and ‘a 
pattern of textual authority’ (Messick 1993: 6). Although texts are important 
in the study of law in literate societies, Messick, by focusing his attention 
on disengaged documents, loses sight of the phenomenon of law practice and 
its work of producing formalised records.
Most research considers human beings as rule-driven creatures, in societies 
dubbed Muslim in particular. Oussama Arabi (2001), for instance, states that 
Islamic law still determines the daily behavior of people in Muslim societies and 
constitutes a living reality in contemporary societies where it is implemented 
as the state’s positive law. With regard to sexuality, for instance, Arabi seems to 
be implying that provisions identifiable in fiqh1 treatises continue to influence 
today’s common-sense and legal conceptions. Empirically speaking, it would 
be utterly hard to demonstrate this. Actually, according to Arabi, common 
sense considers that sexual relationships that go beyond simple flirtation 
belong to the category ‘harâm’ (the forbidden) if they are not validated by a 
religious contract. The point is to know whether we can ground on the 
observation of the use of a contractual form the claim that a kind of inter-
nalised religious normativity still frames and determines the social.
Against incorporation theories, a praxiological approach shows that it is 
impossible to open the ‘black box’ of the authority of rules by substituting for 
it the other black box that makes of people the mere individual receptacles 
of cultural principles that are somehow consubstantial with them. Authority 
must be understood as the modality of an action (one acts with authority), 
an attribute of a person (someone has authority over others) or the quality 
specific to a norm (the authority of rules). It is always the predicate of some-
thing that somehow it accompanies. In Arabi’s approach, rules are independent 
of practice. They are endowed with clear meaning and determine people’s 
behaviour in a univocal way. They are invested with some intrinsic authority 
that proceeds from their belonging to the religious repertoire. This feature 
allows it to escape any hermeneutics. Whereas legal norms have an ‘open 
texture’ (Hart 1961), religious norms are rigid and a-temporal objects escaping 
contingency by virtue of their divine inspiration. To the contrary, I consider 
that rules are practical accomplishments and their authority a modality that 
is linked to people’s public orientation to the force they recognise in them. 
Rules do not pre-exist their practice and their authority is not an intrinsic 
feature.
1 Usually, sharî‘a is understood as Islamic law as revealed by God (in the Qur’ân or Koran) 
through His Prophet Muhammad (Sunna or Prophetic Tradition), whereas fiqh is the knowledge 
of this Law and the body of jurisprudence that originates in it.
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Most literature on Islamic law tends to impose a structure on legal phenomena 
and activities, instead of looking at their operating process. For instance, Layish 
and Shaham (in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn) give the Arabic word 
tashrî ‘a religious signification on the ground of its etymology and ignore the fact 
it is used today to designate the notion of legislation in its most general sense. 
Starting from their pre-established knowledge of the etymological trajectory of 
the word, they impose on the legislative phenomenon a dimension that cannot 
be documented. Moreover, in their attempt to evaluate the transformations of 
tashrî ’, they posit a distinction between legal orthodoxy and deviance that places 
the scholar in the situation of saying which rules are orthodox and of adopting 
an ironical stance vis-à-vis the many ways in which people deceive themselves 
when adhering to one or another conception of Islamic law. All this places 
the debate on a normative ground, while dodging the central question of how 
and what people do when they refer to the sharî‘a in current contexts.
Islamic law can be the mere reference to Islam in a legal setting or it can 
be a legal system identified with the classical body of fiqh. In the latter case, 
there must be a substantial definition of Islamic law, the criteria of which 
are satisfied by the specific law on which we focus, so that it can be taken 
as a particular instance of a general model. This raises several questions 
about constitutive criteria, the paradigmatic model, relevant instances and the 
authority to constitute and certify the model. Literature on this issue drifts 
between different positions. Sometimes it claims that we must stick to people’s 
utterances. However, while Islamic law is what people refer to as Islamic law, 
we should not consider that the use of the same word at different times 
necessarily means that the word refers to the same meaning and technical 
definition. Sometimes literature claims that people deceive themselves. Thus, 
for instance, the statement that, although Egyptian judges no longer use the 
word ‘dhimma’ the dhimma system2 is still in force in Egyptian law (Berger 2001). 
This is an ironic stance that assumes that scholars know better than the people 
engaged in a practice. It also contradicts the first assertion that we must stick to 
the words people use. Moreover, it is a metaphysical and deterministic position 
that claims that structures are permanent, even though people are no longer 
aware of them, and that people are determined by external constraints and 
neither produce nor transform anything, but only reproduce the past. The 
combination of these two positions makes the argument non-falsifiable.
B. Rephrasing the question
There is no reason to assume that what people refer to as Islamic law is 
identical to, or different from, the set of technical provisions that form the 
idealised model of Islamic law. The question is not relevant, because it is 
2 The system of minority subjection and protection under classical Islamic law.
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totally disembodied from actual practices; and it fails to address the phenom-
enon itself, that is, the practice of referring to Islamic law. For the question, 
‘What is Islamic law?’ we should substitute the question, ‘What do people 
do when referring to Islamic law?’
Legal actions, like all social actions, are irreducibly events or actions in a 
social order (Sharrock and Button 1991: 157). In law, as in any social activity, 
concepts, like words, are parts of what Wittgenstein calls ‘language games’ (1967: 
paras 7–24 et seq.). Wittgenstein specifically targets ‘big concepts’ that are often 
constructed as floating entities, totally decontextualised, and then projected 
back into the world as its inner nature, as ‘something that lies beneath the 
surface’ (1967: para. 92), independent of any instantiation or context of use. 
These remarks hold true with regard to concepts like ‘Islamic law’.
There is no case to make something ‘an instance of’ something else (e.g. 
to make personal status in Egypt an instance of the larger ‘model’ of Islamic 
law). The main problem with any model construction lies in the idea of 
correspondence between the model and the data it is supposed to aggregate, 
between the general and the particular, between an abstract proposition and 
its concrete instances. In our case, Egyptian personal status law is supposedly 
an instance of an abstract Islamic legal system. Model building requires that 
the different instances of the model share some common characteristics that 
satisfy the postulates of identity and equivalence so that they can be measured 
accurately and ascribed to the general model. For instance, the characteristics 
of Egyptian personal status law may be measured so that their belonging or 
not-belonging to the general Islamic law model may be assessed. However, 
when referring to local situations as instances of a general model, researchers 
use implicit assumptions about both and hide the fundamental fact that the 
same word ‘Islamic law’ means very different things in various contexts. The 
result is that we know little about the properties of the underlying phenomena 
and take for granted the very basis of what we propose to explain.
Rather, we should ask how the members of any social group conduct the 
activities by which they identify and characterise something as an instance 
of something else (cf. Lynch 1991: 86ff.). In terms of Islamic law, this means 
to focus on how people, in their many settings, orient themselves to something 
they call ‘Islamic law’ and how they refer personal-status questions to the 
Islamic-law model. Such an attitude suggests that we focus on the methods 
people use locally to produce the truth and intelligibility that allow them 
to cooperate and interact in a more or less ordered way.
Egyptian personal status law can be categorised variously as an instance 
of Islamic law, Egyptian law, civil law or heterodox codified sharî‘a. Rather 
than asking to which abstract category it actually belongs, we should ask 
what is the purpose and the mechanism of the categorisation itself (cf. Hester 
and Eglin 1997; Jayyusi 1984; Sacks 1974, 1995; Watson 1994). Attention 
must shift to the description of the phenomena and the properties they 
display. The consequence for social scientists is that their task is to observe 
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and describe the methods used by the members of a society (ethnomethods) 
in their everyday life – including their professional life – to produce intel-
ligibility, communicability and the capacity to be acted upon.
B.1 Re-specifying the sociological study of Islamic law
The study of Islamic law needs focusing much more on living phenomena and 
actual practices. Anthropological research has shown its willingness to engage 
in that direction. It turned away from scholastic conceptions of law, which 
would only be law in books, and turned to law as something encountered 
and lived by flesh-and-blood people (Mir-Hosseini 1993). It even sometimes 
attempted to capture the language of law in action in an Islamic setting 
(Hirsch 1998) and sought to explore the practical ways of legal reasoning 
(Bowen 2003). However, by concentrating on issues like power and gender, 
or by abstracting data from their context, it missed part of the phenomenon 
it set out to analyse. Our contention is that the whole issue of Islamic law 
needs a praxiological re-specification that can be argued around three central 
themes: the opposition between law in action and law in books; the ‘missing 
what’ of law-and-society and statistical-legal studies; the opposition between 
‘hyper-explanations’ and description of situated activities.
C. Law in books and law in action
In Marriage on Trial, Mir-Hosseini states that ‘from its inception, Islam has 
been both a political and a social order’ (1993: 3– 4), and Islamic law, ‘the 
divine law’, has constituted ‘the backbone of Muslim society  .  .  .  ever since’ 
(1993: 4). With reference to modern times, she describes sharî‘a as still forming 
‘the basis of family law, though reformed, codified and applied by a modern 
legal apparatus’ (1993: 8). Opposing the theory of Islamic law to its practice, 
she adds that ‘what characterizes the Shari’a perhaps more than anything else is 
the distance between the ideal and the reality’ (1993: 8). She concludes that:
.  .  .  it is precisely because this Divine Will needs to be discerned by 
human intellectual activity, and, more importantly, because it is enforced 
by human courts, that it is bound to bear the influence of the time and 
environment in which it operates.
 (1993: 10)
By looking for the nature of law, Mir-Hosseini misses the phenomenon of the 
practice itself. In the core of the book, theory takes the form of a synthesis 
of applicable legal provisions, whereas practice is represented by 20 cases, 
duly summarised, and statistical data that supposedly provide the necessary 
basis for understanding the underlying patriarchal ideology of the sharî‘a 
model. However, even though she gives sharî‘a a meaning, a content, an 
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ideological orientation, people do not seem to address it directly in the cases 
summarised by Mir-Hosseini. In other words, we suffer from a double bind: 
social actors remain external to the fundamental significance of the law they are 
practising; researchers who claim to have access to the meaning of the law 
have little grasp of its practicalities. This double bind is in part the result 
of the scholarly construction of a dichotomy between theory and practice.
Hirsch does not look for any substantial description of what is Islamic law 
and does not attempt to give it any trans- or a-historical meaning. When 
she uses the expression, it is generally to refer to kadhis’ conception or 
representation of it, not to ascribe it as an essentialist meaning. Actually, her 
bias stems from the marginal dimension of the legal setting in the design 
of her argument. Her analysis is neither about law nor about legal practices. 
It is about gender as observed from the vantage point of the Kadhi court. Law 
is not a topic in its own right, it is ‘a symbol of both Muslim governance 
and its vulnerability in the postcolonial era’ (Hirsch 1998: 136). There is 
something that is lost in this process, and this is the coherence of the legal 
setting in which all this happens, its recognisability for the participants, and 
the ways in which this recognisable coherence is produced.
Law as a social phenomenon cannot be reduced to the mere provisions of 
a legal code (law on the books). However, it would be misleading not to 
consider law on the books as an integral part of the practice of law. We must 
give credit to the natural attitude of people who do not experience reality as 
purely subjective and law on the books as purely formal. By merely opposing 
theory to practice and legal provisions to the ‘living law’, we fail to under-
stand fully what, for instance, Egyptian personal status law is. We are more 
likely to gain such an understanding through the close description of people’s 
orientation to, and reification of, legal categories as it emerges from their 
actual encounter with legal matters.
D. The ‘missing what’ of law-and-society and legal-statistical 
research on law
Describing her personal research experience in Iranian Courts, Mir-Hosseini 
says:
One judge  .  .  .  assigned me the task of drafting court notes, the usual duty 
of the court clerk. This helped me a great deal to see the case from the 
court’s viewpoint (or, more accurately, his), and I learned how to construct 
‘legal facts’, how to translate the petitioners’ grievances into court language, 
and how to discern the principles upon which the court operates.
 (1993: 18)
From a praxiological point of view, this statement sounds most promising. 
Indeed, praxiology advocates precisely that scholars pay closer attention to, and 
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better describe, the modalities of the construction of legal facts and people’s 
orientation to, and manifestation of, their understanding of the judicial setting, 
its constraints and its structure. However, Mir-Hosseini continues, ‘[L]ater 
this duty became cumbersome as it prevented me from paying full attention 
while following the disputes during that session’ (1993: 18).
Hirsch’s approach suffers from the same kind of bias, which is related to 
her focus on law as one strategic device among others through which power 
relationships are negotiated. In the sequence of her book, gender and power 
come first, language, as their vehicle, second. And law has an ancillary role, 
it is considered as an arena where conflicting narratives oppose each other. 
But law and the practice of law are not a bunch of mere narratives competing 
with other narratives, they also constitute an activity accomplished on a daily 
basis, of an overwhelmingly routine character, the place of production and 
reproduction of professional practices which are oriented to nothing but the 
accomplishment of the law.
Mir-Hosseini’s use of the techniques of judicial statistics and case reports, 
and Hirsch’s focus on discourse content and strategic uses eschew addressing 
law as a practical activity. This is the ‘missing what’ problem in the study of 
work. With regard to legal professions, this means that ‘sociologists tend to 
describe various “social” influences on the growth and development of legal 
institutions while taking for granted that lawyers write briefs, present cases, 
interrogate witnesses, and engage in legal reasoning’ (Lynch 1993: 114).
The problem with statistical data is that it largely erases the ‘here and 
now’ dimension of every case, that is, it obscures the necessarily situated 
character of every activity. The correspondence between statistical entries and 
the social reality thus codified so as to make it statistically relevant is, how-
ever, far from obvious. As a result, we fail to understand the two operations 
that are at the core of law: formulating legal categories and providing legal 
characterisations of facts. To paraphrase Michael Moerman (1974: 68), socio-legal 
scientists should describe and analyse the ways in which legal categories are 
used and not merely take them as self-evident explanations.
With regard to case reports, the problem is of a different nature.3 Many 
studies have tried to capture some aspects of court activities through ethno-
graphic observation, but very few attend closely to what is really done within 
this institutional setting. This is particularly true in studies that rely on 
participant observation and interviews. There is a real descriptive failing, 
which leads researchers to advance worldviews alternative to those of the 
actors or to remain insensitive to legal work as it is understood by its daily 
practitioners. Travers (1997) speaks of a descriptive gap. In order to bridge 
the descriptive gap and to fill the ‘missing what’, we must reorient ourselves 
3 The use of case reports has also become a common method in political sciences (see, for 
instance, concerning the Middle East, Brown, 1997).
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to the content of legal work, to its mainly practical character, and thus to 
its technicalities, situated character and specific modes of reasoning.
E. Hyper-explanation vs. description of situated activities
This last consideration leads to the question of macro- and dualistic explan-
ations, what I call ‘hyper-explanations’. Mir-Hosseini produces a historical 
sketch of Islamic law that allows her to examine the characteristics of sharî‘a 
that are relevant to her study. She states that ‘a historical perspective is 
essential to appreciate the current place of law in Muslim societies, and in 
particular to explore the dynamics of the changing relationship of law and 
society’ (1993: 3). Although she claims that ‘those who ardently argue for 
the rule of the Shari’a  .  .  .  tend to hold an idealized and totally ahistorical 
version of the development of the Islamic faith and its institutions’, she 
asserts at the same time that ‘Islamic law’ has a ‘nature’ that is related to 
the ‘nature’ of ‘Islamic civilization’ (1993: 3). This paradox is strengthened 
when Mir-Hosseini claims that modernisation ended in ‘the creation of a 
hybrid family law, which is neither the Shari’a nor Western’ (1993: 11). In 
conclusion, she argues that there is a ‘Shari’a model’ according to which 
actual patterns of marriage and family structures can be evaluated and that 
is based on a patriarchal ideology (1993: 191 sq.). Yet one wonders what 
models, patterns of marriage or ideologies look like outside their embodying 
practices. More important, we can also raise the issue of the explicative capacity 
of notions like patriarchy.
The same holds true when considering Hirsch. Although she seems clearly 
reluctant to engage in generalisations taking the form of cultural explanations, 
she advocates the substitution of other hyper-explanations like history, power, 
legitimation, ideology and globalisation. This is in particular reflected in her 
dealing with language as a medium that contributes to, and shapes, ‘the 
gender-patterned production of accounts of conflict in relation to ideologies 
that link women to storytelling and men to authoritative speech’ (Hirsch 
1998: 222). Although concentrating on actual verbal interactions within 
Swahili Kadhi courts, her focus is on discourse content rather than on the 
discourse sensitivity to the context of its production and the constraints that 
result from its institutional embeddedness and organisation. It results in an 
overstatement of the strategic, reflexive and ideological dimensions of court 
interactions and an understatement of their institutional, conversational, 
contextual, procedural, technical and legal constraints.
II. The praxiological study of Islamic law:  
Egyptian cases
I turn now to actual Egyptian cases to show how the reference to Islam is 
practically achieved. In these contexts, the many people engaged in the 
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production of a legally relevant description of facts to which legally relevant 
consequences are attached pay little attention to the question of ‘Islamic law’. 
This does not mean that this or that legal provision has no history. Rather, 
it means that so long as a legal concept is used in a stable, unproblematic 
and unquestioned manner, any account of its theoretical and historical basis 
has no special relevance to its current uses. Conversely, exclusive attention 
to the theoretical and historical genesis of the concept leads to the disap-
pearance of its contingent and situated character.
Personal status matters are organised in Egypt by, for example, Law 
No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929, both amended by Law No. 100 
of 1985, and Law No. 1 of 2000. In the absence of any statutory provision, 
Law No. 1 of 2000 stipulates that the judge must refer to ‘the opinions that 
are prevalent in the school of imam Abû Hanîfa’.4 In practice, many judges 
still make use of unofficial codifications compiling Hanafite-inspired legal 
provisions. Personal status has been subject to procedural rules that are 
common to all civil and commercial matters. Cases are adjudicated by 
specialised circuits within the courts. The personal-status circuit of the 
courts is competent with regard to financial (wilâya ‘alâ al-mâl) and non-
financial (wilâya ‘alâ al-nafs) matters, including the granting of judicial 
divorce on the ground of harm, with regard to which Article 6 of the Law 
No. 25 of 1929 states:
If the wife alleges that the husband mistreated her in such a way as to 
make it impossible between people of their social standing to continue 
the marriage relationship, she may request that the judge separate them, 
whereupon the judge shall grant her an irrevocable divorce if the harm is 
established and conciliation seems impossible between them. If, however, 
he [viz., the husband] refuses the petition and she subsequently repeats 
the complaint without establishing the harm, the judge shall appoint two 
arbitrators and he shall judge according to the provisions of Articles 7, 8, 9, 
10 and 11.
In the following example, we can observe the form taken by a ruling in 
personal status matters:
Excerpt 1 (Case No. 858, 1998)
‘In the name of God the clement, the merciful’
In the name of the people
Gîza Court of First Instance
for the Personal Status – Persons / First Circuit shar‘î
Ruling
4 Sunni Islam is divided into four legal schools (madhhab): Hanafites (after Abû Hanîfa), 
Malikites (after Mâlik b. Anas), Shafi’ites (after al-Shâfi‘tes) and Hanbalites (after Ibn 
Hanbal).
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At the shar‘î session held publicly at the palace of the court on Tuesday 
25/12/2000 m.5 Under the presidency of His Excellency Mr  .  .  .  , President 
of the Court
And the membership of MM  .  .  .  and  .  .  .  judges
In the presence of Mr  .  .  .  , deputy of the prosecution
In the presence of Mr  .  .  .  , clerk
The following ruling was issued:
In the petition submitted by Mrs  .  .  .
Against
Mr  .  .  .  Registered on the public roll as No. 858 of the year 1998 m., P.S., 
plenary of Gîza
The Court
After the hearing of the plea, the examination of the documents and the 
Prosecution’s opinion, and the deliberation according to the law:
Considering that [it appears] from the facts of the case that the female 
petitioner introduced her petition in pursuance of a form deposed at the 
office of the clerk of this court  .  .  .  about which the defendant was legally 
notified, in conclusion of which she asked for a ruling [that would] divorce 
her, asking that it would be required from him not to oppose to her in her 
marital affairs and compelling him to [pay] the expenses [1]
In support of this, it is said that she is the wife of the defendant.  .  .  .  He 
kept on inflicting on her bad treatments  .  .  .  by assaulting her, insulting her 
and abandoning the marital domicile.  .  .  .  She asked her the divorce  .  .  .  but 
he did not accept.  .  .  .  [2] [‘considering’ 1 and 2 = petition]
Considering that  .  .  .  [‘considering’ 3 to ‘considering’ 7 = procedures 
followed by the court]
Considering that  .  .  .  [‘considering’ 8 to ‘considering’ 15 = examination of 
the legal grounds]
Considering that  .  .  .  [‘considering’ 16 = application of the law to the facts 
of the case]
Considering that  .  .  .  [‘considering’ 17 = expenses and accessory demands]
For all these reasons
The court rules the judicial divorce of the petitioner  .  .  .  from the defend-
ant  .  .  .  in the form of an irrevocable divorce on [the ground of ] harm, requires 
him not to oppose to her in her marital affairs and compels the defendant 
to [pay] the expenses and to [pay] 10 pounds for the attorney’s retainer.
Clerk President of the Court
This structure reflects the actual procedural constraint under which the judge 
operates. One of his major tasks, as a professional routinely engaged in his 
occupation, is to publicly manifest the correct accomplishment of his job. At 
this procedural level, it is obvious that the judge orients himself exclusively 
5 ‘Milâdî ’, i.e. AD.
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to the technicalities of Egyptian procedural law. These technicalities may 
include some reference to provisions explicitly relating to Hanafite or Malikite 
law, but this is always through the provisions of Egyptian law, as eventually 
interpreted by the Court of Cassation:
Excerpt 2 (Case No. 858, 1998)
Harm is established through the testimony of two men or one man and two 
women, in pursuance of the prevailing opinion of the doctrine of Abû Hanîfa 
and in application of Article 280 of the By-law [organizing the courts] of 
the sharî‘a6: ‘Evidence belongs to two men or to one man and two women’ 
(Cass., Civil, 28/2/1960 m., 11th judicial year, p. 181).
Most of the documents in any judicial file show this orientation of judges 
and other professionals to procedural correctness. This orientation proceeds 
from the general sequence of the trial in which every participant addresses 
in turn people who, at certain times, are not physically present in the court-
room, although they constitute silent auditors to whom the members of the 
trial turn beyond their direct and immediate verbal exchanges. This notion 
of the ‘overhearing’ audience (Drew 1992) can be extended to absent people to 
whom a document like the ruling is addressed (Dupret 2004). The potential 
overruling that an appeal might eventually produce is directly taken into 
consideration by the participants and translates into the very careful attitude 
they adopt vis-à-vis the procedures they are required to follow. These procedural 
constraints must not be considered as elements imported from a foreign, ancient 
or external legal system. Rather, they represent the direct, obvious, real and 
practical dimensions of a daily, bureaucratic routine of people engaged, in 
today’s Egypt, in various legal, professional activities.
To illustrate the point, I reproduce a conciliation report written by the Arbi-
tration and Conciliation Committee of Gîza in a case of unilateral divorce at the 
wife’s request (khul‘). This conciliation attempt is imposed by virtue of the new 
procedure settled by Article 20 of law No. 1 of 2000. This document reflects the 
mainly bureaucratic and routinised nature of the practice of personal status, even 
though it originates from an explicitly religious institution, al-Azhar.7
Excerpt 3 (Case No. 180, 2000)
In the name of God the clement, the merciful
al-Azhar al-sharîf Concerning: Report in Case No. 180
Department of Islamic Research of the Year 2000 introduced by Mrs  .  .  . 
General Office of Preaching 
and against  .  .  .
6 Law No. 1 of 2000 integrally reiterates this provision.
7 Al-Azhar is an old and famous mosque in Cairo, home of one of the most prestigious 
universities of the Muslim world.
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Religious Information
Preaching Area of Gîza, Arbitration and Conciliation Committee
Report
His Excellency Mr Counsellor  .  .  .  , Court of North Gîza, First shar‘î Circuit,
Plenary, North Peace be upon you, God’s clemency and His benediction
The honourable court has appointed us to arbitrate in the petition No. 180 
of the year 2000 introduced by Mrs  .  .  .  against  .  .  .
Execution of the warrant
1– The wife appeared before the Arbitration and Conciliation Office of the 
Preaching Area of Gîza and it was proceeded to record her words in writing 
and orally and to hear her. Many sessions were held concerning her. It appears 
from them that an agreement and a conciliation between her and her husband 
is impossible, given that her husband did not appear despite his knowledge 
of these sessions. The wife reported through her words that she had faced 
humiliation, slander, insult and assault to her honour from her above-
mentioned husband. He so pronounced calumniating words, as to cause 
psychological harm to the children and to her hating him and her wanting 
to divorce in a unilateral way (mukhâla‘a) in order to preserve the future of 
the children. She said: I fear not to respect God’s limits with him (allâ uqîm 
hudûd allâhi ma‘ahu).
2– We proceeded to send telegrams to the husband and he did not appear on 
the premises of the Arbitration and Conciliation Committee of the Preaching 
Area of Gîza until the writing of this report.
Opinion of the two arbitrators
After the examination of the documents of the case, the accompanying 
documents, the wife’s words and what is asked from the husband, the impos-
sibility of cohabitation and marital life between them appeared manifest. We 
bring this forward to your Excellency. It belongs to the justice of the court 
to adjudicate in the manner that is deemed adequate.
Peace be upon you, God’s clemency and His benediction
First arbitrator Second arbitrator
Beyond the attempt to conciliate the spouses, to which this report testifies, 
the structure of the document reveals at least two things. First, the report 
is an accomplishment in itself, in which the arbitrators produce all the 
features that manifest their acting in their capacity and their mastering of 
the procedural and technical aspects that make it possible to produce a report 
from the ad hoc office of al-Azhar. Second, this report is part of a global 
procedure. It mentions that it belongs to the more encompassing procedure 
that is followed in the trial of a case that was submitted to the arbitrators 
by the court, asking them to perform the action required by the law.
Besides the constraining effect of procedural rules, legal issues must be 
addressed by the many people engaged in the judicial process. These issues 
mainly consist in giving a factual substance to some formal legal definitions. 
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In the case of judicial divorce on the ground of harm, two questions must 
be dealt with: what counts as harm? What is the cause of this harm? The two 
questions appear to be closely related to each other, and all the participants 
in the judicial process orient to them.
As for the harm itself, the statutory provision defines it broadly. Article 6 
speaks of the wife alleging that her husband mistreated her in such a way 
as to make it impossible for people of their social standing to continue the 
marriage relationship. Hence, it is up to the judge to characterise the facts 
under review so as to fit them into the definition of Article 6. Here, the 
judge is constrained by the definitions given by the Court of Cassation, as 
appears explicitly in the following excerpt of the ruling:
Excerpt 4 (Case No. 701, 1983)
Considering that, as it emerges from the text of Article 6 of Decree-Law 
No. 25 of 1929 concerning certain provisions on repudiation, the Egyptian 
legislature requires, in order for the judge to rule for judicial divorce 
on the ground of harm, that the harm or the prejudice comes from the 
husband, to the exception of the wife, and that life together has become 
impossible. The harm here is the wrong done by the husband to his wife 
by means of speech or action or both, in a manner that is not acceptable 
to people of same status, and it constitutes something shameful and 
wrongful that cannot be endured (Cassation, Personal Status, Appeal No. 
50, 52nd Judicial Year, session of 28 June 1983; its standard is here the 
non-material standard of a person, which varies according to environment, 
culture and the wife’s status in the society: Cassation, Personal Status, 
Appeal No. 5, 46th Judicial Year, session of 9 November 1977, p. 1644). 
The harm also has to be a specific harm resulting from their dispute, 
necessary, not susceptible of extinction; the wife cannot continue marital 
life; it must be in the capacity of her husband to stop it and to relieve 
her from it if he wishes, but he continues to inflict it, or he has resumed 
it (Cassation, Personal Status, Appeal No. 5, 47th Judicial Year, session 
of 14 March 1979, p. 798; Cassation, Personal Status, Appeal No. 51, 
50th Judicial Year, session of 26 January 1982).
Here again, the Court’s formal definition does not totally extinguish the 
uncertainty the judge faces when characterising the facts. This does not mean, 
however, that the judge’s work is problematic or arbitrary. On the contrary, the 
categories to which the judge refers have, for him, an objective nature, 
even though it is his characterisation that objectifies them. Moreover, the 
legal process of characterisation is thoroughly supported by the sociological 
process of normalisation, that is, the operations through which the judge 
routinely selects some of the features of a case resembling a common, normal, 
usual type of case. It is to these ‘normal’ categories, which have, beyond their 
legal definition, a common-sense dimension, that the judge, as well as the 
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prosecutor, the attorney, the victim, the offender and the witnesses orient 
themselves.
In the case of 1983, the wife mobilised two types of grounds in order to 
substantiate the category of harm: (1) the husband’s alleged impotence and, 
(2) the violence from which she allegedly suffered. Neither impotence nor 
violence is explicitly mentioned in Egyptian law. However, on the one hand, 
impotence is traditionally assimilated with either permanent illness (Article 
9 of the 1920 Law) or harm (Article 6 of the 1929 Law), while violence is 
considered as the exemplary type of harm; on the other hand, Hanafite law 
recognises impotence as a ground for marriage dissolution (Shaham 1997: 
125), and this is confirmed in our case by the judge:
Excerpt 5 (Case No. 701, 1983)
Abû Hanîfa and Abû Yûsuf permitted separation on the ground of a 
permanent defect that impedes intercourse between the man and the 
woman, if he is impotent, emasculated or disabled, because the goal of 
marriage is the protection of procreation, so that, if the man is not 
capable of this, it becomes impossible to implement the provision of the 
contract and there is no good in upholding it. Its upholding despite this 
[constitutes] a harm for the woman the prolongation of which cannot 
be accepted and which can only be resolved by separation (The Personal 
Status of imam Abû Zahra, p. 414, para. 297, ed. 1957).
However, this reference to Islamic law is made so as to substantiate a positive-
law provision, that is, Article 6 of the 1929 Law. Impotence and violence 
are not presented as Islamic-law provisions that must be directly implemented 
by the judge, but as two forms of the harm from which the wife suffered 
and on the basis of which the judge grants a judicial divorce according to 
Article 6 of the 1929 Law. The judge seeks to substantiate the legal category 
of harm, and what counts as harm for him is not totally dependent on 
statutorily defined8 or Islamically defined9 provisions, even though they can 
play an important role. What counts as harm varies also according to the 
judge’s conception of ‘normal harm’, that is, the manner in which he typically 
characterises a certain type of behaviour he encounters in the performance of 
his routine activities. As mentioned above, what counts as harm for the judge 
includes, for example, his knowledge of the typical manner in which a wife may 
suffer prejudice, the social characteristics of given classes of male offenders 
and female victims, the social and physical features of the settings in which 
such a situation can take place. The judge’s conception of harm functions 
reflexively: he orients to a conception which he thinks he shares with, and 
8 The 1920 and 1929 laws.
9 The above-mentioned stipulations of Abû Hanîfa and Abû Yûsuf.
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which will be confirmed by, other people participating in the judicial process, 
while those other people bear on the judge’s conception, which they are asked 
to confirm, and produce reports that in turn serve as the basis for the judge’s 
final ruling.
Excerpt 6 (Case No. 858, 1998)
It is established in the [Court of ] Cassation’s jurisprudence that ‘the harm 
committed by the husband is either positive or negative. Positive harm 
consists in the evil inflicted by the husband toward his wife by [means of ] 
blows and insults, which is not authorized by Islamic sharî‘a and from 
which the wife suffers. As for negative harm, it consists in the husband’s 
neglect of his wife. This is the most severe harm, the harm that dishonours 
the wife. It suffices that it happens because of the husband, against the 
wife, only once, to entitle her to ask for a divorce on the ground of harm’ 
(Cass., 31/3/1984 m., p. 287, Majallat al-qadâ’, 1984 m.).
The criterion for harm in the sense of Article 6 of Law 25/1929 m. is 
personal, not material, and its assessment is what makes the prolongation 
of marital life impossible. [Its criterion] is objective, left to [the discre-
tion of ] the judge [adjudicating on] the substance, and it varies accord-
ing to the environment of the two spouses, their cultural level, and their 
social milieu (Cass., 1/11/1978 m., p. 1174).
Harm is established through the testimony of two men or one man 
and two women, in pursuance of the prevailing opinion of the doctrine of 
Abû Hanîfa and in application of Article 280 of the By-law [organizing 
the courts] of the sharî‘a: ‘Evidence belongs to two men or to one man and 
two women’ (Cass., Civil, 28/2/1960 m., 11th judicial year, p. 181).
Article 6, although it makes judicial divorce on the ground of harm 
conditional upon the judge’s inability to conciliate the spouses, does 
not design any precise way [to follow] for the conciliation attempt 
between the two spouses. The court henceforth proposed conciliation 
to the two parties. The husband accepted and the wife refused. This 
is considered an [expression of] the inability of the court to conciliate 
the two spouses as required by Article 6 (Cass., 14/47, 30th judicial 
year [sic!],10 p. 906).
In the case of 1983, two evidentiary techniques are mobilised in order to 
establish the types of prejudice that result in the harm. With regard to the 
husband’s impotence, the forensic physician is asked to give a medical report, 
while the husband’s violence is established through the oral testimony of 
witnesses. The latter technique is one of the few sections of the ruling in 
10 The 30th judicial year corresponds to 1962 and 1947 corresponds to the 15th judicial 
year.
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which reference is made to Islamic law, although here again it is mediated by 
positive-law mechanisms, that is, the Court of Cassation’s jurisprudence:
Excerpt 7 (Case No. 701, 1983)
Considering that Hanafî doctrine requires, in order to accept the testimony 
(shahâda) regarding the rights of believers, that it be congruent (muwâfaqa) 
with the petition (da‘wâ) with regard to what is stipulated in it ( fî-mâ 
tushtarit fîhi). The contradiction [of the petition by the testimony] is not 
acceptable. The congruence is complete when what the witnesses testify 
to is exactly what the petitioner has claimed; the congruence is implicit 
when he has testified to part of the case. This is accepted as an agree-
ment. The judge considers what the witnesses testified to as evidence of 
what the petitioner claimed. The congruence need not be literal; congruence 
in meaning and intention suffices, whether the expressions are the same 
or different. (Cassation, Personal Status, session of 23 November 1982, 
published in the Judges’ Review; Appeal No. 2, 53rd Judicial Year, session 
of 20 December 1983.)
Accordingly, the court decided to collect the testimonies of the witnesses 
designated by the petitioner and the defendant. Although these testimonies 
are written documents,11 they tend to reproduce verbatim the parties’ exact 
wording and they allow us to get closer to the interactional details of the 
practice of judging. These can be read as follows:
Excerpt 8 (Case No. 701, 1983)
[1]
1– The court called the petitioner’s first witness and he said
2– My name is  .  .  .  oath
3– Question: What’s your relationship to the two parties
4 – Answer: My workplace is close to the post office in which the peti-
tioner works
5 – Q: What are you testifying to
6 – A: The petitioner is the defendant’s wife by virtue of a legal marriage 
contract there were disputes between them and I saw the petitioner’s 
husband whom I know although I don’t know the place of his residence 
he was addressing to her words in front of the post office in which she 
works calling her I heard him addressing her as you bitch you filthy and 
other words of this kind for nearly two years and one month ago he 
called the police against her because there was between them something 
I don’t know
7– Q: For how long have you known the petitioner’s husband
11 Legally, testimonies made in front of the court are considered written testimonies.
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8 – A: For nearly two years
9 – Q: Does he live in your neighborhood
10 – A: I don’t know
11– Q: For how long has the defendant addressed bad words to the 
petitioner
12– A: For nearly two years
13– Q: What are the words he’s addressed to her
14 – A: He told her you bitch you filthy and words of this kind and this 
was in front of the post office
15 – Q: Did any harm affect the petitioner because of this
16 – A: Yes, she broke down while working at the post office
17– Q: Anything else to say
18 – A: No  .  .  .
[3]
35 – The defendant’s first witness was called. He said:
36 – My name is  .  .  .  oath
37– Q: What’s your relationship to the two parties
38 – A: The defendant lives with me at home
39 – Q: What are you testifying to
40 – A: The petitioner is the defendant’s wife by virtue of a legal mar-
riage contract and the defendant lives with me and he’s lived in my home 
for one year and eight months and nothing like a misunderstanding 
happened between them and he didn’t assault her and he didn’t hit her 
and he didn’t insult her and the policeman came and took the defendant 
and locked him in the station
41– Q: Did you see the defendant assaulting the petitioner
42– A: No
43– Q: Did you hear the defendant insulting the petitioner
44 – A: No
45 – Q: The petitioner’s two witnesses reported that he insulted her and 
hit her in front of her workplace
46 – A: No it didn’t happen
47– Q: Anything else to say
48 – A: No  .  .  .
Even though testimonies are supposed to be transcribed in the witnesses’ own 
words, they clearly appear to have been at least partly reformulated by the judge 
(and his clerk). This is why the witness is always reported to have begun his 
testimony by stating that the petitioner and the defendant are spouses ‘by 
virtue of a legal marriage contract’. In addition to this rewriting or editing 
process, the overall stereotypical nature of the organisation of the testimony 
and the pre-allocated sequence of turns in the production of the testimony 
are noteworthy. Both depend on the institutional context in which these 
testimonies are given. As noted in a seminal study of courtroom interactions, 
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‘the talk in each stage of court hearings shares the feature that although it 
occurs in a multi-party setting  .  .  .  the parties who may participate are limited 
and predetermined’ (Atkinson and Drew 1979: 35). Moreover, whatever is 
done in this context is necessarily managed by the participants within the 
constraining framework of this pre-allocated turn-taking organisation. In 
other words, unlike ordinary conversations, turn order in judicial settings is 
fixed, as is the type of each speaker’s turn.
Within this system of turn allocation, both the judge and the witnesses 
are oriented to the production of information that may be legally relevant, 
and to the credibility of this information. On the judge’s side, the credibility 
of the information provided by each witness is tested by questions directed 
at the credibility of the witness himself. This is why the interrogation always 
begins with a question about the witness’s ‘relationship to the two parties’ 
(turns 3, 37). This credibility can be further investigated by asking the 
witness to produce a first account of his testimony (turns 5, 39) and then 
assessing the reliability of this global narrative by asking the same witness 
to confirm his statements piecemeal (turns 7–14, 41– 44). Some of the judge’s 
questions are clearly directed at challenging the witness’s version of the facts by 
confronting him with another witness’s testimony (turn 45: ‘The petitioner’s 
two witnesses reported that the defendant had hit her and insulted her’). 
Clearly, the judge also seeks to extract some elements of information – nature 
of demeanor (insulting and hitting: turns 41, 43), temporal dimension of 
the demeanor (for how long?: turn 11), content of the demeanor (words used 
by the husband: turns 13, 16), responsibility (who did it?: turns 11, 41, 43), 
prejudicial nature of the demeanor (what effect on the wife?: turn 15) – that 
are the constituting features of the legal category of harm. Indeed, together, 
the spare parts of this query for information are in congruence with the many 
conditional elements of the notion of harm as defined, in the ruling and 
according to the Court of Cassation, as:
the wrong done by the husband to his wife in the form of speech or 
action, or both, in a manner that is not acceptable to people of same 
status, and it constitutes something shameful and wrongful that cannot 
be endured.
At the same time, the witness attempts to establish his credibility by offering 
some elements of information that can reasonably be considered to qualify 
him as a reliable witness – the nature of his perspective (turn 4: workplace; 
turn 38: neighbourhood), duration of his witnessing (turns 8, 12: nearly two 
years) – or which appear as very plausible – exact wording of the insults 
(turn 14: ‘bitch’ and ‘filthy’), effects of these insults (turn 16: her breaking 
down at the post office). With regard to the content of his testimony, the 
witness clearly orients to what appears to him as the constitutive element of 
the harm, either denying or confirming it having occurred. Interestingly, the 
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witness who denies the existence of any harm directly orients his first global 
narrative, the elements of which were not elicited by the judge, to the 
husband having neither insulted nor hit her. Accordingly, one may conclude 
that the normal conception of harm is made of either blows or insults, or 
both, in a manner largely independent of any formal legal definition.
If we turn now to the practical ways in which members of the judicial 
setting orient to the issue of causation and agency in the production of harm, 
we observe that, although Article 6 of the 1929 Law deals with harm for 
which the husband is deemed responsible, whereas Article 9 of the 1920 Law 
deals with harm resulting from the husband’s permanent defect, for which he 
cannot be deemed responsible, however, in the case examined here, the judge 
merges the two sources of harm and mentions only the statutory reference 
of Article 6. Moreover, we see that, for the people engaged in judicial pro-
cedures, causation takes many forms that are directly linked to common-sense 
conceptions. These conceptions depend on commonly shared assumptions and 
vary according to the position people occupy within the judicial procedure. 
In the case under scrutiny, people orient to an institution such as marriage 
in terms of its normal goals. This teleological approach to marriage is clearly 
manifested in the petitioner’s request and in the judge’s ruling:
Excerpt 9 (Case No. 701, 1983)
Petitioner: The petitioner is the wife of the defendant in pursuance 
of a valid legal marriage contract; she was married to him and discovered 
suddenly that her husband the defendant had a constitutional defect, 
that is, he was totally incapable of having marital relations with her, 
which therefore made it impossible for her to procreate and this put her 
life in trouble and made her psychologically sensitive, and her life became 
deeply sad as it became clear that this kind of marriage would not realize 
the aims of marriage.
Ruling: Considering that  .  .  .  the forensic physician has established 
that the defendant  .  .  .  is affected by psychological impotence.  .  .  .  Abû 
Hanîfa and Abû Yûsuf permitted separation on the ground of a perman-
ent defect that impedes intercourse between the man and the woman if 
he is impotent, emasculated, or disabled, because the goal of marriage is 
the preservation of procreation, so that, if the man is not capable of this, 
it becomes impossible to implement the provision of the contract and there 
is no good in upholding it. Its upholding despite this [constitutes] a 
harm for the woman the lasting of which cannot be accepted and which 
can only be resolved by separation.  .  .  .
The many parties to the case commonly consider the absence of marital relation-
ships and the inability to procreate an incongruity that disturbs the normal 
course of a marriage. This is precisely what must be accounted for. A causal 
factor – here impotence – is invoked so as to remedy this incongruity. 
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Impotence is elevated to the rank of the main causal source, from which all 
other factors are derived.
Besides this teleological conception – the cause of harm is the element 
that forecloses the realisation of the goals of marriage – harm causation is 
considered in terms of successive integrated factors. This means that events 
are presented as necessarily following each other. In our case, the argument 
proceeds as follows: the wife risks committing infidelity, because of antipathy 
between her and her husband, because marital life has become unbearable, 
because the wife is compelled to live under moral duress, because of the 
blows, insults and false accusations that she must suffer, because of her 
husband’s bitterness, because of his impotence. In this causal argument, 
Islam and Islamic law may play a role, but it is only one among the many 
different reasons why people abide by the rule. This is reflected in our 
case in the presentation of the petitioner’s request in which her motives are 
exposed:
Excerpt 10 (Case No. 701, 1983)
For the same abovementioned reason the defendant’s reproductive impo-
tence and his inability to realize the aims of marriage led him to express 
his anger in revenge and hostility against the petitioner, by insulting 
and hitting her and finally by accusing her of dishonesty and telling the 
police that the petitioner, who is his wife, had stolen Egyptian £1500 
and jewels (a golden bracelet, a necklace and a ring), falsely, aggressively 
and wrongly, so as to compel her to live with him under moral duress. 
Then, he denounced her for asking him to give back her marital belong-
ings. The pursuance of marital life has become impossible, for there is 
antipathy and dislike between them and she is still a young person and 
she fears infidelity for herself and she fears God Almighty.
Explicitly ‘Islamic’ considerations are few. Moreover, they are generally 
mediated by reference to law books and case-law. In that respect, we must be 
concerned only with the way in which the judge (as also the Public Prosecutor, 
the forensic physician and the attorney) orient to the provisions of Egyptian 
law, including those rules that originate in classical Islamic fiqh. In our cases, 
impotence and violence are not characterised by the parties as Islamic-law 
provisions per se.12 Rather, we observed the ways in which the parties refer 
to impotence so as to exhibit the workshop level of their practices, which 
are publicly and accountably made up of considerations for the institutional 
setting, procedural correctness and legal relevance.
12 This is an assumption that can be justified only because scholars know in advance that 
these are grounds for divorce in classical Islamic fiqh.
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III. Conclusion
Many scholars claim that, despite major transformations in law and adjudication 
in Egypt during the last two centuries, it is still an Islamic judge who issues 
Islamic rulings in the field of personal status law, the last stronghold of 
Islamic law. I argued that such claims must be challenged on two different 
levels. On the first level, these claims fall short of any satisfactory definition 
of what is specifically Islamic that would make this law an Islamic law and 
its provisions something better characterised by their Islamic rather than 
their national Egyptian dimension. On the second and more fundamental 
level, my contention is that these claims are sociologically irrelevant, for they 
eschew the praxiological dimension of adjudication. Instead of assuming that 
there exists something called an Islamic personal status law to which judges 
necessarily conform, it would be better to examine and describe judges’ actual 
daily activities and practices, through which they manifest their legal know-
ledge, their formal and practical legal training, and the routinised nature of 
their activity in the field of personal status law. Thus scholars should 
not presume the Islamic nature of rulings on the basis of their genealogical 
connection to the provisions of an earlier legal system, for this would be to 
adopt an ironic position by which scholars tell judges what is Islamic and 
what is not in their daily judicial activities. Instead, any ascription of an 
Islamic dimension and authority to rulings should proceed from the judges’ 
personal characterisations and orientations, to which only a close scrutiny of 
actual interactions and utterances bears witness. In other words, there is no 
valid preconceived model to the yardstick of which one can evaluate actual 
judicial practices. The Islamic nature of rulings is something that is instantiated 
and realised by the actual written and oral performances of judges.
At the very place where it is supposed to be massive and overwhelming, 
that is, in personal status law, references to Islamic law are conspicuous for 
their paucity. This suggests that the issue of Islamic law in contemporary 
Egyptian law does not proceed from what the scholarly tradition generally 
claims. Reference to Islam is occasional; moreover, it is always mediated 
through the use of Egyptian law’s primary sources, that is, legislation 
and case-law. Henceforth, this reference takes place in the banality and the 
routine of a judge’s activity, which consists mainly in legally characterising 
the facts submitted to him. By so doing, the judge is obviously more inter-
ested in manifesting his ability to judge correctly – according to the standards 
of his profession, the formal constraints that apply to its exercise, the legal 
sources on which he relies and the norms of the interpretive work his activity 
supposes – than he is to reiterate the Islamic primacy of the law he imple-
ments. There is no doubt that, if asked, the same judge would underscore 
the conformity of his activity and the law he applies with Islamic law. However, 
such an attitude would only be retrospective, a posteriori and justificatory. 
In the course of his work, the judge does not orient himself to the necessity 
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to assess the Islamic dimension of any object, even in this domain of law 
where the Islamic genealogy of rules seems most evident. The close descrip-
tion of the modes of usage of, and reference to, legal rules, some of which 
have an Islamic genealogy, shows us the extent to which law is a practical 
accomplishment, rather than an archaeological search for the Islamic pedigree 
of the norm.
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Chapter 6
State of equalities
Law, marriage and citizenship in  
the Islamic Republic of Mauritania1
Satyel Larson
The question of kafA ”a or ‘equality of birth’ in Islamic law can be posed in 
a number of ways, and I shall do so three times throughout the course of 
this paper. After introducing kafA ”a and the problems around which this 
paper has been organised, I will first pose the question of kafA ”a doctrinally 
as an instance of a discursive production of a legal norm in Islamic law.2 
Then I will pose it empirically in order to illustrate two instances of kafA ”a 
in practice in postcolonial Mauritania. Finally, I will pose it a third time in 
a way that will, I hope, expose a relation between legal norms and practices 
in an Islamic context.
KafA ”a is in a strict legal sense the concept of equality of marital partners 
developed by Sunni Muslim jurists that together with an appropriate dower 
(mahr, RadAq) render a marriage suitable.3 In Arabic, the literal meaning of 
1 I would like to thank Professors Baber Johansen, Marianne Constable and Adam Gearey 
for their generous and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am indebted to 
Dr Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem for directing my attention to his influential work on citizen-
ship in Mauritania. I was fortunate to have in Nima Bassiri a superb and thoughtful reader.
2 A note on transliteration and translation: In general, I have followed the system of trans-
literation outlined by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) for trans-
literating Modern Standard and Classical Arabic. I have provided the transliterations with 
vowels (tashkCl ) where I thought it may help to disambiguate the original text. However, 
so as not to encumber the reader, I have not voweled every word. Unless otherwise noted, 
all translations are mine, and I have tried to the greatest extent possible to preserve the 
intentions, effects and meanings of the original texts.
3 In Islamic Law, marriage is the foundation of an affinity to an agnatic family that gives 
the marital partners the mutual right to inherit from one another. Marriage is instituted 
through the conclusion of an oral or written marriage contract (nikAM) that simultaneously 
renders licit sexual relations between a woman and a man, and the gaze upon the ‘shame-
zones’ (“awra), areas of the body which were forbidden to the gaze prior to the conclusion 
of the marriage contract. The marriage is rendered legally valid when an adult woman or 
her guardian (walC ) and an adult man consent to the marriage, which is duly witnessed by 
at least two people. Whereas in the Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafi’i madhAhib (schools of Islamic 
law, singular: madhhab) the offer and acceptance of marriage must take place in the same 
meeting and in the presence of two adult males, in Maliki law the presence of two witnesses 
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kafA ”a is equality, or ‘a position in which one thing is equal to another thing’ 
(Luwcs Malef 1954: 690). Traced to its consonantal root, it also connotes 
sufficiency or satisfaction as a means of balance, for instance, in weight.4 
Jurists and legal scholars confer a technical sense to kafA ”a, and it is this 
technical meaning that has been translated into English as the suitability or 
equality of marriage partners with respect to certain aspects of the partners’ 
identities, such as religion, freedom, lineage, morals, profession and piety. 
The meaning of the doctrine of equality (kafA ”a), itself a formal, abstract 
standard to measure social identity, requires further interpretive schemas at 
multiple levels.
While I accept the fitness of the translation (i.e., equality, suitability), the 
three attempts to understand kafA ”a in this essay are attempts to give a richer 
and more specific meaning to the doctrine and practice of equality as it 
mediates power as well as the ideas of nation and state in the postcolonial 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, where authoritative interpretation of the law 
is not limited to state institutions and where knowledge of the law produces 
privilege and cultural capital. In order to give kafA ”a a fuller meaning in this 
context, I will examine how the specific conditions of equality before the law 
are and have come to be practised and understood through the institution-
alisation of national identity and the law of personal status. The question of 
legal equality positions the formal, abstract and universal identity of the 
Muslim citizen as the bearer of equal rights against the culturally and bio-
logically defined identities (ethnic, tribal, racial, caste) of particularised legal 
subjects also bearing equal rights.
By filling out the complex meanings of kafA ”a, I will effectively illuminate 
the conceptual parameters of this paper. First, I will show how kafA ”a is an 
overlooked aspect of contemporary Maliki juridical practice of the family in 
the modern era of reformed, state-regulated Islamic law.5 While fewer highly 
developed doctrinal and theoretical accounts of kafA ”a exist in the juridical 
treatises of Maliki jurists than in the treatises of, say, Hanafi jurists, non-
binding advisory legal opinions ( fatwA, sing.; fatAwA, plural) and cases issuing 
from the territory that is now the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, a region 
that has historically and loyally followed Maliki jurisprudence ( fiqh), show 
how kafA ”a is either invoked (for instance, by matrimonial guardians) in an 
attempt to circumscribe the autonomy of the adult woman or her male 
guardian, or is forgotten (for instance, by spouses) in order to maintain 
matrimonial practices that govern the drawing up of the marriage contract. 
is recommended, provided the marriage is given sufficient publicity. See Khalcl ibn Ismaq 
al-Jundc (1980), 90; and Dawoud Sudqi el Alami and D. Hinchcliffe (1996).
4 Ammad ibn Mumammad Fayyemc and ‘Abd al-Karcm ibn Mumammad Rafi‘c, KitAb 
al-miRbAM al-munCr fC gharCb al-sharM al-kabCr li-l-RAfi“C (1980).
5 For a historical discussion of the relation between the theory and practice of kafA ”a in the 
late Middle Ages, see Zomeño (2001), 87–106.
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The two cases of kafA ”a I examine illuminate both how contemporary jurists, 
lawyers and courts in Mauritania continue a legacy of extensive juristic 
disagreement (ikhtilAf  ) among Maliki jurists on the issue of kafA ”a, and how 
the specific interpretations of kafA ”a map out the political terrain of Mauri-
tanian society and mediate the question of the nation.
I will additionally demonstrate how measures of equality before the law 
are based on the repetition of the memories of founding moments, and 
imagined historical situations and traditions. Lastly, I will discuss how these 
measures of equality are doubly situated in that they reflect competing 
normativities and institutionalisations of group life that are determined by 
varying modes of temporally oriented, imagined communal identities or 
based on divergent modes of belonging. The difference between precolonial 
custom (viz. caste and ethnic identities) and the postcolonial nation-state 
(viz. citizenship) best illustrates the double situation of the measures of 
equality before the law. Each of these forms of imagined identity are grounded 
in practices that have distinct relations to time and which conceive and limit 
the identity of the postcolonial subject of Islamic family law.
I. What is kaf10a? The doctrine of kaf10a
KafA ”a is the doctrine of equality or parity in marriage first set forth in classical 
Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (  fiqh), under which a woman may not contract 
a marriage with a man whom the male agnative relatives of the woman deem 
to be of unequal social standing to her and, through her, to them. A marriage 
that does not meet the requirement of kafA ”a is the object of judicial sanction 
and lack of kafA ”a is ground for annulment (  faskh) of the marriage contract 
(al-nikAM).
KafA ”a may be the only situation in which Islamic law concerns itself with 
race (Lewis 1990: 128 –9). Unlike the laws of Nazi Germany or Apartheid 
South Africa, it does not proscribe marriage between races, but rather gives the 
family as represented by the male relatives a legal possibility for opposing 
an ‘unsuitable’ marriage. It gives power to the father or guardian (walC ) to 
oppose a marriage contracted without his consent, or to annul a marriage 
that has already been contracted through deception, as long as there is neither 
child nor pregnancy.
The doctrine of kafA ”a finds antecedents in the law of Kufa, and pre-Islamic 
and tribal customs, which imposed a certain degree of social equality between 
spouses.6 While various Qur’anic passages discuss the permissibility or 
6 Ziadeh (1957), 509; Linant de Bellefonds (2008); Musa Ali Ajetunmobi (1984), 86 –101; 
Schacht (1964), 182: ‘The degrees of equality by birth (KafA ”a), which is demanded only of 
the man, among the free Muslims are: members of ]uraysh, the tribe of the Prophet; other 
Arabs; and non-Arabs (with subdivisions of these degrees)’; and Coulson (2005), 49.
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prohibition of marriage according to diverse paradigms such as degrees of 
consanguinity and suckling as well as religious identity and morality,7 and 
while reports of the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad (KadCth) narrate 
discussions about the qualities that a man should look for in a wife and the 
desirability of equality in marriage,8 the doctrine of kafA ”a is not explicitly 
sanctioned by the Qur’an and indeed may contradict Qur’anic passages about 
the equality of all believers (Ziadeh 1957: 509 and de Bellefonds 2008).
KafA ”a reveals an attitude toward marriage in which marriage is as much 
an alignment between two families as it is an alignment between two people. 
It is used to determine whether an alignment between two families will be 
beneficial beyond the two individuals being married and aims to protect the 
family of the woman from misaligning itself with a family that it considers 
unequal and unsuited to it. A man can marry beneath his social status with-
out creating a misalliance, but lack of kafA ”a of the future spouse of a woman 
is deemed harmful to the honor of the woman and her family. The rule is 
unidirectional insofar as it prohibits a woman from contracting a marriage 
to a man of inferior social status. Only the man’s status is measured and it 
has to be equal to or better than the status of the woman’s male relatives.9
According to the doctrine of kafA ”a, the woman gains her fundamental value 
or meaning and is given her identity in the marriage contract, not through 
any intrinsic, particular value that she herself may hold, but rather only 
insofar as she represents, and is represented by, the men of her consanguineal 
7 On Qur’anic passages about marriage, see Abdullah Yusuf (1998), chapter/verse: 2:221; 
4:3– 4, 20 –5, 34 –5, 128 –30; 5:5; 7:189; 23:6; 24:3; 24:26, 32–3; 25:54; 30:21; 33:37, 
50 –2; 53:27–38; 60:10.
8 See Mohammed Muhsin Khan, TaMCM Al-BukhArC (1994), chapter 60, The Book of NikAM, 
Hadith 1835, 889: ‘Narrated Abu Huraira, raLiya Allahu “anhu: The Prophet, Ralla Allahu 
“alayhi wa sallam: “A woman is married for four (things), i.e., her wealth, her family status, 
her beauty and her religion. So you should take possession of (marry) the religious woman 
(otherwise) you will be a loser”.’ Also see Al-Imam Hafiz Al-Baris Al-Allamah Jamaluddin 
Abi Muhammad Abdullah bin Yusuf al-Hanafi Al Zai’ali, NaRbul Al-Rayah (no publication 
date) vol. 3, 196 –7. The Prophet said: ‘Women are not to be proposed (to) and married 
except by their equals’, and ‘Select (fit) woman (in respect of character) for your seeds and 
marry (you) your equals and give (your daughters) in marriage to them’. Quoted in Zaleha 
Kamaruddin (2004), 34 –5.
9 Interestingly, in an equation, it might look something like the algebraic law of transitivity: 
M ≥ F where F = m + m + m to ∞; therefore, M ≥ m + m + m to ∞. Thus while the 
doctrine seems to give adult women a certain amount of social mobility insofar as a woman, 
unlike a man, can marry into a class above the one she was born into, the unidirectionality 
of the social mobility indicates the woman’s mediating function in the social exchange of 
marriage, since she does not elevate the status of her husband if she marries beneath her 
class. Since the woman is first associated with the status of her father and then with that 
of her husband, it seems then that it is ultimately the social identity of the father (both 
symbolic and real) that is at stake, as notions of honor and shame attach to him through 
the act of the daughter’s marriage.
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male forbearers. Of course, since personal attributes such as beauty, age and 
virginity help to determine the dower, and since a proper dower is an element 
that renders a marriage suitable, it may be said that particular characteristics 
of the woman play an indirect role in determining kafA ”a.
There is a difference between the four Sunni schools, and differences within 
each school itself, as to what defines this equality and what grants this value – 
and as to whether the equality and the value are defined in terms of genealogy 
(nasab), piety (dCn) and the historical depth of the family’s adherence to Islam 
(bayt), nobility or social prestige (Masab), race, liberty (al-Murriyya), profession 
or wealth.10 The notion of kafA ”a is practically irrelevant in Shi‘i law, except 
in the case of marriage between a non-Muslim man and Muslim woman 
(Al-Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillc 1991: 140). Literature on 
kafA ”a attributes this difference between the schools, as well as the relative 
degree of sophistication of the doctrine, to the social climates in which the 
schools developed; it remains less developed in the Maliki than it does in 
the Hanafi doctrine. Indeed, the Hanafis have an elaborative hierarchy of 
professions that determine the equality of spouses.11
If the doctrine of kafA ”a took root more firmly in classical Hanafi juris-
prudence than it did in classical Maliki jurisprudence, the branches of those 
roots are even more visible in twentieth-century codifications of family law 
throughout the Islamic world in countries that have historically followed the 
Hanafi school of law (madhhab). Whereas Syria, Jordan and Iraq have incorporated 
kafA ”a articles into their Codes of Personal Status, the doctrine of kafA ”a is 
nearly absent – or expressed in a less obvious way – in the corresponding 
Maghrebi codes in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. For example, 
Chapter Four, ‘KafA ”a’, of the Syrian Code of Personal Status (QAnEn al-aMwAl 
al-shakhRiyya12) devotes seven articles (26 –32) to the regulation of kafA ”a.13
10 For discussions of what determines equality in KafA ”a, see Johansen (1996), 76; Coulson 
(2005), 49, 94; Ziadeh (1957), 509; and de Bellefonds (2008).
11 Coulson (2005), 94. Farhat Ziadeh concurs: ‘A review of early authorities on Muslim law 
reveals that Malik had nothing to say about kafa”ah in al-MuwaSSa whereas Abu Hanifah, 
Abu Yusuf, and Shaybani (d. 189 A.H.) recognized it. Malik is reported to have expressly 
authorized the marriage of non-Arab men to Arab women, and to have said that lineage 
(sharaf  ) and honor (Masab) should not stand in the way of a previously married woman in 
marrying herself off to whomever she wishes, while these considerations are material to 
the Hanafi doctrine of kafa”ah’ (Ziadeh 1957: 505).
12 Syria, and Muhammad Fahr Shaqfah, MajmE“at qawAnCn al-aMwAl al-shakhRiyya al-nAfidha fC 
SErCya ma“ al-uREl wa-l-bayyinAt: wa-tashmal QAnEn al-AMwAl al-ShakhRiyya (A Collection of 
the Laws of Effective Personal Status in Syria with the Sources and Explanations, including 
the Code of Personal Status) (1996) 22, hereafter referred to as Syrian Code of Personal Status.
13 See Syria, Syrian Code of Personal Status. These seven articles specify that the man must be 
equal to the woman (‘YushtaraSu fC lEzEmi al-zawAji an yakEna al-rajulu kufu”an li-l-mara”ati’) 
Art. 26; that kafA ”a is determined by Syrian local custom (“urf al-bilAd ) Art. 28; and that 
a marriage contract should be annulled ( faskh) if lack of kafA ”a on the part of the husband 
is discovered after the conclusion of the marriage contract, the pregnancy or birth of a 
child notwithstanding, Articles 30 and 32.
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One possible reason for the legal regulation of parity between spouses in 
the Hanafi doctrine, and the lack of such a developed doctrine in Maliki fiqh, 
may be found in the relationship between kafA ”a and institution of the matri-
monial legal guardian (walC). In Maliki doctrine, the walC historically plays 
a greater legal role than he does in Hanafi doctrine.14 In the classical Maliki 
doctrine, the walC ’s presence and consent are necessary components of the 
adult woman’s marriage contract, rendering kafA ”a less necessary and, perhaps, 
redundant.15 This is because it is the duty of the walC, in giving his consent 
to the marriage, to respect the equality of the partners in a marriage alliance 
and to ensure that the woman’s family will not misalign itself through a 
marriage contract. In Hanafi doctrine, however, the woman who has reached 
the age of puberty may contract her own marriage without a guardian. Her 
autonomy in selecting a marriage partner purportedly lends greater risk to 
the possibility of a misalignment and the necessity for legal redress in the 
event of such a misalignment ( Johansen 1996: 76).
However, while the secondary literature on the doctrine would absent 
kafA ”a from Maliki doctrine and practice (Coulson 2005: 94; Ziadeh 1957: 
14 Thus, the Syrian and Jordanian codes of personal status have incorporated this right of 
the guardian and permit him to intervene on the grounds of lack of kafA ”a to annul a 
marriage contract. See Syria, Syrian Code of Personal Status, Articles, 27, 29, 32; Jordan, 
and ‘Izzat Ghayth, 2001, QAnEn al-AMwAl al-ShakhRiyya: qAnEn mu”aqqat raqm (61) li-sanat 
1976. Silsilat al-TashrC “At al-qaLA”iyya, 5. Amman: Dar Qindil (Referred to as Code of 
Personal Status), Articles 21–2. While contemporary codes of personal status in the 
Maghreb that have historically followed Maliki doctrine have abolished matrimonial 
constraint ( jabr) and require that the adult woman give her express consent to the mar-
riage, the guardian is still a socially necessary component in the marriage contract. See 
Charrad (2001), 138 –9, 160, 163, 224, 231; Ziba Mir-Hosseini (1991), 146 –7. While 
the Code of Personal Status of Mauritania lists the guardian of both the legally adult 
woman (18 years) and the minor as one of the four constitutive elements to effect a legal 
marriage (Article 5), the guardian only continues to play a legal role in the marriage of 
the minor in the Tunisian (Articles 6 –9) and Moroccan (Articles 13, 20, 22) Codes of 
Personal Status. See The Moroccan Family Code (Moudawwana) of 5 February 2004 (unofficial 
translation) www.hrea.org/moudawwana.html; The Tunisian Record of Personal Status, 
Tunisia (2007), Majallat al-aMwAl al-shakhRiyya. [Tunis]: ManshErAt al-MaSba“a al-Rasmiyya 
li-l-JumhEriyya al-TEnisiyya; and Mauritania (2001), Loi N˚ 2001-052 portant Code du statut 
personnel/QAnEn raqm 2001-052 yataLamman Mudawwanat al-AMwAl al-ShakhRiyya, in Arabic: 
www.mauritania.mr/index.php?niveau=6&coderub=4&codsoussous=175&codesousrub= 
11&codsoussous1=176 or French: www.mauritania.mr/fr/index.php?niveau=6&coderub=
4&codsoussous=176&codesousrub=11&codsoussous1=178. Articles 24 and 25 of the 2004 
Moroccan Code of Personal Status give the woman who has reached 18 years old the de 
jure power to contract her own marriage without a guardian. According to de Bellefonds 
(2008), however, diminutions in the role of the guardian in Morocco have been accom-
panied by the introduction of attenuated forms of kafA ”a previously unknown to classical 
Maliki law.
15 See the chapters on marriage (KitAb al-Nikah) of leading Maliki jurists: Khalil Ibn Ashaq 
al-Jundi (1980) 89 –121; in Arabic/French: La Risala, “Abd Allah ibn “Abd al-RaMman Ibn 
Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, Bercher (1968), 173–93; and Malik Ibn Anas (1989).
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503–7, 515 –17; and de Bellefond 2008)16 classical and modern,17 and while 
its existence in contemporary personal status codes is attenuated,18 the work 
of Yahya Ould al-Bara who has studied the vast corpus of Mauritanian fatwAs 
on kafA ”a (see Yahya Ould al-Bara 2001), as well as two cases of kafA ”a in 
Mauritania in the late-twentieth century, bring to light kafA ”a as an over-
looked aspect of Maliki doctrine and practice, and call for a renewed interest 
in looking to adaptations of fiqh in specific localities and in a distinct social 
phenomenon, as well as to the legal literature that is studied and produced 
(decisions, non-binding advisory legal opinions – fatAwA, cases – al-masA”il, 
collections of cases – al-nawAzil), at the so-called margins of the Islamic 
world.19 If we consider this legal literature as an important part of the develop-
ment of the sharC ”a, we may transform, broaden or deepen our understanding 
of the development of kafA ”a in Maliki doctrine while reassessing or reim-
agining the kind of Islamic legal norms that could have historically existed and 
that could have impacted multiple social, economic and political relations.
According to Maliki jurists, the doctrine of kafA ”a was originally addressed 
to women to prevent them from marrying non-Muslims, and then spread to 
ethnic difference, levels of employment, and class status between nobles and 
non-nobles, as is the case in Mauritania (Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem 2003: 
37–53). The founder of the Maliki school, Malik Ibn Anas (d. 179/796), 
never mentions kafA ”a in his MuwaSSa”, nor specifies genealogical nobility as 
a requirement of kafA ”a in Sahnun’s Mudawwana, where he quotes Qur’anic 
verse 49:13 and states that ‘All Muslims are equal’.20 Nevertheless, local jurists 
16 Amalia Zomeño’s article (2001), 92 above, discusses the expansion of kafA ”a in Maliki 
doctrine and its subsequent theoretical articulations after Malik Ibn Anas in the furE“ 
works of Ibn Rushd, Ibn Juzayy, Ibn Majishen, Khalcl ibn Ismaq al-Jundc, Ibn Mughcth 
and several other prominent Maliki jurists, whose works all ‘reflect a lack of agreement 
with regard to the theoretical criteria which must be included in the evaluation of the 
kafA ”a doctrine’. However, while the classical doctrine reflects the expansion of various 
juridical opinions on kafA ”a, Zomeño finds only one case concerning kafA ”a in Ahmad ibn 
al-Wanshari’s voluminous collection of approximately 6000 fatwAs.
17 For further discussion on the complicated question of the relationship between modern state 
family law reform of classical Islamic doctrine in the Arab-Islamic world, see Welchman (2004).
18 So that, for example, in Mauritania, Article 15 of the personal status code insists that 
the value of the dowry (RadAq) is fixed by parity. Article 44 states that the status of 
being afflicted by a serious illness (al-iRAba bi-maraL makhEf ) is a provisional or temporary 
obstacle (al-mawAni“ al-mu”aqqata) to marriage, and Article 45 states that it is not permis-
sible for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim, and that a Muslim man may not marry 
a woman if she is not of the ‘People of the Book’, i.e., Jewish or Christian.
19 For responsible inquiries into how Islam and Islamic law are not monolithic phenomena, 
and how they adopt and are adopted into local custom and practice in Africa, and how 
Africa is considered and considers itself a marginal Islamic space, see Levtzion and Pouwels 
(2000); Fischer (1970); and Hunwick (1999), 72–99.
20 ‘Ahlu al-Islami kulluhum ba“Luhum li-ba“Lin akfA”’, Malik ibn Anas, and Samnen (1970) 
Al-Mudawwanah al-kubrA, 6 vols (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthanna).
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in Mauritania introduced genealogical nobility in their adaptation of kafA ”a 
to the point that it became moored in the local imaginary and represented 
in mythical litigation narratives. One of the oldest of these narratives is the 
legend of the fourteenth-century mythical war between ‘black’ (Idawffal) and 
‘white’ (Idashirghra) tribes. The war began when a Maure scholar wanted to 
marry his young daughter to a young educated, pious man who belonged 
ethnically to the Peuls, but who had spent a long time with a Maure tribe.21
For at least three centuries in Mauritania, kafA ”a has been situated between 
a tribal ideology and the rule of fiqh.22 I understand tribal here to mean the 
political and social expressions of ethnicity as forms of power, alliance 
and collective identity. As noted above, social and customary differences in 
particular localities such as Medina and Kufa may account for the level of 
elaboration of kafA ”a. According to Yahya Ould al-Bara, while juridical norms 
are most often invoked in kafA ”a and in relation to marriage, there are social and 
political reasons that explain why the Islamic legal literature has privileged 
a restrictive reading of kafA ”a. In a social optic where the tribe is of central 
importance, particular local values (genealogy, endogamy, aRabiyya23) mix 
21 This myth is narrated by Youra Ould Ahmed a Mauritanian faqCh, in Yahya Ould al-Bara 
(2001), 446.
22 A note on the use of tribe and ethnicity as categories of analysis: I recognise the major 
problems that inhere with the use of the words ‘tribal’, and ‘ethnicity’, their archaism 
and connection to racist essentialism (i.e., the classification of people, generally non-
Anglo Europeans, by race as a biological category), and the colonial enterprise. I feel, 
however, that I must use the language of tribe and ethnicity in this essay for two reasons. 
First, the categories of tribe and ethnicity are primary analytics in contemporary scholarship 
of Mauritania. In order to address claims made by scholars who work on Mauritania, I 
must first reiterate the claims and describe the categories of analysis used. Second, one of 
the main issues in this essay is the way that collective identity, articulated through forms of 
belonging (racial, ethnic, tribal, caste, national), becomes the site of a power struggle at 
the social, political and legal levels. Thus while I am critical of the uses and effects, both 
productive and repressive, of these categories of identity, I think that they are appropriate 
for this essay. For helpful critiques of the use of the concept of tribe and ethnicity in 
Africanist and Mauritanian scholarship see Villasante Cervello and de Beauvais (2007); 
and Amselle and M’Bokolo (1985).
23 See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima I, 326 for a social – as opposed to a legal – analysis of the 
relationship between Saharan patrilineal genealogy (naRab) and the structural corporation 
of agnatic solidarity (“aRabiyya). The general rule between “aRabiyyAt is the competition 
and hierarchy between them for social distinction and status, which eventually results in 
the power of one over all others: ‘The tribal spirit is composite and results from the mixing 
of several clans, one of which is stronger than the others. This is the origin of social tribal 
organization and superiority over men and dynasties. The key to success is the clan that 
dominates the whole tribe tallies with the temperament that is in the process of gestation. 
The temperament results from the mixing of the elements. As we have seen, no mixing 
can take place if the elements are in equal proportion. One of these elements must be 
superior to the others in order to achieve mixing. In the same way, one of the clans must 
be stronger to unify the others and fuse them into a single corporate spirit (“aRabiyya).’
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with local interpretations of Islam, such that Islamic law is interpreted and 
instrumentalised through genealogical and endogamous ethics (Yahya Ould 
al-Bara 2001: 441). The anthropological structures of Maure marriages are 
such that the preferred alliance is between brothers’ children (awlAd “amm) 
and preferably with the female paternal parallel cousin, that is, the daughter 
of the brother of the father. This category of marriage is simultaneously a 
classificatory genealogy, as an entire tribe is ideally descended from one apical 
male ancestor (see Bonte 2006: 98 –122). I will return to the importance of 
classification and its attendant exclusions as a form of danger and power later 
in this essay. For now, I would like to underscore this preferential choice of 
ideal marriage as that which establishes kafA ”a between individuals, families and 
agnatic solidarities (“assabiyyAt)24 in Arab Maure marriages in Mauritania.
Mauritanian and Maliki fuqahA” have taken positions on this. The Maliki 
Egyptian jurist, Khalcl ibn Ismaq al-Jundc (d. 776/1374) whose obscure yet 
concise MukhtaRar (abridged manual of legal treatises25) has become the main 
source of jurisprudence in many areas of law in contemporary Mauritania, 
and who introduced the Malikite doctrine in Mauritania and was well known 
and being widely studied there by the sixteenth century (Mohamed El 
Mokhtar Ould Bah 1981: 36, 43–72), wrote ‘Matrimonial equivalence is 
religion and status’ (Al-kafA ”atu [hiya] al-dCnu wa-l-MAlu) (KhalCl ibn IsMAq 
al-JundC 1980: 103). Commentaries on the meaning of this, notably in the 
glosses of the Libyan Maliki scholar Mumammad ibn Mumammad al-kassab 
(d. 954/1547),26 and the Egyptian Maliki glossator Muhammad ibn Ammad 
ibn ‘Arafah al-Daseqi (d. 1230/1815)27 imply that there is consensus that 
‘status’ (al-MAl ) refers to the physical condition of being healthy and free from 
vulgar deformities (  .  .  .  al-MAlu ”ay al-salAmatu min al-“uyEbi28 and al-murAdu 
24 Two in-depth and concise analyses of the historicity of the political domain in Mauritania 
are Marchesin (1992) 51– 4; and Bonte (2006), 109 –11.
25 MukhtaRar is both the title of Khalil’s manuscript, and reference to a genre of didactic, 
utilitarian oriented writing which began to appear with increasing frequency in the tenth to 
eleventh centuries in Arabic literature, philosophy, religious science, history and philosophy. 
The mukhtaRar condenses and epitomizes lengthier works in order to relieve ‘the educated 
readers from all the lengthy discussions, chains of transmitters and endless appendices; 
they offered them the essentials; the specialised work became more accessible’. The genre 
of the MukhtaRar was particularly important in the field of law as it permitted lawyers to be 
trained quickly. Khalil’s MukhtaRar represents the ‘termination of a series of abridgments, 
of which the Mudawwana is the beginning  .  .  .’ This genre, intended to concentrate many 
ideas into as few words as possible, inspired and perhaps necessitated lengthy commentaries 
(sharM) and supercommentaries (MAshiya) rendering somewhat redundant the attempts at 
abridgement. Arazi (2009).
26 Mumammad ibn Mumammad kassab, Zakarcya ‘Umayrat, Khalcl ibn Ismaq al-Jundc, and 
Mumammad ibn Yesuf Mawwaq (1995), vol. 5, 106 –7.
27 Mumammad ibn Ammad ibn ‘Arafah Daseqc, Mumammad ibn Ammad ‘Illaysh, Ammad ibn 
Mumammad Dardcr, and Khalcl ibn Ismaq al-Jundc (1980), vol. 2: 226.
28 Ibid.
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bihi an yusAwChA fC-l-RiMMati ”ay sAlimAn min al-“uyEbi al-fAMishati29). The dis-
cussions of what constitutes religion (al-dCn) turn on the idea of righteousness 
and the question of what to do if the man is sinful (  fAsiq) and drinks alcohol. 
The discussion of matrimonial parity (kafA ”a) in al-Daseqi’s text extends 
beyond religion and status, to freedom (al-Murriyya), nobility (Masab) and a 
proper dower (mahr al-mithl ).
While neither the texts of Khalil, nor al-Dasuqi and al-Hattab mention 
genealogy, ethnicity or lineage (nasab), these are the elements that, in addi-
tion to nobility or caste and the role of the walC, are most significant for 
this discussion of the meaning of status (al-MAl) as a measure of kafA ”a in 
Mauritania. Ibn Rushd/Averroës (d. 595/1198) observes in BidAyat al-Mujtahid, 
describing how guardians (awliyA”) are one of three necessary conditions 
of the marriage contract (shurES al-“aqd ), that disagreement on the matter 
of guardians who attempt to prevent their wards from marrying ( fC “aLl al-
awliyA”) arises between jurists around the question of which exact criteria 
(piety, freedom, lineage, health, wealth, proper dower) establish kafA ”a (Ibn 
Rushd/Averroës 1995: 960 –3). A survey of Maliki fiqh on this subject reveals 
differing opinions, ranging from piety alone, to wealth, health, freedom, 
proper dower and piety inclusively.30 In the following section, I will examine 
how contemporary jurists, lawyers and courts of Mauritania continue this legacy 
of extensive juristic disagreement (ikhtilAf ) among Maliki jurists on the issue 
of kafA ”a, and in the final section, I will discuss how these disagreements 
mediate questions of law and the nation.
II. What is kaf10a? Two cases of kaf10a31
To illustrate the invocation of kafA ”a in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 
I will now recount Mauritanian scholar Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem’s account of 
two present-day personal status cases in which the marriage between people 
of different castes and ethnicities is contested by individuals belonging to 
29 Ibn Rashid in KaSSAb, op.cit. 106.
30 See Zomeño (2001), 92. Zomeño’s summary of the various criteria establishing kafA ”a for 
Maliki jurists is helpful on many accounts. I would point out however that Zomeño seems 
to misread Ibn Rushd on the matter of slavery as a criterion of kafA ”a and forgets to include 
wealth in her summary of his criteria for kafA ”a. While Zomeño claims that Ibn Rushd 
states that slavery does not determine kafA ”a, in Bidayat al-Mujtahid, he writes that ‘There 
is no disagreement in the school that freedom is a measure of kafA ”a, because of the estab-
lished sunna giving the female slave a right to choose [to remain in a marriage contracted 
before she was granted her liberty] once she is liberated’ (”ammA al-Murriyyatu falam yukhtalif 
al-madhhabu ”AnnahA min al- kafA ”ati likawni al-sunnati al-thAbitati litakhyCri al-”Amati ”idhA 
“utaqat.) Ibn Rushd (1995), 962.
31 These cases are originally reported in their entirety in French in Zekeria Ould Ahmed 
Salem (2003), 47–51. My recounting of the two cases here, while not a strict translation, 
remains as close to the original text as possible.
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historically nomadic tribal elites who have held power since the seventeenth 
century in the territory that has now become the republic of Mauritania.32 
In the final and subsequent part of this essay, I will represent the different 
levels of juristic argumentation and analysis of the meanings of kafA ”a 
presented by the two cases as they mediate the underlying question of the 
relationship between the grounds of law and the postcolonial nation-state. 
As I will explain further on, it is important to keep in mind that the cases 
are heard in the 1990s, after the publication of the first pluralist, democratic 
and Islamic 1991 Constitution, but before the first codification and promul-
gation of a Code of Personal Status in 2001 (QAnEn raqm 2001-052 yataLam-
man Mudawwanat al-AMwAl al-ShakhRiyya). It is important, from the point 
of view of the possible effects and functions of codifying classical Islamic law, 
to question the relationship between the absence of a codification of personal 
status law by the state, the court’s acceptance of kafA ”a as a justiciable cause 
of action, and the particular tribalist and statist readings of kafA ”a.
These two cases have several points in common beyond their historical and 
geographical proximity. Both occur in the largest urban centre in Mauritania, 
the capital Nouackchott, in the mid-to-late 1990s; and both concern the 
contestation of the validity of a marriage based on the lack of equality of one of 
the spouses after the consummation of marriage. One is an inter-caste marriage 
and the husband is a local entertainer (ighyuwa), a profession that historically 
belongs to an occupational caste composed of musicians, poets, artisans and 
craftsmen. The other is an interethnic marriage in which the husband is a 
descendent of a slave. Furthermore, both cases are originally heard by state 
courts, which rely primarily on the norms of the shari“a developed in Maur-
itania, although constitutional norms are also invoked in the first case. That 
case is decided by the State Court of Appeal of Nouakchott, while the second 
case is rejected by the State Court of First Instance, and is picked up and 
decided by private, non-state Mauritanian jurists ( fuqahA” plural, faqCh sing). 
Finally, both produce personal status legal norms through their interpretations 
of the MukhtaRar (abridgement) of the Maliki Egyptian jurist Khalil ibn Ishaq 
al-Jundi, and in particular, of his phrase, ‘KafA ”a or matrimonial equivalence 
is religion and status/condition’ [Al- kafA ”atu al-dCnu wa-l-MAlu].
Case 1. Judgment number 57/92 of the Court of  
Tevragh Zeina and its appeal
The defendant, the young Y. Ould N., was an artist belonging to the Maure 
ethnic group and to the caste of griots (igawen/ighyuwa), which is situated at 
32 Marchesin writes, ‘The political and military hegemony of the Bani Hassan, whose language 
Hassaniya was imposed on the Berber speakers, was in effect in the 17th century. (L’hégémonie 
militaire et politique des Bani Hassan dont la langue, le hassanya, s’impose aux berbéphones, est 
effective au XVII siècle’) (1992), 26.
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the base of the pyramid of castes in Mauritanian society. Born in 1964, he 
already knew before the age of 30 a certain success and fame with Mauritanian 
youth in Nouakchott. In 1988, he became affiliated with a young adult woman, 
A. Mint T.E. who belongs to the tribe of Shurfas (pl. of sharif, descendants 
of the Prophet Mohammad) – and hence, to a noble family that, using a 
different terminology, may be described as part of the nascent middle class. 
The relationship infringes upon the general rule of endogamy observed by 
Mauritanian society.
After having tried in vain to separate the two lovers by exerting various 
tenacious pressures on the young woman, her family lived with the alliance 
as a serious catastrophe and source of social shame and familial decline. The case 
culminates in 1991 with the birth of a child, doubly illegitimate insofar as 
he was born out of marriage and was also the fruit of a forbidden love. The 
case, until this point purely social and cultural, took a juridical turn when 
the couple, in an attempt to make the alliance less insufferable to the woman’s 
family, as well as to the eyes of society and the law (in theory, the Sharc‘a 
punishes the crime of fornication and illegitimate marriage33), produced a 
document proving a marriage beginning in 1988. The father of the woman, 
her guardian, had intervened and separated the two spouses to give her in 
marriage in January 1989 to a cousin of the family. According to a local 
Imam, this arranged marriage hardly lasted ten months, when the young 
woman fled to ‘remarry’ Y. Ould N. for the second time. The spouses lived 
like this for three years in difficult conditions until the very tenacious father 
of the woman, D. Ould T.E. brought them before a court in Tevragh Zeina 
(Nouakchott) in order to annul the second marriage.
On 16 June 1992, the Court of First instance in Nouakchott gave a verdict 
annulling the marriage for the following reasons: the marriage was secret 
and therefore not valid Islamically; the two spouses willingly concealed the 
marriage from the father, legal guardian (walC ) of the woman. The act of 
marriage itself presents procedural problems: the marriage was performed by 
an unknown person who did not declare his identity, it is devoid of customary 
formulas, the witnesses were not cited, and so forth. The Court of First Instance 
insisted thus that it is not because a Muslim woman is divorced that she can 
do without a guardian; rather, on the contrary to what is believed, Malik 
Ibn Anas never permitted that (Ould Ahmed Salem 2003: 47).
Following the judgement of annulment, the spouses immediately appealed 
and the case was sent to the ‘chambre civile’ of the Court of Appeal of Nouakchott, 
33 The connection between maintaining the family as the only unit with the right to sexual 
reproduction and licit sexual relations – and the principle of crimes against persons com-
mitted in acts of adultery (zinA) in Islamic penal law (MudEd, quite literally meaning 
limits or boundaries), is quite interesting. For more on ZinA, see Islamic Penal Code of Iran 
(1986), 39 – 47; The Offence of ZinA (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; and Butti 
Sultan Butti Ali Muhairi (1996).
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which decided the case a little less than a month later on 7 July 1992. The 
appeal was heard just one year after the adoption of the new pluralist and 
Islamic Constitution (12 July 1991) and only six months after the first 
pluralist elections in the country on 24 January 1992. The couple was 
defended by two lawyers, one of whom, Mohammad Chein was not picked 
by chance. Mr Chein, belonging to a family of entertainers (griots), was also 
President of the Bar of the Association of Mauritanian lawyers. The father 
was represented by three lawyers, amongst whom was Mr Ichidou, a former 
political militant well known for his liberal positions and his engagements 
in favour of human rights. The arguments of his plea, however, suspend 
his personal engagements for the benefit of his client and for a particular 
conception of personal status in Islamic law as it is applied in Mauritania.
Before the Civil Court, Mr Chein, the lawyer for the two spouses under-
scored the regularity of the marriage and the validity of the act without 
separating the Islamic juridical repertory from his defence. He emphasised 
that his client properly contracted the marriage in a mosque and not in a 
‘nightclub’. Then he cited Khalil: ‘If the father persists in his refusal to marry 
his daughter, she can separate from him in the marriage procedure’.34 Mr Chein 
then referred to texts that interpret kafA ”a in the sense of a ‘democratisation’ 
of matrimonial relations. According to him, kafA ”a or matrimonial equivalence 
does not concern caste or social status but only the religious quality of being 
a Muslim. Finally he invoked the Constitution of July 1991 (Article 1, line 
2) that declares: ‘The Republic guarantees all Mauritanians equality before 
the law and does not distinguish between origin, race, sex or social class’.35
The lawyers for the father, for their part, invoked the importance of the 
legal guardian (walC) and cited a number of hadiths as well as elements of 
the sCra (life of the Prophet Muhammad), which insist on the point of 
equivalence (kafA ”a) without which the marriage is not valid. Mr Ichiddou, 
in particular, affirmed the lack of application and validity of the Constitution, 
which according to him was not a divine law in this particular case. He argued 
that the laws of the shari“a and positive laws in usage have far more substantive 
import in the law of personal status. He then cited texts taken from the 
Khalilian tradition to support his argument. Finally, he added that the only 
witnesses of the act of marriage – which itself presented a number of procedural 
inadequacies – were (Zounouj) ‘Noirs’, that their identification was insufficient, 
that the woman was barely 21 years old when she married Y for the first 
time and that she was consequently influenced and constrained (mujbara).
34 Ould Ahmed Salem (2003), 48: citing Khalil: ‘If the father persists in his refusal to marry 
a daughter, she may dismiss him from the marriage procedure. (Si le pére persiste dans son 
refus de marier une fille elle peut l’écarter de la procedure du marriage.)’.
35 1991 Constitution of Mauritania: ‘TaLmanu al-jumhEriyyatu li-kAffati al-muwASinCn 
al-musAwAata amAma al-qAnEni dEna tamyCzin fC-l-aRli wa-l-i“rqi wa-l-jinsi wa-l-makAnati 
al-ijtimA“iyyati.’
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The Court of Appeal rendered the following decision:
Considering that the parties are in agreement on the fact that there was 
an act of marriage, even if one of them wants to annul it; considering 
that the act of marriage was accomplished by the most simple form as 
stipulated by Khalil and the fact of the saying of the Prophet: “Three 
things will be taken seriously even if meant in jest: marriage, divorce and the 
freeing of a slave”; considering that the spouses went to the mosque to be 
married, giving thus the illuminating proof of their good faith and of 
their desire to avoid committing religious crimes [.  .  .]; considering that 
the brevity of the formula is not a sufficient motive for the annulment 
of the marriage, but rather, on the contrary, if we refer to Khalil and the 
interpretation given by El-Hattab [.  .  .]; considering that the marriage 
cannot have taken place in secret since, on the one hand, it was concluded 
in a mosque and, on the other, nothing indicates that the act intimated 
to the witnesses to keep it a secret; considering that the young woman, 
whether non-noble or noble, can in both cases dispense with a guardian. 
If she is considered non-noble, her guardian is not constrained to decide, 
namely because in this case another Muslim can give her in marriage, 
and, if she is known as ‘noble,’ her guardian cannot be consulted once 
that which Khalil calls ‘ett’oul’ happens, that is to say the fact that a long 
period has passed between the consummation of the marriage and its 
contestation by the father.
Considering the argument advanced by the lawyers of the defense 
according to which Y. Ould N. does not fulfill the conditions of kafA ”a, 
it must be said that Khalil was clear and precise in affirming: ‘KafA ”a is 
religion and status.’ Considering that the majority of commentators of 
Khalil see in the term ‘religion’ the reference to Islam and, in the term 
‘al-MAl’ the reference principally to the state of health that must be 
equivalent in quality to that of the spouse. This is what we can conclude 
from the commentaries of Ibn Bashcr, Ibn Shas and others, and even in 
the case where kafA ”a would not be fulfilled in particular cases, it is 
totally possible to pass it because Khalil expressly said that the guardian 
as well as the woman can exempt it; without even considering that the 
dominant opinion is that the condition of kafA ”a, is that it is religion. 
And this is Islam [.  .  .] and all Muslims are equal on this regard accord-
ing to the Qur’an [.  .  .]. All this, knowing that the observance of the 
conditions of the guardianship and of kafA ”a in marriage assume that the 
guardian is capable of protecting his ward against concupiscence, because 
even a second of loss of strength cannot be tolerated, and that marriage is 
always preferred. Now in this particular case, the father D. Ould T.E., has 
not clearly proven such a capacity since, according to his own declarations, 
he did not have knowledge of the first marriage of his daughter until 
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after she became pregnant; and he did not have knowledge of their second 
marriage until three years after they were married. Now, from two things, 
one: either he knew about the marriage and accepted it, or he did not. 
With this last hypothesis, he neglects his family and does not have the 
capacity to take care of them, in which case we would encourage A (the 
young woman) to live within the confines of marriage. The goal of marriage 
is to lighten the punishment of the final judgment.
Considering that the annulment of the first judgment in favor of the 
annulment of the act of marriage is very defendable from the point of view 
of Maliki texts after the précis of Khalil [.  .  .]; considering that the 
confirmation of a judgment of annulment is not supported by the texts 
and that it cannot result but in acts of loss and debauchery [.  .  .]; for these 
reasons and in reference to the text of Khalil, the Court decides:
1. To admit the appeal against the judgment number 57/92 of the court 
of Tevragh Zeina on June 6, 1992 and the recognition of the validity 
of the marriage between A. Mint T.E. and Y. Ould N.
2. Refusal of the demand of the D. Ould T.E. to maintain the first 
decision of the annulment of the marriage.36
Case 2: A private reading of kaf10a
The second case epitomises the perspective of partisans of a racial and tribal 
notion of kafA ”a as it is revealed in the judicial arena through a private 
fatwA.
This case was set in motion in 1996 when two young people, a brother 
and a sister, joined a religious revival movement (al-JamA“at al-da“wa wa-l-
tabligh also known as the Tablighis) which had been spreading widely in 
Mauritania for several years. One of the ancestors of the brother and the 
sister was an exceptionally prestigious religious figure, Sheikh Mohammad 
El-kafedh (from the eminent marabout tribe, Idawali, belonging to the class 
of the ‘people of the book’), who is known for introducing the Tijaniyya 
brotherhood in Mauritania and West Africa. At the JamAt al-dawa wa-tabligh 
meetings, the brother and sister met a young man, a descendent of a slave 
(MaratCn: quite literally, freed man or second freedom, i.e., from Murr thannC ), 
and began a friendship with him. Later the brother, legitimate legal guardian 
of his sister, married her to the young ‘haratin’ man. Upon hearing news of 
the marriage, the collateral cousins of the siblings attempted to file a case 
before a court of first instance in order to have the marriage annulled. The 
cousins claimed that the marriage should be annulled for the social non-parity 
36 See Ould Ahmed Salem (2003), 48; ‘[D]ans trois choses, la plaisanterie est sérieuse: le mariage, 
le divorce et l’affranchissement de l’esclave.’
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(kafA ”a) between the young woman and her husband who was a descendant of 
slaves.
Despite the efforts of the members of the tribe to have the marriage 
annulled in state court, they did not succeed in bringing the case before the 
court. They then decided collectively to compose a fatwA that would shift 
the dispute from the scene of the state judiciary to the private sphere. An 
impressive assembly of illustrious jurists ( fuqahA”) of the tribe composed a 
42-page document that treated in detail the pertinence of their recourse to 
annulment. Produced before judicial and political authorities, this ‘über-fatwA’ 
put forward three main arguments that showed how kafA ”a could be inter-
preted in contradictory ways.
The first argument centred around the importance of the co-extensiveness 
of local custom and convention (“urf ) in the practice and understanding of 
Islamic law. According to this line of thought, while the court’s rejection of the 
demand to annul the marriage rested on the fact that the Prophet Moham-
mad married one of his cousins to a former slave (Zayd ibn al-Haritha), this 
marriage between a noble woman and a man descended from slaves was not 
jurisprudentially legitimate since fiqh in general, and kafA ”a in particular 
cannot be abstracted from tradition and customs according to time and place. 
In Mauritania, the fatwA argues, the practice of marriage between a descendent 
of slaves and a girl descending from a noble, illustrious person is not known 
or admitted by local customary practice (“urf  ).
The second argument used by the opponents of the marriage in the fatwA 
focused on the definition of kafA ”a in terms of religion and status or situation 
of the person (al-MAl ). The fatwA proclaims that the religious movement of 
the Tablighis, where the two young people met, constitutes a blameable 
innovation (bid “a) and that it is closer to a sect than to the religion of Islam 
as it is practised in Mauritania, according to the admitted Maliki doctrine. 
Therefore, the condition of ‘religion’ as a measure of kafA ”a is not met.
Moreover, the fatwA claims, the ‘MAl’ of the young man does not make him a 
suitable marriage partner for the woman since, according to the fatwA, MAl indi-
cates four things: genealogy, occupation, material riches, and the qualities of a 
prestigious family. Concerning the family of the young man, it argues, it is 
evident that the family is not very prestigious because the young man’s ancestors 
were reduced to slavery. According to this, his genealogy is ‘polluted or con-
taminated by a subordinatio’. On all these levels the spouse must have at minimum 
the same status and condition as his wife in order to be her pair or equal. The 
young man, furthermore, is poorer than the young woman that he married 
since the extended family to which the young woman belongs is wealthy.
The fatwA dwells on ‘the interest of the claimants in the cause’, that is, 
the interest of the tribe of the young woman in taking up a judicial measure 
to annul the marriage on grounds of kafA ”a. The arguments taken from 
Islamic jurisprudence and from a particular conception of kafA ”a are as 
follows: it is not the woman that determines the kafA ”a of her future husband, 
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but all those who might carry the prejudice of a disreputable alliance at the 
level of social shame that would affect all the adult male members of the 
tribe. For this reason, the guardianship of the woman is given to them, and this 
justifies their interest in the cause of annulling an improper marriage that is 
devoid of the sine qua non condition of Muslim marriage, which is kafA ”a.
Despite their effort to popularise the cause and build a case based on these 
particular interpretations of kafA ”a, the cousins did not obtain a matter of 
cause before the court. It seems important to note, however, that the state 
court did not reject the case due to a lack of justiciability of kafA ”a (i.e., 
reject the case because the court does not recognise kafA ”a as a valid cause of 
action) or due to its finding lack of kafA ”a between the marital partners, but 
did so rather because they would not establish race or ethnicity as a criterion 
governing the determination of kafA ”a. The court’s decision not to hear the 
case does not invalidate the doctrine of kafA ”a as a socio-legal norm, but 
rather calls into question the specific interpretation of kafA ”a set forth by the 
would-be plaintiffs. In refusing to grant jurisdiction for the want of lack of 
equality, it upholds equality as a value in determining marriage alliances. I 
will return to this issue shortly. The epilogue of this case happened in the 
private legal realm, outside the judicial system. Refused by the courts, the 
cousins of the young woman, after having exhausted all means and using all 
political pressures at their disposition, finally proposed a ‘friendly arrange-
ment’ to the young man: they offered him a modest sum of 1,400,000 
Ouguiyas, (about $5,500) to divorce his wife and restore their honor (Ould 
Ahmed Salem 2003: 50 –1).
III. What is kaf10a?; contextualising kaf10a in 
postcolonial Mauritania
European Enlightenment accounts of law’s origin figure the people qua nation 
as both source and telos, subject and object, of the law. Through their general-
yet-particularly located will, the people harness a universal, self-constituting 
and auto-generative force that founds the law. Modern jurisprudence of positive 
law, while shifting the focus from the people towards official technologies of 
propositional codes and constitutions, continues a tradition of thinking the 
law’s origin according to the principle of self-constitution and self-generation, 
assuming that there is no law prior to positive law, and that the law always 
has a moment that founds it and to which future moments must return for 
legitimation and justification.37
37 It has been argued that postmodern critiques of both Enlightenment thought (i.e., Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, Hobbes) and modern legal positivism (i.e., Kelsen, Austin, H.L.A. Hart) 
incorporate the very religious and metaphysical assumptions that they were hoping to 
overcome. See Carter (1990).
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One paradox of such foundationalist narratives is that despite this general 
self-constituting, self-legitimating and universalising condition, law has to 
be particularly founded so as to be determined and determining in specific 
places at specific times. It has to issue from a bound place, and yet not be 
bound by it, remaining intensely particular and uninhibitedly universal. The 
place of the people, the law and their codes since the Treaty of Westphalia, 
has predominantly, though certainly not exclusively, been the territorial nation. 
In an age of rights, codes and constitutions, law has extended its reach most 
intensely and most frequently in, over and through the nation. The particu-
larities of a nation elevated to the status of the universal form the content 
of its law. Reciprocally, law continuously forms the nation, linking and 
mediating between its universal and particular dimensions, between its claims 
to inclusiveness and its force of exclusion.
Literature on law and the modern nation reveals a sweeping spectrum 
of values, concepts and prognostications concerning the possible or impos-
sible unfolding and overcoming of the universal-particular, territorialised-
deterritorialised and civilised-barbaric dynamics that separately and jointly 
constitute law and nation. For example, E.J. Hobsbawm famously prophesied 
the impossibility of the nation and nationalisms, as they remain persistently 
linked to the very particularities that are repeatedly unable to form them 
absolutely (Hobsbawm 1992). Others like Benedict Anderson, assert that the 
end of the era of the universalising force of the imagined community of the 
nation, whether constituted by or in opposition to particularly or ethnically 
founded myths, is ‘not remotely in sight’ (Anderson 1991: 3). While it is 
not within the scope of this essay to canvass the historical or philosophical 
trajectories of the literature on the nation and nationalism, the remaining 
discussion connects the role of Islamic law in the postcolonial Mauritanian con-
text to the persistent issues (universal-particular, territorialised-deterritorialised 
and civilised-barbaric) raised in debates about the nation. The problem of 
the relation between Mauritania as a nation and kafA ”a as a doctrine and 
practice of personal status law centres on the problem of ‘particular univer-
sals’. It is a relationship of complementarity in which Mauritania and kafA ”a 
mutually compensate for their intrinsic inadequacies – that is, the intrinsic 
inadequacies of the particular universals that effectively define and sustain 
both. This leads to the question of the relation between personal status law 
and the nation-state, each remaining unresolved without the other, their 
duality being mutually dependent. How, in other words, is the irresolution 
of Mauritania’s identity as a multi-ethnic nation overcome or resolved by 
kafA ”a, and the irresolution of kafA ”a’s identity as a doctrine and practice of 
matrimonial equality overcome or resolved by Mauritania? And is their 
mutual resolution ever absolute? Does it, for example, take on a pure form, 
like that of the state?
Personal status law holds a considerable place in Mauritania and touches 
on the fundamental question of the nation (la question nationale), which was 
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first posed after independence as a question of how to Mauritanianise the law 
(Mauritanisation de la justice) (Mohamed Yahya O. Abdelwedoud 2001: 141–54) 
– that is, how to unify the disparate elements of the postcolonial nation. The 
national question became critically transparent in the 1989 pogroms, when 
non-Maure Mauritanian nationals (i.e., Halpulaar/Toukalour, Wolof, Soninké, 
Fulbe, Bambara) were expelled from Mauritania into Senegal. The Mauritanian 
government, dominated by Arab Maure nomadic elites complied with the 
violence, expulsion and dispossession of its own citizens based on ethnicity. 
While Mauritanian authorities asserted that those expelled were not Mauritanian 
citizens, the refugees themselves, together with international humanitarian 
organisations charged the Mauritanian government with ethnic cleansing by 
forced migration: the government deliberately manufactured refugees in order 
both to purge Mauritania of its non-Maure population, and expropriate the 
property and land they left behind.38
This violence, reflective of exclusionary (ethnocentrist) state practices, deeply 
traumatised Mauritania and in turn, made ethnicity and personal status into 
the question-problem of law and the nation. Personal status in Mauritania 
crystallises around questions of equality and value, the relations between 
different ethnic and social groups, as well as the relations of inequality, 
difference and exploitation at the heart of identity groups.
The 1991 Constitution, following the aftermath of the 1989 Mauritania–
Senegal events, introduced an article declaring that no citizen will be dis-
criminated against based on race or ethnicity. The two cases above reveal 
that this constitutional-democratic principle of the equality of all citizens 
challenges the principle of equality of the doctrine of kafA ”a. It was of course 
Aristotle (d. 322 B.C.) who pointed out in Book Five of his Politics, that 
while democratic justice in Athens implies equality, it is not for everybody, 
only for those who are equal (Aristotle, and McKeon 1941: 1233). Equality 
of marital partners thus has a very different meaning if equality is originarily 
exclusive, based on the idea of intrinsic and insuperable inequalities. More-
over, without governing criteria that determines the interpretation and limits 
of equality, kafA ”a has very little meaning. How is kafA ”a in particular, and 
democratic equality more generally, both a challenge to and an instance of 
discrimination? How does and can a doctrine of equality determine what is 
equal without falling into inconsistency or without looking outside itself for 
its meaning? What then is the function of kafA ”a?
In the Mauritanian context, the interpretations of kafA ”a operate according 
to at least two measures of equality, both of which reveal Islamic law as a 
38 Marion Fresia work offers an excellent ethnographic account of the Mauritanian refugees 
on the Senegalese River Bank: Fresia (2009); Park, Baro and Ngaido (1991), 2; Fleischman 
(1994), 13–16; Doyle (1989), 14; and BBC News, ‘Mauritania’s Victims of the Race 
Divide’ (2001).
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means of contesting and producing the identity of the nation. In the two 
cases above, Islamic law, rather than providing a universal warrant for a unified 
national law, signifies cultural capital representing particular interests striving 
to control productive resources and maintain relations of social hierarchy. 
The strife involved within the nation to determine its identity plays out as 
a theatre of interpretations of the law. At least two measures of equality are 
at work in the two cases: on the one hand, a formal measure based on an 
abstract universal notion of the citizen and member of the nation-state, as 
the legal subject who bears rights; and on the other hand, a formal measure 
based on the abstract notion of a particular subject, of a subject granted 
rights based on his or her place in a rigidly demarcated social hierarchy – as 
a member of a tribe or caste.
The two cases show both the enveloping and the limiting function of 
kafA ”a, while reflecting and producing the contending fantasies of what the 
nation is, or what the nation should be according to the conflicting visions 
of the jurists, guardians and marital partners who represent the state, his-
torically nomadic elites and marginalised minorities, respectively. KafA ”a in 
the fatwA of the inter-ethnic case is a limit classification that sanctions the 
destruction of the matrimony of non-equals. Cruel and exclusionary, the 
measure of matrimonial equivalence is a technique to reproduce normatively 
the social hierarchy as a barrier that maintains cultural and material capital 
in the hands of distinct elite groups. Aiming to arrest the potential flux of 
the identity of the non-Maure post-colonial subject, the kafA ”a of the fatwA 
presupposes equality as the measure of diversity according to the degree 
of distance from or proximity to a principle of identity (i.e., as difference 
between self and other), emphasising difference as monstrosity (‘free from 
vulgar deficiencies’), evil (the blameable innovation of the Tablighis), danger 
(‘contaminated or polluted’) or error. In the fatwA, kafA ”a becomes a classifi-
cation that internalises the frontiers of the national space at the heart of that 
space itself, thus making possible the modern notion of the ‘internal enemy’, 
the non-parity of Mauritanian nationals, and the expulsion of citizens based 
on ethnicity. The fatwA of the inter-ethnic case seeks the coherence of the 
nation through the production of an internal alterity in which the nation 
forms its identity through the exclusion of that which remains integral to 
it (viz., the non-Maure Mauritanian citizen). It gives a private reading of 
Islamic law and kafA ”a, based on the repetition of customary matrimonial 
practices and of a past prior to the law, and it presents a particular and 
fixed legal subject petrified both by categories of social identity and by the 
model of the family and tribe as an extended patrilineage based on agnatic 
kinship ties.
KafA ”a as a measure of belief, on the other hand, as presented by the Court 
of Appeal, has an enveloping function, a power and a safety, which unifies the 
not-equal (caste) in the equal (national), leaping over and confounding the 
barriers between properties as unmediated diversity (or as difference within a 
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commonality): the Court of Appeal states, apropos of religion: ‘[A]ll Muslims 
are equal on this regard according to the Qur’an.’ This is the image of equality 
issuing from the inter-caste case – an image that emerges from the perspec-
tive of the state – that gives a public reading of Islamic law and kafA ”a, and 
presents a universal legal subject based on the idea of the equality of citizens. 
Since both cases attempt to transform the idea of the nation-state by relying 
on the sources of the Maliki doctrine of Islamic law, we cannot look to the 
latter to explain the difference in the two cases, but must rather inquire 
further into the public and private spaces of Mauritania.
What I will try to do now, then, is to show how Mauritania as a nation 
provides a ground, a location for kafA ”a as a doctrine and practice of Islamic 
law. Then, I will reverse the perspective, and show how kafA ”a as an instance 
of Islamic law locates Mauritania as a nation.
A. Mauritania as a condition of kaf10a: national identity  
as the essence of law
Mauritania’s identity as a nation is not violated by its relation to kafA ”a since 
the nation appropriates kafA ”a as an instance of self-affirmation, both in its 
private and public readings which attempt to identify particular fantasies of 
nation with society itself. A desire to represent one form of belonging to the 
exclusion of all others animates the readings of kafA ”a and the relationship 
between the various kinds of equalities and belongings (ethnic, gendered, 
familial, linguistic, national) affirm and constitute Mauritania as a nation. It is 
precisely the inclusion of the various belongings and equalities that give law its 
particular Mauritanian content. Paradoxically, the completeness of Mauritania 
as a nation contains its own relatedness to law.39 Given the ethnic, social and 
political histories and the co-existence of multiple origins of Mauritania, 
equality is the accommodating condition of the nation’s self-affirmation.
The story of the conflicting interpretations of kafA ”a here is integral to 
that of the modern nation of Mauritania. In its identification with local his-
tory, practices and myths – with genealogy, birth, death and memory – it 
acquires location in a rigidly demarcated national territory, which it clings 
to as its epitome. While nomadic elites in Mauritania have a biological 
conception of history, a cyclical notion of time and a tribal concept of territory 
– such that the nation, far from representing a monolithic space, is associated 
with necessary solidarities and reciprocities in the harsh environment of the 
Sahara (Marchesin 1992: 26 –30) – the nation-state that incorporates them 
conceives of history and territory, including the space beyond the Sahara and 
the incorporation of the Senegal River valley, as the founding of a new time 
39 For a discussion of how the nation and other communities can be defined through the 
political nature of resistance against immanent power, see Nancy (1991), 4.
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and space that leaps over the tribal territories and biological boundaries and 
homogenises them.
Thus, while kafA ”a may seem to issue from time immemorial, from custom, 
historical traditions and founding myths before the law (as I suggested in 
part I), it also issues from a national time, a time simultaneous to the nascere 
of the nation. Its origins may be chronologically and geographically distant 
from contemporary law but that distance can only be perceived from the 
national post-colonial space. Thus, kafA ”a is about repeating origins that 
predate Islamic law, but which establish Islamic law as the appropriate 
emblem with which to characterise the specifically Mauritanian quality and 
originality of kafA ”a. Equality becomes pre-originary, not only in its capacity 
to index a pre- or extra-Islamic moment, but in its power as a first cause – a 
founding power that establishes Islamic law as the terms by which the nation 
defines equality, and thus defines itself. It attempts to found two different 
measures of equality by presupposing a pre-existing inequality in the interethnic 
case, and a productive equality in the inter-caste case, both of which spring, 
generate and enfold their own origins.
B. Kaf10a as a condition of Mauritania: law as the essence  
of national identity
What first stands out in the comparative account of the two cases I offer is 
the absolute disagreement about the meaning of kafA ”a between the Court 
of Appeal in the first case and the fuqahA” in the second. While for the Court, 
individual status concerns a discourse on the equality of citizens, for the 
fuqahA” it refers to an ‘anarchy of minor differences’: genealogy (family, ethnicity 
and rootedness), and the level of belonging within a certain class, understood 
either as a social hierarchy (tribe, caste, historical relationship to freedom–
dependant, protected, profession), or as a degree of authenticity and purity.
The Court of Appeal says that kafA ”a is religion and status, where status 
means good health. The first principle observed by the Court of Appeal is 
that marriage is a legal relation that cannot be submitted to social factors 
such as social caste, or an institution based on oppressive classifications and 
exclusionary practices. The state no longer validates the power of the kin 
group or the power of the patrilineage over individual choice. Equality for 
the court is based on an abstract universal religious identity (Muslim) and 
an abstract biological normativity (health, ‘free from vulgar deficiencies’), 
which is granted to the citizen, an abstract juridico-political subject limited 
only by a territorial concept of political sovereignty. Where kafA ”a stipulates 
religion uniquely in terms of Islam and status in terms of health, all healthy 
Muslim male Mauritanians are abstractly equal as marriageable subjects 
before the law. The court interprets kafA ”a as a measure of difference occur-
ring after the founding of the Republic and law – so that the terms of legal 
equality must be integral to the state as an Islamic Republic. If the state is 
9780415566810_C06.indd   157 5/16/11   3:27:19 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
FS
158 Islam, law and identity
constituted by religion – as proclaimed by the 1991 Constitution40 – it is 
the abstract quality of religiosity that is constitutive of the citizen, the legal 
subject, before the law. Interpreting kafA ”a for the court is a method for 
measuring the present in reference to a past historical situation that is 
coextensive with the founding of the law of the nation-state. Equality before 
the law is therefore measured in relation to the founding of an imaginary 
ideal future of a homogeneous nation governed by central rule, insofar as 
that founding is conceived as a radical break with the temporalities, practices 
and political logics of the past.
KafA ”a for the Court of Appeal thus attempts to constitute Mauritanian 
society, in its aggregation of society’s disparate elements by incorporating a 
religiously derived universalism with the particularity of the territorial 
assertion of a centralising government; but kafA ”a does so by also transcending 
the diverse and particular within the territory. The kafA ”a of the court attempts 
to occupy and homogenise the space of the nation through a juridical apparatus 
that must deliver to the Mauritanian citizen a deracinated, universal subject 
and a law orienting itself towards the universal. The simultaneity of the two 
understandings of kafA ”a unfolds in the state’s struggle to deracinate the 
doctrine from its tribal roots, which emphasise the particular, the racinated, 
the heterogeneous, the ‘blood and soil’. As I will elaborate in just a moment, 
it is this impossible oscillation between an assumption of the universal and 
an emphasis on the particular that is the very tension between nation and 
state, which kafA ”a attempts to mediate.
In the second case, the Tablighi case, the principle observed by the fuqahA” 
is that marriage is a legal relation that can be submitted to specific social 
factors such as ethnicity and caste. KafA ”a means religion in terms of an 
orthodox understanding of the discourses and practices of the Maliki doctrine, 
and status in terms of ‘genealogy, occupation, material riches, and the qualities 
of a prestigious family’. The Tablighi husband is not the equivalent of the 
spouse in terms of religion (his interpretation of Islam is inauthentic – a 
‘blameable innovation’ – rendering his status as a Sunni Muslim unorthodox 
and untrue) or status. Born into a family descended from slavery, his blood 
is ‘polluted or contaminated by a subordination’.
The fuqahA” interpret kafA ”a as presupposing a natural or biological inequal-
ity that is prior to legal norms, social institutions, society and the state. The 
norm (kafA ”a) is then instituted a posteriori to measure the a priori equality 
among those who belong to a particular collective identity and the inequality 
of those who do not belong. Belonging is defined by a quasi-biological 
concept of pure blood, where equality is measured by a person’s distance or 
proximity to an ideal origin defined by agnatic blood relations. The young man’s 
blood is condemned, ‘polluted’ or ‘contaminated’, by a historical oppression. 
40 ‘Islam is the religion of the State and the people’. See 1991 Mauritanian Constitution.
9780415566810_C06.indd   158 5/16/11   3:27:19 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
State of equalities 159
Social identity through the body becomes a sign that bears the mark of its 
origin. Both try to ontologise socially determined conditions of the body 
(what constitutes health, racial or class purity, etc.) as abstract equivalences 
to be read or measured before the law. In this way, the Mauritanian fuqahA” 
seem to be engaging in what Mary Douglas calls pollution behaviour, ‘which 
condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished clas-
sifications’ (Douglas 2006: 45), posing a constant danger to the power of the 
kin group.
In this way, kafA ”a reconstructs the status of the man in his reproductive 
capacity as a marriage partner such that his sexuality is a performance 
of social relations. The danger of mixing blood is related to his status, a 
socio-biological category determined before his birth. KafA ”a for the fuqahA” 
is thus a method for measuring the present in reference to a past historical 
situation that is prior to the law, and which prepared the ground for legal 
life. Indeed, their notion of kafA ”a is a topographic genealogy of the field of 
social relations from which the noble Maure family can measure its relation 
to another geneA (nasab)41 for the marriage at hand. Equality before the law 
is thus measured in relation to an imagined ideal past insofar as that past is 
said to exist before the law.
The disagreement in the two cases on the meaning of religion and status 
(al-MAl) in kafA ”a conceals a deep agreement of the value of founding or of 
origin itself. The distinction between equal and unequal maps on to the 
division between civilisation and barbarism, reason and simulacrum, cosmos 
and chaos. In other words, the question of the origin, or of the founding of 
the measure of equality, is itself one form of the question of ethics. Both 
interpretations, that of the Court of Appeal and that of the jurists of the über 
fatwA agree that, insofar as it is stipulated that a condition of equality must 
be met in order for a marriage to have legal validity and for a legal social 
exchange to occur, the measure of equality is the same: an imagined historical 
situation. In both cases, kafA ”a is claimed to re-enact a historical, contingent 
situation – in one case the founding of the nation, in the other the founding 
of a tribe.
The nation and the tribe, however, operate according to different temp-
oralities. Citizenship and the nation vie here with the contained familial-tribal 
bond and status. Both, however, unify and transcend, and join together 
groupings, marking what is common to them. The equality of castes and 
tribes is isomorphic and prior to the equality of citizens. While the member 
of the tribe and the tribe itself is conceived of over and against the barbarian 
without, while excluding proximates within (women, slaves, occupational groups 
41 The definition of nasab in the Hans Wehr Arabic-English Dictionary is: lineage, descent; 
origin, parentage; genealogy, noble descent; kinship, relationship, affinity; and relationship 
by marriage.
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and so forth), the citizen and the nation are conceived of in opposition to 
the barbarian without, while continually constituting themselves in opposition 
to customary and traditional identities within. What is particular and localised, 
what is difference in rank and status, must give way to a common citizenship 
tied to a territorial sovereign. In both, the claim is reduced to an assertion 
of belonging and commonality as against an idea of a perceived threat or 
danger. But, the particular has its revenge: for while citizens are supposed 
to be related by law, law has an operative common existence within the order 
of the nation. The law constitutes that existence and mediates between the 
citizenry making up the nation. Equality between citizens certainly cancels 
what is particular and makes all subjects formally equal before the law – this 
is often the paradigm of the human par excellence, the paradoxical bearer of 
human rights necessarily tied to a particular soil. However, and here is the 
essential quandary, equality between particulars ultimately institutes and 
reproduces in a strict sense the particular bodies which are read as signs of 
ethnicity, caste, genealogy, class, profession and so forth – bodies that bear 
the mark of the pure or impure blood of their origin.
In the end, the nation’s attempts to produce the general conditions of 
democratic equality reproduce the marks of inequality in equal measure. In 
this light, it is possible to reconsider kafA ”a as an analytic of the socio-
political nature of the power relations that inhere in interpreting the law. 
As an analytic, kafA ”a allows us to see how a discourse and practice of equality 
migrates between and is grasped by the state, as an image of the nation, and 
society. The consequence of this is that the more the state generalises its law 
of equality, the more it forces particular equalities to name the particular 
inequalities it is attempting to resolve. The more Mauritania through the 
force of its state law enacts universal equality, the more it reproduces, sustains, 
and perhaps even embeds in greater measure, the wide-scale inequalities that 
it cannot through any lawful means resolve. This must give us pause to 
wonder whether the law and with it the democratic state are the mechanisms 
by which universal equalities can be achieved.
IV. Conclusion: revitalising kaf10a,  
translating citizenship
By way of a conclusion, I offer a brief analysis of how the encounter between 
kafA ”a and citizenship in the legal arena is mutually transformative. I would 
suggest that the cases at hand illuminate not only how a normative model 
of democratic state law of the equality of citizens revitalises and transforms 
the ‘traditional’ Islamic doctrine of kafA ”a, but also how the model of citizen-
ship is translated and transformed in the process.
This paper has analysed how the liberal democratic model of citizenship, 
expressed by Article 1 and by the ‘right to equality’ in the Constitutional 
Preamble, has been translated in Mauritanian state courts and private legal 
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practices, as well as particularistic resistances (tribal, ethnic and caste based) 
to such translations. It has simultaneously examined particular translations 
of Islam as a source of law. At the heart of this inquiry has been the question 
of the very translatability of the democratic model of universal equality – and 
of Islam – as it is articulated, understood and practised by lawyers and state-
appointed judges in Mauritanian state courts, as well as by non-state private 
Islamic jurists ( fuqahA”).
As we have seen, the 1991 Constitution, following the aftermath of the 
1989 Mauritania–Senegal events, introduced an article guaranteeing all 
Mauritanians equality before the law, declaring that no citizen will be dis-
criminated against based on ‘sex, race, ethnicity or social class (al-makAna 
al-ijtamA“Cya)’ and stating that the law intends to punish all ‘particularistic 
propaganda of racial or ethnic character’ (Art. 1). Relying on secular liberal 
models of democratic citizenship that understand citizenship primarily as a 
legal status denoting a community of shared law in which all members are 
equally protected by the law, the 1991 Constitution explicitly reflects the 
influence of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic in its dedication 
to liberal democratic principles and inalienable human rights. The Constitution 
also proclaims adherence to the principles of the 1789 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1981 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. At the same time, the new 
constitution re-emphasised its commitments to Islam as ‘the religion of the 
people and the state’ (Art. 5) guaranteeing the ‘rights attached to the family 
as the basic unit of the Islamic society’ and declaring for the first time the 
‘precepts of Islam’ as ‘the sole source of law’ (Preamble, al-dCbAja).
Thus, at least two measures of equality are at work in the two cases: on 
the one hand, a formal constitutional measure based on an abstract universal 
notion of the citizen and member of the nation-state, as the legal subject 
who bears rights; and on the other hand, an equally formal customary and 
quasi-Islamic measure based on the abstract notion of a particular subject, 
of a subject granted rights based on his or her place in a rigidly demarcated 
social hierarchy – as a member of a tribe or caste.
While some scholars and legal practitioners have prophesied the disap-
pearance of traditional customary or religious legal forms under the twofold 
pressures of state and transnational law, these cases in Mauritania suggest 
that the normative model of democratic equality paradoxically revitalises 
customary and religious traditions of equality in and outside the official legal 
system. KafA ”a is revitalised in a number of ways, the first of which is through 
the court’s recognition of kafA ”a as a justiciable cause of action. In both cases, 
the Court of First Instance is the plaintiffs’ first venue of choice. By allowing 
kafA ”a as a cause of action, and by ruling on kafA ”a, the judiciary permits 
kafA ”a as a traditionally Islamic legal form to continue not only to have 
social value, but also to gain legal validity within the juridical apparatus of 
state law and its institutions.
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In this light, it seems important to repeat that the state court did not 
reject the Tablighi case due to a lack of justiciability of kafA ”a (i.e., reject 
the case because the court does not recognise kafA ”a as a valid cause of action) 
or due to the lack of matrimonial equivalence between the marital partners, 
but did so rather because they would not establish race or ethnicity as a 
criterion governing the determination of kafA ”a. In other words, in the 
Tablighi case, the court’s decision not to hear the case does not invalidate 
the doctrine of kafA ”a as a legal norm, but rather calls into question the 
specific interpretation of kafA ”a set forth by the would-be plaintiffs. In refusing 
to grant jurisdiction for a case attempting to base matrimonial equivalence 
on racial or ethnic grounds, and by limiting the specific criteria that deter-
mine the validity of kafA ”a to the religious quality of being a Muslim in 
good health, the Court effectively revitalises matrimonial equivalence (kafA ”a) 
as a social value in determining marriage alliances, while transforming the 
specificity of its social significance and the form of its cultural entrenchment 
in order to reflect new national commitments to democratic equality and 
social cohesion.
The second way in which kafA ”a is revitalised is through its translation as 
a democratisation of Islamic equality. In the Appeal of the first case, the 
democratic model of liberal citizenship wherein all citizens are equal before 
the law revitalises and transforms the doctrine of kafA ”a, filling out the spe-
cificity of its national contours while renewing its democratic meaning. When 
the lawyer for the young couple invokes Article 1 of the Constitution declaring 
the equality of all Mauritanians before the law, and argues that kafA ”a means 
a democratisation of matrimonial relations such that ‘matrimonial equivalence 
does not concern caste or social status, but only the religious quality of being 
a Muslim’, he effectively reconfigures kafA ”a through the lens of a new notion 
of Islamic citizenship. The decision of the Court of Appeal revitalizes kafA ”a 
in this light, emphasising the Qur’anic and sharC “a-based nature of its jurispru-
dence. Relying on specific interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence that define 
‘religion’ and ‘status’ in the broadest possible ways, the Court decides that 
the sole conditions of kafA ”a are health and Islam, and that ‘all Muslims are 
equal on this regard according to the Qur’an’. Thus, particular interpretations 
of Islamic law in general and Maliki fiqh in particular are revitalised in the 
name of democracy.
Finally, citizenship itself becomes Mauritanian. The terms of legal equality 
must be integral to the state as an Islamic Republic such that the criteria 
governing the determination of kafA ”a become the equality of all Muslim 
citizens. Where kafA ”a is now a matter of the equality of Muslim citizens, the 
secular liberal model of citizenship is transformed such that religion, and 
specifically Islam, is reinforced as the very criteria governing citizenship. 
Paradoxically, it is the secular model of equality of citizens before the law 
that revitalises and democratises kafA ”a, which reciprocally reconfigures and 
reasserts citizenship according to the religious criterion of being Muslim. 
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When the state is constituted by religion, it is the abstract quality of re-
ligiosity that becomes constitutive of the citizen, the legal subject before the 
law. In this way, the principle of the equality of all believers becomes a tenet 
of Mauritanian citizenship and democracy.
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Chapter 7
Entrepreneurs and morals
Gül Berna Özcan*
We repudiate all morality that is taken outside of human, class concepts 
.  .  .  We say: morality is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting 
society and to unite all the toilers around the proletariat.
 Lenin (1921, USSR leader, communist thinker)
Don’t break anyone’s heart, even if he is an unbeliever
To break the heart of a man is equal to hurting God.
 Yesevi (twelfth-century poet, Sufi philosopher)
Out beyond ideas of wrong-doing and right-doing there is a field. I’ll 
meet you there.
 Rumi (fourteenth-century poet, Sufi philosopher)
I. Introduction
In the twelfth century the Mogul ruler, Akbar, argued that morality can be 
guided by critical reasoning. Akbar stipulated that morality would be above 
religion and beyond faith as part of the human capacity to reason and intel-
ligence. While supporting Akbar’s wisdom, Amartya Sen (2000: 35) went further 
by questioning the sceptical view that the scope of reasoning is limited 
by cultural differences and refuted two common views: that reliance on 
reasoning and morality is a western way of thinking and approaching issues; 
and that people in different cultures may systematically lack basic sympathy 
and respect for one another. Reasoning, Sen argued, plays a crucial role in 
cultivating moral imagination and creating a better world. The relativity 
and cultural disharmony in moral sense is also being challenged by other 
scholars. For example, Wilson (1997) in his substantive work on the moral 
sense illustrated the depth and importance of morality in human action, 
showing its universality and existential role in social encounters. The common 
premise put forward by different scholars is that morality is a formidable 
* PhD reader in International Business and Entrepreneurship, the School of Management, 
Royal Holloway, University of London (g.ozcan@rhul.ac.uk).
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undercurrent in all human actions and shapes the principles and boundaries of 
economic relations, the scope of transactions, and an individual’s deliberation 
about self-worth, justice and virtue. However, accepting the universality of 
moral reasoning does not presuppose a moral uniformity or a preordained pre-
eminence of a singular morality. Norms and values are subject to biological 
and behavioural evolutionary changes (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998). Our 
moral sense, as illustrated by Wilson, has evolutionary, developmental and 
cultural origins. In a recent work, Hallpike (2004) showed that the evolution 
of moral comprehension is an outcome of individuals’ capacity to perceive 
and comprehend moral problems and this is largely acquired through partici-
pation in group life (Hallpike, 2004).1
This chapter examines entrepreneurs’ inner worlds in relation to their 
business activities and moral dispositions within the changing contours of 
faith and values. Moral harmony is an invisible yet a formidable part of 
market and state building. Similarly, a moral void, confusion and polarisation 
bring societal upheavals and conflicts. We draw our examples from newly 
independent states of Central Asia where there has been a massive shift from 
Soviet to capitalist relations during the past two decades. The emergence of 
new markets and entrepreneurial classes brought about massive changes to 
the region. However, the transition from the vassal Soviet satellite statehood 
to independent nation states proved to be much harder than anticipated by 
all parties, local and international actors alike. The state building process 
not only requires national identity formation and power consolidation but 
also societal moral harmony. In order to forge this, as the past experience of 
modern western nation states illustrate, the state uses its coercive power to 
eliminate opposing groups and impose uniform moral harmony and unity in 
many realms of life (language, religion, identity, etc.). The state has been 
subject to new pressures in recent years. In particular, the need for moral 
harmony in nation building and in reinforcing the legitimacy of central 
power has become the central concern for the emerging states of post-Soviet 
Central Asia.
Central Asian entrepreneurs face profound anxieties that mainly stem from 
three sources: extreme information asymmetries, weak legal regimes, and 
highly erratic institutions. They also face moral dilemmas about wealth 
accumulation within impoverished post-Soviet countries that have no strong 
social references for legitimating business success. Property rights remain 
blurred, formal contracts matter little, and the market is manipulated by 
powerful political elites. Racketeering and violence exercised by self-governing 
syndicates deepen the penetration of disguised interest groups in the market. 
1 C.R. Hallpike in his book, The Evolution of Moral Understanding, identifies the lack of con-
sensus about the nature of morality among contemporary philosophers and puts forward a 
strong case in support of evolution of moral comprehension. He develops four fundamental 
non-reductive aspects of morals (utility, the social order, virtue and human status).
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In the face of these pressures, entrepreneurs search widely for moral references 
that might justify their actions, protect their positions and legitimate their 
pursuit of profit seeking.
Looking at entrepreneurs’ worlds through a prism of morality leads to 
many interesting and challenging questions. As the three quotes at the 
beginning of this section suggest, Central Asia, once the home of a tolerant 
pragmatic Sufi tradition and the hub of the Silk Road trade, became a decaying 
backwater in the Middle Ages with little economic growth and innovation. 
Both Russian colonial expansion throughout eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and subsequent Soviet power consolidation in the region imposed 
by non-titular groups, that is, Russians and European settlers, brought deep 
societal changes such as cultural Russification, modernisation and collectiv-
isation. There are shades of the long waves of cultural and ideological trans-
formations in today’s moral understanding and culture; sometimes exerting 
itself through overlapping coexistence or disruptive changes. The influences 
of Shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam have different effects and 
shades in the daily lives of Central Asians. They are often disguised and mixed 
with the influences from two centuries of Imperial Russian modernisation 
followed by Marxist scientific determinism, intensified Russification and 
collectivisation. The historical disruption and societal turmoil brought by 
colonisation and later Soviet social engineering not only created confusion 
over moral standards but also led to deep changes to an individual’s moral 
standing vis-à-vis the state and society. This process on the one hand dissolved 
prevailing societal structures through spatial displacement and re-distribution 
of wealth, and on the other hand enforced new group identities and encour-
aged the transformation of clan relations.
In this essay, I aim to illustrate the importance of morality in entrepreneurs’ 
lives by looking at the formative lines of massive ideological waves of faith 
and world views. By using a combined method of empirical observation and 
secondary literature review, that is, relevant scholarly work as well as litera-
ture, poetry, and dictums, I develop a proxy setting to examine the moral 
positioning among entrepreneurs in three analytical categories: the core 
morality of doing business, understandings of the virtue of duty, and ideas 
of justice and the greater good. This analysis is built on the contours of each 
ideological wave and its ethical world with moral proxies rather than claim-
ing its exact shape of moral standing. There are naturally many overlaps and 
heterodox moral positions in each sub-set defined here; as it is hard to argue 
that moral purity or homogeneity even under a dominant ideology, regime 
rule or single time period. However, for the simplicity of abstraction, I will 
identify domineering moral positions today and their corresponding entre-
preneurial dimension in this examination.
Based on new empirical studies with male entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the chapter examines the variety of moral posi-
tions entrepreneurs take in handling their everyday businesses. In analysing 
9780415566810_C07.indd   169 5/16/11   3:27:30 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
170 Islam, law and identity
this evidence we point out three major patterns of moral disposition set in 
waves of faith, ideology and world views. These are Soviet rationality, Sufism, 
and utopian Islam. This paper presents the nature of these moral positions 
in relation to the ethics of running business. Three categories are used as 
proxies for exploring the essence of morality and business: a core morality 
of doing business, the virtue of duty for businessmen, and the quest for 
justice and a greater good.
A. Morality, markets and entrepreneurs
There is an idealised, benign notion of free markets in liberal economic 
theory that focuses on the self-interested individual and on liberty. For 
example, in Morals by Agreement, Gauthier (1986) suggests that a perfectly 
competitive market is a morally free zone, an arena of social life in which 
moral evaluation has no role to play. The fundamental notions of liberty, 
impartiality and optimality of perfectly competitive markets form the basis 
of a morality-free zone. Similarly, Milton Freedman emphasised that markets 
promoted freedom in two ways: (1) in market systems participation in eco-
nomic actions is itself an exercise of freedom, and (2) markets guarantee a 
separation of powers that is necessary for political freedom. Political freedom 
is threatened if those who direct the coercive apparatus of the state gain 
control of the means of livelihood as well. These analysts recognised grave 
dangers when a single group monopolises the two main sources of social 
power. Where markets accomplish the economic tasks of allocation and dis-
tribution without relying on a centralised bureaucracy they prevent such 
concentration of power (McMahon, 1981: 273).
Other scholars put forward convincing arguments against the rather abstract 
view of the market as a morally free zone. These studies emphasise that markets 
are not amoral and value-neutral spheres and that morality should be seen as 
an integral part of human action and transactions in the market (McMahon, 
1981; Kuran, 1998; Sen, 1985; Wilson, 1993; Zak, 2008). Hausman (1989) 
argued that not just the intentions of individuals but the outcomes of perfectly 
competitive markets would be subject to moral criticism and assessment.
In one of the earliest such studies, Barnard (1938) argued that business 
frequently presents situations in which owners and managers must violate 
their personal moral codes. From this perspective Barnard proposed a dis-
tinction between public and private morality. In a popular work, Albert Carr 
(1968) argued that ‘bluffing’ is a part of doing business; questioning the 
need, or even the notions, of honesty and integrity for business. Carr’s argu-
ment is not only interesting in that it offers a sense of moral compartmen-
talisation but it also sheds some light on entrepreneurial motivation and risk 
taking. Bluffing, imagination and opportunism go hand-in-hand with entre-
preneurial initiative and rent seeking, but not utter frankness or the search 
for certainty. In defending himself against the criticism that he is condoning 
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unethical behaviour, Carr insisted that an executive who acts according to 
prevailing business practices is guilty of nothing more than conformity; he 
is merely playing the game according to the rules (Carr, 1968).
There is a common belief that business is inherently problematic from the 
moral point of view. One position, exemplified by McMahon (1981), is that 
the morals of doing business might as well be different from all other ethical 
ideals of civilised relationships. From time immemorial, there has been wide-
spread scepticism about the moral climate of business and the moral character 
of business people in different theological contexts and cultures. Even just the 
notion of wealth accumulation by a small number of people, not to mention the 
numerous scandals, abuses and unlawful practices, has always drawn attention 
to immorality or the unjust character of business owners in contrast to wage 
earners, peasants and small property holders. At the time of a deep financial 
crisis, precipitated through miscalculation, fraud and greed, these views 
resonate even more strongly than a decade ago. Until recently, liberal eco-
nomics looked invincible while its rival, the Socialist command economies, 
all crumbled throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. The recovery is expected 
to come from new entrepreneurs, morally sound, innovative and hardworking 
types.
Behavioural economics offers a promising tool to analyse morality in entre-
preneurship. Timur Kuran’s work is illuminating in many ways. According 
to Kuran (1998: 242) we have inherited a moral capacity, and the values that 
form our moral systems are rooted partly in our biological evolution and 
partly in social processes exhibiting inertia. One can identify values which 
form clusters called moral systems or moralities. This can be interpersonal 
or intrapersonal. Interpersonal values consist of the judgements we make 
about the preferences of others and it is them that produce moral conflict. 
Intrapersonal values encompass the judgements we make about our own 
preferences. The state of having values which cannot be satisfied within the 
prevailing physical and financial constraints may be called moral overload. 
This condition generates moral dissonance, psychological discomfort stemming 
from the feeling that one’s personal values remain unfulfilled or compromised 
beyond desirable levels (Kuran, 1998: 232). One can claim that entrepreneurs, 
as individuals but more importantly as economic actors who deal with the 
allocation of scarce resources to maximise their gains in everyday life, en-
counter more intensive moral dilemmas than others. This may be especially 
the case in the post-Soviet context.
We can see a two-dimensional moral axis for entrepreneurs. The first one 
represents inner judgements and moral convictions, with pure altruism at 
one end of the axis and entirely self-regarding motives at the other end. 
Entrepreneurs live in constant conflict between these two positions. The 
second dimension represents the relationship between inner judgement and 
action. At the one end of this continuum are actions that accord with moral 
ideas; at the other extreme are deceit, dissembling and dishonesty. The problem 
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for entrepreneurs is that they often have to act opportunistically and disguise 
their real motives and intentions. Information asymmetries provide specific 
advantages and privileges that can enable the ‘squeezing out’ of competitors. 
Entrepreneurs often hide their business intentions for speculative purposes 
or to protect their gains. Other practices that verge on the dishonest can be 
imitating the products or ideas of others without considering that these 
strategies amount to unfair competition. Specific problems comes out of the 
post-Soviet context. Some entrepreneurs believe in collective ownership and 
communism but do business for profit. This leads to moral dissonance. At 
the personal level an individual might believe in communist norms, but acts 
as a self-serving capitalist to survive. There are two related moral issues: a 
contradiction within the core beliefs of the ‘inner self ’ and a belief that one 
is being dishonest in one’s dealings with others. The scientific materialism 
of communist ideology and the vision of a timeless purity of Islamic funda-
mentalism can both lead to similar situations of moral discomfort, guilt and 
shame.
In realistic human conditions, however, incentives to cheat, free ride and 
steal necessitates an enforcement body, namely a government or a god-given 
order (Pfleiderer, 1896). Yet, the coercion of the state and self-regulatory 
groups distort the liberal and liberating provisions of the idealised market 
even further in post-Soviet transition. A multiple-layered moral compass is more 
likely to emerge among entrepreneurs in their day-to-day business dealings. 
Based on societal and individual moral convictions entrepreneurs can hold many 
moral positions, sometimes even temporarily in contradiction with one another, 
as opposed to a neat linear notion of private and public morality. The moral 
convictions of their decisions in market dealings swing within the bi-polarity 
of altruism and egoism like a pendulum. The centre of gravity is the base 
of their ideological world standing. In the following sections we will illustrate 
the most visible elements and exemplary cases of these positions of central 
gravity: Soviet rationality, Sufi traditions, and utopian Islam.
II. The moral gravity of entrepreneurship:  
three categories for central Asia
In order to apply our concept of moral conviction to the behaviour of Central 
Asian entrepreneurs, we use a typology that categorises positions. We assess 
entrepreneurs based on their reported or observed stances in relation to their 
business practices, their perceived sense of duty, and their sense of justice. 
Here we will provide illustrative cases from our extensive field work among 
entrepreneurs of Central Asia. A survey of 183 entrepreneurs was carried out 
between 2004 and 2007 through face-to-face interviews. This survey revealed 
many aspects of an emerging entrepreneurial class and its position between 
the state-market axis. I published my extensive findings in a monograph, 
Building States and Markets: Enterprise Development in Central Asia (Özcan, 
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2010). The arguments and the case studies in the following section are based 
on the data and interviews of this survey. The three cases below correspond 
to a general pattern of entrepreneurial positions I observed in my sample. To 
illustrate the real life circumstances we will tell the story of one entrepreneur 
within each category.
A. Paradoxes of Soviet rationalism
Even after around two decades of separation from Russia, the current gen-
eration of Central Asian entrepreneurs over the age of 40 retain a Soviet 
mind-set that inhabits a moral space that includes traditional regional and 
nomadic beliefs. This has created a hybrid of Turko–Mongolian traditions 
and Marxist–Leninist ideology. Older businessmen were educated in Soviet 
universities, trained and apprenticed to state enterprises and associate personal, 
societal and technical advancement with Russian culture and language. In 
the process of being Russified and Sovietised, many lost their native identity 
and culture, but the majority retained a strong spiritual link with their 
nation, clan and community. They express concepts of principled and 
rational living in terms of scientific determinism and try to explain the 
change in their lives thus. A cold rationality of survival is at the core of 
their moral being. However, that has to co-exist with a passion for family 
and ancestral lineage. Their moral flexibility is facilitated by their strong 
sense of realism and the necessity to be rapid adapters to radically changing 
circumstances.
Although Central Asians were rarely recruited into the Moscow-centred 
Soviet elites, thorough socialisation of the population, through schooling, 
workplace integration, the press and party bureaucracy succeeded in trans-
forming the region. That transformation was not entirely successful, as remnants 
of Asiatic culture were occasionally apparent. While those remnants fostered 
suspicion among non-Asian Soviet citizens, they provided the foundation for 
some adaptability to the post-Soviet liberal economy and search for new 
identity. Those adaptations, however, made frequent reference to underlying 
notions of Soviet rationalism and a deterministic understanding of the market 
(Alexander 2007; Payne 2001).2
Atheistic ideals and communism, blended with shamanism and tribalism 
of ancestral lineage, co-habited reasonably well in Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies. 
The former was public and the latter was pushed to the private sphere; often 
relegated to the status of irrational traditions. In their late conversion to Islam, 
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz peoples incorporated the naturalism of centuries of 
nomadic traditions into Muslim rituals and developed a pragmatic attitude 
2 See Alexander (2007) for an extensive debate on this. A Kazakh professional who trained 
and worked in the Soviet era states, ‘I tell them the market is like the law of gravity’.
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towards the teachings of Islamic law. Compared to a tendency to ritualise 
adherence to Islam among the settled and agrarian peoples of the Fergana 
Valley and elsewhere in the region, the Kazakh and Kyrgyz people followed 
Islam selectively, blending it with their animism and pantheism. Shamanistic 
and celestial celebrations were also maintained more easily as part of nation-
alistic and folk culture under communism, divorced from church-based 
monotheistic religions.
Entrepreneurs who are most influenced by this blending of Soviet ration-
alism and the surviving elements of ancestral nature religion are more likely 
to have the following traits in relation to business and morality (see Table 1 
for a comparison):
I. Core morality of doing business: they believe that business is a means to 
survive and the change of the regime is a consequence of dialectic materialism. 
Life is seen through the prism of determinism but sacred lineage and 
family and tribal relations form an exception. Care for others is limited to 
these lineages and veneration is reserved for the progenitors of their clan.
II. The virtue of duty: an entrepreneur’s duty is to survive and serve the 
needs of their extended family. The law of nature applies: whoever is 
stronger will survive; this often takes on a predatory character. In order 
to achieve success and manage to survive one can be ruthless and bend 
the rules when necessary.
III. Justice and greater good: there appears to be a bounded sense of justice 
for the clan and the family. However, they tend to be open to new ideas 
and curious about the world. There appears a continuing moral dissonance 
with formative Soviet teaching. There is a commitment and individual 
responsibility to friends and family. These entrepreneurs often have faith 
in and expectations from the capitalist life style as a form of personal 
advancement.
Case Study 1: Aybek: the ex-physician taxi man3
We were sitting in a small rundown Suzuki minibus covered in dust with 
fellow passengers waiting in front of the Ak Tilek market in the town of 
Karakol, near the eastern end of Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan. Ak Tilek was 
established in 1987 as part of the Perestroika programme’s aim to loosen 
state control and encourage cooperative and entrepreneurial activities. From 
100 traders in those [early?] days the market expanded to 1,000 traders in 
2004 as unemployment in the town grew exponentially. Mostly poor and 
rural people shopped there. Unbranded items ranging from foodstuffs to 
second-hand clothes were sold on open stalls. Many brought small items to 
3 See Özcan (2010: 201–2).
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sell to make ends meet for the day. A few jars of jam, a few cups of pickled 
vegetables, several kilogrammes of apples and other goods were on display. 
It was mostly women, but some men and children dressed in many layers of 
clothes were waiting for buyers. It was dusty, noisy and cold. Porters were 
pushing their carts with a singing tone ‘jol ver, jol ver’ (open the way).
Aybek, in his 40s with hazel eyes and a black moustache dominating his 
round face, was wearing a dark leather waistcoat and a hat. Fond of Pushkin 
and Tolstoy, he preferred to talk in Russian. He was deeply nostalgic about 
the Soviet era; yet saw the inevitability of economic changes and their con-
sequences too. He was educated and lived briefly in Moscow before rising in 
his profession as the chief physician of a hospital in Karakol. Soon after the 
dissolution of the USSR, however, hospitals, as with other public institutions, 
began having financial problems and failed to maintain basic services. There 
were shortages of much essential medical equipment; even electricity. Salary 
rises remained way below the inflation rate. In the mid-1990s, he was earning 
as little as 30 USD a month. This forced him to seek other income-generating 
jobs to survive. There was nothing to do. He felt depressed for weeks. Gradually, 
he came to accept the state of turmoil and decided to establish a business to 
help his income. After several trading jobs, he began running a shuttle taxi 
service with two minibuses and a car. He owned the vehicles, hired the drivers 
and supervised their daily routine.
While talking, the minibus began filling up with massive shopping bags 
and other trading items including a small lamb. Since he had no office space 
we had to carry on our talk in his vehicles. He took us to his second minibus 
which was next in line. The driver left us alone and only a couple of old 
peasants with their bags and a young girl with a beautiful round face framed 
by ruby earrings were there. They all looked uninterested. Aybek looked 
unsettled and spoke in Russian about his moral stance:
My main aim is to survive and keep the family together. This business 
has been doing well so far. You never know, things might change  .  .  .  Every-
thing looks calm and stable right now as if it has always been. But, since 
the end of the Soviet Union, we have been going downhill  .  .  .  and the 
future remains uncertain.
Aybek looked around with some displeasure and avoided communication 
with his fellow customers. He praised the Soviet system and complained 
about the new Kyrgyz state. When we came close to finishing our conversa-
tion we left our seats to fellow passengers carrying bags. Before departing, 
Aybek looked out over the bustling market place. While bitterly smiling, 
he sighed:
During the Soviet Union life was good for professionals like me and I 
miss those days. You know, when I was a chief medic, if someone told 
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me that I would run a taxi service in front of a dirty bazaar one day, I 
would have only laughed  .  .  .  Well here I am  .  .  .
B. Attractions of Sufism
As Islam melded with Central Asian culture, traditions from Buddhism, 
animism, the naturalist religion of Tengri (celestial god in old Turkic) and 
mystical sacred lineages were incorporated into Islamic ritual. One widespread 
heterodox Islamic faction, Sufism, was especially adept at accommodating 
pluralism while promoting peace, balance, harmony and divine love. Sufis 
are attractive to Central Asians also because of some similarities between the 
rituals of shaman priests and the ways miracles and prophecies are employed. 
Ancestor cults and the spirits of early nomads are associated with veneration 
of Sufi saints and their shrines have become places of popular respect and 
worship (Mélinkoff, 2003; Privratsky, 2001).
In his pioneering work, first published in 1951, Sabri Ülgener explored 
the morals and mentality behind the economic dissolution of the Islamic 
world in the Middle Ages and compared this moral and economic descent 
to the rise of the west, which witnessed increased entrepreneurial activities 
and overseas expeditions and the emergence of dynamic capitalist enterprises. 
Ülgener (1991; 2006) illustrated that the intolerant moral and ethical values 
and increased mysticism and fanaticisms in Islam eventually hindered enter-
prise growth by condemning the pursuit of wealth, shaming risk taking, and 
eventually perpetuating economic laxity. This moral and formative ideo-
logical decay, which took place over several centuries, subsequently limited 
market expansion and inhibited the growth of capitalist enterprises along 
the Silk Road and in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, prolonged feudal 
and semi-feudal relations led to the traditional markets mostly being controlled 
by a narrow group of artisanal and rentier classes along with despotism and 
political dissolution. Eventual shrinkage in capital, production and trade 
brought about the isolation of markets, ambiguous morals for business, and 
introverted communities.
Although Sufism is hardly intact as a belief structure or institution in the 
region, Sufi ethics has survived and is especially apparent in master–apprentice 
relations and associated traditions. Some Sufi groups are resurgent, offering 
spiritual guidance, arbitrating disputes and offering new networks that 
invariably extend material opportunities. They tend to be more prag-
matic in applying religion to their lives. Businessmen occasionally join 
such groups, identify with a spiritual leader, and are likely to display the 
following traits:
I. Core morality of doing business: they see business as part of a moral 
responsibility that they have to accomplish in the world through their 
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labour. Hard work in this world is a preparation for the afterlife. Work-
ing is also a form of reaching God and seeking blessing.
II. The virtue of duty: their virtue is based on the principle of serving God 
in a search for harmony and upholding family values. The old Sufi 
master–apprentice tradition is reflected in the workplace. This requires 
obedience to hierarchy and seniority. Learning a business or a craft from 
a master or elder is preserved as a form of passing good moral attain-
ments and work discipline from older generations to the new ones, from 
one believer to another.
III. Justice and greater good: they do not have a compartmentalised moral-
ity of communism or fundamental Islam. At the very core there is 
humanism and universality but it is also open to interpretation as well 
as various ideas and influences. Therefore, it is both pragmatic and non-
monolithic.
Case Study 2: Ali: the humanist multi-tasker4
At the age of 43, Ali was upbeat about business, family life and his achieve-
ments. He began as an apprentice at the age of 16 to a Jewish master leather 
worker, for whom he worked 12 years in Tashkent. His master became an 
inspiration and role model in life for him. Over the years his business grew 
into a small shopping centre in a newly acquired site employing 82 people 
in eight stores. He later followed some links to Jewish businessmen in the 
USA and sold semi-processed leather for a few years to them. Then he traded 
garments and foodstuff between Turkey and Uzbekistan for a couple of years 
and later brought construction material from China. He was pragmatic, non-
doctrinal and argued that Uzbeks needed to learn how to establish and run 
businesses from other countries like China and Turkey.
After entering into a large courtyard surrounded by a single storey building 
where eight different businesses were located (a hairdresser, internet cafe, dry 
cleaner, billiard room, café-restaurant, home appliances store, watch repairer, 
and barber), we were met by Ali’s secretary who took us into a meticulously 
clean and orderly room with a desk, table and bookshelves full of files. Ali 
came to greet us, dressed in white well-ironed trousers and a colourful shirt. 
He was short, looking fit and smiling with big round dark eyes. The business 
life and serenity of order he built around his modest courtyard had more to 
it. This was a world within a world; a shelter. Ali was a man of principles, 
ideals, duties and he claimed to have higher values beyond making money 
and enjoying a good living. It was easy to follow his Khorezm dialect.
4 See Özcan (2010: 205 –7).
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It is not enough that you are good. Your workers have to be good, well 
behaved and disciplined too. The master-apprenticeship relations are 
important. They need to respect their elders, have a good social and 
spiritual discipline. They also should know the business well  .  .  .  If you 
don’t satisfy your customers they won’t come back.
Ali stressed the importance of recreation, travel and learning, and above all 
a spiritual density [intensity/awareness?]. According to him, there are three 
respectable spaces in life and we should approach them with purity: God’s 
realm (mosque and cemetery), family (home), and enterprise (work place). In 
the harmony of these three divine realms, there exists a humanistic and toler-
ant view of the world.
While obsessively organised and disciplined, Ali had many liberal and 
pragmatic ideas along with a Sufi-style Islamic adherence. He did his deeds 
and adhered to Islam. Yet, he did not believe in orthodoxy. He had a deep 
affection for the Jewish faith and praised his old Jewish master. Ali’s desk 
had a large PC, many files and books. He had several photos of his well-
groomed children and Russian wife and he was very proud of his family. Ali 
first met his wife at a Japanese art exhibition in Tashkent. He was not only 
impressed by her looks but also by her taking notes while looking at the 
items on exhibit. For him marrying a woman of a different faith and race 
was even a blessing. He claimed that children from mixed marriages are 
better looking and smarter.
‘The more you know the less you lose’.
Ali first proudly took us around and showed his large courtyard and shops, 
and later explained his new business ideas and plans. He was exuberant and 
believed that he could open more businesses and create more opportunities 
for others and even generate work for up to 3,000 people. He was planning 
to develop the bakery business further by exporting new machinery that 
would provide novelty and productivity. He joked with a confident smile on 
his face: ‘I often lose in chess but usually win in business.’
C. Utopian Islam
Aside from Sufism, various forms of modern, fundamental, utopian Islam 
are having an increasingly strong influence. This is most visible in the 
Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, where, despite the government’s efforts to 
suppress Islamic groups, resurgence of religion continues to be a binding 
force. However, Islam is expressed in diverse ways, often with a local flavour. 
Social groups, known as ‘jamaats’, fill the vacuum left by the state by deliver-
ing public goods and welfare provisions. New empirical evidence shows 
that even in towns most loyal to the government, local representatives of 
state organs tolerate Islamic groups as they alleviate the state’s poor economic 
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performance, mediate between corrupt institutions and ameliorate local 
service delivery.5
Some such groups are organised in the Sufi fashion, others are aligned to 
political Islam or religious utopian sects. They aim to carve an autonomous 
realm in the market for their own benefit to avoid the state, seek cultural 
authenticity and to protect their wealth. Mutually beneficial networks help 
to exchange capital, goods and business opportunities. These businessmen and 
communities utilise Islam to foster trust and legitimise their business and 
group behaviour (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2006). The twin promise, worldly 
and spiritual, has considerable appeal to ordinary people, many of whom try 
to survive on marginal incomes from agriculture and small trade.
While entrepreneurs from professional classes and in major urban centres 
display mostly non-theological morality, the more agrarian and rural charac-
teristics of people in the Fergana Valley are comfortable with a balance of 
religion and political authority. Political opposition, protest against exclusion 
or suppression, finds different expressions among social groups in power 
politics. For example, as studied by Ilkhamov (2006), the Akromiya move-
ment led by small business leaders in the Fergana Valley is not just a religious 
movement proselytising good morals but also a business solidarity platform 
and an attempt to establish a self-governing rule in order to insulate busi-
nessmen and their local communities from the negative effects of corruption 
and authoritarian rule.
Entrepreneurs who are influenced by the teaching of fundamentalist Islam 
wish to construct a different realm for themselves. Contrary to common percep-
tions in the West about fundamentalist Islam, these individuals pursue their path 
peacefully and consciously. An imagined pure Islamic society, they believe, 
would bring material wealth, spiritual richness, and inner calm to them and their 
community. As in other such groups, they search for justice not liberty (Kuran, 
1989; 1996). These groups are more likely to have the following traits:
I. Core morality of doing business: they see business as part of the duty of 
a Muslim and link it to the paternal or family continuity of trade or craft. 
One has to conduct oneself as if an omnipotent and omnipresent God 
is watching. Carrying out the mater craftsmen tradition and paternal 
lineage of business preserves order with responsibility and obedience.
II. The virtue of duty: their virtue is based on the principle of serving God 
and helping to re-establish the perfect order by going back to their 
interpretation of ‘original Islam’ under the Prophet Muhammad. The 
5 Alisher Khamidov, who carried out extensive empirical research on Islamic groups in the 
Fergana Valley, observes that despite the suppressive policies carried out against Islamic groups 
by the central government, the local government functionaries tolerate and even benefit from 
the charity and welfare provision of Islamic business groups and their social arm: ‘cemaats’.
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duty of an entrepreneur is to maintain the craft or business as a living 
and a way to be a good Muslim.
III. Justice and greater good: political tyranny leads to moral suffocation. 
Within fundamentalist Islam, entrepreneurs see their future within the 
fraternity of groups and paternal lineage rather than state institutions 
or a broader society. The outside world is troubling and distressing until 
liberation which will emerge under perfect Islamic order.
Case Study 3: Osman: the bewildered silk weaver6
Osman, tall by Uzbek standards with hazel eyes and a restless spirit disguised in 
an ill-fitting dark suit, accompanied us to his home in the suburbs of Namangan. 
A tall gate took us into an open porch surrounded by rooms and a wide open 
garden. My two assistants, Osman and I sat on the floor around a low table 
symmetrically and colourfully decorated with Fergana nuts and fruits; grapes, 
apples, pistachios, pomegranates, almonds, candies, etc. Two young girls around 
12, veiled and looking down at the ground, brought tea bowls. They shyly avoided 
our eyes but secretly watched behind the curtains. We saw no adults from the 
family. After breaking his Ramadan fast, Osman was eager to talk and the girls 
brought in a delicious soup. Then came the Uzbek pilau, the master dish of 
Uzbek dining, rice with meat, raisins, chickpeas and grated carrot. Each colour-
ful bowl of pilau was topped with a succulent piece of baked quince.
Osman came from a typical artisan-merchant family that was common in 
the Valley. His father was a silk weaver, as his eight brothers were all involved 
in silk production, dying, weaving and marketing. He was an atheist until 
the age of 20 when, doing his military service on the cold Kazakh steppe, 
he fell ill. The Army sent him back home where he remained bedridden for 
a year. Recovery was slow and he claimed that during that period he had 
many thoughts and reflections on life and God. After his recovery, he came 
into contact with Islamists who preached the purity of Islam. It felt good to 
believe and to ‘start again’.
Osman believes in Islamic salvation through the teachings of Prophet 
Muhammad; and striving for purity and the fundamentals of Islam. Like 
most of his fellow Fergana folk, he is neither an extremist preacher nor a 
militant. His approach to work, life and religion had signs of Wahabi teaching 
although he simply explained that he had been attending mosque meetings 
where he learned Arabic in the 1990s.
A devout man in the Muslim faith would not touch unlawful substances 
and would not take another’s share. A man without faith can do anything 
and get lost in life. If you are faithful, you know what is at stake. I work 
6 See Özcan (2010: 212–14).
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with people who have this faith and I do my trade and business with 
such men. I get my blessed share. In this village we don’t lock our doors 
we just close them  .  .  .
During the Soviet era, the Namangan silk factory employed around 3,000 
people. One of his brothers served eight years in prison for weaving silk at 
home, a prohibited pursuit of personal wealth. During those years they used 
to steal materials from the factory and weave at home. Their silk patterns 
and the quality of weaving done at home was always better then the factory 
ones which lacked care, patience and attention. The bothers then used to sell 
the woven goods to black market traders in Samarkand and Bukhara.
Osman explained the miracles of silk and emphasised how maintaining 
family traditions was his duty to his father and generations of grandfathers, 
how silk is blessed by god and how he is a ‘slave of god’ pursuing a craft 
that has such sanctity. Osman produced a treatise on silk and in which he 
had written the following7:
Women wore silk to look pretty but the skin health and healing is the 
essence of silk. If you wear one hundred per cent silk, bugs don’t get 
close to you, and even if you don’t wash you don’t get ill.
If there was another more significant fabric then Allah would have 
dressed all heavenly people with that fabric but the Koran says:  .  .  . They 
all will be dressed in pure silk in heaven.
I am proud of choosing my father’s profession, being a national atlas 
weaver  .  .  .
Osman, in common with many other artisans I met, has a deep resentment 
about the policies of the Tashkent government. According to him, laws come 
7 Osman wrote this for a national festival of artisans and won an award. His pamphlet on 
silk contains the following information on how local silk cloth, atlas, is produced:
 1. 1,500 –2,000 units of silk caterpillar eggs, which amount to 1 gram, are placed into 
incubator to turn them into caterpillars.
 2. The silk caterpillar is looked after for 28 –30 days and nights with mulberry leaves. 
By this time the caterpillar is 5 years old and at the last in 3– 4 days it will start to 
turn into a cocoon.
 3. Cocoons are submitted to warehouses where they are sorted and stored.
 4. Cocoons are processed into silk in special workshops.
 5. The raw silk is milled in the silk-mill and reeled.
 6. The raw silk is boiled in soda and the sericin is washed out.
 7. The processed silk is winded and then warped.
 8. The die maker prepares the warp for painting. The silk is dipped into the die accord-
ing to the pattern and design of the fabric.
 9. The artisan weaves the Atlas fabric in an eight-pedaled weaving loom.
10. The fabric is decorated and presented to the buyer.
9780415566810_C07.indd   181 5/16/11   3:27:33 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
182 Islam, law and identity
from above with no prior deliberation for people concerned. The only role 
expected from them is to cheer, clap and bend down to whatever comes 
from the government. Artisans face deep problems and have a tough time 
surviving in the Fergana Valley. Despite several government initiatives to 
protect traditions and train artisans, the region is entirely cut off from the 
world. There is no tourism and with the decline of local merchant traditions 
and physical isolation, artisan families are increasingly at the mercy of large 
traders who often have a bad reputation for being opportunists. Many such 
merchants come from Samarkand and Bukhara where there is a bigger market 
and international tourism. While we were chatting the girls brought in towels 
and Osman initiated the final course by pealing and slicing apples and dividing 
the watermelon. He then dismantled the sweet, glassy red seeds of pomegranate 
with patience. At the end of the long and slow chatty meal, our casual together-
ness was ritualised and evolved into friendly bonding and Osman felt com-
fortable enough to show us his hidden underground workshop.
Where we dined, Osman later told us, was his sister’s house. We crossed 
the street to another big mud brick house with a large garden on a slope. 
Ten to fifteen kilometres out of the city centre this suburb was new, built 
in the northern hills of Namangan in 1996, and it followed local architectural 
traditions with single houses surrounded by tall walls and spacious gardens; 
quite different from the usual fully circled Uzbek gardens. Osman’s atelier 
was next to his house dug under several basement floors with many small 
rooms connected to one another. There were at least 10 large Soviet-made 
spinning machines, dye material and other items. His atelier was protected 
from outside intruders through several floors beneath the entrance in a maze-
like basement. But, despite his treatise on silk, the materials were bright red 
and white nylon. Harsh economic circumstances intensified competition and 
low incomes fuelled the demand for cheap products. The colourful shades of 
adras and atlas are giving way to cheap Chinese imports and lowering the 
quality of local production. But, sadly and more profoundly, a centuries-old 
craft and artisanal tradition, together with sophisticated artistic forms and 
values, was slowly fading away. Silk was what god prized, the craft was his 
ancestors’ legacy, but Osman was spinning nylon thread in a disguised work-
shop to earn his livelihood. Osman summarised his sentiments with a sad look:
If you don’t hope and take sadness lightly in the face of the problems 
we have here, you cannot endure. Life becomes a pain, sour  .  .  .  I often 
act silly and take it lightly to survive  .  .  .  We have a saying: a man can 
get used to even his grave within three days.
Early the following morning, we departed from the Namangan guest house built 
for high ranking Soviet bureaucrats out of granite and marble, yet with little 
charm compared to Osman’s suburb. He insisted the night before that we should 
have breakfast in his home before leaving the town. Most of his family had just 
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gone to sleep after finishing their Ramadan meal before the crack of the dawn. 
He was overjoyed by our return and watched us drink tea and eat our breakfast. 
For him, we were a novelty, maybe a hope, in isolated and mundane Namangan.
III. Conclusion
The examples provided here of different moral paths illustrate the pervasive-
ness of longstanding societal overtures against the forced convergence of 
Soviet engineering that aimed to eradicate the past by building a timeless 
future. As the Soviet regime collapsed, there emerged a moral void and many 
people searched for a new direction to compensate for their worsening con-
ditions. They needed to be able to cope with the burdens of increasing corrup-
tion and the authoritarian regimes that presided over the ruthless process of 
economic re-allocation (Özcan, 2010: 217).
As a response, three patterns of moral disposition arose based upon natural-
istic shamanism, Sufi harmony and utopian Islam. In relation to the core moral-
ity of conducting business, virtue, justice and the greater good, these three 
patterns are associated with radically different moral dispositions: pragmatic, 
normative and utopian.
The points of each moral standing in relation to core morality, virtue and 
justice relate to entrepreneurial choices. The three patterns of thinking lead 
to different levels of pragmatism, normative and utopian stance with varying 
degrees of moral satisfaction, guilt and dissonance. The highest moral dis-
sonance is observed among the ones who are guided by a utopian-style Islam.
The desirability of institutions that lessen cultural or moral diversity is 
important and indeed the function of the state is to converge and co-opt 
these positions under a web of institutions and legal frameworks. As Kuran 
(1998) pointed out, conflicting interpretations of the world may breed cognitive 
dissonance. Numerous sociologists, most notably Emile Durkheim (1933), 
have suggested that nation building requires a convergence of values. Scholars 
have also argued that the homogenisation of individual values contributes to 
social stability and economic cooperation by reducing violence and conflict. 
Therefore, as Timur Kuran argues (1998: 262), conflicts between individuals 
leading to moral diversity can be socially costly to manage. One group of moral 
entrepreneurs will institute a moral escape; another will pursue moral reform. 
Even if trying to resolve the same problem, the groups may become rivals.
The process of building states and markets in Central Asia requires the 
promotion of harmonious moral regimes. Yet, deepening moral confusion in 
the weakness of intellectual and political leadership towards a lawful and fair 
society is likely to continue to play at the hands of authoritarian regimes.
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Chapter 8
Religion, politics and the 
dilemma of national identity  
in Pakistan
Tasneem Kausar*
Introduction
Understanding the mysteries of the creation and mutation of religious and 
political identities in a pluralistic society is a challenging and pressing task. 
Identities are neither stable nor permanent; they are subject to historical 
process of transformation. It is this process of invention and re-invention that 
will be addressed in this essay; indeed, it would appear that – in the context 
of Pakistan – the identities of the ‘pre-terrorism age’1 are presently subject 
to complex forms of re-alignments. The question of ‘identity’ in Pakistan 
has always been fraught. Religion played a crucial role in the creation of the 
country; as it did in the foundation of the Israeli state. However, while religion 
as a source of identity has helped integrate the identities of multi-ethnic 
Jewish communities (see Ben-Rafael and Sharot 1991: chapters 2, 8 and 10; 
see also Reed 1978), religion in Pakistan, has largely failed to create a sus-
tained notion of national identity, despite what was achieved at independence 
in 1947.
Pluralist societies require integrating processes whereby ethnic, cultural, 
regional and linguistic differences are downplayed and a common identity 
asserted (Ben-Rafael and Sharot 1991: at 170; Ortega y Gasset 1930: at 
169 –171). With the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Indian sub-continent 
witnessed a unique event. Religious identity was effectively mobilised to 
create a country defined by Islam. In order to understand this process, and 
taking the sovereign nation as our reference points, we can make an analytical 
* Associate Professor of Law at Pakistan College of Law; LLB (Pakistan College of Law), LLM. 
(Yale Law School, USA), MA. (Punjab University). This article was presented at the 
Conference organised by The British Academy on Religious and Political Identities in 
Monotheistic Cultures, held in Istanbul, Turkey in August 2007.
 I would like to dedicate my article to my daughter Zarrmein and all the children of Pakistan with 
a wish that they will have a better understanding of their identity as Pakistanis then the earlier 
generations.
1 Author makes an arbitrary division between the time period before 9/11 and after 9/11. 
It is the world before the event of 9/11 that has been labelled as the pre-terrorism age.
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distinction between internal and external factors. Scholars have tended to 
stress the internal factors in the creation of Pakistan, in particular the homo-
geneity of the religion shared by the different Pakistani peoples. This tends 
to sideline the equally important external factors – the most important of 
which was the ‘common fear of Hindu dominance’.2
Over-emphasis on religion as the primary cause of integration has not just 
been a scholarly preoccupation. This paper examines the role of religious 
identity in Pakistan, and, its integrative and disintegrative relationship with 
other ethno-political identities. It focuses on four phases of Pakistani history: 
the creation of the nation, the cessation of East Pakistan, the Islamisation of 
the Zia regime and the recent military rule of General Musharraf. It is argued 
that the creation of a state and its preservation3 are two distinct phenomena. 
The continuous deployment of religious identity as national identity has 
created a problematic myth: Pakistan and Islam are synonymous. Moreover, 
the failure to understand the distinction between the creation of the nation 
and its preservation has led to religion becoming a primary prescription for 
many of the nation’s problems and a deflection of debate over matters of 
democratisation and modernisation; in particular, the creation of a satisfactory 
system of sharing economic benefits and political power (Brass 2005: at 
30 –31, 40 – 41 and 45 – 46).
Arguably, the drift from Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan as a liberal welfare 
state began early. The early militarisation of Pakistan shaped the Pakistani 
identity, nation and state and has continued to do so for more than 40 years. 
It is concluded that unless Pakistan’s objectives are redefined to focus on 
economic prosperity and popular participation in governance, reforms which 
the military have consistently obstructed or blocked, the state will continue 
to turn to Islam as a national unifier and a symbol of national identity.
2 Bharat Verma (2006). The author writes that: ‘In 1950s, Hans J. Morgenthau, the then 
Director of Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at University of Chicago, in 
his book The New Republic had observed, “Pakistan is not a nation and hardly a state. It 
has no justification, ethnic origin, language, civilisation or the consciousness of those who 
make up its population. They have no interest in common except one: fear of Hindu 
domination. It is to that fear and nothing else that Pakistan poses its existence and thus 
for survival as an independent state.” During the same period, another American scholar 
Keith Callard in his book Pakistan-a Political Study commented, “the force behind the 
establishment of Pakistan was largely the feeling of insecurity”.’ See also von Tunzelmann 
(2007) (commenting that after the elections of 1937, Jinnah suddenly transformed from 
an electoral failure into the champion of free Islam against Hindu dominance).
3 See Rafiqul Islam (1985) at 219 (enumerating factors essential for creating state such as 
desire of self-determinism, homogeneity of people, separatist demands must be based on 
gross human rights abuse, promise of minimum and reasonable political stability, economic 
viability, etc.); Cohen (2002) at 109 (mentioning that when security, economic parity, 
human services, justice and basic necessities are not provided the states can fail).
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I. Two nation theory: Muslim nationalism in 
undivided India
The point at which the Muslims of India became conscious of the differences 
that existed between them and the Hindu majority is perhaps open to debate. 
However, it was the identification and articulation of this difference that led 
ultimately to the separatist agenda. Scholars have attributed ‘the two nations 
theory’ to Muhammad Ali Jinnah – a defence of common belonging on the 
grounds of religion as well as culture (Qureshi 1974: 127–29).
Within this fraught historical field, there are further arguments between 
scholars regarding the origins of Muslim nationalism (see Ikram 1997; see 
also Qureshi 1974). However, in the context of the Pakistan movement, three 
years stand out: 1906, 1930 and 1940. It was in 1906 that the demand for 
political participation on the basis of a separate religious community was 
made by establishing a new political party, the All India Muslim League. In 
the same year, the Muslim League made a claim for seats in the legislatures 
on the basis of separate Muslim constituencies. Religious affiliation had 
become an issue in the British period. Scholars have suggested that when 
Muslim dynasties ruled over India, the religious affiliation of their subjects 
was not their main concern (see Riaz 1987: 11–13). The merger of religious 
and political identities in the Indian sub-continent had its primary basis in 
the introduction and development of representative institutions in British 
India (Gaborieau 1985: 7), where political alignments were sought to be 
adopted on the basis of religion (Gaborieau 1985: 7).
This politicisation of a separate identity of Muslims emerged more force-
fully, when in 1930, Dr Iqbal presented a structured idea of a separate Muslim 
state as an extension of the religious identity of Indian Muslims.4 Dr Iqbal was 
convinced that a natural correlation existed between the religion and state in 
Islam (see Hakim 1992: 54, 55; see also Hakim 1983: 1640). The creation of an 
Islamic state was the only way to preserve Islamic society and an Islamic way of 
life in India (see Neufeldt 1981: 178). In this process, religion was an adhesive 
that united and bound together the political aspirations of the Muslims 
of India. Consequently, in 1940, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while formally 
announcing the demand for Pakistan, stated the crux of Muslim nationalism:
The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, 
social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry, nor dine together 
and they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly 
on conflicting ideas and conceptions.
 (Ahmad 1970: 380)
4 In the 1930s Presidential address of All India Muslim League in Allahabad, a demand was 
forwarded from the forum of All India Muslim League whereby the Muslims of India 
claimed a separate state.
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This emergence of a profound religious identity and nationalism, in the 
form of two-nation theory, was accepted as theoretically sound and practically 
feasible only by Indian Muslims themselves and their very few foreign 
supporters,5 since both in theory and practice, it challenged many already 
existing stable perceptions of nationhood.6 Returning to the point made 
earlier, the factors responsible for the emergence of Muslim nationalism can be 
seen to be internal as well as external to the religious ideology. Internal factors 
have received a great deal of attention from researchers and scholars of the 
Independence movement.7 It is popularly believed that Muslims of India 
united to seek separation from the Hindu majority because of the perception 
that the ideological differences between the two religious systems were almost 
impossible to reconcile (Ahmad 1952: 469; Gaborieau 1985: 8). Internal factors 
thus stress expressions of common belief and ritual which bound the Muslims 
of India together despite ethnic, economic or linguistic differences.
External factors relate to those circumstances and events that were not 
intrinsically present in the schematic characteristics of religious or cultural 
identity. From this perspective, Muslim nationalism can be seen as a reaction 
against Hindu political identification. It is necessary to generalise a little; to place 
our discussion in context. Modern considerations of the factors responsible for 
forming and preserving nations refer to factors such as religion or ideology; 
common ethnicity; cultural, especially linguistic homogeneity; and common 
economic interest (Deutsch and Foltz 1966: 3; Ward 1966: 18). The relative 
influence of each of these factors varies considerably in actual historical experi-
ence (Syed 1980: 578).8 Our analysis can be clarified in the following way:
Thesis I: The integration of religious and political identities is a reactive 
phenomenon.
Thesis II. In the absence of circumstances justifying a reactive response to a 
hostile ideology, it may not be possible to transform religious identity into 
political identity.
5 For example, British writer Beverly Nichols (1944) and the British Labor M.P. Woodrow 
Wyatt (1952).
6 See Gaborieau (1985) at 8 (referring to factors responsible for forming and preserving na-
tions, enumerates agents such as religion or ideology, common ethnicity, cultural or language 
or economic interest). See Gareth and Wright Mills (1958) at 177–178 (mentioning that 
Max Weber while noting the common factors for creating state, commented that even 
though any one of them might suffice to generate sense of nationhood, none of them can 
be relied upon to produce a nation); Ortega (1930) at 169 (saying that it is the state which 
makes the nation, not nation the state); see also Emerson (1962) at 96 (quoting Lord Acton: 
‘a nationality should constitute a state is contrary to the nature of modern civilization’).
7 Almost all major writers on this topic, such as Muhammad Ali, Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, 
S.M. Ikram, etc., have considered the religious, cultural and linguistic differences of Muslims 
and Hindus as a basis for their separation.
8 See supra footnote 6.
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In the context of the discussion of Islamic identity and the two nations 
theory, it seems that thesis II is more compelling than thesis I; that Hindu–
Muslim antagonisms animated the creation of the independence movement 
rather than the ‘natural’ homogeneity of Indian Muslims. Indeed, barring 
the small urban elite, the over-whelming rural Muslim masses did not 
share any internally common characteristics of race, language or culture. 
The one factor that they had in common was dislike of Hindu-dominion, 
a glimpse of which was had during the brief period of Congress Ministries 
in 1937–39.
This is not to dismiss the political force that the perception of a shared 
identity had. Pakistan did come into being as a Muslim nation – and in such 
a way that involved a massive migration9 of population. Although migration 
was in part a response to massacres and genocide, it can perhaps also be seen as 
evidence of mass popular commitment to the ‘idea’ of Pakistan.10 At the same 
time, the ‘common belonging’ thesis can be overdone. In 1971 Bangladesh 
achieved its independence from Pakistan. Although the Bengalis had been 
ardent supporters of the creation of Pakistan, a common identity as Muslims 
was clearly not enough to hold the nation together.11
So, ‘Muslim nationalism’ was a reaction to Hindu nationalism. Historians 
have arguably established that Hindus took the lead in Hindu–Muslim 
separatism.12 On the other hand, the primary focus of Muslims at least up 
to 1940 has been to secure the political rights of their community. It was 
not until 1940 that Indian Muslims were formally declared to be a ‘nation’. 
The repeated failure of Congress to cater to the interests of Muslims in 
India, shifted the political focus of All India Muslim League, and directed 
it towards religion as a focus for oppositional energies to Congress. Hence, 
antagonism and reaction are the two persistent themes in the tense relation-
ships between Hindu and Muslim nationalism in undivided India (Spear 
1963: 36).
 9 It was considered to be the largest migration of a population at a singular point of time 
in the recent history. According to one estimate more than one billion people (of all 
religions) migrated at the time of partition.
10 The count of dead was approximated to be between the figures of four to five hundred 
thousand.
11 Maulvi Abdul Haque of Bengal has been reported to have been the main author of the 
Lahore Resolution of 1940 whereby the claim of independent country with the name of 
Pakistan was made.
12 Majumdar (1963) at 39 – 41 (referring to the beginning of the Hindu nationalism, he 
noted that in 1870, the ‘National Society’ was founded to promote unity and national 
feelings among the Hindus. When objection was taken to the use of the word ‘national’ for 
a Hindu organisation, it was asserted by the organisers of the National Society, Hindu-Mela, 
that ‘the Hindus certainly form a nation by themselves, and as such a society established 
by them can very properly be called a national society’).
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There is another external factor that can be seen as central.13 During the 
course of the independence movement, at least until 1940, the awareness of the 
political status of Muslim identity was much stronger at the level of the elite 
than the masses (Qureshi 1969: 22). It was the failure of this elitist politics 
which compelled the Muslim elite to mobilise the masses and spread ‘Muslim 
nationalism’ as an integrated religious and political identity of Indian Muslims. 
Congress, on its part, could not understand the apprehensions of the Muslim 
minority.14 Furthermore (and ironically) the Muslim League had very little 
support amongst the ulema of India,15 perhaps due to its secular leadership 
(Binder 1963: 183–207). Therefore, it became more a matter of political expedi-
ency for the Muslim League to show a religious face in order to gather support 
from the Islamic factions of society. The use of religion brought the ethnically 
divided Muslims of India political power and recognition, a significant out-
come, as they had been marginalised since the fall of the Moghul Empire.
In brief, Muslim nationalism became the vehicle for the achievement of 
Pakistan. This nationalism was uni-dimensional since it singularly focused 
on religion and disregarded factors of geography, ethnicity and local tradition. 
With one stroke, it separated Muslims from the people with whom they had 
resided for generations and made them kin to those with whom they had 
never interacted due to the difference of ethnicity and language.
II. Pakistan, national identity crisis and  
Bengali nationalism
Pakistan was created on 14 August 1947. During the last days of the campaign 
for Pakistan, nationalistic symbols16 (such as language, dress, etc.) with religious 
connotations were adopted and used successfully. The deployment of religious 
identity to achieve the goal of Pakistan, suspended for the time being, the 
ethnic and linguistic identities of the people of the newly created state of 
Pakistan. Nevertheless, history from 1947 to 1971 witnessed the disintegration 
of this newly acquired national identity due to the ethnic, linguistic and 
demographic differences as well as political disagreements.
13 See text at page 12.
14 Congress refused to incorporate the 14-point demand of Muslims in Nehru Constitution, 
rejected the Communal Award and declined to include Muslim Leaguers in the ministries 
in the Congress-dominated provinces. For detailed examination of the role of the Congress 
in alienating Muslims, see Moon (1962); Dwarkadas (1966).
15 Muslim League received the support of Islamic factions when finally Jamiat-ulema-i-Islam 
was organised in 1945.
16 For example, Quiad-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah always appeared in public meetings 
dressed in a sherwani, the national dress of Indian Muslims, and the Muslim League made 
great efforts to promote the Urdu language as the main language of Indian Muslims as 
against Bengali, since Urdu was similar in script to Arabic, whereas Bengali was written 
in Hindi-like script, i.e. devnagri.
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At the time of its creation Pakistan was composed of two parts: East 
Pakistan and West Pakistan. When examining the integrative ‘adhesives’ 
present in both parts of Pakistan, one is provided with an interesting lead for 
analysis. East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, bore the potential of a 
nation state. It was and is culturally, ethnically, linguistically and territorially 
homogenous. In contrast, West Pakistan was and is quite heterogeneous in 
character. It has multiple cultural and regional traits. It has at least four 
provincial languages,17 various dialects and many cultural streaks. Further-
more, various component groups in West Pakistan had strong cultural and 
linguistic affiliations with groups outside the national boundaries.18
Given the heterogeneity of Pakistan, how could a sense of national identity 
be sustained in the absence of visible external threats to the Muslim nation? 
Although the invasion of Pakistan has been a constant feature of Pakistan’s 
history, in the immediate post-Independence period there was no eminent 
threat. Although the two-nation ideology had provided a compelling founding 
idea, it lost some of its relevance in the post independence period. Although 
there would not have been any Pakistan, if Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans 
and Balochs would not have chosen their Muslim identity over and above 
their ethnic and linguistic identities, this religio-political identity required 
further development so that it would address the regional and cultural diversity 
of the new nation.
One must be mindful that individuals are members of various social groups, 
identifiable on the bases of religion, family, tribe, caste, region and language. 
A multiethnic state cannot afford to ignore its multiple identities (Wendell 
and Freeman 1974). In Pakistan’s case, it was taken for granted that the 
religious national identity of being a Muslim would always prevail. However, 
bonds of a shared religion and a shared history of the Independence movement 
proved too weak to hold the country together. Although ethnic differences 
or similarities do not necessarily lead to balkanisation (Rafiqul Islam 1985: 
219; Cohen 2002: 109), many analysts have held the separation of East and 
West Pakistan can be traced to its ethnic divisions (Oldenburg 1985: 711).19
The argument that the Bengalis had strong reasons to separate from Pakistan 
– as people ethnically different, shut off from political power and furthermore 
17 These include Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto and Balochi.
18 For example, the people of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) are culturally as well 
as linguistically, aligned with the people of Afghanistan. It is in the context of this align-
ment that after the fall of Kabul, a very large number of Afghan refugees entered Pakistan 
and settled predominantly in NWFP.
19 Separate ethnic identification may operate as a necessary internal condition to begin with, 
but not a sufficient one, or else every multiethnic state would naturally lead to fragmen-
tation. Besides, if the political system is seen as an independent variable itself with the 
multiple sets of strategies, policies and influences as external factors, one may arrive at a 
better understanding of changing national identities integrate or disintegrate (Nordlinger 
2002: 45 – 47).
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economically exploited – has been widely accepted. However, the staunch 
support of Bengalis for Pakistan in 1946 – 47 is enough evidence to prove 
that the Bengali Muslims considered the religious differences more significant 
than the racial characteristics or linguistic differences. In spite of their ethnic 
affinity, the Bengali Muslims did alienate from Bengali Hindus in 1947. 
Bengali Muslims supported the idea of a separate Muslim state and voted 
for Pakistan with a large majority. Religion as a principal source of Bengali 
Muslim identity retained its importance during the pre-Pakistan as well as 
post-Pakistan era at least for the masses.20
Political factors, and the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan21 
created the conditions for the disintegration of the nation. The elections of 
1954 and 197022 proved the closure of religious differential, as the political 
parties who went to the polls with religious agendas performed miserably. 
In East Pakistan, the Awami League won on the basis of a programme of 
regional autonomy, and in the West, the People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP) 
won by presenting a socialist manifesto.23
In this speculative understanding, the cessation of East Pakistan was in 
part the result of a failure to recognise what the meaning of Pakistan would 
be in the absence of a ‘Hindu-Muslim dichotomy’. After the creation of 
Pakistan, there was no modern interpretation of Shari’a to provide the basis 
for a Pakistani Constitution acceptable to all political groups. The pre-1947 
ideal of an Islamic welfare state never materialised.
Bengali nationalism grew in response to the changing nature of ethnic-
group interactions. It aimed at changing the ‘dominant-subordinate’ relation-
ship between East and West and the distribution of power within society 
with demands for language rights and economic equality. In the same way 
that the Pakistan of 1947 came out of the failure of Hindus and Muslims 
to accommodate each other, the Bangladesh of 1971 was a product of the 
inability of East and West Pakistanis to share power equally and freely.
III. Post-1971 Pakistan: mainstreaming  
religious identity
The cessation of Bangladesh in 1971 left Pakistan a territorially homogenous 
unit, not ‘a religious geography carved out of history’ (Qureshi 1973, quoting 
20 The fact that Bangladesh, though severed from Pakistan, did not reunite with India or 
Indian West Bengali Hindu majority has been an evidence of the sustainability of two-
nation theory and Islamic identity (Qureshi 1973: 570).
21 See further Oldenburg (1985).
22 The 1954 elections were held only in East Pakistan, whereas 1970 elections were held in 
both East and West Pakistan.
23 It may be noted, however, that both these parties had equal claims to Islamic ideology 
and none of them posed to be secular in its political ideology.
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from The Times 1971). To compare Pakistan of 1947 with Pakistan of 1972 
is somewhat misleading but nevertheless essential. The political problems of 
these two periods remain identical: the search for national identity, consensus 
upon a new constitution and the role of the military are the central themes.
The post-1971 history of Pakistan witnessed a fresh attempt to integrate 
religio-political identities. In this period, Islam was used as a focus for recovery 
from the 1971 defeat in Dhaka. The then government spent energy in estab-
lishing the power structures not only internally but also internationally, so 
that Pakistan could be taken as a key member of the Islamic Ummah (Ritcher 
1979: 547).
However, the creation of a polity is a process inherently different from its 
preservation. What had been useful in creating Pakistan proved less so for 
its continuity. The real problem of post-1971 Pakistan has not been the use 
of religion but its misuse and overuse. During 1971– 87, Pakistan experienced 
many attempts at artificial implantation of the integration processes with 
full concentration upon the internal factor of religion as the basis of identity 
as well as legal and political agendas. This part of the paper will review this 
mainstreaming of religion in post-1971 Pakistan.
My position regarding this period is that the religious identity of the 
people of Pakistan has never been subjected to a democratic ‘test’. There 
has never been a serious democratic attempt to gauge popular inclinations, 
favourable or unfavourable to religious identity. Without such assessment, the 
attribution of religious identity to Pakistani people is questionable. Indeed, 
the continuous failure of Islamist political parties in elections, suggests that 
it was an international desire to see a ‘religious Pakistan’ as a cold war partner 
and to prop up the ‘Islamicist’ military dictatorship of President Zia that 
sustained the religious identity of the nation. There is little evidence of a 
sustained ‘organic’ and democratic commitment to an Islamic identity.
A. Constitutionalising religious identity
If the ambiguities of the Muslim League’s demands, during the Independence 
movement had irritated its opponents, the unambiguous language in which 
Jinnah spoke for the separation of state and religion,24 at the first meeting of 
the Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947 would have utterly 
confounded the followers of the ‘Islamic state ideal’ ( Jalal 1995: 73, 77). 
However, unsatisfied and unsure of the wisdom of Jinnah, the definition of 
Pakistan on religious lines started right after the demise of Jinnah in 1948. 
The first recorded political move to incorporate Islam in the state apparatus 
24 Jinnah declared: ‘You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to 
any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State.’
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was through the Objective Resolution of 1949, which outlined the aims and 
objectives for future constitution of Pakistan. In retrospect, it can be con-
cluded that this document was the outcome of intense pressurising by the 
Ulema who started mobilising the public to hold the government account-
able for backing off from its commitment to ‘make Pakistan a fortress of 
Islam’ (Binder 1961: 85; Nasr 1993: 261, 267).
The Resolution had two significant clauses: first, it stated that sovereignty 
lies with Allah; and second, the document asserted that Muslims of Pakistan 
would live their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of 
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. Although the document 
has been described as ‘carefully imprecise’ (see Smith 1971), it could not 
mask the tensions between traditionalists and modernisers. Who was to speak 
for the nation? In ensuing struggle, one of the most significant sources of 
Islamic information which keeps the religion of Islam ‘modern’, that is, 
Ijtehad was almost swept aside. This empowered the clergy and their claims that 
they alone could interpret the Quran and Sunnah for the ignorant citizens 
of Pakistan. It almost seemed like an attempt to shift the power base towards 
those who had protested against the very origin of the country of Pakistan, 
that is, the Ulema.
The Objective Resolution was passed by the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan in March 1949, but was only made a substantive part of the 
Constitution of Pakistan by General Zia-ul Haq in 1985.25 The year of its 
pre-ambler formulation and its much later incorporation into the main text 
of the 1973 Constitution suggests that the military leadership of the 1980s 
wanted to procure the maximum from the introductory but recessive, shift 
of power base that the Objective Resolution had caused.
Pakistan’s struggle to become a complete Islamic state was still deemed 
to be incomplete. In later years Pakistan continued to debate the ‘Islamic 
state’ ideal, leaving the country polarised between religious and secular 
factions. The 1956 Constitution labelled Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, a 
title that was retracted with the Constitution of 1962. The 1973 Constitution 
again made Pakistan an ‘Islamic Republic’. This frequent label-changing 
indicated a serious struggle between religious identity and territorial identity. 
This, in turn, led to an internal dualism between ethno-Islamism and the 
ethno-nationalism. Within the ethno-Islamic framework, a citizen was con-
sidered to be a Muslim first and then Pakistani. This points towards a pan-
Islamic sentiment, as witnessed during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and (in more recent years) the Pakistani stances upon Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Palestine issues. On the other hand, if a citizen is Pakistani first 
and Muslim second, then her primary identification will be ethnic because 
she may be a Pakistani Punjabi, Sindhi or Balochi. Therefore, within the 
25 Presidential Order No. 14 of 1985, Article 2-A (with effect from 2 March 1985).
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ethno-national framework the internal dualism oscillates between ethnicity 
and nationality, which requires that the external factors, mainly distribution 
of power and economic disparity, be seriously addressed. Furthermore, this 
political adoption of religious identity over and above ethno-national models 
posed a further challenge inside Pakistan, due to the multiplicity of religious 
identities. This was the problem confronted by Pakistan during the sectarian 
divide of the 80s and 90s discussed later in this paper.
B. The Islamic Constitution of 1973
The 1973 Constitution can easily be seen as the most religiously oriented 
constitution of the country. It contains a number of provisions, which 
mention ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ in one manner or another. Of Pakistan’s three 
constitutions, only the 1973 Constitution, in its original form, has been 
recognised by commentators as a democratic document due to its creation 
by a duly elected parliament, and the procedure which led to its adoption.26 
However, the changes and amendments introduced without popular mandate 
and through authoritative military regimes have considerably destroyed its 
democratic credentials.27
The Constitution of 1973 was created by a parliament that was elected in 
the 1970 elections. In this first ever general elections, the PPP was pitched 
against the Muslim League and Jamat-i-Islami, the two leading political 
parties emphasising religious identity and agendas. The slogan ‘Islam is our 
religion; Socialism is our economy; Democracy is our politics’ was the one 
with which PPP mobilised the masses and scored an astounding victory 
(Ahmed 1973; Syed 1991: 582). Though people voted for the PPP in the 
name of social and economic rights, however, within months of establishing 
government, the PPP built a grand political alliance with all those religious 
and semi-religious parties, which had bitterly opposed PPP in elections. If 
26 Newberg (2002) 138 – 40 (commenting that while the process that led to the 1973 con-
stitution was full of acrimony and power politics, ‘[n]onetheless, a new constitution was 
written and approved by a directly elected [National] Assembly for the first time since 
independence.  .  .  .  [While] no party or faction was fully satisfied by the governance 
structure created by the constitution,  .  .  .  it received unanimous approval from the National 
Assembly.’).
27 Since 1973, the resilience of both Pakistan and its Constitution have been tested by 
several events, including:
(1) General Zia’s 1977 military coup;
(2) Presidential Order of 1985, of important General Zia-sponsored amendments to the 
1973 constitution;
(3) unstable and short-lived democratic governments in Pakistan throughout the late 
1980s and 1990s; and
(4) General Musharraf ’s 1999 military coup and his sponsorship of yet more amendments 
to the 1973 constitution.
9780415566810_C08.indd   196 5/16/11   3:27:45 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
FS
Religion, politics and national identity 197
the people of Pakistan had wanted Pakistan to be an orthodox theocracy, 
they could in fact have voted for the parties with religious programmes 
(see Nasr 1993: 261), especially where some of those parties had Islamic 
socialism as the basis of their manifestos and at least in theory, could have 
delivered a progressive Islamic state. However, the Constitution drafted 
under the alliance with religious parties created a document that sufficiently 
pushed into motion the mainstreaming of religious identity in Pakistan. The 
concrete manifestation of this can be seen in Article 26028 which provided 
the constitutional definition of the ‘Muslim’ (and ‘Islam’, by implication).29 
Previously constitutional provisions concerning Islam had not taken such a 
specific form. For example, Article 31, the principle of policy, whose subject 
matter is the ‘Islamic way of life’, references ‘the fundamental principles 
and basic concepts of Islam’, the ‘meaning of life according to the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah’, and ‘Islamic moral standards’, but gives no precise or 
controversial content to these ideas.30 Furthermore, Article 2 of the Con-
stitution declares that ‘Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan’ (Consti-
tution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 2).31 Other constitutional 
28 This article was inserted into the 1973 constitution in 1974 through a constitutional 
amendment.
29 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 260(3). In its present form, this 
article states:
260. In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless there is 
anything repugnant in the subject or context, –
(a) “Muslim” means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, 
in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be 
upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet 
or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense 
of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); 
and
(b) “non-Muslim” means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging 
to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadi-
ani Group or the Lahori Group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), 
or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes.
30 Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah, P.L.D. (1986) S.C. 360, 474 (presenting a 
contemporary demonstration of the Islamic legal implications that might arise by a specific 
reliance on the Qur’an and Sunnah, instead of other sources of Islamic law, in a dissenting 
opinion Justice S M H Quraishi says: It must, however, be noted that Muhammaden Law 
as understood and interpreted in the above cases by the Courts is based on the juristic 
principles (Fiq-h) [sic] as expounded by the scholars of legal thought in Islam. But here, 
in a matter arising under Article 203-D of the Constitution we are concerned with the 
question whether the law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the 
Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet. A law may not be in conformity with 
the juristic opinion of one or the other of the Schools but that would not render the same 
repugnant for the purposes of Article 203-D unless the repugnancy is clearly brought out 
as against some specific Injunction either in the Qur’an [sic] or the Sunnah.).
31 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 2.
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articles require that the President, the Prime Minister32 as well as most 
members of the Parliament be Muslim.33
The 1973 constitution also created certain institutions to channel the 
application and interpretation of Islam: the Council of Islamic Ideology and 
the Shariat Court. The ‘Council of Islamic Ideology’ (Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 227-31) was created to ensure that ‘all 
existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam 
as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah  .  .  .  and [so that] no law shall 
be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions’ (Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 227(1)). The real import of this Council 
came into the limelight during General Zia’s regime when it was used in 
conjunction with the Shariat Court to create an Islamic State of Pakistan by 
testing the vires of all existing and future laws of the country.
The Shariat judicial courts were not present in the original Constitution 
of 1973 and were later inserted in 1979 by General Zia-ul Haq who came 
to power after the successful coup d’état of 1977. Religion was the founda-
tion on which General Zia attempted to build a structure of support for his 
otherwise unconstitutional rule. He introduced reforms designed to create a 
Nizam-i-Islam (Islamic Order) (Gustafson and Ritcher 1981: 166) in Pakistan. 
The establishment of Shariat courts was central to the reforms. The Shariat 
judicial system was designed to operate in parallel with Pakistan’s long-
standing mainstream judicial system, which had the usual common law 
system. Importantly, the original jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court was 
defined in the Constitution. It was given the power to examine and decide 
the question whether or not any law or provision of law was repugnant to the 
Injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy 
Prophet (Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 203-
D(1)-(3)(b)). Further, if any law or provision of law is held by the Court to be 
repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, such law or provision shall, to the extent 
to which it is held to be so repugnant, cease to have effect on the day on 
which the decision of the Court takes effect (Constitution of Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 203-D).34 Hence, a significant merging of Shariah 
and the modern state system was formed under General Zia’s military rule.
32 Although no article of the Constitution requires the Prime Minister to be Muslim spe-
cifically, however Article 91 used to mention that the ‘National Assembly shall  .  .  .  elect 
.  .  .  one of its Muslim members to be the Prime Minister’, but this explicit requirement 
was eliminated by changes made to the 1973 constitution in 1985. While the Prime 
Minister is required, before assuming office, to take an oath – part of which includes a 
declaration that the Prime Minister is a Muslim – there is nothing in the 1973 constitution 
stating any consequences for mendacity vis-à-vis this oath. See Id. Art. 91(3), Third 
Schedule [art. 91(4)].
33 There are specified seats for non-Muslim minorities on the basis of separate electorate.
34 Ibid. at Art 203-D.
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C. The process of Islamisation and the referendum of 1984
General Zia came to power in 1977 in a military coup. During his 11-year 
rule, he gained international support, mainly from the US, by using the 
Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan as an argument that Pakistan 
required a strong and stable government under his leadership. As for 
domestic political support, General Zia looked to Muslim groups and parties 
(see Nasr 1993: 262–265). For their appeasement, Zia declared Pakistan 
an Islamic state and embarked on a path of promoting Islamic practices in 
the social sphere and in the legal system. However, the same parties and 
religious groups that Zia relied upon to support his rule, had not done too 
well earlier in the elections of 1970 and 1977 (Nasr 1993: 262–265). The 
discussion that follows in this section revolves broadly around the policies 
of the Zia regime that gave Pakistan its unparalleled religious identity. I 
will argue that there was no democratic or popular basis for the religious 
policies of the Zia regime, and therefore, the Islamic face of Pakistan presented 
during this period cannot be truly reflective of the identity of the people of 
Pakistan.
During his reign, General Zia contemplated significant and ambitious 
Islamic reforms in Pakistan. His programme contemplated modifications in 
Pakistan’s legal, economic, educational and social systems. General Zia’s 
agenda of Islamism was a demand for legalism since a broad-based Islamic 
programme could not have been enforced in a state that was not Islamic 
itself. Therefore, beginning with the Constitution, some crucial changes 
were made. Through a ‘repugnancy clause’ in the form of Article 2-A, the 
Objective Resolution, was made a justiciable provision of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, Shariat Courts were grafted onto the judicial system of the 
country, criminal laws were amended, newer Islamic criminal laws in the 
form of Hudood Ordinances of 1979 were enforced, and evidence laws 
were also Islamised to change the competency and quantum of testimony in 
civil and criminal matters (Kennedy 1990: 62–77). Above all, a universal 
process of Islamisation of laws was commenced under the collaborative 
initiative of the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat Court. 
All major and minor laws were examined to asses the vires of those laws in 
the presence of Article 2-A, the ‘repugnancy’ provision of the Constitution 
(Kennedy 1990).
Within the economic system, Islamisation was done by establishing ‘Islamic 
Banks’, calling for abolition of riba (usuary), and introducing a mandatory 
collection of Zakat (social welfare tax) against the bank holdings of Sunni 
Muslims. The Islamisation agenda of General Zia also mandated educational 
reforms by extablishing new institutions to promote Shariah education by 
enhancing the importance of Arabic in the curricula, and by contemplating 
the wholesale redrafting of textbooks to incorporate Islamic pedagogy. 
Social reforms were introduced through stressing the sanctity of Ramzan, 
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the encouragement of purdah (veil), and stricter enforcement of bans on 
gambling and drinking. These Islamic reforms had a very prominent public 
profile and were portrayed as leading Pakistan in the direction of becoming 
‘truly Islamic’.
Hence, General Zia bestowed upon Pakistan, an unparalleled religious 
identity. Never before had there been such an involvement of religion in 
every aspect of life, public or private. This brings us to the questioning of 
the validity of this representation of Pakistan under Zia’s regime.
General Zia enjoyed a form of personal rule, until 1981 when he inaugurated 
the Majlis-i-Shoora, an appointed advisory body that replaced the elected 
national assembly. When General Zia inaugurated the Majlis-i-Shoora in 1981, 
he announced that its main tasks were to accelerate the process of Islamisa-
tion in the country and to create conditions congenial to the establishment 
of an Islamic democracy.35 President Zia viewed the role of his appointed 
Shoora as an intermediate step to the eventual development of what he called 
an Islamic democracy (Korson and Maskiell 1985: 591–592).
Interestingly, in Zia’s Islamic democracy, political parties and their polit-
ical manifestos had no place. The Islamic Ideology Council, in support of 
military regime, declared all political parties un-Islamic. With Parliament 
already dissolved, political parties declared ‘defunct’ and hence banned, 
General Zia called for a referendum in December 1984. In the referendum, 
people were asked to vote on a single issue: ‘whether they supported the 
process initiated by the Government for the Islamisation of all laws in ac-
cordance with the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah and whether they supported the 
Islamic ideology of Pakistan’. General Zia further manipulated the terms of 
the referendum to provide a vote of confidence for his leadership and gave 
an interpretation of a ‘yes’ vote on the referendum as constituting an endorse-
ment of his Islamisation policies and an extension of his Presidency for a 
further five years.36 By incorporating multiple consequences into a single 
question, the government presented voters with a choice of voting for Zia 
or against Islam.37 Despite General Zia’s claims of a fair and free referendum, 
the entire exercise was rather a one-sided affair.38 The referendum of 1984 
was followed by a non-party-based general election in 1985, in which, however, 
35 The other two tasks assigned to the appointed Majlis-i-Shoora were, first, to offer ‘opinion 
and wisdom’ to the administration on important national and international matters; and 
second, to assist in overcoming the economic and social difficulties of the people. On these 
tasks of Majlis-i-Shoora, see further Korson and Maskiell (1985) at 590.
36 Some voters who resolved this dilemma by marking the yes column of their ballots ‘Islam 
yes’ and no column ‘Zia no’ had their ballots declared invalid.
37 During the referendum campaign weeks, the controlled media exhorted the people to vote 
‘yes’; to oppose the referendum or to advocate a boycott was declared a crime and, hence, 
illegal. The offence of boycotting the referendum was made punishable with three years 
imprisonment.
38 On the referendum of 1984, see further Waseem (1989) at 410.
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Jamaat-i-Islami was registered as the only eligible party to contest elections; 
other candidates were expected to contest individually without any party 
affiliations. Since the elections did not involve any political party or political 
manifestos, it is almost impossible to read the electoral tilt. The government 
created under those elections did not present any independent policy but 
continued to tow General Zia’s line. Neither the referendum of 1984, nor 
the general elections of 1985 could bring the required legitimacy of the 
policies of Zia’s regime.
D. Religious sectarianism of the 1980s and 1990s
The rise of the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and Shi’as of Pakistan in the 
80s subjected the nation’s sense of identity to further strains. The emergence 
of the sectarian divide broke that myth of homogeneity of religious identity in 
Pakistan. The sectarian split extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal 
issues between Sunnis and Shi’as, and metamorphosed into a political conflict 
around the mobilisation of religious-group identity to achieve political power 
and viability. Sectarianism in the Pakistani context refers specifically to 
organised and militant religio-political activism, the specific aim of which 
was to promote the socio-political interest of the particular Muslim sectarian 
community. Militant discourses promised empowerment to the sectarian 
community, in tandem with greater adherence to Islamic norms in public 
life (Ahmed 1992: 230 –240).
This prominence of religious-group sectarianism presented a new phase 
in the career of religious identity in Pakistan. This time the demand was 
not for an Islamic state only but for the ‘correct form’ of the Islamic 
state where religious minorities would be marginalised. This sectarianism 
was tied to Islamism in that the defining identity was elaborated in terms 
of Islam. Sectarianism in Pakistan displayed far more concern for religious 
orthodoxy than Confessionalism in Lebanon, and Protestant and Catholic 
politics in Northern Ireland, but the fundamental direction of their politics 
were not dissimilar (Nasr 2000: 171–190) from these other expressions of 
extremism.
There are a number of theories as to why sectarianism flared up in Pakistan. 
Some see Iranian desires to exert control over Pakistani politics as the main 
driver in sectarian divisions (Nasr 2000: 171–190). This understanding can 
be developed in two different ways. Some analysts have argued that the 
ideological force of the Iranian revolution, combined with the fact that the first 
successful Islamic revolution had been carried out by the Shi’as, emboldened 
the Shi’a community and politicised its identity within Pakistan. Others 
have suggested a rather different account of Iranian influence. According to 
these analysts, the emergence of a Shi’a state inspired the Pakistani Sunnis 
so much that they started conceiving afresh the ideal of establishing a Sunni 
Islamic State in Pakistan. In whatever way we approach the influence of the 
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Iranian revolution, other important factors relate to the domestic religious 
and political context. Since General Zia’s reforms39 were based on strict Sunni 
interpretations of Islamic law (rather than Islamic universalism), the Shi’as 
viewed them as interferences with their religious freedom and a threat to 
their socio-political interests. These grievances fed into the violent clashes 
between the Sunni majority and Shi’a minority (Zaman 1998: 689 –716).
Alongside the domestic context, we need to keep in mind the significance 
of the Soviet–Afghan war of the eighties. The Iranian revolution and the 
Afghan conflict were redefining the terms of the Cold War. The need to 
sustain an anti-Soviet alliance led western powers to ignore or even support 
the universalisation of religious identity in Pakistan. The unpopular and 
despotic military regime thus received little criticism from the US and their 
western allies. However, except for its utility in the Soviet–Afghan war, such 
a strong and universal religious identity was in no one’s interest, a fact so 
thoroughly proven by the events of 9/11 and later (Zaman 1998).
E. Integrating religious and political identities:  
a comment on Zia ul Haq regime
During the Zia era, therefore, Pakistan continued to suffer a ‘real’ identity 
crisis. Although this time, the appended hardcore religio-political identity 
of Pakistan was in line with the script of a broader world scenario. Two 
important inferences could be drawn from the analysis made in this part of 
the article. First, no process has been initiated to assess democratically the 
inclination of the people of Pakistan, which consequently makes the entire 
attribution of religious identity to the Pakistani people a highly questionable 
assumption, especially in the light of counter-indicators such as the referendum 
of 1984. Second, the attachment of religious identity to Pakistan has served 
the interests of military regimes, and the interests of western powers. Under 
Zia’s rule the image of religious identity was stretched to such a point that 
it became a religious identity of universal import. However, what Pakistan 
really needed was a territorially tailored identity to accommodate its other-
wise ethnically plural society. This could not be developed since the ruling 
civil-military oligarchy continued to define the state’s identity through mixing 
religious and militarist nationalism. Sectarianism further revealed the tensions 
inherent in the vision of a nation united under Islam.
39 Shi’as made their position clear when in 1980 General Zia sought to implement Sunni 
laws of inheritance and collection of zakat, which the state was charged to collect in the 
name of Islam. Faced with the strong Shi’a protest and significant external pressure, the 
government capitulated. It recognized Shi’a communal rights and thus gave legitimacy 
to their sectarian posturing.
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IV. Pakistan, religious identity and post-9/11 world
Although the period from 1988 to 199940 can be marked as democratic, the 
military continued to dominate Pakistani politics. It set Pakistan’s ideo-
logical and national security agenda, and repeatedly intervened to direct the 
course of domestic politics. Hence, Pakistan was prevented from developing 
a consistent system of government, with unrelenting political polarisation 
between civilians and the military, and between Islamists and secularists. 
This semi-democratic period ended when General Musharraf seized power in 
October 1999. The Musharraf regime has both experienced and shaped the 
impact of the post-9/11 transition upon the religious identity of Pakistan.
A. The Musharraf regime: distancing religious identity  
from national identity
In the context of religious identity, the Musharraf regime presents a phase that 
is distinct from the earlier periods. The pre-Musharraf periods of Pakistan’s 
political history can be easily classified as one uniform phase on the basis of 
at least three common characteristics. First, in all previous political periods 
of history, Pakistan has had authoritarian military regimes; second, these 
regimes have used religion profusely as a common denominator in national 
identity; third, all these regimes had especially used a pan-Islamic interpre-
tation of religious identity.
The Musharraf regime, however, has been different. When Musharraf took 
over in 1999, his military government needed a new ideology. As we have 
seen, the military regime of Zia had extensively used religion. Musharraf, on 
the other hand succeeded the semi-democratic period of the 1990s, which 
followed the massive Islamisation of the 1980s. The 1990s governments of 
Ms Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif did not interfere with the already existing 
Islamisation of General Zia and continued with existing Islamic policies. 
When Musharraf took over government, the political utility of religion in 
Pakistan was at its lowest ever. Musharraf’s emphasis on taking up a moderate 
approach towards religion reflected the lack of support for a religion-based 
politics amongst the masses who repeatedly showed themselves to be more 
interested in economic reforms and social justice.
Moreover, Musharraf ’s option to use religion politically was further reduced 
by the events of 9/11. One of the main dynamics of the post-9/11 world had 
been a suspicion of pan-Islamism, and the unfortunate identification of Islam 
40 The reason for passing over the entire period of alternated democratic governments of Ms 
Benazir Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif has been that both of their tenures had hardly any 
effect on the identity crisis of the country. Pakistan continued its disproportionate focus 
on religious identity as the primary political identity, defined and developed mainly 
through military leadership.
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with terrorism and violence. The decision to ally with the US-led coalition 
made it necessary for the Musharraf regime to break away from this religious 
identity of pan-Islamism. Thus in terms of religio-political identity, the 
Musharraf government can be contrasted to Zia’s. During the Zia regime 
the religious parties and the military had been the leading architects of the 
religious identity of Pakistan. In the aftermath of 9/11, for the first time, 
there has been a ‘real’ clash of interest between the religious parties and 
the military. At last the military leadership appears to be denouncing the 
Islamism that is so bound up with Pakistani political identity.
B. ‘Pakistan First’ – a paradigm shift: from pan-Islamism  
to globalism
The Musharraf regime invented a new slogan: ‘Pakistan First’41 to denote an 
ideological departure from the previously held religious identity. ‘Pakistan 
First’ attempted to redefine Pakistani identity on three primary lines. First, 
Pakistan’s identity should break free from the stagnant religio-political 
elements based on pan-Islamism. Second, the identity of Pakistan must be 
defined in terms of the territorial reality of Pakistan with the commitment 
to preserve the state. And third, the preservation of the state lies in opting 
to side with the US and her allies.42 The ‘Pakistan First’ ideology was further 
supplemented by an ‘enlightened moderation’43 doctrine that called for the 
adoption of a new approach to religion, stressing tolerance, openness, revolt 
against taboos and acceptance of western cultural values.
Comparing ‘Pakistan First’ and ‘enlightened moderation’ with the univer-
salistic religio-political ideology of the 1980s, reveals that although they 
are quite distinct positions, the methods of their implementation have been 
the same. The universalistic religious identity of Pakistanis was a military 
attribution, just as this latest moderation had been conferred upon the people 
of Pakistan by a military ruler. There is another fundamental problem. 
Musharraf ’s ‘Pakistan First’ impressed upon people the need to identify 
with globalism, as represented by the culture and values of the West. The 
demands of pan-Islamism and globalism, in the context of Pakistan, are 
common in the sense that they both have considerably ignored the demands 
attached to the territorial reality of Pakistan.
41 President Musharraf’s Speech on 19 September 2001 available at www.americanrhetoric.
com/speeches/pakistanpresident.htm (last visited on 11 October 2007).
42 Ibid. For further comment on Musharraf’s ‘Pakistan First’ theory, see Shafqat Mehmood, 
Pakistan Comes First, available at www.jang.com.pk/thenews/columnists/shafqat/shafqat21.
htm (last visited on 21 October 2007).
43 Pervez Musharraf, Time for Enlightened Moderation (2004) available at www.presidentof 
pakistan.gov.pk/EnlightenedModeration.aspx (last visited on 12 October 2007).
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C. Rejection of attempts at disintegration between religious and 
national: electoral success of religious parties in 2002
Ever since the creation of Pakistan, religious parties have struggled to estab-
lish a foothold in the country’s mainstream politics. The ‘liberal lobby’ always 
boasted that religious groups had never been able to muster double-digit 
figures in terms of seats in any general election (Murlidhar Reddy 2002). 
Ironically, the general elections of 2002 proved an exception to this rule. In 
the 2002 elections, the Mutahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a political alliance 
of religious parties, came to power. Their success and popularity can be 
explained as a popular reaction against the US invasion of Afghanistan, and 
the failure of leadership in the mainstream political parties in 2002 elections 
(Moreau and Hussain with Hirsh 2002: 39). Just as the Muslim League in 
undivided India highlighted the external factor of ‘fear of Hindu dominion’ to 
transform the religious identity into a political aspiration, the interpretation 
of ‘war against terrorism’ as ‘war against Muslims’ has helped religious parties 
to success in elections.44
At the time of the formation of this religious parties alliance, it was proclaimed 
that they should struggle to ‘protect the Islamic identity’ of the country and 
promote the basic objectives of the creation of Pakistan. Most of these successful 
religious parties initiated their demand for converting Pakistan into an Islamic 
state soon after independence in 1947. Although they were unable to generate 
popular support for their mission, the ruling elite (particularly the military) did 
initiate a process of giving the Pakistani state an Islamic identity for reasons of 
their own political expediency. The official measures taken to Islamise Pakistan 
in the first three decades have been more of cosmetic exercises, whereas the 
electoral success of 2002 did raise speculation as to how these Islamic parties’ 
world-view would affect the spectrum of ‘national identity’ in Pakistan.
V. Complexity of the national identity issue faced 
by Pakistan
Why did Musharraf ’s ‘Pakistan First’ fail as an identity slogan for the people 
of Pakistan? This question is particularly important since two arguments 
have already been made in the paper: first, the religious identity of 1947 
needed to be transformed into a more territorially designed political identity45; 
and second, the people of Pakistan did not politically support the pan-Islamic 
44 For detailed results of the 2002 parliamentary elections, see www.heraldelections.com (last 
visited on 10 October 2007). See further Moreau and Hussain with Hirsh (2002) at 39 – 40 
(noting that among others a notable factor in this political victory has been the passivity 
of the otherwise secular voters, though the religious parties have made these electoral 
gains without dramatically increasing the share of votes traditionally won by them).
45 See text on page 20.
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version of religious identity bestowed by Zia.46 Therefore, the chances of 
success for Musharraf ’s identity doctrine should have been quite bright since 
‘Pakistan First’ created an impression of being a territorially oriented identity 
and ‘enlightened moderation’ cuts deep into the Islamic universalism adopted 
during the Zia regime. The creation and growth of an identity, however, 
is not a mechanical but an organic process. In fact, Musharraf repeated 
Zia’s mistake. He tried to implant an identity upon the people of Pakistan. 
Musharraf ’s vision of ‘enlightened moderation’ for Pakistan was fraught with 
contradictions in regards to its domestic, regional, and international policies. 
Furthermore, this ‘enlightened moderation’ was not followed by any democ-
ratisation of the country.47
Furthermore, the current attachment of a non-religious identity on Paki-
stan is ever so more important due to its timing in world history, particularly 
when capitalism, in the guise of an ideology, is asserting its need to be 
transnational. These are the times when, globally, the choice has been reduced 
between acceptance and rejection, which further cuts deeper into the chance 
for ‘moderation’ to evolve as an ideology. Following this upon the basis of 
arguments developed in this paper, it is submitted that instead of predeter-
minism, chance must follow the democratisation process since the formation 
and change of identity is a process that can neither be planted nor uprooted. 
Hence, reliance must be placed upon leaving this organic process intact, and 
upon allowing the democratisation of the society and people of Pakistan. 
This will offer a possibility of the evolution of moderate forces which will 
in return shape a national identity for Pakistan in which a balance between 
the religion and politics will be struck; a realisation of Jinnah’s vision of 
Pakistan, as stated in July 1947 (Khan 1985):
Religion is there and religion is dear to us  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  but there are other 
things which are very vital, our social life, our economic life, and without 
political power how can you defend your faith and your economic life?
 (Ahmad 1970: 380)
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Chapter 9
Theorizing Islam without  
the state
Islamic discourses on the minority 
status of Muslims in the West
Alexandre Caeiro*
I. Introduction
Discussions about the necessity of creating a ‘European Islam’ have become 
ubiquitous throughout the continent today. State actors and public intel-
lectuals across the political spectrum frequently emphasise the need to adapt 
Islam to the West in order to counter the threat of terrorism, prevent the 
radicalisation of young Muslims, facilitate the integration of immigrants and 
render Islam compatible with European secularisms. Although they rarely 
take part in these public discussions, orthodox Muslim scholars committed 
to the Islamic legal tradition ( fiqh or shari‘a) have over the past decades been 
debating similar issues in the global spaces of Islamic normative debate which 
they inhabit. This article deals with these debates, focusing specifically on 
the attempts by Islamic scholars to theorise a distinctive ‘European’ or ‘Western 
Islam’ through what is called a Muslim jurisprudence for minorities ( fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat or minority fiqh).1 Fiqh al-aqalliyyat is a new construct in the 
Islamic legal tradition closely associated with the fiqh councils based in the 
West, namely the European Council for Fatwa and Research and the Fiqh 
* Research Fellow, Erlangen Zentrum für Islam und Recht in Europa EZIRE, Friedrich-
Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg.
1 I distinguish here between descriptive and normative uses of minority fiqh. By descriptive 
uses I mean the understandings of the rights and duties under Islamic Law of Muslims 
living as minorities in predominantly non-Muslim lands. In this regard, instances of fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat occur whenever Muslim minorities have sought guidance under the shari‘a. 
The problems they have faced, and the juristic opinions these problems have elicited, 
constitute fiqh al-aqalliyyat in this descriptive sense. The focus of this paper is, however, 
on the normative uses of fiqh al-aqalliyyat. These refer to the call voiced by Muslim actors 
to devise a new system of Islamic normativity (fiqh) that suits the specificities of Muslim 
minorities. As I argue below, this call is thoroughly a modern one, engaging a wide number 
of contemporary Muslim scholars and activists. The extent to which this discourse draws 
on, selects and ignores the opinions found in the Islamic fiqh heritage is left here as an 
open question.
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Council of North America.2 It finds one of its most regular social expressions 
in the live fatwa sessions conducted by websites such as www.IslamOnLine.net, 
a prominent Arabic–English Internet portal with headquarters in Doha.3 
Although an attempt to understand the practical orientations of the construct 
must also therefore study the fatwas that are issued in its name, in this paper 
I approach fiqh al-aqalliyyat from a third angle: as the subject of specific 
theoretical reflection by Muslim scholars and public intellectuals. A significant 
number of books and articles arguing for and against minority fiqh have been 
published in Arabic since the early 2000s.4 These texts have so far received 
little attention from social scientists, perhaps because of a tendency to view 
these kinds of writings as apologetic texts seeking – in the best tradition of 
Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh) – to provide theoretical bases for already 
existing social practices (and therefore of limited theoretical interest in and 
of themselves).5 In contrast to these views, I treat the elaborations on fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat here as discursive interventions into larger debates on Muslim 
identity and the integration of Islam in Europe – debates which in turn 
connect variously with discussions in the Muslim majority world about the 
viability of tradition, the prospects of reform, and the dynamics of religious 
authority. In this paper I seek to unpack the debate on whether European 
Muslims require or not a new system of Islamic normativity specifically 
designed for life as a minority living in a predominantly non-Muslim polity, 
and the particular conceptions of Islam and of Europe that underlie this 
debate.6 Given the diversity of trajectories, interests and sensibilities of the 
Muslim actors participating in the minority fiqh discourse, the question of 
what actually constitutes this construct arises with a certain urgency: what 
precisely underlies the vivid terminological dispute about the legitimacy of 
a ‘minority fiqh’ – a dispute which has blurred the conventional dichotomies 
2 On the ECFR see Caeiro (2004 and 2010) and Rohe (2004); on the FCNA see DeLorenzo 
(2000) and Karman (2008).
3 On IslamOnLine see Gräf (2008).
4 Many of these writings are listed in the bibliography.
5 See on this point al-Azmeh (1988). Some orthodox Muslim scholars have reached similar 
conclusions. As ‘Abd al-Majid al-Najjar (2003: 45 – 8) notes, usul al-fiqh emerges counter-
intuitively not before but after fiqh has dealt with real cases. For a different attempt to 
make sense of Muslim writings on fiqh al-aqalliyyat see March 2009.
6 Many of the texts arguing for or against minority fiqh are responses to particular fiqh issues 
such as the permissibility of political participation in non-Muslim countries, the status of 
the marriage of a married woman who converts to Islam while the husband does not, or 
the uses of interest-bearing mortgages to buy property. I have dealt with the latter in an 
earlier article (Caeiro 2004). The hypothesis I am pursuing now in this article is that the 
debates on minority fiqh, even when they take as their starting point particular fiqh issues 
as those mentioned above, are actually debates about how to understand the viability of 
the Islamic legal tradition (what continuities and changes are necessary for it to remain a 
living and coherent tradition?), and how to conceptualise the contemporary secular West 
and the kinds of freedoms and constraints that it places upon Muslims.
9780415566810_C09.indd   210 5/16/11   3:27:56 PM
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
FS
Theorizing Islam without the state 211
between ‘traditionalist’ versus ‘reformist’ actors?7 And what is at stake in 
discussions of minority fiqh as ‘just another branch’ (Qaradawi 2001) or a 
‘special kind’ (Alwani 2003) of Islamic normativity?
I will argue here that writings on minority fiqh are – as the name indicates 
– predicated on a commitment to the Islamic legal tradition, and on an 
understanding of the minority condition as posing a particular challenge to 
the viability of that tradition. I then show that the kinds of commitments 
to fiqh as well as the understandings of the appropriateness of the minority 
condition to describe the situation of Muslims in Europe actually vary widely 
even amongst minority fiqh advocates. This variation seems to reflect the 
fact that Muslim actors writing on the topic come from different social and 
intellectual backgrounds8; if they write mostly in Arabic, they nevertheless 
address different audiences and respond to divergent concerns.9 The starting 
points of their reflections range from the continuation of an interest in non-
Muslim minorities under Islamic states (Qaradawi 2001), to a contextual 
engagement with Islam debates in Western public spheres (‘Alwani 2003), 
to a critical approach to human rights discourses (‘Atiya Muhammad 2007). 
I conclude by suggesting that it is perhaps in the relatively open-ended 
nature of the minority fiqh discourse, liable to different appropriations by 
various actors, that resides the interest and appeal of the discourse.
II. The emergence of fiqh al-aqalliyyat
It seems appropriate to start by providing a sense of the contexts in which 
the discussion on minority fiqh takes place. The transnational circulation of 
7 In the writings of contemporary Muslim scholars the very use of the expression ‘fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat’ has become fraught with implications. Muslim scholars who write today on 
‘fiqh al-aqalliyyat’ are assumed to be in favour of the political participation of Muslims in 
the West, the use of interest-bearing mortgages to buy a house, and the permissibility of 
staying in a marital relationship with a non-Muslim husband for the married woman who 
converts to Islam – in other words, they are assumed to agree with the fatwas issued by 
the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) under the guidance of Qaradawi. 
Those scholars who write on Muslims in the West from a fiqh perspective but who never-
theless do not wish to be associated with the particular approaches of the ECFR use terms 
such as ‘fiqh al-darura’, ‘fiqh al-nawazil’, or ‘qadayya al-jaliyat al muslima fi-l-gharb’.
8 Qaradawi and Alwani are traditionally trained ulama who have earned doctorates in fiqh 
from Al-Azhar, while Bishri and al-Najjar, although qualified in fiqh, are more eclectic 
Muslim/Islamist intellectuals. They all seem to share, however, an emphasis on Islam’s 
comprehensiveness, a hallmark of the Muslim Brotherhood paradigm.
9 Qaradawi’s work on fiqh al-aqalliyyat, to give just one example, has been presented at the 
Muslim World League’s 4th General Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia (April 2002); it 
has been discussed in front of a transnational audience on Al-Jazeera’s al-sharia wa-l-haya 
(14 September 1997; 2 May 1999); it is widely available for a general readership in Egypt; 
and has been presented by Qaradawi to gatherings of Muslims on the occasion of his visits 
to Europe – and in his meetings with European state officials.
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the discourse is in this regard quite striking. Its most famous advocates live 
in locations as different as the United States (Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani and Salah 
Sultan), France (‘Abd al-Majid al-Najjar and Al-‘Arabi al-Bishri), and the 
Gulf countries (‘Abd Allah Bin Bayyah in Saudi Arabia and Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
in Qatar).10 Similarly, some of the most vocal contestations of the construct 
have originated in continental Europe (Tariq Ramadan), the United Kingdom 
(Asif Khan), Egypt (Salah al-Sawi) and Syria (Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti). Fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat has thus seemingly given rise to global – and often impassioned – 
debates. Although this transnationalism draws to some extent on the traditional 
cosmopolitanism that characterises the universalistic traditions of Islam, the 
task at hand is to avoid ahistorical and reified notions by providing a situated 
account of the scope and limits of this cosmopolitanism.11 The current article 
seeks to lay the grounds for such an account.
Minority fiqh has become an established topic of study and research in 
several Islamic institutions of higher education across the West.12 In addition 
to the Arabic texts on minority fiqh which circulate in a variety of media 
forms,13 translations of the books by Alwani and Qaradawi have appeared in 
English and French, targeting mostly the Muslim youth born or educated in 
the West.14 While elite study groups convening in London, Paris, Rotterdam or 
the San Francisco Bay Area have debated the pros and cons of minority fiqh,15 
10 Interestingly, all of these advocates of minority fiqh are themselves migrants: ‘Alwani was 
born in Iraq, studied at Al-Azhar and moved to the US in the early 1980s; Qaradawi 
is Egyptian by birth and education; Bin Bayyah was a Minister in his home country 
Mauritania before moving to Saudi Arabia to teach; al-Najjar is Tunisian, lived in the 
Gulf before settling in France around the turn of the century. The Algerian-born al-Bishri 
has been based in France for two decades.
11 See on this point Zaman (2005).
12 The list of institutions offering courses on minority fiqh includes the Institut Européen 
des Sciences Humaines in France (IESH); the ALIM (American Learning Institute for 
Muslims); the IIIT and the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (now Cordoba 
University) in the United States; the European Academy of Islamic Studies (East London); 
and the Abu Zahra in the UK, etc. Fiqh of minorities is also an area of research at 
Malaysia’s International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), Saudi Arabia’s Al-
Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, Dar al-‘Ulum in Cairo, Batna University 
in Algeria, etc.
13 Alwani’s book has been published by Nahdat Misr in Cairo and is available at www. 
islamonline.net. Bin Bayyah’s treatise was published by the Global Wasatiyya Centre in 
Kuwait as well as the Global Centre for Renewal and Guidance in the UK. The lectures 
on which the book was partly based are available in an 18-CD set from Alhambra Produc-
tions in the US.
14 Significantly, Qaradawi’s book has also been translated into Bosnian, while Alwani’s 
treatise has come out in Russian and there are plans to translate it into Chinese (see IIIT, 
‘Chinese Scholars, IIIT Look into Possibilities of Joint Research’, at www.iiit.org).
15 In June 2005, a talk on ‘The Jurisprudence (Fiqh) of Muslim Minorities’ by the imam of 
al-Muntada al-Islami Mosque (West London) Haitham al-Haddad was held in London. 
At the time of writing the speaker was completing a PhD on minority fiqh at the School 
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larger Muslim audiences attending the great Islamic meetings of the Diaspora 
have become increasingly familiar with its principles and techniques.16 
Although the discussion is framed in the language of the fiqh tradition, the 
participants who have actively engaged in this debate in the West are not 
limited to the traditional interpreters of that tradition, the ulama.17 Muslim 
preachers, social scientists, media professionals and activists have also made 
significant contributions to the discourse. Western policy-makers and academics 
are also paying increasing attention to (and sometimes actively encouraging) 
these inter-Muslim debates.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, for a concept which deliberately attempts to con-
struct borders in a global religious field (Bowen 2004), minority fiqh has 
also attracted considerable attention in the Muslim majority countries of the 
Arab world.18 In the Muslim world state and non-state actors alike participate 
in the production and dissemination of minority fiqh – including in its most 
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). In Spring 2008, a study group met at London’s 
Regent Park Mosque around Kamal Hussein (also known as Abu Zahrah) to critically 
engage reformist approaches to Islam, including those related to fiqh al-aqalliyyat. Email 
discussion groups and internet forums announced both events widely. In 2001 ‘Abd Allah 
Bin Bayyah (a member of the ECFR) gave a series of lectures on fiqh al-aqalliyyat at the 
Zaytuna Institute in California. A five-part lecture entitled ‘The Need For A Minority Fiqh’ 
by US scholar Ali at-Tamimi is available on YouTube. In the mid-2000s the Islamic Univer-
sity of Rotterdam invited Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti to discuss the idea of minority fiqh.
16 Minority fiqh has become a regular topic in events such as the Annual Convention of 
the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) since the 1990s, typically through panels 
involving scholars affiliated to the Fiqh Council of North America (Ihsan Bagby, Zulfiqar 
Ali Shah, Jamal Badawi, Yusuf Ziya Kavakci, etc.). Likewise, the ‘Rencontre Annuelle 
des Musulmans de France’ organized by the Union des organisations islamiques de France 
(UOIF) at the Bourget has included discussions on fiqh al-aqalliyyat since the late 1990s 
(involving mostly ‘Abd Allah Bin Bayyah and local members of the ECFR).
17 In an explicit attempt to widen the scope of voices in the debate beyond the circle of the 
traditional scholars a conference on ‘Fiqh Today: Muslims as Minorities’ was organised 
in 2004 by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) in association with the 
International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), the London-based Muslim College, and 
the British Muslim monthly magazine Q-News. Anas S. Al-Sheikh Ali used his Opening 
Remarks to criticise the ‘knowledge by remote control’ of many of the scholars issuing 
fatwas for Muslims in the West, calling for the ‘full participation’ of social scientists in 
the construction of a fiqh al-aqalliyyat. Proceedings of the AMSS are forthcoming from 
AMSSUK Publications, see www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf /Fiqh%20for%20Minorities%20
Conference%20Review.pdf. The conference found wide echoes both in the media. See 
‘Jam‘iyyat ulama al-ijtima‘iyyat al-muslimina fi Britania tundhdhimu mu’tamaran hawla 
fiqh al-aqalliyyat’, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 17/2/2004 and the conference report in IslamOnLine 
by Adul-Rehman Malik, ‘Fiqh Today: Muslims as Minorities’, www.islamonline.net/ 
servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1162385854362&pagename=Zone-English-Euro_
Muslims%2FEMELayout.
18 The interesting question of how to explain the overwhelmingly Arab dominance in the 
current debate (in comparison to the relative lack of engagement by South Asian or Turkish 
scholars despite the importance of their respective Diasporas) cannot be dealt with here.
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official circles. Several Arab states have been directly involved in the financing 
of the minority fiqh project, such as the ruling family of Dubai (Sheikh 
Hamdan Rashid’s Maktoum Foundation funds the ECFR) and the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs in Kuwait (which sponsors a newly established Global 
Wasatiyya Centre active in the West) and Qatar (which has published a 
treatise on minority fiqh in its Kitab al-Umma series). Publishing houses in 
Cairo and Beirut – the powerhouses of Arabic publishing – as well as in 
Amman, Doha and Kuwait City have invested the discourse. In Egypt, the 
investment in this discourse by representatives of state Islam and of the 
Islamist opposition provides one illustration of the porosity of the boundaries 
between the two camps.19 Meetings of Muslim scholars organised by the 
Saudi-backed Muslim World League have since the 2000s regularly included 
the presentation and discussion of papers establishing the contours of a 
distinctive ‘minority fiqh’.20 The recently established International Union of 
Muslim Scholars (Ittihad al’Alami li-l-Ulama al Muslimin) has a special 
committee that deal with the issues of minorities and publishes books 
on the subject. The London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat has 
contributed much to stimulating the debate amongst Arabic-speaking Muslims 
at home and in the Diaspora. The satellite TV station Al-Jazeera, particularly 
in the weekly talk-show al-shari‘a wa-l-hayat (Islamic Law and Life), has 
provided another privileged venue for debate on the topic.21
As several of the previous examples suggest, many of the actors engaging 
with minority fiqh are linked to the scholarly networks established around 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the ‘global mufti’ (Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen 2009) 
who chairs the ECFR and author of a widely read and taught book on fiqh 
19 In addition to regularly attending the sessions of the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research, scholars from Al-Azhar also participated in a 2003 Cairo conference on fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat organised by IslamOnLine for its media muftis. The conference, which targeted 
mainly the fatwa editors of the website, was attended by two members of the ECFR 
educated at Al-Azhar and living in the West (Salah Soltan and Hussein Halawa) and a 
professor of comparative fiqh from the millenariam Islamic university (‘Atiya Fayyad). A 
summary of the meeting is available at www.islamonline.net/arabic/Daawa/2003/08/ 
article09.shtml. More recently, a lawyer with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood 
published a book on the topic in Cairo (‘Atiya Muhammad 2007).
20 See, for a recent illustration, ‘Al-mu’tamar al-‘alami li-l-fatawa: hadithu “an al-zaman 
wa-l-makan wa haya” li-riqaba “al-fatwa” wa fiqh “al-aqalliyyat” ’, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 
19/01/2009. Qaradawi’s work on fiqh al-aqalliyyat was presented at the Muslim World 
League’s 4th General Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia (April 2002). See also the article 
of Sano Koutoub Moustapha, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Method in Handling Issues of 
Muslim Minorities’, Journal of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, 16th Issue, Vol. 1 (2006).
21 Episodes of Al-Shari‘a wa-l-Hayat devoted to fiqh al-aqalliyyat or to fiqhi perspectives on 
Muslims in the West have been aired with relative frequency since the programme’s 
foundation in 1996. For the importance of al-shari‘a wa-l-hayat amongst Arabic-speaking 
Muslims in Europe see for example Roald (2001).
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al-aqalliyyat (Qaradawi 2001).22 The interest on fiqh al-aqalliyyat, however, 
seems part of a broader global Muslim concern with the future of Islam in 
the West – a concern that has galvanised and perplexed public opinion in 
the Arab world at key moments (the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo; the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid and London; the recurrent European debates on veiling) 
and with relative intensity since 9/11 and the rise of Islamophobia. This 
concern with Muslim minorities mobilises figures as different as the state 
Mufti of Egypt Ali Gumu‘a,23 the constellation of actors and networks 
involved in the discourse on the maqasid al-shari‘a24 and tajdid al-islam,25 the 
drafters of The Amman Message,26 and the international Islamic fiqh councils 
based in Saudi Arabia.27 It often appears to be predicated upon a de-politicised 
understanding of terrorism as stemming from inappropriate understandings 
22 More specifically on Qaradawi’s role and activities in Europe see Caeiro and Saify (2009).
23 See IslamOnLine, ‘Egypt’s Mufti Urges Integration Protocol for Muslims in the West’, 
www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-01/13/article08.shtml.
24 Work on the maqasid is often what leads Muslim scholars to engage in minority fiqh in 
the West as in the East: Alwani, Qaradawi, Jamal al-din ‘Atiya Muhammad, ‘Abd al-Majid 
al-Najjar, and Muhammad Brich all fall under this category. Many of these thinkers 
sometimes appear to use fiqh al-aqalliyyat and fiqh al-maqasid interchangeably.
25 As Professor Muhammad al-Mansi of Dar al-‘Ulum told me, ‘to speak of fiqh al-aqalliyyat 
is to speak of tajdid al-fiqh’ (personal communication, Cairo, 25 May 2010). Mansi began 
teaching a course on fiqh al-aqalliyyat which he devised himself in 2008. Similarly, the 
current Minister of Religious Endowments of Egypt singles out in a recent publication 
Muslim minorities as one of the areas of jurisprudence where the need for tajdid is most 
pressing (Zakzouq 2007: 28).
26 Note in this regard the necessity felt by the drafters of the Message to include in this 
Islamic declaration against terrorism a sentence enjoining Muslims in the West towards 
‘good citizenship’ (The Amman Message, pp. VIII, 90).
27 The minority fiqh construct has also given rise to (largely autonomous) debates and local 
appropriations in places like India, Singapore and South Africa. The ways in which these 
local debates inter-relate with those I study here are outside the scope of this paper. See 
inter alia Yoginder Sikand’s review of Taha Jabir al-Alwani’s Towards a Fiqh for Minorities 
published in two parts in the Indian Muslim magazine The Milli Gazette, 16 –30 April 
2004 and 1–15 May 2004; Noor Aisha Binte Abdul Rahman (Assistant Professor at 
National University of Singapore), ‘Muslim Resurgence and the Case for Minority Fiqh 
in Singapore’, paper presented at The Sacred in a Global City: Symposium on Religion 
in Singapore (10 March 2007), National Museum of Singapore, 10 March 2007; Shaykh 
Moegamat Igshaan Taliep (Vice-Rector of the International Peace University South Africa), 
‘Muslim Participation in South African liberal democracy: an usul al-fiqh approach’, 
online at www.ipsauniversity.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=128: 
muslim-participation-in-south-african-liberal-democracy-an-usul-al-fiqh-approach&catid=
54:papers&Itemid=111 (accessed 23 January 2009); and Na’eem Jeenah, ‘Political Islam 
in South Africa and its contribution to a discourse of a fiqh of minorities’, paper presented 
at Islamic Civilisation in Southern Africa conference, organised by the University of 
Johannesburg, Awqaf South Africa and OIC Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and 
Culture (IRCICA), University of Johannesburg, 1–3 September 2006.
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of Islamic norms.28 The global nature of the fiqh al-aqalliyyat debate thus 
confirms the existence of a specifically Muslim public space (Mandaville 2001; 
Eickelman and Salvatore 2004) while reminding us that globalisation leads 
not only to the collapse of old frontiers but also to the establishment of new 
boundaries. Advocates of minority fiqh have to work through the disjuncture 
arising out of their various geographical locations (in other words, their 
operation in a global field), on the one hand, and their own commitment to 
setting symbolic boundaries (designing a fiqh for minorities), on the other.29
III. The concept of minority, citizenship, and the law
Advocates of minority fiqh seek to ‘restore the role of sharia in modern life’.30 
This commitment to the Islamic legal tradition, as Qasim Zaman (2002) has 
shown, is in many ways constitutive of the otherwise heterogeneous body of 
the ulama. In the writings of minority fiqh advocates, as I hinted above, this 
commitment is accompanied by a view of the minority status as constituting 
a distinctive political problem for the Islamic tradition. Accordingly, the 
concept of ‘minority’ has given rise to quite wide-ranging debates: on what 
grounds can the status of minority be legitimised? How should the minority 
condition itself be understood – in terms of numbers, power differentials, 
legal rights, or states of mind? Does this status accurately reflect the reality 
of Muslims in Europe? Is the distinction majority-minority natural to Muslim 
legal thought and to the workings of European secular democracies – or is 
it the product of a political imagination which tends to view European 
Muslims as less than normal citizens?
Practitioners of minority fiqh vary in their understandings of the historical 
specificities of the presence of Muslim minorities in the West. Some argue that 
the current minority situation is unprecedented (Ibram 2002), mirroring the 
claims made by a number of Western social scientists.31 Others point to the 
28 Alternatively one might read the connections that are established between the need to 
establish a minority fiqh and the terrorist threat as an attempt to pre-empt an understanding 
of terrorism as stemming from religious interpretations. If this is the case, one might still 
consider the risk of performative contradiction that strikes Muslim discourses which explicitly 
connect the two. For an explicit postulation of the link between ‘the need’ for fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat and the necessity to contain the terrorist threat see Alwani (2003: xviii).
29 Muslim scholars based in the Islamic world such as Qaradawi or Bin Bayyah face of course 
a particular predicament: if their call for devising a new fiqh for minorities by integrating 
knowledge of the reality of Muslim communities in the West works to disqualify compet-
ing Muslim voices in the Muslim world, it also seems to undermine their own authority 
to speak on these issues, not least in the eyes of Muslims in the West. As far as I am 
aware they have not yet openly addressed this seeming paradox in their writings.
30 Quotations of Alwani are taken from the English text published by the IIIT in 2003, 
except when the Arabic text published in the ECFR’s Majalla (to which ‘Ajil al-Nashmi 
responds) differs significantly from the English version. All translations are mine.
31 Yusuf Ibram is a Moroccan scholar based in Zurich and a member of the ECFR.
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fact that although Muslim minorities have historically existed and have in many 
ways been a condition for the expansion of the religion, their incorporation 
into the juristic tradition of fiqh has been limited due to historical contin-
gencies.32 According to the latter line of reasoning, the contemporary necessity 
for elaborating a minority fiqh is variously related to the current centrality of 
minorities in Islam (Alwani 2003: xiii; see also Nielsen 2002 and Ramadan 2003); 
the connectedness of the modern world (Alwani 2003: xiii; Bin Bayyah n/d); the 
need to dispel talk of civilisational clashes; the unprecedented level of penetration 
of modern state power into individual lives; and the possibilities offered by 
the institutionalisation of minority rights under international human rights 
regimes (Alwani 2003: xii; Bin Bayyah n/d; ‘Atiya Muhammad 2007).
One of the most common starting points for the reflection on a Muslim 
jurisprudence for minorities has been the question of the religious status of 
Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. Critically engaging the fiqh tradition 
on this question, Muslim scholars have asked whether emigration from and 
residence outside traditional Muslim lands is forbidden (haram), discouraged 
(makruh), permissible (mubah), encouraged (mandub) or obligatory (wajib) – the 
five gradings that have historically defined the system of Islamic normativity. 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi draws on two different structures of justification to legitimise 
the Muslim presence in the West. In a number of fatwas and other texts, he has 
argued from within the fiqh tradition that Muslims living in non-Muslim 
nations are not required to emigrate to Muslim lands: Qaradawi stresses here 
the universality of Islam and refers to the Qur’an (21: 107; 25: 1). This 
universality usually requires, in a second moment, a redefinition of the dar 
al-islam/dar al-harb binary; Qaradawi preferring to use dar al-‘ahd (the domain 
of truce) or the non-committal ‘non-Muslim lands’.33 Historical memories of 
32 al-Najjar explains the relative lack of theorisation of minorities in fiqh by reference to the 
small number of Muslims living as minorities historically, and to the fact that by the 
time Muslim minorities acquired a certain importance the gate of ijtihad had already been 
closed (2003: 45–8). One Muslim explanation of the closing of the gate of ijtihad represents 
it as the result of attempts by the ulama to preserve the authenticity of the shari’a from 
political interventions (Bin Bayyah, n/d).
33 Dar al-Islam (The Domain of Islam) refers to the territories where the population is 
Muslim and/or shari’a is applied. It is classically opposed to Dar al Harb (The Domain 
of War), a non-Muslim space where the safety of Muslims could not be guaranteed and 
which was considered to be at war. Intermediate spaces where Muslim safety was expected 
were deemed Domains of the Truce. While the terms used to describe the West may vary 
(Alwani speaks of ‘dar al-da’wa’), all practitioners of minority fiqh share a refusal to cat-
egorise the West simply in terms of dar al-harb. As Nielsen has argued elsewhere (1992: 
86), the point to be made here is not that the distinction between Muslim and non-
Muslim lands has become irrelevant; clearly, the very idea of fiqh al-aqalliyyat is an attempt 
to re-imagine this distinction in a ‘globalised context’ governed by ‘international treaties’. 
Having said this, it is also evident that the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
contexts turns out to be significantly less clear than in the past; in fact, its relative import-
ance becomes a matter of debate and contestation among competing Muslim actors.
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Mecca before the Hijra and of the first Companions’ stay in Abyssinia are 
typically mobilised. In relative continuity with the classical fiqh discussions 
(Abou El Fadl 1994), the permissibility of residing outside Muslim lands is 
then made conditional solely on the safeguarding of religion.
Elsewhere (including in his treatise on fiqh al-aqalliyyat), Qaradawi’s defence 
of the possibility of living outside Muslim countries has been more overtly 
pragmatic: the Muslim presence in the West is a fact that is not only 
‘permissible’ but ‘necessary’ for spreading the Islamic message, welcoming 
converts, receiving Muslim migrants, and politically defending the causes of 
the umma (Qaradawi 2000, 2001; see also al-Nashmi 2005). This reasoning, 
which Qaradawi is careful to relate to the discursive tradition of the shari’a 
by naming it the ‘fiqh of priorities’ ( fiqh al-awlawiyyat), stands in contrast 
with the previous mode of argumentation in so far as it does not seek to 
relate itself directly to the founding texts or the established juridical schools, 
but seems to depend instead upon contextual assessments of changing social 
conditions ( fiqh al-waqi‘). In this sense, Qaradawi’s justification of the choice 
to live under minority status appears symptomatic of his impetus to politicize 
fiqh, that is, to render the Islamic legal tradition accountable to changes in 
underlying power relations. This politicising impetus, which Qaradawi seems 
to share with all reformist actors, be they conservative or liberal, may also 
explain some of the larger Muslim debates and contestations around minority 
fiqh.34
Despite an acknowledgement of the different types of Muslim minorities 
in the ‘West’ and in the ‘East’ (Qaradawi 2001: 16 –20),35 the writings of 
Qaradawi and his peers often betray an Arab-centric view of Islam which 
suggests that the real addressees of minority fiqh are (Arab) Muslim immigrants 
in Western Europe and North America.36 As Andrew March has recently 
pointed out, the focus on the ‘West’ in the writings on minority fiqh indicates 
a perception of a distinctive liberal challenge created by the secular nature 
of Western political regimes (March 2009: 36). The emphasis on geopolitical 
considerations – particularly the need to develop an active Muslim presence 
in the global decision-making centres of the West – further reinforces the 
symbolic exclusion of Muslims located at the European periphery. This may 
help to elucidate the relative lack of interest in minority fiqh among Muslim 
minorities outside Western Europe, and why the historical experience of 
34 For a more specific critique of how advocates of minority fiqh politicise the Islamic tradi-
tion see Said Ramadan al-Buti (2007: 143–156).
35 Qaradawi’s distinction between Muslim minorities in the West and in the East is remark-
able because most authors engaged in this reflection assume ‘Europe’ (al-Najjar) or the 
‘West’ (Alwani) to be the geographical framework of minority fiqh.
36 The implicit assumption, common among champions of minority fiqh, that Muslims in 
Europe are immigrants serves as a reminder that advocates of minority fiqh are mostly of 
Arab ethnicity (and some are first-generation immigrants themselves).
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Muslims in the Balkans – with the creative adaptations that Muslims in the 
region have devised to live Islamically under non-Muslim rule (Kar[i\ 1999) 
– have remained largely outside the minority fiqh debate (in spite of the 
presence of the Bosnian reisu-l-ulema Mustafa Ceri\ among the members of 
the European Council for Fatwa and Research).37
Fiqh al-aqalliyyat for Qaradawi and his peers is perhaps best understood 
then as the starting point for a general theory of Islamic law for Muslim 
minorities which builds on their conditional legitimation.38 It is an attempt to 
‘preserve the identity of Muslims’ in the absence of the Muslim state. In 
moving away from the problematics of the state by virtue of the minority 
status (and thus reiterating its relevance in Muslim majority lands), practi-
tioners of minority fiqh deliberately seek to shift religious authority and 
moral responsibility away from the state and towards the community – and 
its authorised scholars (Bin Bayyah n/d; Qaradawi 2001; al-Najjar 2003; 
al-Bishri 2004). This move depends also upon a fictional account of the legal 
primacy of the shari’a in Muslim majority countries, an account which pur-
ports to ignore the ubiquitous role of ‘man-made laws’ in the legal reasoning 
of contemporary Muslim states.39 Acknowledging the relative loss of the self-
evident character of Islam in a minority setting (Alwani 2003: 13; al-Najjar 
2003: 48; see also Roy 1999), advocates of minority fiqh seek to counter the 
double threat posed by ‘assimilation’ and ‘isolation’ through the interpella-
tion of Muslims – including ‘forgetful’ Muslims – as believers subject to the 
Divine Will (shar‘). Writings on fiqh al-aqalliyyat are to a large degree concerned 
with defining this Will and the demands it makes upon Muslims living in 
the West. Some authors go one step further and remarkably recognise that 
the existence of a Muslim minority in the West is not simply given, but 
requires prior disciplining: for these writers (Alwani 2003: 25; al-Bishri 
2004: 204), it is the role of Islamic leaders and institutions in the Diaspora 
37 Although Mustafa Ceri\’s project for establishing a ‘European Isla’” based on the Bosnian 
experience and on a centralised structure of religious authority resonates in part with 
the aims of the fiqh al-aqalliyyat school, Ceri\ himself has publicly declared he does 
not ‘believe in the fiqh of minority because [he does] not accept to be treated as a 
half-way Muslim’ (2004). Even if Qaradawi’s treatise on minority fiqh has been trans-
lated into Bosnian, possible reasons for the relative lack of interest in the concept in 
the region include the reliance upon the language of traditional fiqh and to the con-
notation that the term ‘minority’ carries in the context of the ex-Yugoslavia. Obviously, 
many Muslims in countries like Albania, Bosnia or Turkey do not consider themselves 
as ‘minorities’.
38 For a perceptive analysis along these lines of the ECFR’s fatwa on residing outside 
Muslim lands see Peter (2006: 450 –2).
39 ‘Abd al-Majid al-Najjar, a cosmopolitan Tunisian intellectual living in France, bases his 
call for establishing minority fiqh on the claim that Muslims in Europe are subject to 
‘man-made laws’ (al-Najjar 2003: 60 –1). While this claim functions as a rhetorical strategy, 
the erasure of the legal transformations of the Muslim world in the twentieth century is 
rather striking for someone educated at Tunis’s al-Zaytuna.
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to persuade Muslims living in non-Muslim countries that they actually form 
a minority community.40
If, as I have been trying to suggest, minority fiqh seeks to institute a 
relation of power – delineated by Islamic legal orthodoxy – that can restore 
the role of the shari’a in the life of Muslims denaturalised as minorities, it 
does so within a specific understanding of the political nature of Western 
societies (and of the place of Muslims therein). Secularism, for many of the 
Muslim authors considered here, is a distinctively Western development 
arising out of tensions within Christianity. Part of the difficulties of estab-
lishing Islam in Europe relates to the hegemony of a secularist understanding 
of religion as a private matter of inner faith (al-Najjar 2003: 53). In this 
political-theological framework, positive law functions both as the terrain 
and the boundary of Muslim claims. Muslims living as minorities are thus 
urged by minority fiqh advocates to respect the Constitution and the laws 
of the countries they settle in by virtue of an implicit contract.41 Despite an 
occasional reference to the legal authority that Muslims as citizens of 
European democratic nation-states also hold (al-Bishri 2004: 203), the under-
standing of Muslims in Europe as simple addressees of the Law seems to be 
widespread amongst minority fiqh advocates.42 This vision reposes in turn on 
a perception of weakness which is further underscored by the regular emphases 
on taysir (lenience) and darurat (necessities). At the same time, calls for the state 
recognition of Muslim ‘religious, cultural, social, economic and political 
rights’ (Qaradawi 2001), including Muslim Family Laws, try to extend the legal 
pluralism of Western societies.43 The fact that these claims are often framed 
40 The ideas that Muslims can become ‘alienated from their roots’ (Alwani 2003: xv) or be 
‘unaware of their identity’ (Qaradawi 2001) are predicated upon a racialised understand-
ing of Muslim-ness. Although scholars such as Alwani are acutely aware of – and even 
sensitive to – the perceived contradiction between understandings of freedom of religion 
in the West and the traditional condemnation of apostasy in Islam (Alwani 2003: xix–xx), 
exit conditions from the Islamic religion remain un-theorised in minority fiqh.
41 Muslims are also urged, in at least one instance, to ‘love’ Western countries: Salah Sultan’s 
emphasis on affect – on the need for Muslims in the West to ‘love’, show ‘gratitude’ and 
‘affection’ to their new countries (Sultan 2008) – ironically mirrors the liberal state’s 
insistence on romanticising citizenship.
42 The most intriguing case is al-Najjar: although he recognises that laws in Europe are 
‘established on the basis of collective cooperation’ (al-Najjar 2003: 54 –5), he goes on to 
claim that Muslim minorities have neither the power to change these laws nor even in some 
cases the right to claim to change them (al-Najjar 2003: 63). It is precisely this kind of 
reasoning that led the Union des organizations islamiques de France (UOIF) to refrain from 
participating actively in the demonstrations against the French headscarf ban in public 
schools in 2003 and 2004. According to the UOIF’s Muslim critics – particularly the Muslim 
youth organisations – this sensitivity to the politicisation of legal discourse in France 
precluded the realisation that French Muslims were citizens, not (neo-)colonial subjects.
43 I do not discuss here the extent to which claims for recognition of Muslim family law are 
politically realistic. This might vary significantly from one European country to another.
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in a language of equal rather than special rights signals a relative familiarity 
with tensions within liberal political thought: Western Muslims are urged to 
strive for recognition ‘as a minority amongst other minorities’ and to establish 
legal forums for settling personal status like other religious groups.
Calls for legal recognition seem to presuppose both a secular-liberal regime 
(where such rights, as Qaradawi is keen on noting, are ‘guaranteed by the 
Constitution’) and a critique of liberal strategies of exclusion (which prevent 
the Muslim holders of such rights to effectively access them).44 Two decades 
of controversy regarding the visibility of Islam in Europe have made Muslim 
actors acutely aware of the difference between the religious freedom granted 
by European laws, and the social and political obstacles which prevent its 
actual realisation – a difference between the ‘formal’ and ‘actual’ equality 
familiar to critics of liberal legalism (Brown 1995; see also ‘Atyia Muham-
mad 2007). It is arguably the realisation that Muslims need to fulfil certain 
previous conditions in the social field (including the acquisition of a specific 
cultural capital) in order to be able to have access to the formal equality 
promised by the Law (al-Bishri 2004: 204) that partly drives the enterprise 
of minority fiqh.45
So far the main response of minority fiqh advocates to this conundrum has 
been to reaffirm the necessity of applying the existing (European) laws. 
Muslims are thus enjoined to ‘stand up for their rights’ (Alwani 2003: 29) 
while Islamic institutions are urged to disseminate the knowledge necessary 
for Muslims to make use of the legal possibilities available to them. This 
reliance upon law is partly related to the traditional fiqh misgivings con-
cerning political participation in non-Muslim regimes. It draws both upon 
a long tradition of Muslim legalism (Diamantides 2006) and upon a more 
recent history of penetration of cosmopolitan norms and Human Rights 
discourses in the Islamic world ( Johnston 2007). But the primacy of Law 
should also be seen in a wider postcolonial context. As Comaroff and Comaroff 
(2007: 141– 6) have argued, the current prevalence of zones of law and disorder 
dialectically feeding into each other often results in a ‘fetishisation’ of the 
former. Law appears to become the privileged language of a very wide range 
of actors since it promises a ‘ready means of commensuration’ in the face of 
difference, heterogeneity and fragmented subjectivities.
44 See Alwani (2003); al-Bishri (2004); and ‘Atiya Muhammad (2007). I borrow the concept 
of ‘liberal strategies of exclusion’ from Mehta (1990) and Peter (2010).
45 The realisation that law does not guarantee equality does not seem to apply when the law 
in question is Islamic Law. Qaradawi states in his treatise on the status of non-Muslims in 
Islam: ‘Although man-made laws and constitutions speak of equal rights and obligations 
for their citizens, their realization in practice is thwarted because of the prejudices  .  .  .  upon 
which laws can have no impact, and because the people either have no sense of the laws’ 
sacredness or do not believe in submitting to legal authority. Islamic laws are, however, 
an exception’ (Qaradawi 1985: 14).
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In the case of minority fiqh, the reliance upon law has rendered Muslim 
practitioners vulnerable to at least two different critiques – each bearing 
distinct political import. The first, voiced by figures such as the imam of 
Bordeaux Tareq Oubrou, criticises minority fiqh for ‘misconstruing the legal 
status of Islam in Europe’.46 While Oubrou may mean a number of different 
things by this claim, one of them appears to be the following: the attempt 
to make Islamic norms compatible with European legal systems partly through 
the state recognition of Muslim family law seems to the French–Moroccan 
scholar to be unrealistic and even counterproductive.47 Although Oubrou’s 
‘sharia de minorité’ also started off as an attempt to achieve a ‘double legality’ 
– shariatic and French – (Oubrou 2004: 206), the politicisation of law witnessed 
in recent integration debates in France (particularly during the headscarf 
affair) persuaded Oubrou of the need to reconcile Islamic norms not with 
‘French law’ but with ‘French culture’ instead. Although the distinction 
between law, shari‘a and culture is central to the Islamic Reformist traditions 
where minority fiqh practitioners draw inspiration, ‘culture’ has remained 
largely outside the integration process attempted by the institutions engaged 
in minority fiqh.48 Oubrou’s project depends on a recognition of the cultural 
dimensions of historical fiqh (as well as the existence of shared cultural norms 
in France – to be measured ideally by sociological surveys). Placing culture 
at the centre of the hermeneutical exercise allows Oubrou to bridge the gaps 
between Islamic norms and French calls to integrate/assimilate Muslims. It 
also seems to open up a hermeneutical field which has wider implications 
than the simple invocation by advocates of minority fiqh of ‘urf (custom) as 
a normative source for issuing fatwas.
The second – and politically more radical – kind of critique, articulated 
most notably by Tariq Ramadan, attempts to reformulate European Muslims 
less as a docile group and more as a resisting or dissenting community through an 
emphasis on ‘citizenship’ instead of ‘minorityness’ (Ramadan 2003; see also 
Mestiri 2004). In seeking to displace the legal imaginary which serves as the 
symbolic boundary of minority fiqh (and arguably of much of the current 
Muslim social-political activism in Europe), Ramadan wants to refashion 
Muslim activism within an ecumenical ethical horizon open to a greater 
range of political claims – and where Muslims see themselves as (at least) 
46 Oubrou, personal communication, Bordeaux (2005). For an attempt to contextualise 
Oubrou’s sharia de minorité, see Caeiro (2006).
47 I do not discuss here whether Oubrou is right or not in this assessment. For a recent 
discussion of Muslim demands for state recognition see Williams (2008) and Bano (2008).
48 As I argue elsewhere, integration in institutions such as the European Council for Fatwa 
and Research has tended to be understood in legal rather than cultural terms (Caeiro 
2009). Alwani comes closest to echoing Oubrou’s call when he writes intriguingly of the 
‘polemical relationship between legislation, whether divine or man-made, and cultural 
traditions and conventions’ (Alwani 2003: xiv).
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potentially part of the ‘ethical majority’ (Ramadan 2003). The political pos-
sibilities unlocked by Ramadan’s critique have started to be recognised by 
the members of the ECFR themselves. Responding in part to this criticism, 
Qaradawi’s own understanding of the situation of Muslims in the West has 
started to move away from the emphasis on minorityness towards a stress 
upon citizenship (Qaradawi 2007) – although it may still be too early to see 
what is precisely at stake in this move.
These and other Muslim critics of minority fiqh have thus argued that the 
status of minority is not a natural category but rather the product of a specific 
political imagination which seeks to contain Muslim agency. Mohamed Mestiri 
(International Institute of Islamic Thought-France) considers that fiqh al-
aqalliyyat consolidates categories that are foreign to the practices of democratic 
politics. For Ajil al-Nashmi (see below), the concept of minority presupposes 
a ‘nationalist framework’ which does not correspond to contemporary post-
national Europe (or the United States). In so far as Western nation-states are 
‘secula’’, and both citizens and immigrants ruled by a ‘social contract’ on the 
basis of ‘needs and necessities’ (al-Nashmi’s way of describing the neutrality 
of the liberal state), the minority condition is deemed inappropriate to think 
of the Muslim predicament (al-Nashmi 2005: 20).49 Other writers like Jamal 
al-Din ‘Atiya have started to think of minority fiqh in the context of the 
institutionalisation of minority rights in international law. His use of fiqh 
interchangeably with law, even in non-Muslim contexts, highlights the hybrid 
nature of the discourse. Muslim scholarly debates about the minority status 
have thus tried to articulate two different universes of reference. While Muslim 
scholars are now involved in the contestation over the proper limits of legal 
pluralism, their engagement with the problematics of minority rights in a world 
increasingly governed by cosmopolitan norms is seemingly only starting.
IV. The prophetic Sunna, the commitment to  
the fiqh tradition, and affective reason
Writings on fiqh al-aqalliyyat presuppose, as I have shown above, specific 
understandings of Europe as a distinctive political space. As engagements 
with the Islamic legal tradition, however, they also appear in many ways to 
carry their own context. The minority fiqh discourse often reads as lists of 
legal maxims (qawa‘id fiqhiyya) providing hermeneutical and methodological 
guidelines for muftis dealing with questions from Muslims in the West.50 A 
49 al-Nashmi also questions the relevance of the status of minority for fiqh: in so far as fiqh 
is a method of extraction of rules considerations of power or number are not relevant. 
‘Minority’ in this view is incommensurable with the term – fiqh – which it purports to 
qualify (al-Nashmi 2005: 22–3; see also al-Buti 2007: 181–7).
50 Writings on minority fiqh bear strong resemblance to the traditional adab al-mufti genre: 
they articulate a number of themes familiar to that literature, such as the gravity of issuing 
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set of these guidelines relates to the structures of religious authority. The 
often-repeated call for exercising ‘collective ijtihad’ (Mahdi n/d; Qaradawc 
2001; Ibram 2002: 70–1; Alwani 2003: 33; Sultan 2008) is an attempt to 
unify the various – and sometimes contradictory – fatwas of Muslim scholars, 
as well as a way of coming to grips with the complexity of Western societies, 
where ‘good and evil appear mixed in complicated ways’ (al-Najjar 2003: 
61–2; see also al-Bishri 2004: 204). The emphasis on taking the context 
(al-waqi‘) into consideration is another regular leitmotif (Qaradawc 2001: 
44 – 6; Sultan 2008: 42–7), taken to its radical conclusion by Alwani’s call 
for incorporating social scientists into the fiqh reflections (Alwani 2003: 3, 
33– 6; see also Badawi in Alwani 2003: ix; and Ramadan 2009).51 This 
emphasis, often accompanied by a less than subtle effort to exclude scholars 
based outside Europe (and not affiliated to the institutions committed to 
minority fiqh) from participating in the discussions (Halawa n/d; Mahdi n/d), 
should be seen as an attempt to modify the capital required for speaking in 
the name of Islam (Peter 2006). It is therefore perhaps not surprising that 
it should have elicited sarcastic responses from excluded Muslim scholars, 
who prefer to emphasise instead the importance of knowledge of the Islamic 
texts and its disciplines (al-Buti 2007).
A second set of guidelines invoked by the advocates of minority fiqh deal 
directly with hermeneutical questions. These guidelines typically stress the 
objectives of the shari’a (maqasid al-shari‘a),52 the understanding of priorities 
(awlawiyyat) and the consideration of the collective requirements over the 
individual needs of Muslim minorities. This insistence on the values and 
principles of the shari’a over its historically constituted norms appears as a 
condition for various kinds of strategic thinking, laying the ground for the 
emergence of what has been called a ‘public Islam’ (Eickelman and Salvatore 
2004). Understandings of the ‘common good’ are thematised as preconditions 
for conveying Islam’s universal message. A striking example is provided by 
Salah Sultan, who wonders what would happen if ‘the Muslims took upon 
themselves the mission of eradicating the illiteracy of 23 million Americans’: 
‘How many of them could become Muslims or think good of Islam and 
Muslims or at least stay neutral’ (2008: 40 –1).
fatwas, the danger of following people’s whims or submitting to the desires of the rulers, 
the contrast between the reticence of the pious predecessors regarding issuing fatwas and 
the current facility and haste in which so-called muftis respond to questions. The vitality 
of the adab al-mufti tradition under changed conditions is further demonstrated by the 
fact that criticisms of minority fiqh are also played out in the field of the etiquette of the 
mufti (Buti 2007). On the adab al-mufti see inter alia Masud (1984); Caeiro (2006).
51 The emphasis on devising a ‘realistic fiqh’ may be seen as an attempt to overcome the 
‘pessimistic consciousness of the tension between ideal and actuality’ which Kerr attributes 
to traditional Muslim scholars (Kerr 1966: 1).
52 On the maqasid al-sharia see Johnston 2007.
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The lists of principles are extensive, perhaps because minority fiqh advocates 
seek to contain the elements of arbitrariness and subjectivism inherent in 
the emphasis on upholding the maqasid of the shari’a (as their critics have 
repeatedly pointed out). The principles do not eliminate these arbitrary ele-
ments altogether but they succeed in many cases in rendering clearer the 
intended direction of the ijtihadi reasoning.53 Because they are sensitive to 
the politics of authenticity enacted by those who criticise fiqh al-aqalliyyat as 
a regime of exceptions for ‘Westernised Muslims’ (Khan 2004; al-Buti 2007; 
see also Ramadan 2003), most of the authors considered here rhetorically 
emphasise that minority fiqh is not a ‘fiqh of concessions’ but an authentic 
fiqh bound by the rules of the universal shari’a (Qaradawc 2001; Alwani 
2003: 4; al-Bishri 2004: 205).54
Writings on minority fiqh have not only provoked wide-ranging debates 
within Muslim public spheres; they have also given rise to some controversy 
within the ranks of those scholars committed in principle to the idea of 
devising specific rules for Muslims in the West by virtue of their minority 
status. Below I focus on an exchange between two members of the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research, Taha Jabir al-Alwani and ‘Ajil al-Nashmi. 
The exchange is remarkable because it highlights the diversity of understand-
ings of minority fiqh in those institutions most closely associated with the 
project.55 The context of this discussion is the European Council for Fatwa 
and Research. Qaradawc’s first use of the expression fiqh al-aqalliyyat – in the 
late 1990s – was part of an attempt to legitimise the ECFR in the Muslim 
world,56 and various theoretical attempts to ground minority fiqh have been 
53 al-Najjar attends to the need to weigh conflicting goods: forbidding evil (mafsada) and 
promoting interests (masalih) are two kinds of acts valued in and of themselves, but when 
an evil and an interest are simultaneously present al-Najjar enjoins Muslim jurists to pay 
attention to the short- and long-term effects of each (al-Najjar 2003: 61–2): but how is 
one to distinguish the situations in which the evil is only temporary and the corresponding 
maslaha great in the future, from those where the maslaha is small and the evil so large 
that it will cause a fitna amongst Muslims in the future? How is the genuine interest 
(al-maslaha al-haqiqiyya) to be identified without falling into arbitrariness? al-Najjar does 
not seem to provide an answer.
54 ‘Ajil al-Nashmi’s perception of Taha Jabir al-Alwani’s characterisation of fiqh al-aqalliyyat 
as a ‘rigorous’ rather than ‘concessionary’ fiqh (Alwani 2003: 4) as an attempt to make life 
difficult for Muslim minorities, denying them the possibilities of legitimate derogations 
offered by the Islamic tradition (al-Nashmi 2005: 28), totally misses this point. On the 
exchange between ‘Alwani and al-Nashmi see below.
55 The internal diversity of opinion on this issue explains the adoption of a descriptive rather 
than normative understanding of fiqh al-aqalliyyat by the ECFR: ‘The final opinion of the 
Council on the Fiqh of minorities is that it means: the juristic rulings concerning the 
Muslim who lives outside the Islamic land’ (Resolution 12/5).
56 In his introduction to the ECFR’s First Collection of Fatwas, Qaradawi wrote that the 
ECFR does not pose itself as a ‘competitor to the established fatwa bodies in the Muslim 
world’ [the MWL’s Islamic Fiqh Academy and the Fiqh Committee of the OIC]; rather, 
according to Qaradawi, it complements such bodies through a specialised focus on what 
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closely connected with the efforts to guide and redirect the ad hoc nature of 
the work of the European fatwa council (al-Najjar 2003; see also Alwani 
2003: 14). The ECFR’s bi-annual scientific magazine (al-Majalla al-‘Ilmiyya) 
has done much to foster the debate, publishing research papers and also 
occasionally responding to external criticism against fiqh al-aqalliyyat.57 A 
full day of discussion was devoted to the topic at the ECFR’s 12th ordinary 
session held in Dublin in December 2003/January 2004. Taha Jabir al-
Alwani’s paper on fiqh al-aqalliyyat was presented and discussed.58 This and 
other papers on the topic were published in the corresponding issue of the 
Majalla (issues 4/5, 2004), which was to a large extent devoted to efforts at 
grounding fiqh al-aqalliyyat. In his response paper (presented at a later meet-
ing of the ECFR and published in the 7th issue of the Majalla), the Kuwaiti 
scholar ‘Ajil Nashmi offers a very critical – and at times remarkably ungen-
erous – reading of Alwani’s text. Here I describe and then interpret the 
controversy, all the more noteworthy since – as al-Nashmi himself points out 
– both scholars studied together the same subjects (usul al-fiqh) under the 
same scholars at Al-Azhar in the early 1970s.
Although al-Nashmi disagrees with Alwani on a range of different issues, 
the core of al-Nashmi’s critique of Alwani’s treatise focuses on the assessment 
of the place of the Sunna in the extraction of Islamic norms. al-Nashmi’s 
disagreement with Alwani on this count over-determines some of al-Nashmi’s 
reactions to unrelated claims made by Alwani. This debate sheds light also 
on what is at stake in the discussion of whether fiqh al-aqalliyyat is just a 
branch of fiqh – like the fiqh of medicine, economic or politics (Qaradawc 
2001; see also al-Najjar 2003: 50) – or whether it requires a new fiqh meth-
odology (usul al-fiqh) – as claimed by Alwani (2003).
The status of the Sunna has arguably been at the centre of Muslim responses 
to modern challenges to religious authority (Brown 1996). Muslim scholars 
associated with the Islamic Revival – including those who advocate minority 
fiqh – have typically tried to navigate between the modernist attempts to 
dismiss Prophetic narrations in favour of the Qur’an, on the one hand, and the 
traditionalist reliance on the Sunna as the unsurpassable model for practical 
action on the other. Muslim Revivalists have sought to emphasise the com-
plementariness of the two sources even as they recognise the ontological 
primacy of the Qur’an. In contrast to many of the controversial discussions 
he called for the first time (as far as I am aware – a Muslim ‘fiqh for minorities’. If fatwas 
change according to place, time and circumstances, ‘what greater difference is there’, 
Qaradawi rhetorically asks, than that between ‘a Muslim and non-Muslim land’? (Qaradawi 
in ECFR [1999] 2002: X).
57 See the issue 12–13, 2008: 11–13.
58 Unlike the other North American members of the ECFR (Salah Sultan and Jamal Badawi), 
Alwani does not regularly attend the meetings of the European fatwa council. His paper 
on fiqh al-aqalliyyat was presented and discussed in absentia for health reasons.
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in the Muslim world which deal directly with concrete issues related to the 
place of women in society, Islamic criminal laws, and questions of economics, 
the practical implications of the exchange between Alwani and al-Nashmi 
are mostly implicit. To put it briefly, Taha Jabir al-Alwani argues, in his 
treatise on minority fiqh, that the Qur’an takes precedence over the Sunna. 
While this claim appears at first sight conventional for reformist actors keen 
on reviving the practice of ijtihad, the repeated emphasis which Alwani places 
on this hierarchization of the Islamic sources is – as al-Nashmi himself notes 
– quite remarkable (2003: 18, 19, 20). On closer look, this claim represents 
a break with Alwani’s previous writings, which mainly stressed the ‘comple-
mentariness’ of the two major sources in Islamic legal thought.59 In Towards 
a Fiqh for Minorities, however, Alwani seeks to marginalise the Prophetic 
Sunna to the rank of mere auxiliary: ‘The Sunnah revolves around the Qur’an 
and is closely tied up with it, but never surpasses or overrules it’ (Alwani 
2003: 18 –19). While fiqh practitioners have always recognised that the 
Qur’anic text – as ‘the direct word of God Almighty, the eternal and absolute 
miracle’ which ‘cannot be allegorically read or interpreted’ – is ontologically 
different from the Prophetic Sunna (Alwani 2003: 18), they have not con-
cluded with him that jurists cannot derive new rulings from the Sunna alone. 
For Alwani, however, the normative authority lies exclusively upon the Qur’an 
– and specifically upon what he calls its ‘higher principles’.
There is a particular representation of the Sunna underlying Alwani’s call 
for ‘a review of the relationship between the Qur’an and the Sunnah’ (Alwani 
2003: 19); this is a representation of the Sunna as ‘intolerant’ which occasionally 
resurfaces in Alwani’s writings.60 Alwani’s Quranic-centred methodology, 
based on two crucial Quranic verses (Al-Mumtahanah 8 –9 and al-Ma’idah 8), 
seeks to establish ‘kindness and justice’ as the two higher principles of Islam 
governing Muslim relations with the Other (Alwani 2003: 26 –7).
In assuming that ‘tolerance’ and ‘justice’ can be transculturally defined by 
standards outside a specific tradition (Islamic or otherwise), Alwani’s vision 
seems to rest on certain a priori philosophical–political commitments – a 
method that has long been part of the Islamic reformist discourse and strategy. 
59 In an article originally published in 1995, Alwani argued explicitly for the complementary 
of the Qur’an and the Sunna: ‘Both the Qur’an and the Sunnah represent sources of revealed 
knowledge that complement the natural universe  .  .  .  The Sunnah clarifies and elaborates 
on the Qur’anic epistemic methodology by linking the Prophet’s example and the Qur’an’s 
values so that these may be applied to the actuality of changing circumstances’ (reprinted 
in Alwani 2005: 5).
60 This perception of the Sunna is revealed in passages like the following: ‘Once the Qur’an 
establishes a certain principle, such as tolerance and justice in dealing with non-Muslims, 
the ruling of the Qur’an takes precedence’ (Alwani 2003: 20). Qaradawi provides an example 
of an account of the Sunna which shares with Alwani the effort to derive general principles 
from Prophetic narrations but ends up emphasising quite the opposite – the Sunna’s 
‘tolerance, convenience, and ease’ – see Brown (1996): 119 –22.
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Part of al-Nashmi’s critique of Alwani has been of a hermeneutical nature: 
in the absence of the explanatory Sunna, which Alwani voids of normative 
content, what are the grounds – al-Nashmi asks (2005: 37) – from which 
one can understand the so-called higher principles of the Qur’an? Alwani’s 
prudent silence on the sources of these guiding principles leaves him exposed 
to the critiques of those claiming to be solely driven by a commitment to 
the founding texts of the Islamic tradition in all their multivocity.
What is at stake here, I submit, is not a particular understanding of how 
Muslims should relate to the Other. It is not even a disagreement about the 
need to reform specific historical normative understandings or to revise certain 
fatwas. al-Nashmi is part of the large constellation of ulama who view ijtihad 
as a contemporary necessity. The fiqh he and his peers desire is a ‘creative’ 
one: al-Nashmi works within a complex temporality which simultaneously 
draws inspiration from the pious predecessors while interiorising the linear 
narrative of progress and reform. The Kuwaiti Muslim scholar makes suffi-
ciently clear in his response paper that he does not seek to apply old fatwas 
to current situations (al-Nashmi 2005). Like most members of the ECFR, 
al-Nashmi also privileges the objectives of the shari’a over its historically 
constituted norms, and emphasises the need to adapt religious rulings to 
specific circumstances. Both Alwani and al-Nashmi belong to a school of 
thought which politicises – through references to the fiqh of priorities – the 
Islamic tradition. If, in the eyes of critics like al-Nashmi, Alwani’s comments 
about the Sunna appear unacceptable, it is not only because their basis in certain 
a priori philosophical commitments makes them liable to characterisations 
of unbridled personal opinion (instead of reliance upon the founding texts). 
It is also – and mainly – because they are seen as symptomatic of a conditional 
commitment to the Islamic fiqh tradition. It is the threat that he perceives in 
this conditionality that underlies al-Nashmi’s uncharitable reading of Alwani’s 
text, and which explains why the critique is largely played out in the register 
of ‘affective reason’.61 In other words, it is less the content of Alwani’s engage-
ment with the Sunna than his way of doing so that seems to be at stake.
To be sure, Alwani is not what one would conveniently identify as a 
modernist; he openly criticises those Muslims in America who ‘tend to 
apologize for those statements [“randomly” picked out by “Islam’s detractors”] 
and dismiss them as ancient and irrelevant’ (Alwani 2003: xix). As a religious 
scholar, he naturally presupposes a ‘true’ Islam distinguishable from its his-
torical understandings (Alwani 2003: 25). For Alwani as for al-Nashmi, fiqh 
is also the terrain in which solutions to current problems are to be sought 
(Alwani 2003: 34). Alwani’s project, however, is also predicated upon a 
specific appraisal of the inherited fiqh which borders at times on an assertion 
of its contemporary irrelevance. It is perhaps because Alwani’s remarks on 
61 I borrow this notion from Hirschkind (2006): 133–7.
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the Sunna are part of his larger critique of the fiqh tradition that al-Nashmi’s 
rhetorical defence of the status of the Sunna needs to be so vigorous.
Many of Alwani’s critiques of the fiqh tradition are shared by fellow mem-
bers of the ECFR; but while the latter seek to minimise the impression of 
discontinuity, Alwani seems to deliberately wish to emphasise them.62 The 
tradition of fiqh is equated with a ‘mere collection of philosophical and 
polemic rules or linguistic and intellectual arguments’ (2003: 12), in sum, 
a ‘minor science’ (2003: 12).63 Past jurists were – in the eyes of Alwani – 
guilty of imprecision (they ‘did not classify the sources of Islamic law in a 
precise way’, 9), introversion and parochialism (they ‘overlooked the universal-
ity of Islam’, 9). Their approaches were ‘confused’ (18), ‘simplistic’ and 
‘unscientific’ (4), and their theories mere reflections of a particular historical 
context – one furthermore characterised by the logic of ‘conflict’ (11) and a 
superiority complex.64
al-Nashmi’s main aim in his response paper is to demonstrate the con-
temporary relevance of the Islamic fiqh tradition. He does this partly by 
recasting Alwani’s reformist claims as unoriginal, and partly by showing 
(somewhat circularly) how they fall outside the tradition of the pious predecessors 
and the scholars of the past.65 It is Alwani’s attitude towards these scholars, 
however, that comes under the most severe criticism, justifying the irony and 
sarcasm with which al-Nashmi treats his fellow mufti. The lack of ‘respect’ 
that al-Nashmi perceives in Alwani’s text is deemed incompatible with the 
discipline (2005: 49). It underlies al-Nashmi’s subtle exclusion of Alwani 
from the circle of the fuqaha (al-Nashmi 2005: 17–18). This is not (only) an 
authoritarian argument against internal critique. It also signals a different 
relationship to the tradition of reasoning which both Alwani and al-Nashmi 
purport to share, albeit differently. As Hirschkind has shown in another 
context, excellence in fiqh requires not only mastery of the relevant sciences 
but a certain inner disposition. This is also why Muslim scholars setting the 
62 The contrast between Alwani and Qaradawi or al-Najjar is in this regard striking: although 
they call for a new legal methodology (usul al-fiqh) for devising a minority fiqh – and 
often resort to a language that seems foreign to the fiqh tradition – al-Najjar and Qaradawi 
go to great rhetorical lengths to minimise the discontinuities with this tradition, which 
they repeatedly praise, while Alwani seeks on the contrary to deliberately emphasise 
ruptures.
63 Elsewhere Alwani (2005: iv) has criticised the ‘fiqhi mentality’ of Muslim communities.
64 For a similar account of fiqh as the historical product of Muslim hegemony and superiority 
in medieval times see the works of Wahid al-din Khan (as described in Zaman 2002: 
181–3).
65 Thus the call for introducing the social sciences into fiqh is equated with the centuries-old 
insistence on understanding the social conditions of the mustafti (al-Nashmi 2005: 29 –30); 
Alwani’s call for a new type of ijtihad is condemned because the Sahaba were able to 
answer all kinds of question following the only method of ijtihad they knew (al-Nashmi 
2005: 30 –2).
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conditions for issuing fatwas insist on the need for the mufti to be pious and 
to fear God (Caeiro 2006; Sultan 2008).
I have been arguing that the polemical discussion between al-Nashmi and 
Alwani is less about specific Muslim attitudes towards non-Muslims than 
about different kinds of commitment to the fiqh tradition. But what are the 
contexts in which these two positions are articulated? Clearly, the two Muslim 
scholars assess differently the possibilities for gradual reform – the necessity 
of which none of them really questions. These assessments, I suggest, appear 
in turn related to the positions that each scholar occupies in the Islamic 
religious field.
Alwani’s reform project – which borrows significantly from the Islamisa-
tion of Knowledge venture, with which he has long been associated (Abaza 
2002) – views the ‘crisis’ of the Muslim world as first and foremost an ‘intel-
lectual crisis’ (Alwani 2005). This diagnosis of a modern intellectual crisis 
is not, however, a call for a return to a pristine Islam, since classical Islamic 
sciences, not least the fiqh tradition itself, are also deemed in dire need of 
reform. Rather, it is a call for a much more wide-ranging – if somewhat 
ambiguous – critique of Western and Islamic intellectual traditions. Minority 
Fiqh for Alwani appears as a step in this wider reform agenda. His engage-
ment with the minority status is in this sense quite self-consciously strategic: 
‘There is a need to propose and develop such principles to assist in revealing 
more of the purposes of the Qur’an. This should, in turn, help in building 
up fiqh rules for minorities as well as majorities’ (Alwani 2003: 20).
While the inscription of minority fiqh within a global reform agenda 
significantly raises the stakes of the debate, Alwani’s reform project – like 
al-Nashmi’s and the ECFR’s – also depends upon the continuing viability of 
authority structures. How should one therefore understand Alwani’s argument 
that Islam has no clergy or ‘grand “ulama” board’ who can ‘monopolize the 
sources of religious knowledge and the interpretation of religious dogma’ 
(Alwani 2003: xiv)? This claim, as al-Nashmi himself has pointed out, leaves 
the door wide open to all kinds of interpretations.66 While Alwani himself 
is wary of the individualisation and assimilation of Muslims in the United 
States which the fragmentation of religious authority engenders, the state-
ment above suggests a greater sensitivity to the perceived weight of established 
traditions of reasoning than to the dangers of assimilation (and terrorism for 
that matter). It nevertheless leaves Alwani powerless in the face of conflicting 
religious advice: if ‘ordinary people can select the scholar whom they wish 
to follow and pick from the “common law” the reasons, terms and restrictions’ 
(Alwani 2003: xiv), how can the ulama counter the ‘sea of confusion’ in 
66 al-Nashmi argues that while there are clear preconditions for performing ijtihad and 
exercising religious authority, there is no evidence suggesting that one group cannot 
monopolise the interpretation of religious scriptures at any one point in time (al-Nashmi 
2005: 24 –5).
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which Muslims find themselves when confronted with ‘differences in opinion 
among jurists’ (Alwani 2003: 7)? If Alwani’s discussion suggests that contrary 
to Qaradawi, al-Nashmi and many of his peers within the ECFR, Alwani 
locates himself within the margins of the Islamic religious field, it also 
appears to highlight a more general perplexity regarding the intractability 
of the problem of authority in contemporary Islam.
V. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to provide an account of ongoing Muslim scholarly 
debates on the status of Muslim minorities living in the West. The vitality 
of the discussions notwithstanding, the terms of the debate on minority fiqh 
may appear in certain respects to be quite narrow. Advocates and opponents 
of fiqh al-aqalliyyat do not by and large seek to disrupt ‘the immanent rela-
tionship between normative particularism [fiqh] and social behaviour’ which 
is sometimes seen as one of the prime dimensions of functional pluralisation 
of Islamic knowledge (Mandaville 2007). In some ways it could be argued 
that they seek precisely to reaffirm this relationship. These Muslim voices 
nevertheless act in a social context where Islamic knowledge has been de facto 
resettled as one among various systems of authority, standing sometimes in 
open conflict, often in productive tension with each other. As a series of 
engagements with the Islamic legal tradition and with the reality of Muslims 
in the West, these transnational conversations are part of a wider global 
context marked by the proliferation of Islamic discourses on the ‘objectives 
of the law’ (maqasid al-sharia), ‘moderation’ (wasatiyya) and ‘renewal’ (tajdid ). 
They echo the increasingly insistent voices calling for the ‘integration’ of 
Muslims in the West. Like the discourse on ‘Islamic moderation’, minority 
fiqh emerges as an internal critique and as a civic response to the fear of 
Muslim radicalisation and ‘Islamic terrorism’ – a response which simultane-
ously lends credence to, and seeks to redirect, the European debates and 
policies on the integration of Muslims.67 The discourse seems furthermore 
to share with the wider integration debates in Europe a similar concern about 
the social consequences of religious interpretation. This concern is based upon a 
widespread ambivalence towards religion understood as the ‘causally effective 
clause’ (to borrow an expression from MacIntyre) of social action of people 
defined as ‘religious’ – in this case ‘Muslim’. It provides in this regard a 
prime example of how ‘the penetration of geopolitics into religious discourse 
67 Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani is the most explicit about the anti-terrorist import of fiqh al-
aqalliyyat: ‘The shattering events of September 11 have left everyone in a state of shock. 
Since then, Muslims and Americans have woken up to a new reality, the like of which 
has never been known before. Since then, the need has arisen, as never before, for a new 
fiqh dealing with the question of Muslim minorities in the West in particular’ (Alwani 
2003: xviii).
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impacts the politics of knowledge production’ in contemporary Islam 
(Mandaville 2007: 112). If the relative success of the minority fiqh construct 
lies in the possibility it gives to a range of Muslim actors to engage and 
re-shape debates about the integration of Islam in Europe, its limits are related 
to the reliance upon a discursive tradition – fiqh – which is increasingly 
contested by Muslim and non-Muslim voices alike.
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Chapter 10
Terror in the faculty lounge1
Addressing the politics of fear and  
the politics of difference in government 
security policies
K.E. Brown
I. Introduction
‘Two held in terror swoop on campus’
 (Press Association, 15 May 2008)
‘MGS seeks to unite all those Muslimahs2 who have a strong interest 
either in promoting or pursuing education. This can be in any capacity, 
from those wishing to enter university from A Level’s to adult learners 
wanting to go back to education  .  .  .  We believe that Muslim Sisters in the 
UK need to work together to achieve the standards of British Muslims’
 (Muslimah Graduate Society homepage 2008)
The aim of this chapter is to explore the dynamic relationship between two 
forms of politics in the UK: fear and difference. The way in which the 
politics of fear has co-opted the discourse of difference fundamentally under-
mines the development of multifaceted public identities, such as those based 
on religion. This debate is not just an issue of Islam within Britain, but also 
highlights the complex relationship in modern Britain between the citizen, 
human rights and the state. By way of example, the chapter addresses the 
securitisation of British universities and the challenges this presents to the 
development of civic-minded Muslim citizenship.
In contemporary British politics security dangers and fears are identified 
not so much as existential threats to the ‘life of the nation’ but as those which 
undermine the ‘British way of life’. The UK security agenda has moved away 
from a ‘military’ external threat to ‘homeland’, such as those faced during 
1 The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this chapter are those of 
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the UK Joint Services Command 
and Staff College, the UK MOD, or any other governmental agency.
2 ‘Muslimah’ is the feminine form in Arabic for Muslim, and is used here to denote that the 
focus in on Muslim women.
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the Second World War,3 towards an internal ‘enemy within’ which is perceived 
not to share ‘our’ values and customs. For example, Charles Clarke (MP) 
when introducing the 2006 Counter Terrorism Act said that:
The government is determined to do everything possible to protect our 
citizens from those who seek to destroy our society, way of life and our 
freedoms  .  .  .
 (Clarke 2006)
As a result of this security narrative, which also posits ‘new terrorism’ as 
motivated by extremist religious sentiments and carried out by a particular 
religious group targeting ‘liberal ways of life’, Afshar, Aitken and Franks 
argue that ordinary Muslims ‘stand accused of being a threat to the West 
and its national security and insufficiently committed to the politics and 
values of their host communities’ (2005: 262). This confirms a ‘new racism’ 
in Britain, ‘which reconstitutes the discourse of “the Asian” through a fore-
grounding of “the Muslim”: the latter having certain very particular pan-
European and global connections’ (Brah 1996: 169). Attention given to an 
emerging ‘green peril’ within and beyond UK borders has consequently 
provided the focus for a range of security policies covering ever more areas 
of social life (Ismail 2001; Ferguson 2004), including education. The shift 
in security policy matters and attendant rhetoric implicitly places ‘the blame’ 
for potential ‘support for extremist sentiments’ on multicultural policies in 
the past and on the sociological phenomena of multiculturalism. In February 
2008 David Cameron, then leader of the opposition party, argued that ‘we 
cannot continue with the multicultural apartheid’ caused through the 
preservation of cultural differences and played out in education policies 
(www.comservatives.com). In particular students on university campuses are 
seen as vulnerable to the ‘extremist message’ because they exist outside of 
the ‘common bonds’ of community and nation and are exposed to foreign 
radicalising influences (Glees in Taylor and Smithers 2005; House of Repre-
sentatives 2005). Such rhetoric prioritises ‘fear’ of the ‘cultural other’ in 
addressing security issues.
However, taking education as an example, such ‘apartheid’ may be more 
the consequence of poor implementation of multiculturalism and a failure 
to address the material conditions of minority groups than as a result of many 
cultures sharing educational and civic spaces. Research shows that across 
the education key stages Muslim children in Britain generally have lower 
levels of attainment than the national average, and lower levels than those of 
3 Concerns about the ‘defence’ of the homeland remain but are no longer policy priorities, 
and various civil contingency acts and military roles endeavour to ‘protect’. Please refer to 
Codner (2007).
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white and some other ethnic groups (Department for Education and Skills 
2006: 5). Detailed analyses of educational findings suggest that differences 
in achievement between various Muslim communities are linked to social class 
and length of stay in Britain (Department for Education and Skills 2003). 
In higher education, despite the differential acceptance rates between Muslims 
and whites with the same qualifications by British universities (40 per cent 
and 54 per cent) the proportion of Muslim children in higher education is 
slowly increasing (Anwar 2008). Stephen Twigg MP, in his forward to the 
Department for Education and Skills policy document, Aiming High: Raising 
the Achievement of Minority Ethnic Pupils (2003) argues that:
for these pupils [Black and Pakistani], the achievement gaps remain 
unacceptably wide. They make it harder for them to go on to university 
or to access good jobs. And they increase the chances that those who 
miss out will disengage not only from education, but wider society.
The implications are clear, for the liberal state ‘all children and young 
people should be able to achieve their potential’ so that they make a positive 
contribution to society as active citizens (Department for Education and 
Skills 2003: 4, 7). Thus the apartheid to which Cameron refers emerges not 
then because of the politics of multiculturalism, but as a structural failure 
to enable equal access to the ‘public sphere’. Policies and aspirations to 
improve access to the public sphere, although not always successful or far-
reaching enough, are characteristic of the UK approach to multiculturalism 
and what Modood (2003) terms the ‘politics of difference’.
In order to fully explore the relationship between these two forms of 
politics in the UK, of fear and difference, this chapter first outlines the rise 
of a religio-political identity among British Muslims as part of the ‘politics 
of difference’; in particular it notes the emergence of ‘British-Islam’, which 
places emphasis on pursuit of education and ‘active citizenship’. The paper 
then moves on to consider legal and policy changes to manage fear through 
the promotion of a secure British identity: in this context the current 
attempts by government to encourage British universities to ‘spy’ on Muslim 
students, and recent arrests of British students on terrorism-related offences 
are discussed. These two sections demonstrate an inherent contradiction in 
government policy towards a post-national and post-multicultural state and 
its attempts to manage fear. Specifically, it is argued that securitising the 
space of ‘the university’ runs counter to the effort to encourage pluralism 
and civic-minded Muslim citizenship.
II. The politics and policies of difference
Traditionally, the politics of difference asserts that minority groups have 
distinct cultures, experiences and perspectives which should be valued rather 
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than triumphed over (Smith and Stephenson 2005). As part of this process 
the recognition and incorporation of different identities in the civic realm is 
required to facilitate group representation necessary to overcome systematic 
oppression faced by minority groups within ‘the normal processes of everyday 
life’ (Young 1990: 41). For Modood (2003) this demonstrates that ‘equality’ 
encompasses public ethnicity, where difference is acknowledged in both the 
public and private spheres. Public difference from a dominant culture and 
access to the public sphere is therefore negotiated and built through consensus 
rather than suppressed. To facilitate this, UK multicultural practices have 
always been ‘laissez-faire’ and under New Labour, government ‘decentred’ 
with responsibility devolved to the ‘local’ level (Cesari 2004; Jopkke 2004). 
Jack Straw summarises New Labour’s approach towards multiculturalism in 
his championing of the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) where he 
concluded ‘full delivery of the Action Plan4 can only be a start on the road 
to delivering a truly multi-cultural Britain, not just free from the scourge 
of racism, but where diversity becomes a cornerstone of our modern society’ 
(BBC 2000). In the longer term, this vision encourages the uneven but 
ongoing transformation of political identities of minority groups in the 
UK, such that their ‘coloured’ migratory experience no longer defines them 
(Modood 2003).
Despite the aspirations of the ‘politics of difference’ the identity formation 
of migrant and minority communities in the UK has been marked by strug-
gles against oppression which deny materially and symbolically the legitimacy 
of their difference. Their oppression has been primarily organised around 
racism stemming from the legacy of colonialism in immigration policy and 
popular politics (Fekete 2004). Initially, ethnic minority communities were 
engaged in the struggle against racism through the promotion of Black-
ethnic identity. During the late 1970s and 1980s, acceptable difference to 
the dominant culture was re-negotiated to include ‘racial’ difference thereby 
allowing equal access to the public sphere and the state for ‘non-White’ 
citizens. This process is seen, for example, in the emergence of Race Relations 
Acts. However, this subsumed many differences under a ‘black’ identity, 
which was defined as the common experiences of oppression of non-whites. 
As a form of essentialism, it focused on the differences of groups from each 
other, and stressed the internal coherence of bounded groups of different 
‘others’. Consequently, this ‘black’ politics failed to incorporate adequately 
the layers and nuances of exclusion and identity among Britain’s ethnic 
minority populations. For example, the different patterns of migration and 
4 The Action Plan linked to the McPherson Report included ‘initiatives aimed at monitoring 
staff in the public services, and highlighted the new emphasis on racial awareness training 
and the review of the National Curriculum to foster diversity’ (Taylor 2000; Back et al. 
2002, p. 447).
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settlement between those emigrating from the Indian sub-continent and 
those from the Caribbean lead to different socio-economic vulnerabilities. 
Nor did it account for the variety of positions and activism adopted by dif-
ferent ethnic minority communities. In this sense it conflated the race riots 
in Brixton and Toxteth occurring in the 1980s with those protesting against 
Salman Rushdie in the 1990s (Glynn 2002).
However, in light of these failings, and following periods of self-identification, 
since the 1990s, recognition has been awarded through ‘politics of difference’ 
to a myriad of identities – some externally imposed, others self asserted – one 
of which is the increasing prominence of religious identities, including those 
based in Islam (Ranger 1996).5 The importance of faith-based identities 
and communities were recognised in the inclusion of a question on religious 
affiliation in the 2001 census of the UK: the first time such a question was 
included for over a hundred years. The results of this census showed that 1.6 
million individuals declared themselves to be Muslim, representing approxi-
mately 3 per cent of the population in Britain and Wales (National Statistics 
Office 2001). Indeed Muslim activists have campaigned for, and demanded, 
the inclusion of ‘Muslim’ identity – as opposed to ‘Asian’ identities – in 
politics for recognition and rights. Issues such as providing halal foods in 
schools, provision of prayer rooms in places of employment and protection 
from discrimination on the grounds of religion (as opposed to race) have 
entered into the public sphere. These issues are not ethnically ‘Asian’ – in 
that they do not affect Sikh or Hindu Asians in the same way.6 This trans-
formation of identity is further realised in the plethora of Muslim civic and 
civil society groups, such as the Muslim Parliament of Britain, An-nisa, the 
Islamic Society of Britain, the Young Muslim Society, Muslim Women’s 
Help-line, Islamic Human Rights Commission, various Shari’a Councils, 
Mosque associations and locally arranged women’s groups. The term ‘British-
Muslim’ has been coined to indicate the dual focus of the identities among 
this group. As one Bangladeshi Islamist in Birmingham argued:
A British identity is important and should be important for the Bang-
ladeshi youth. On the other hand if they neglect their Islamic identity, 
it will be like assimilation  .  .  .  But you can’t survive here in isolation; 
to live here you need to have both identities, British and Muslim.  .  .  .
 (cited in Eade and Garbin 2005: 15)
5 Other factors have also led to the emergences of religiously focused identities, such as the 
abandonment of the myth of return among migrant families, the Salman Rushdie affair, 
and the French banning of the hijab in schools (Asad 1990; Brown 2006).
6 This is further notable in the Sikhs, and Jews are protected under the race relations act 
whereas other faith-ethnic groups are not.
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This combined focus has been demonstrated in a number of polls conducted 
in the UK since 2002 (ICM 2005; Blick et al. 2006; Choudhury 2007). 
Importantly, this new identity is contingent upon developments in national 
multicultural politics; it is self-consciously articulated in the public sphere, 
but it does not necessarily coincide with increased piety among Muslims 
(Lewis 1994: 176 – 8; Samad 2004).
Furthermore, these public identities are contingent; negotiated within the 
local as well as global contexts of everyday lives, such that at times this 
‘Islamic’ identity and rights articulation is in conflict and tension with other 
positions held by groups and individuals. The census also revealed the 
differences within Muslim communities that resist homogenisation. The 
‘British Muslim’ label is a convenient umbrella term that masks a variety of 
other identity positions: ethnicity, class and gender. For example, approxi-
mately 42 per cent of all British Muslims have a Pakistani ethnic heritage 
(National Statistics Office 2004). ‘British Muslim’, as an identity position 
vis-à-vis the state and other communities, is not static or timeless: the ways 
in which this is understood both by the groups themselves and by others has 
altered with the context in which they are rooted. Thus in the ‘politics of 
difference’ the incorporation and recognition of identities in the civic realm 
is an ongoing process.
Tensions between different aspects of public identities are visible in the 
determination of some Muslim groups to separate culture from religion. For 
these groups, those aspects of a culture which are perceived as oppressive 
from a rights perspective are denounced as non-Islamic. For example, as the 
coordinator of the nationally organised Muslim Women’s Help Line (MWHL) 
said:
Culture is engrained, the migrants brought their culture, but failed to 
bring or forgot their religious obligations beyond rituals.
 (2004)
She continued:
The second generation are learning more, through Islamic societies 
(especially University based ones), and there is a change in thinking and 
a realisation of diversity. That they were only doing certain things because 
their parents did, not because it was Islamic.
 (2004)
As a result, traditions are changing, and culture is being redefined to include 
the customs and habits of Muslims from throughout the world. However, 
while managing the outside influences on the Muslim community, there are also 
attempts to portray/create a Muslim community which absorbs differences 
of race and ethnic heritage. Younger Muslims, it is argued, are attempting 
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to rejuvenate their religious obligations and disentangle culture from faith. 
They are attempting to preserve their religious identity and prioritise it over 
their ethnic-cultural heritage. A theme often repeated in interviews in an 
attempt to separate out culture and religion is the suggestion that things 
‘occur that are forbidden in Islam’. In an interview Tahmina Saleem of the 
Islamic Society of Britain (2004) argued that violations of women’s rights in 
Muslim communities ‘are reflections of culture, not of Islam’. As with other 
Muslim groups it was clear that she considered that when violations occur 
of women’s rights it is often because culture is confused with faith, because 
those perpetrators are not aware of the full range of rights afforded to women 
in Islamic jurisprudence (2004). For example, debates around women’s access 
to higher education and marriage are seen to be renegotiated through this 
framework. Merali of the Islamic Human Rights Council argues that this 
debate between culture and religion is part of the search for suitable ethical 
codes and self-management in the modern context (Merali 2004). It is not 
possible to discuss the successes or failures of this attempt to separate religion 
from culture in this chapter; however, this new management of faith and 
culture suggests the beginning of positions which may accommodate new 
forms of discourse, identity and rights (c.f. Brown 2006). This negotiation 
has led to what many scholars are labelling as ‘British Islam’ and indicates 
attempts to reconfigure the consensus which identifies acceptable difference 
in the public sphere.7
A. British Islam, rights, and women’s education
One way in which this management of faith and culture is occurring is in 
debates regarding the promotion of women’s education. Increasingly as part 
of ‘British Islam’ there is an emphasis on rights of education, including for 
women. Some of the non-governmental organisations espousing a ‘British-
Islam’ interviewed for this research found resistance among traditional rep-
resentatives of Islam and Muslim communities to their redefinitions of Islam, 
faith and women’s roles. For example the Muslimah Graduate Society said 
that some opposition was encountered to the idea of creating a female Muslim 
graduate society because ‘women shouldn’t be at university in the first place’ 
(Muslimah Graduate Society 2004). However, the interviewee felt that such 
attitudes were changing and a product of culture rather than religion, thereby 
making a distinction between traditional religious practices and ‘British-
Islam’. Furthermore, more commonly noted among the interviewees were 
Muslim women’s educational achievements and the rights afforded to them 
in Islam with regard to lifelong learning. For the editor of The Revival 
magazine, Sajid Iqbal (based in Manchester, this is a magazine which aims 
7 Although some prefer to identify this as part of a European-wide development – ‘Euro-
Islam’. Please refer to Nielsen (1999); Klausen (2008); Cesari (2004).
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to make Islam more relevant to young people), lifelong education was seen 
as both a right and a duty of all Muslims regardless of gender (2004). In 
nine of the ten interviews conducted among Muslim civil society groups a 
woman’s right to education was explicitly stated and located in religious 
texts. Thus educational attainment was a necessary requirement of religious 
fulfilment. Indeed the Muslimah Graduate Society understands its work to 
support Muslim women in their quest for education in this way; the section 
on their website ‘Women in Islam’ lists the number of ways in which rights 
and citizenship are implicit and explicit in the holy texts of Islam. Through 
their activities the organisation not only promotes ‘religious education’ but 
also provides careers guidance and a further education hardship fund.
The right to education is also considered as a protection against violations 
of rights in marriage. It was seen as a survival strategy in a modern economy 
where the family may not be able financially to support an estranged wife. 
As one woman aptly argued ‘A degree is a must, but not necessarily for a 
career but [sic] if you’ve studied then you could support yourself, just in 
case’ (thirty-three-year-old South Asian housewife 1999). She continued:
I’m educated, and I know I can get a job and support myself, so obviously 
I’m not bothered by it (leaving a marriage/domestic abuse)  .  .  .  I know 
I can cope on my own  .  .  .  But these women (wives from the Indian sub-
continent) because they are not educated, and they haven’t been to Euro-
pean countries or anywhere (before marriage), it’s totally different to 
them, so what do they do if they leave their husbands? They’ve no-one 
to turn to, their family are in Pakistan, and nobody tells them how they 
can get income support and things like  .  .  .  and here she can’t work or 
anything like that coz she’s not educated  .  .  .  they’re stuck with their 
husbands no matter what.
 (Thirty-three-year-old South Asian housewife 1999)
Thus education also provides British female Muslim citizens with the tools 
by which to guarantee and protect additional rights. Indeed, Afshar, Aitken 
and Franks argue that their British education, and the demands it makes of 
students to have enquiring minds, creates a new individualistic approach to 
identity, faith and belonging (2005: 268). This is a reciprocal relationship 
and according to Tariq Ramadan (2004), acquiring education is not simply 
placed as a religious duty, but being a ‘good Muslim’ also requires civic 
engagement, which demands knowledge of your political, social and physical 
environment. Engle and Ochoa (1988) argue that being a ‘democratic citizen’ 
means exercising independent judgement, where education cannot be limited 
to being socialised in unquestioning ways. Contrary to stereotypes about 
Islamic religious education, what was found in a number of interviews was 
an assertion of active research, with a questioning mind-set that challenged 
authority figures and sought practical application of knowledge. An example 
of this is found in the June 2008 ‘Urban Muslim Woman Event’, which 
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emphasises Muslim women’s agency and independence as citizens, and 
promotes their involvement in decision-making forums. Thus vernacular 
‘British-Islam’ requires participation in the politics of difference and enables 
them to participate freely in the public sphere.
However, a more contentious topic (than simply maintaining the right to 
education within Muslim communities) is the nature of that education and 
the setting in which it should take place. In the interviews I conducted, 
Islamic single-sex schools and the issue of Muslim girls’ school uniforms in 
state schools were commonly referred to as ways of fulfilling educational 
rights. The debate surrounding school uniform centres on the right (or 
otherwise) of young Muslim women to wear in schools a hijab and jilbab8, 
which are linked to issues of identity, citizenship and rights (Dwyer 2000). 
Throughout the research, the hijab debate has been ongoing, frequently 
igniting fears that the hijab and face veils might be banned in the UK, as 
in France (Al Jazeera 2010). On a BBC Panorama programme a number of 
Muslim women were interviewed on a variety of issues including the hijab. 
They implied that their right to wear the hijab at school enabled them to 
pursue their educational rights (White et al. 2004). Furthermore, decisions 
to restrict schoolgirls from wearing either the jilbab, niqab or hijab are seen 
as violations on rights to education: for example, the case of Shebina Begum, 
where the school objected to her decision to wear a jilbab, and she claimed 
interference with her right to manifest her religion and right to education 
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (Begum v Denbigh 
High School Governors, 2004; R (On the Application of Begum) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School [2006]). Although the House of Lords later 
held that it was not a violation of Article 9, the framing and discourse of this 
case demonstrates how central the ‘politics of difference’ is to the construction 
of Muslim women’s rights in the UK. In light of the Muslim Council of 
Britain’s report to Bernard Stassi on the French Government ban of the hijab 
in schools, the representative I interviewed argued that ‘The right to wear 
religious symbols links with the right to participate fully in civil society and 
the right to express your identity’ (Muslim Council of Britain 2003). In eight 
out of ten interviews conducted with UK-based non-governmental Muslim 
organisations about rights and citizenship, the hijab was referred to directly 
in relation to education. It appeared to function in two ways: firstly as a 
symbol of the right of Muslim women to express their religious identity in 
the public-political sphere; and secondly as a tool to access that sphere safely 
and legitimately (Muslim Council of Britain 2003; The Revival 2004; Qureshi 
2004). Thus while theological and traditional reasons remain in debates about 
the hijab, the contemporary framing of the hijab demonstrates how ‘British-
Islam’ is embedded in a political and civic culture.
8 A jilbab is a long loose-fitting overcoat.
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Nevertheless, the adoption of veiling practices by Muslim women in the 
UK is often perceived as a marker of difference which is often linked to 
debates about radicalisation.9 The perceived radicalisation of British Muslim 
university students, often personified/symbolised by students who wear Islamic 
dress, also draws on these debates. The decision by Imperial College London, 
on security grounds, to ban face veiling is symptomatic of this linkage (Garner 
2005). A year later the Higher Education Minister, Mr Bill Rammell, 
supported Imperial College’s decision stating that: ‘Muslim students were 
entitled to ask for tolerance and consideration but there were limits to what 
they could and should ask for’ (The Guardian 2006). Rammell places limits 
on the ‘politics of difference’ by claiming that Muslim students (and others) 
are ‘unreasonable’ in their expectations and demands vis-à-vis the liberal state 
(specifically here, in higher education institutions).
Thus, as the debates on hijab and access to higher education indicate, a 
form of identification among British Muslims emerges from the interaction 
with their socio-political environment and their religious beliefs. It particu-
larly emphasises rights which encourage engagement with the public sphere 
where difference is recognised (Tarlo 2007). It is therefore contingent and 
flourishes within the continued development of the ‘politics of difference’ 
found in multiculturalism. However, alongside this move towards a political 
agency based on Muslim identity have been rising fears of a ‘fifth column’, 
which has thrown British multiculturalism into disarray. The perception of 
a ‘multi-cultural’ Trojan horse is reinforced by a political environment which 
prioritises the duty of government to ‘protect’ citizens (Modood 2003; Sparks 
2003).
III. The politics and policies of fear
The politics of fear attempts to manage or eradicate threats to the state, and 
focuses on eradicating both existential threats to the nation and those which 
threaten the ‘British way of life’ via counter-terrorism discourses (Sparks 
2003). Thus ‘danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that 
exists independent of those to whom it may become a threat’ (Campbell 
1998: 1–2). The articulation of danger relies on threats being represented in 
terms that are vilified by a community not simply stating existential threats 
to the territorial state (Campbell 1998). In the UK case, dangers which are 
perceived to stem from ‘radical Islam’ are often granted such characteristics, 
because ‘radical Islam’ is understood to be antithetical to the ‘liberal way of 
life’. The 2007 Building on Progress policy review makes this linkage clear: 
support for extremist sentiments and parties indicates support for values and 
9 The comments of Jack Straw MP regarding veiling as a ‘visible statement of separation 
and of difference’ provoked some outcry (BBC 2006b).
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social norms that are counter to those that should be at the core of a modern 
British identity (Cabinet Office 2007: 89).
Thus, while most security-orientated legislation and policing activity focus 
on the criminal activities of terrorists, other security aspects focus on issues 
of identity and multiculturalism. For example, ‘home-grown’ suspected 
terrorists are seen to lack a strong link to ‘British identity’ and are apart 
from the commonalities that ‘bind citizens together’ (Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment 2007). These absences are seen to make the carrying out of terrorist 
activity conceivable for the individuals involved (The Home Affairs Com-
mittee report Terrorism and Community Relations 2005: 52). One soft measure 
to counter this can be seen in the re-justifying of citizenship classes, which, 
whether occurring in schools or mosques, are now explicitly linked to counter-
terrorism rather than seen as a measure to increase young adults’ participation 
in civil society or to curb anti-social behaviour.
Current counter-terrorism measures have taken new forms to meet the 
changing needs of the post 9-11 and 7-7 security environment and are brought 
together in the Government’s strategy: CONTEST. CONTEST contains four 
key elements: pursue, protect, prevent, prepare. Although these have existed 
since 2003, they are reiterated in the UK 2006 strategy for Countering Inter-
national Terrorism (Her Majesty’s Government 2006). These strands aim to 
tackle radicalisation of individuals, lessen the terrorist threat by disrupting 
terrorists’ activities, reduce vulnerability of the public and key national 
services, and ensure that the UK is ‘as ready as it can be’ for the consequences 
of a terrorist attack (Her Majesty’s Government 2006: 1–2). A fifth component 
concerning community cohesion and resilience is also envisaged in Preventing 
Extremism Together and recent publications on ‘winning hearts and minds’ 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2005, 2007). This 
combination of elements ensures that many areas of socio-political life are 
incorporated within the remit of counter-terrorism, including legislation, 
policing and citizenship.
For the eradication of fear to be efficient in this framework, new legislation 
has been introduced. Justifications for changes in law are based on demon-
strations that there is an immediate danger to ‘the public’ posed by a ‘real’ 
and ‘serious’ threat. The most significant change to the law is the anti- 
terrorist legislation put forward by the government in 2001 and 2006. The 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 extends provisions of 
earlier laws by removing spatial and temporal restrictions on police counter-
terrorism powers. It provides for the detention, pending deportation, of foreign 
nationals suspected of being terrorists; increases powers of arrest in certain 
areas; and protects critical national infrastructure. The Terrorism Act 2006 
provides further consolidation by creating a number of new criminal offences, 
primarily relating to the preparation, encouragement and dissemination of 
publications pertaining to terrorism and related training offences. Charles 
Clarke, who was Home Secretary in 2006, said of the 2006 Act that:
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The Government is determined to do everything possible to protect our 
citizens from those who seek to destroy our society, way of life and our 
freedoms  .  .  .  These new measures will give our law enforcement agencies 
the additional powers they need to help prevent terrorism and prosecute 
terrorists.
 (Clarke 2006)
In this announcement key elements of security strategy are brought together: 
prevention, protection and prosecution. Charles Clarke also makes the clear 
distinction between ‘our citizens’ and ‘terrorists’. (This distinction is discussed 
in more detail later.) Evidence of the success of this legislation is cited by 
reference to ‘the hundred plus individuals waiting trial for terrorism related 
offences’ (Clarke 2007). However, perceived failures led to demands for new 
legislation in the autumn of 2007 to improve the effectiveness of ‘control 
orders’, and to extend the detention of suspects without trial above the current 
limit (Branigan 2007).10
This legislation has two main effects: first it criminalises Muslim com-
munities, and second it de-politicises the threat. Crime, deviancy and crim-
inality have been securitised. While the definition of terrorism has expanded, 
encompassing ‘serious disruption’, the definition of a terrorist has narrowed 
to simply that of a criminal (Gearty 2005).11 When this new legislation is 
combined with a wider moral concern (even moral panic) it helps creates the 
persona of the ‘Islamic radical-criminal’, who is not countenanced as ‘British’ 
(Campbell 1998). The Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, stated this directly:
Let us be clear – terrorists are criminals, whose victims come from all 
walks of life, communities and religious backgrounds. Terrorists attack 
the values that are shared by all law-abiding citizens.
 (2007)12
10 The indefinite detention without trial of suspects – as outlined in the 2001 Act – was 
deemed unlawful by the courts. New methods of controlling ‘suspect’ terrorists who cannot 
be prosecuted in the courts have been put in place known as ‘Control Orders’ (BBC 2005).
11 Including a wider range of criminal ‘protest’ activities – Animal Rights Activists are now 
labelled as ‘terrorists’ for example (Home Office and Northern Ireland Office 1998 para 
3.17). See also, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s.21(1), and Walker (2002: 
20 –30).
12 It is also worth noting that the respected Islamic Scholar, the late Shykh al-Azhar Jad 
al-Haqq, ‘Ali Jad al-Haqq’ of Al-Azhar University, Cairo largely agrees. In 1995 he argued 
that ‘those who [commit violence] are not Islamists and do not represent Islam. They are 
criminals who must be punished. Every individual who challenges public order and the 
State’s authority and power must be punished. Such an individual is not an Islamist at 
all. Those who make mischief in the land are the enemies of God and his prophet [pbh]’ 
in Al-Jumhuriyah 23 February 1995 p. 2. This is Egypt’s main newspaper. Also at: www.
algomhuria.net.eg/algomhuria/today/fpage
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The framing of terrorism as an attack on values is important in the under-
standing of the new threat. Terrorist activity is now understood as a conse-
quence of irrational, unbounded and non-negotiable [religious] ideology as 
opposed to tangible discrete ‘political causes’ (Ruby 2002; Wiktorowicz 
2005). The 2007 Building on Progress policy review argues that the current 
threat is ‘from those who seek to cause the death and destruction in the name 
of a perversion of the faith of Islam’ (Cabinet Office 2007: 8). Tony Blair 
also argued that extremism was not caused by ‘flawed’ multiculturalism but 
‘in the name of an ideology alien to everything this country stands for’ (Blair 
2006b).
However, the government is keen to stress that this is not a ‘war against 
Islam’; rather the government asserts that certain ‘perverted’ or ‘radical’ forms 
of Islam may encourage terrorist activity. Jackson argues that it is typically 
asserted that ‘Islamic terrorism’ is motivated largely by religious or ‘sacred 
causes’ which helps build the ‘widely accepted “knowledge” that certain forms 
of Islam are by nature violent and terroristic’ (2007: 405). The Muslim 
Council of Britain fears that, as a result, there is a pending criminalisation 
of orthodoxy (2004). Such depictions of ‘radical as terrorist’ Islam denies the 
multiple ways in which Islam is lived and believed, and prioritises particular 
understandings of faith over others. As a result, there are ‘Good Muslims’ 
and ‘Bad Muslims’; ‘Good Imams’ and ‘Bad Imams’; and so on (Birt 2006). 
The ‘Bad Muslim’ is a radicalised male and is said to represent one per cent 
of all British Muslims (Saggar 2006). However, although this distinction 
suggests a degree of subtlety on the part of policy makers, nevertheless the 
overall impression is that there is something within ‘Islam’ that makes it 
uniquely prone to being used as a justification for violence. Overall, terrorist 
threats are seen to reside with those who adhere to the Islamic faith because 
they always remain susceptible to the ‘terrorist’ message. The media too 
reflects this characterisation, for example as The Daily Telegraph published, 
‘it is the black heart of Islam, not its black face, to which millions object’ 
and ‘all Muslims, like all dogs, share certain characteristics’ (Will Cummins 
2004a, 2004b). The changes in legislation and framing of the security threat 
make this demonisation tolerated where it would not be for other groups 
(Islamic Human Rights Commission 2006: 56).
As a result, contemporary terrorist threats are seen to lack any possibility 
of ‘explanation or mitigating circumstance, and [is] isolate[ed] as well, from 
representations of most other dysfunctions, symptoms and maladies of the 
contemporary world’ (Said 1988: 47). Understanding terrorism in this way 
established a need to reinforce the values which terrorism seeks to undermine. 
This can be seen in the new legislation to deal with the dissemination of 
material which might support or glorify terrorist activity. Counter-balancing 
this affirmation of the liberal state values is a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy 
aimed at preventing (Islamic) radicalisation which is seen as the first step on 
the way towards supporting terrorism (Department for Communities and 
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Local Government 2005, 2007; Kelly 2007). Consequently the ‘eradication’ 
of fear becomes forcefully linked to issues of identity and citizenship.
A. Citizenship, identity and education
The above mechanisms indicate how CONTEST is implemented and incor-
porated into a new judicial framework. However, the first major report from 
the Home Affairs Committee, asserted that the strategy should be ‘more than 
a set of police and judicial powers: it must be part of an explicit broader 
anti-terrorism strategy’ (2005: 3). This is to be achieved by overcoming 
experiences of isolation and developing a vision of ‘British identity’ (Home 
Affairs Committee 2005) in three ways: reiterating the international element 
of terrorism; highlighting that terrorism is partly a problem of controlling 
foreigners; asserting that terrorists are not genuine citizens (Wolfendale 2006; 
Bulley 2008) and establishing ways of linking citizenship to identity as a 
counter-point to extremism and radicalisation.
Debates in the Houses of Parliament indicate that early on, terrorism was 
seen to relate to non-citizens, for example David Blunkett stated:
I think that we all accept that there is a compelling need for more effective 
powers to exclude and remove suspected terrorists from our country. We 
rightly pride ourselves on the safe-haven that we offer to those genuinely 
fleeing terror. But our moral obligation and love of freedom does not 
extend to offering hospitality to terrorists.
 (2001)
Implicit in this is an assumption that government and security services 
are dealing with international terrorism, and therefore the terrorists are 
foreign.13
However, although the origins of the Islamic-terrorist threat are conceived 
of as lying outside of the UK, through processes of globalisation the ‘Islamist 
world’ is also seen as residing within state borders. This is epitomised by 
the phrase Londonistan (Philips 2006; Jackson 2007; Le Figaro 2007). The 
attacks on London in July 2005 by UK nationals destabilised the division 
between ‘our citizens’ and terrorists. The threat has become internalised, 
seen as emanating from deviant (Islamic) groups operating within tolerant 
democratic societies and not only from Muslim-majority states (Adamson 
and Grossman 2004). The unsettling [nature?] of the discursive link between 
foreign[er?] and terrorist, leads to a focus on citizenship embedded in a 
13 This is not dissimilar to events in Germany, where in 2002 the leader of the Christian 
Democrats made a pledge during election campaigning to expel ‘4,000 Islamic funda-
mentalists’ from the country (Hooper 2002).
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‘British identity’. One participant at the Listening to Muslim Women event in 
Manchester said, referring to those July 2005 bombings:
If we see what happened in the UK this summer, they were British-born. 
How can someone brainwash them? Because they feel isolated, they don’t 
feel they belong to Iraq or Pakistan or wherever their parents were from 
and don’t feel British either.
 (Raz 2006: 41)
This question of identity was explicitly raised in the Home Affairs Committee 
report Terrorism and Community Relations, which dedicated an entire section 
to the issue. It concluded that ‘questions of identity may be inextricably 
linked with the reasons which may lead to a small number of well-educated 
and apparently integrated young British people to turn to terrorism’ (2005: 52). 
David Blunkett argued, ‘it is religious extremism which forces them to choose, 
separating them from their citizenship and demanding the impossible’ (2003). 
Those who commit acts of terrorism, and those associated with them, are 
rhetorically stripped of their British citizenship because these acts demonstrate 
that they did not identify with the ‘commonalities that bind citizens’ together 
(Her Majesty’s Government 2007).
In an attempt to strengthen the ‘commonalities that bind’, the government 
has implemented ‘hearts and minds’ and ‘community cohesion’ policies in 
order to articulate ‘Britishness’ as part of the counter-terrorism strategy 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2005, 2007). The 
terms of reference for anti-terrorist activities have broadened to incorporate 
this new element, focusing now on counter-radicalisation (The Security Service 
2006). So, the 2007 policy review states that:
Terrorism itself may not be prevented by increased [community] cohesion, 
but lack of cohesion is considered to be a significant factor behind com-
munities allowing extremist feelings to go unchallenged and for not 
condemning extremist views. Support for extremist sentiments and parties 
indicates support for values and social norms that are counter to those 
that should be at the core of a modern British identity.
 (Cabinet Office 2007: 89)
The multicultural model premised on a ‘politics of difference’ is now seen to 
have significant problems, namely minimal cultural contact between distinct 
different communities and conflict over material resources ( Jopkke 2004; 
McGhee 2005). This ‘weak integration’, emerging from old multicultural 
polices, is said to lead to radicalisation and increased security threats in the 
form of ‘home-grown’ terrorism; this can be overcome through developing a 
‘meta-community’. Thus a new ‘politics of difference’ occurs, through emphasis-
ing the need for communities to be drawn together by a ‘meta-community’ 
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united by ‘civic renewal’ and ‘civic integration’ to increase a sense of ‘nation-
hood’ (Cantle 2001, 2006; Joppke 2004). These common bonds based on 
a ‘civic integration’ agenda are premised on ‘liberal’ democratic principles 
and procedures, such that the ‘liberal way of life’ or ‘British way of life’ 
is prioritised and overcoming particular traditions and practices of ‘other’ 
different groups.
Tony Blair’s speeches towards the end of his premiership insisting on a ‘more 
hard-line’ stance towards Muslim communities also reflects this troubling 
of British Muslim citizenship and identities formed under the ‘politics of 
difference’ (2006a; BBC 2006a; The Scotsman 2006). Muslim communities 
are held responsible for tackling signs of difference and non-cohesiveness 
(BBC 2006b; BBC 2006a), a requirement articulated by Denis MacShane, 
MP for Rotherham, who demanded that Muslims must choose ‘the British 
way’ or the ‘way of terrorists’ (2006).14 The special duty of Muslims to detect 
terrorists is emphasised because it is believed that:
This new generation of terrorists is more discreet than its predecessors. 
They no longer gather at Mosques, where clerics rant against Western 
governments, or congregate with known militants. Instead they prefer 
to set up their own youth clubs, using back rooms in parents’ houses to 
devise their schemes.
 (McGrory 2006)
More recently, universities have been identified as spaces where this ‘new 
generation’ of Muslims gather. This has resulted in Ministerial requests that 
academics ‘spy’ on Muslim students at British universities. Since April 2005 
the issue of ‘radicalism’ on university campuses has emerged on an annual 
basis. In April 2005 Claude Moniquet15 testified to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the US House of Representatives, claiming that the 
expansion of radical Islam in Europe was helped by the presence of refugees 
in universities who fled their native country ‘because of repression for their 
Islamist activities’. He continued ‘in Universities we find cells of Islamist of 
terrorist movements such as the Muslim Brothers, Hezbollah or Hamas, 
Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian or Turkish groups etc  .  .  .’ (Moniquet 2005: 35). 
In July 2005 the Higher Education Minster, Mr Rammell, told university 
vice-chancellors that there would ‘have to be a debate’ about the role 
universities will play in confronting the ‘evil ideology’ that brought about 
the London bombings (Curtis 2005). At this time there were also reports 
14 This is not the first time Denis MacShane MP has made such claims: in 2003 he demanded 
that it is ‘time for the elected and community leaders of British Muslims to make a choice’ 
between being British or Muslim’ (The Guardian 2003).
15 Claude Moniquet is the Director General of European Strategic Intelligence and Security 
Centre – a think-tank based in Brussels.
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that ‘security services’ had ‘barred more than 200 foreign students from the 
UK’ since 2001 ‘amid fear they could present a security threat’ (Curtis 2005). 
By September 2005, the Education Secretary demanded a ‘clamp down on 
student extremists’ (Taylor and Smithers 2005). A report by Professor Glees 
of Brunel University argued that ‘It is in this environment [university] that 
these groups can flourish without being detected’ (cited in Taylor and Smithers 
2005). In April 2006 Hizb-ut-Tahrir’ members re-ignited the debate by 
protesting that the group was falsely accused of being a terrorist group. 
Their actions were part of a campaign to have them removed from the NUS 
‘no-platform’ list but was reported as primarily about rising ‘radicalisation’ 
on British campuses. In reporting by The Guardian attempts were made to 
show how support for Hizb-ut-tahrir was widespread among Muslim students 
and their representative organisations (Federation of Student Islamic Societies; 
FOSIS) (Lewis 2006). FOSIS responded to The Guardian article by arguing 
that although many Muslim students disagreed with Hizb-ut-tahrir they 
supported its right to free speech and to exist. And, further, that such sup-
port did not demonstrate that FOSIS or other Muslim students are ‘influenced 
by a hardcore of extremists’ or that this ‘represents a new and dangerous 
flirtation with radicalism’ as The Guardian article suggested (Kahn 2006). 
By October that year, ‘radicalisation’ of students was once again reported as 
a ‘growing problem at some UK universities’ (Gardner 2006). This time 
‘Muslim sources’ claimed that ‘on certain campuses radical Islamist groups 
have secretly been recruiting new members, preying on those they regard as 
vulnerable’ (Gardner 2006). London Metropolitan University’s appointment 
of a ‘respected moderate Imam’ to ‘tackle the problem’ was seen as one of 
the ways in which universities are responding to public fears (Gardner 2006). 
However, this was not seen as sufficient, and later that month The Guardian 
gained access to a draft document by the Department for Education which 
announced that it would be providing universities with information about 
how to inform ‘special branch’ about suspicious activities of students of ‘Asian 
appearance’ (Dodd 2006). Ruth Kelly asserted that academic staff were not 
being asked to ‘spy’ but rather to monitor their students (Taylor et al. 2006; 
BBC 2006c). The document was released the following month, which aimed 
to give ‘practical guidance’ about tackling the promotion of ‘extremism in 
the name of Islam’. The document asks academic staff to ‘become more 
vigilant and take preventative action to tackle violent extremism’ (BBC 
2006d). It was not until July 2007 that the issue re-emerged when five 
British Muslim students were jailed for downloading and sharing ‘extremist 
material’. The reporting was framed by the constant reference to their ‘student’ 
status (they were at Bradford University) (BBC 2007). With the new academic 
year, fears of ‘radicalism’ on campuses emerged in October 2007, when the 
Prime Minister announced he would update guidance to universities regarding 
extremism and affirmed the government view that they had a significant role 
to play in combating terrorism (Lipsett 2007). Jonathan Evans, head of the 
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UK domestic spy agency MI5, warned in November 2007 that there is evidence 
that extremists are grooming children and teenagers for attacks against Britain 
(Stringer 2008). In January 2008 the government reissued the advice it gives 
universities, this time confirming that although ‘there is no single profile’ 
‘they are likely to be young – generally younger than 30 – and male, although 
the number of women who support and participate in violent extremism is 
increasing’ (BBC 2008a). And in February 2008, the five students convicted 
of terrorism offences the year before were released after a Court of Appeal 
decision, much to the disdain of politicians and the media. The Appeal court 
decision means that the prosecution team now has to demonstrate that the 
material was intended for terrorist use (The Times 2008). The Islamic Human 
Rights Commission said it hoped that the Appeal Court’s judgement would 
stop the ‘criminalisation of Muslim youth for downloading and reading 
material that is widely available to everyone’ (BBC 2008b).16
This three-year concern with the perceived threat of radicalisation on British 
campuses and the responses by Islamic groups, university unions and other 
university representatives confirms inherent limitations in this policy.17 The 
guidance by the government re-affirms trends away from the ‘politics of 
difference’ towards the ‘politics of fear’. As universities respond to fears of 
‘radicalisation’ on campus, Muslim community reactions are as yet unreported. 
Nevertheless, the niqab ban by Imperial College London and the promotion 
of a culture of ‘monitoring’ students is unlikely to encourage young Muslim 
(women) into higher education. Matthew Boulton College has also banned 
‘religious student groups’ (Kahn 2006), thereby making what Werbner (2007) 
refers to as ‘ethnic empowerment’ virtually impossible, as this relies on 
‘autonomous ethnic spaces’ that are now banned. Making universities ‘unsafe’ 
spaces for Muslim women, by subjecting Muslim women to the increased 
‘gaze’ of security services and staff and by preventing them from observing 
religious dress, is likely to hinder their attempts to convince families and 
16 This has not been the case as, in May 2008, a university student and member of staff 
were arrested for downloading an edited version of Al-Qaeda’s training manual from the 
US government website (Newman 2008). A spokesman for Nottingham University stated 
that: ‘There was no reasonable rationale for this person to have that information  .  .  .  The 
police were called in on the basis of reasonable anxiety and concern’ (cited in Newman 
2008). He added that the edited version of the al-Qaeda handbook was ‘not legitimate 
research material’ in the university’s view (cited in Newman 2008).
17 It is now in fact a five-year concern. The issue re-emerged following UCL graduate and 
former FOSIS president Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab arrest in the US, Christmas Day 
2009, for attempting to blow up an aeroplane. This led to the Centre for Social Cohesion 
to report that “British university campuses are breeding grounds of Islamic extremism” 
(2010 p.v; see also Quilliam Foundation 2010). In 2010, recently graduated Roshonara 
Choudry, re-ignited the issue of radicalisation among university students, as ‘despite’ her 
first-class academic career, she attempted to stab to death an MP because he voted in 
favour of the war in Iraq (Reisz 2011).
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communities of the appropriateness of higher education. As a result, attempts 
to reinforce the commonalities that bind, and the eradication of ‘material’ 
factors which hinder integration, such as through the promotion of higher 
education, are unlikely to succeed given the focus on the purging of danger 
in these security policies aimed at universities.
The focus on universities as sites of fear, and sites of recruitment to rad-
icalisation, is one indicator of the broader trend of securitisation (Wæver 
1995). Religion has become the over-arching frame and narrative in which 
Muslim communities in the UK has come to be viewed. In the securitised 
context, such an association of religion with danger generally, problematises the 
development of Muslim identities in the UK. In the process of securitisation, 
a Muslim student’s identity and politics become reduced to a homogenising 
radicalised position, rather than being recognised as diverse and multifaceted. 
Thus the symbolic ways in which the ‘meta-community’ and ‘civic integration’ 
and the commonality of ‘nationhood’ are being articulated in security policy 
and institutionalised in practice, risks disenfranchising Muslim citizens.
IV. Conclusion
It is argued in this paper that the growing securitisation of Muslim students, 
and university campuses, implies that Islam is perceived as a threat to the 
‘British way of life’ and the liberal state. In attempts to protect liberal 
democratic principles and procedures the government has identified a need 
to ‘revitalise’ citizenship based on the ‘commonalities that bind’ numerous 
communities into a ‘meta-community’. However, the fundamental issue with 
the attempts to create such a ‘meta-community’ is the ‘symbolic’ terms on 
which commonality is created and institutionalised. Muslims are effectively 
locked out of this through the foregrounding of such initiatives in the pol-
itics of fear. In this sense, it is not so much the politics of difference as the 
fundamental problem of definition of the point of commonality that allows 
difference.18 This foregrounding has led to an emphasis on the ethnic and 
religious minorities’ cultural differences in the creation of the meta-community, 
and specifically a need for government to ‘reach out’ to minority youth and 
women and to eradicate ‘radicalisation’ in dangerous spaces – such as mosques 
and universities (McGhee 2005; Brown 2008). However, although acknow-
ledging the importance of identity and citizenship in soft measures, the 
implementation of ‘harder’ security policies makes it increasingly difficult 
for some citizens to achieve the minimum liberal standards demanded through 
the ‘squeezing’ of public space (Adamson and Grossman 2004). In this chapter, 
policies promoting universities’ surveillance of their Muslim students have 
18 I would like to thank Dr Adam Geary for highlighting this point.
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been examined as indicative of this squeezing effect. Furthermore, this squeezing 
of the public space runs contrary to multicultural policies premised on ‘equal 
opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual 
tolerance’ (Roy Jenkins 1966 cited in Back et al. 2002). Consequently, such 
attention on ‘unsafe spaces’ has the potential to undermine efforts by Muslims 
living in the UK to engage as ‘active citizens’ and to create a vernacular 
Islam that promotes ‘civic integration’ and education. As Amnesty Inter-
national argues:
For many years the UK authorities have been undermining human rights, 
the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in the name of 
combating terrorism. They have persecuted people labelled a “threat to 
national security”.
 (2006)
The focus on an uncontrolled and unsurveyed Muslim student body functions 
within this security discourse as a way of delegitimising the ‘politics of dif-
ference’. In this debate recurring imagery is apparent in the construction of 
danger and the way it is used to justify new security policies to the detriment 
of policies aimed at promoting the ‘politics of difference’.
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